Rewrite audit-ready briefing: software is not a certificate.

Open with an executive summary that HIPAA, SOC 2, and ISO 27001
are organizational programs. Verae DataCubes supply store,
communicate, timestamp, verify, and audit tools for the technical
portion only. Chapters cover transit (HPKE, visible routing), rest
(IPFS/Peergos hash-verified restore), receipts, EU Peergos
evaluations (Cure53 2019, ROS 2024), cross-blockchain timestamping,
and write-once Iceberg archive. PDF is branded with the Verae logo
top-left and Verae Inc contact in the footer; last chapters are
sourced bios for Garfinkel (FINRA CRD 5052743), Haber, and Lambert.

source/baa-dpa.rst

@@ -1,76 +1,104 @@
-BAAs and DPAs when ciphertext has no host keys
-==============================================
+BAAs, DPAs, and ciphertext without host keys
+============================================
 
-This is **guidance for an evidence pack**, not legal advice.
+This chapter is **guidance for an evidence pack**. It is not
+legal advice. Counsel has to sign the actual determination.
 
-The operator statement
-----------------------
+The technical fact
+------------------
 
-Data at rest lives in the **encrypted Peergos cryptree**. Restore uses
-**distributed, hash-verified, encrypted IPFS blocks**. Hosts and backup
-media see **opaque blobs** (and random CHAMP labels), not filenames, not
-PHI, not social graph — if keys never leave the client / customer HSM.
+Data at rest lives in the **encrypted Peergos cryptree**.
+Restore uses **distributed, hash-verified, encrypted IPFS
+blocks**. Hosts and backup media see **opaque blobs** (and
+random CHAMP labels), not filenames, not PHI, not the share
+graph --- **if** private keys never leave the client or the
+customer's HSM.
 
-That is **true of the Peergos design** (see :doc:`verification`).
-It **changes the BAA/DPA conversation**. It does **not** auto-delete the
-need for contracts.
+That fact is true of the Peergos design and is the design
+Cure53 reviewed in Berlin. It **changes** the Business
+Associate and GDPR-processor conversation. It does **not**
+automatically delete the need for contracts.
 
-HIPAA (US) — Business Associate
--------------------------------
+HIPAA --- Business Associate
+----------------------------
 
-A Business Associate is a person who **creates, receives, maintains, or
-transmits ePHI** for a covered entity.
+A Business Associate is a person who **creates, receives,
+maintains, or transmits ePHI** for a covered entity.
 
-**Technical argument you can make (and should document):**
+A technical argument the organization can document:
 
-1. ePHI is encrypted **before** it leaves the endpoint (Peergos client /
-   DataCube writer).
-2. The storage node, IPFS, disk, and backup hold **ciphertext + hashes**.
-3. Private keys **do not** reside on the storage host (customer HSM /
-   client). Hash verification detects tampering.
-4. Therefore the host **cannot maintain ePHI in intelligible form**.
+1. ePHI is encrypted **before** it leaves the endpoint.
+2. The storage node, IPFS, disk, Iceberg archive, and backup
+   hold **ciphertext plus hashes**.
+3. Private keys **do not** reside on the storage host.
+   Hash verification detects substitution.
+4. Therefore the host **cannot maintain ePHI in intelligible
+   form**.
 
-HHS distinguishes **conduits** and parties that never have access to
-ePHI. Many programs still **sign a BAA** when a vendor touches
-infrastructure, because misconfiguration, support exports, or logs could
-later expose plaintext. OCR looks at **your** risk analysis.
+HHS has distinguished **conduits** and parties that never
+have access to ePHI. Many programs still **sign a BAA**
+whenever a vendor touches infrastructure, because
+misconfiguration, a support export, or a log could later
+expose plaintext. OCR will look at **the organization's**
+risk analysis, not at Verae's architecture diagram.
 
