Rewrite audit-ready briefing: software is not a certificate.

Open with an executive summary that HIPAA, SOC 2, and ISO 27001
are organizational programs. Verae DataCubes supply store,
communicate, timestamp, verify, and audit tools for the technical
portion only. Chapters cover transit (HPKE, visible routing), rest
(IPFS/Peergos hash-verified restore), receipts, EU Peergos
evaluations (Cure53 2019, ROS 2024), cross-blockchain timestamping,
and write-once Iceberg archive. PDF is branded with the Verae logo
top-left and Verae Inc contact in the footer; last chapters are
sourced bios for Garfinkel (FINRA CRD 5052743), Haber, and Lambert.

source/architecture.rst

@@ -1,43 +1,126 @@
-Architecture (audit interview)
-==============================
+Architecture for an audit interview
+===================================
+
+The picture
+-----------
 
 ::
 
-   Endpoint (keys stay here / HSM)
-       │  HPKE content (NPE suite)
-       │  routing: dest + subject in the clear
-       ▼
-   Untrusted NATS (cannot read bodies)
-       │
-       ▼
-   Verae DataCube chain (append-only hashes)
-       │  written through Peergos client
-       ▼
-   Peergos cryptree (encrypted names, sizes, graph)
-       │  chunks → CID / hash
-       ▼
-   IPFS  (distributed, hash-verified ciphertext)
+   Endpoint (private keys stay here / HSM)
+       |  HPKE content (point-to-point)
+       |  routing: destination + subject in the clear
+       v
+   Untrusted message fabric (honest-but-curious)
+       |  cannot read bodies; can see dest / subject / size
+       v
+   Organizational DataCube
+       |  append-only cube chain (prev + new + diff)
+       |  private metadata, attachments, internal chain
+       v
+   Peergos cryptree  (encrypted names, sizes, graph)
+       |  chunks -> CID / hash, hashes verified
+       v
+   IPFS  (distributed, content-addressed ciphertext)
+       |
+       +-- Verae timestamping
+       |      fingerprint only -> receipt (time + sequence)
+       |      org server linked to central Verae, or direct sync
+       |
+       +-- Iceberg write-once archive
+              snapshot of cube CIDs, not under single-party delete
 
-* **At rest:** Peergos cryptree + IPFS. Hosts with disk/backup see
-  **opaque hashed ciphertext**, not PHI, if they lack keys.
-* **In transit (NATS):** HPKE-Base to directory public keys. Broker is
-  honest-but-curious: destinations yes, bodies no.
-* **Integrity:** cube JSONL chain + dual hash + IPFS CID check on
-  restore (re-fetch blocks, re-verify hashes — not a plaintext tape).
+Walkthrough, in the order an examiner usually asks
+--------------------------------------------------
 
-NATS remains an untrusted router. Production E2E is NPE/HPKE.
-Passthrough means destination in the clear; the body is ciphertext.
+**Where are the keys?** On the endpoint or in the customer's
+HSM. Not on the storage host. Not in the public-key
+directory (that directory holds public keys only). Not in
+the NATS payload.
+
+**What does the network see?** Destination, subject, size,
+timing. Not the body. Production algorithm is HPKE, not a
+lab construction.
+
+**What does the disk see?** Padded encrypted chunks under
+random labels. Peergos verifies hashes. A restore re-fetches
+CIDs and re-checks them.
+
+**How do you prove when it existed?** A hash is registered
+the first time it is seen. A receipt binds hash, time, and
+sequence. The organizational chain and the central Verae
+chain cross-verify. Verae is not given the object, only the
+fingerprint.
+
+**How do you stop delete?** Live cubes replicate as hashed
+ciphertext. Committed snapshots go to an external Iceberg
+write-once tier that is specified to sit outside any one
+party's delete control.
+
+**How do you know the software was not quietly reconfigured?**
+Configuration is Ed25519-signed. Unsigned files are
+rejected. Admin-history records previous state, new state,
+and a diff.
+
+**How do you inspect without turning inspect into a leak?**
+k-of-n officers. The author of a change is not an officer
+on that change. Log-before-reveal.
+
+Identity planes
+---------------
+
+There are two login planes, and they must not be collapsed
+in an interview:
+
+* **Drive / Peergos identity** --- unwraps cubes. This is
+  the cryptographic identity.
+* **Console identity** --- TOTP (RFC 6238), session cookie,
+  admin actions. Google SSO, if present, does **not** unwrap
+  cubes.
+
+Mixing those planes is how "we have SSO" becomes "SSO is
+the master key." It is not.
+
+NATS remains untrusted
+----------------------
+
+The reference message fabric is NATS. It is an
+honest-but-curious broker. Destinations in the clear are
+**passthrough**, not a bug. Bodies are ciphertext, or the
+message is rejected. Error responses carry codes and lookup
+identifiers, not payloads.
+
+A public-edge NATS listener, if enabled, is token-gated and
+is not the same socket the internal services use.
+
+What to hand the examiner
+-------------------------
+
+* this document (HTML or PDF);
+* the two public Peergos reports, labeled as component
+  evaluations;
+* a data-flow diagram of *this* instance;
+* the public-key listing (public keys only);
+* a restore-test ticket;
+* an admin-history excerpt for a dated change;
+* the organization's policies, not Verae's.
 
 .. only:: html
 
-   Live: https://pfc.georgelambert.org/v1/npe/keys (public keys only).
-   Controls: https://docs.pfc.georgelambert.org/controls.html
+   Live technical surfaces (reference instance):
+
+   * https://pfc.georgelambert.org/health
+   * https://pfc.georgelambert.org/v1/npe/keys
+   * https://docs.pfc.georgelambert.org/controls.html
 
 .. only:: latex
 
-   See companion ``peergos-for-compliance.pdf`` (same folder) for
-   controls, custody, and variables chapters.
+   Companion PDFs, same folder as this file (relative PDF
+   hrefs, not Markdown):
 
    .. raw:: latex
 
-      \href{peergos-for-compliance.pdf}{peergos-for-compliance.pdf}
+      \begin{itemize}
+      \item \href{peergos-for-compliance.pdf}{peergos-for-compliance.pdf}
+      \item \href{nats-service-endpoints.pdf}{nats-service-endpoints.pdf}
+      \item \href{secure-messaging.pdf}{secure-messaging.pdf}
+      \end{itemize}