-**Practical pack:** risk analysis memo citing cryptree + IPFS hash checks
-+ key custody; BAA **or** written determination that the vendor is
-**not** a BA because they cannot decrypt; list every party with
-disk/backup (ns1, IPFS cluster, offsite replica).
+Practical pack:
 
-GDPR (EU/UK) — processor vs technical measure
----------------------------------------------
+* a risk-analysis memo citing cryptree, IPFS hash checks,
+  key custody, and the two public Peergos evaluations;
+* a BAA **or** a written determination that a named vendor
+  is **not** a BA because they cannot decrypt;
+* a list of every party with disk, VM, backup, IPFS, or
+  Iceberg credentials.
 
-Encrypted data can still be **personal data** if it is reasonably
-attributable (usernames, IPs, invoice identity). GDPR **Art. 32** lists
-encryption as a security measure.
+GDPR --- processor versus technical measure
+-------------------------------------------
 
-Peergos is designed so the **server is an adversary** for content and
-most metadata. EU-based **independent pentests** (Cure53 DE, ROS NL)
-evaluated that design. Processing location for **self-host** is *your*
-ns1 / customer region, not peergos.net’s Germany hosting, unless you use
-peergos.net.
+Encrypted data can still be **personal data** if it is
+reasonably attributable (usernames, IPs, invoice identity).
+GDPR Article 32 lists encryption as a security measure, not
+as an exemption from Article 28.
 
-You may still need a **DPA (Art. 28)** with anyone who **processes**
-personal data (usernames, logs, billing). Ciphertext-only storage
-**narrows** the DPA’s technical annex.
+Peergos is designed so the **server is an adversary** for
+content and most metadata. EU-based independent pentests
+evaluated that design. Processing location for **self-host**
+is the customer's region, not peergos.net's Germany, unless
+the customer uses peergos.net.
+
+A DPA may still be required with anyone who **processes**
+usernames, logs, or billing. Ciphertext-only storage
+**narrows** the technical annex. It does not always
+eliminate the DPA.
 
 NATS operators
 --------------
 
-NATS is an **untrusted broker**. Content is HPKE; destinations and
-subjects are in the clear. A NATS operator **cannot** read bodies without
-endpoint private keys; **can** see routing metadata; **can** drop/delay
-copy **ciphertext**. Treat like a transit provider: DPA/BAA depends on
-whether routing metadata is personal data in your jurisdiction.
+NATS is an untrusted broker. Content is HPKE. Destinations
+and subjects are in the clear. A NATS operator **cannot**
+read bodies without endpoint private keys. They **can** see
+routing metadata. They **can** drop, delay, or copy
+ciphertext. Treat them like a transit provider: whether a
+DPA or BAA is needed depends on whether routing metadata is
+personal data in the relevant jurisdiction.
 
-What “making yourself audit-ready” means
-----------------------------------------
+Verae as timestamping service
+-----------------------------
 
-You are **not** buying Peergos’s Cure53/ROS reports as *your* SOC 2.
-You are **reusing** those public evaluations as **vendor/component
-assurance**, then adding your scope, RoPA, key-custody, inspect k-of-n,
-admin-history, instance evidence, and contracts that match who can
-actually see plaintext.
+If Verae receives **only fingerprints**, Verae's role for
+**content** is not "stores the records." Verae's role is
+"registers hashes and issues receipts." That is a narrower
+processing. Counsel still has to decide whether the
+fingerprint, plus whatever account data exists (company
+name, billing, operator emails), requires a DPA or a BAA.
+Do not let a sales sentence skip that memo.
+
+Component assurance versus the organization's report
+----------------------------------------------------
+
+Attaching Cure53 2019 and ROS 2024 is **vendor / component
+assurance**. It is appropriate. It is **not** the
+organization's SOC 2, ISO 27001, or HIPAA program. Those
+still require the organization's scope, Record of
+Processing, key-custody, inspect k-of-n, admin-history,
+instance evidence, restore tests, and the contracts that
+match who can actually see plaintext.