# Peergos verification (what was actually audited)

This file records **sourced** facts. It does **not** turn Peergos, Verae, or
DataCubes into a HIPAA, SOC 2, or ISO 27001 certificate.

## Claim to check

> Data at rest is stored in an encrypted append-only Peergos filesystem;
> backup/restore is managed via a distributed, hashed, encrypted Peergos
> IPFS system, designed and evaluated in the EU as an audited secure
> filesystem.

## Verified

### Independent security audits (Europe)

| Year | Firm | Where | What | Outcome (as published) | Primary sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | **Cure53** | Berlin, Germany | Pentest, source-code audit, **crypto/design review** of Peergos (May–June 2019) | Peergos: no fundamental architectural or cryptographic problems found; reported issues fixed. Cure53 concluded the platform **passed this evaluation**. | [peergos.org/posts/security-audit](https://peergos.org/posts/security-audit); [cure53.de/pentest-report_peergos.pdf](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_peergos.pdf); [github.com/Peergos/Peergos/tree/master/audits](https://github.com/Peergos/Peergos/tree/master/audits) |
| 2024 | **Radically Open Security B.V.** | Amsterdam, Netherlands | Crystal-box pentest + code audit of Peergos web-ui (Sep–Nov 2024), report dated 18 Nov 2024 | **0** extreme / high / elevated findings; **2** moderate, **6** low; Peergos states all fixed; none resulted in data exposure or integrity compromise (mostly UI crashes). | [peergos.org/posts/security-audit-2024](https://peergos.org/posts/security-audit-2024); ROS PDF in the same GitHub `audits/` tree |

Both firms are **EU-based**. Both full reports are **public**. That is a
**security evaluation of the Peergos protocol/implementation**, not a
HIPAA/SOC 2/ISO management-system certificate.

### EU funding / NLNet

- Peergos received funding from the **European Union Horizon 2020** programme
  under **NGI-POINTER**, grant **871528** (stated on the 2024 audit post).
- The 2024 audit was supported by **NLnet** (Netherlands).

### Hosted instance location (peergos.net, not necessarily your self-host)

Peergos’s hosted privacy notice states the hosted instance uses servers in
**Germany** and encrypted object storage, with backups that may use other
providers (e.g. Backblaze S3). **Self-hosted ns1 / customer cryptree is a
different processing location** and must be documented in *your* RoPA / BAA
pack.

Source: [peergos.net/privacy.html](https://peergos.net/privacy.html)

### Encrypted filesystem + hashed IPFS (design)

Documented Peergos design (matches “encrypted, hashed, distributed”):

- **Cryptree**: tree of symmetric keys; fine-grained read/write caps; sibling
  names hidden from a cap-holder of one file. Writes are **signed**.
  [book.peergos.org/security/cryptree.html](https://book.peergos.org/security/cryptree.html)
- **Chunks**: up to 5 MiB, padded, independently encrypted
  (Salsa20-Poly1305 / TweetNaCl); random 256-bit keys (not convergent).
  [book.peergos.org/security/encryption.html](https://book.peergos.org/security/encryption.html)
- **IPFS**: content-addressed blocks. Peergos **verifies the hash** of every
  block read from or written to IPFS (server cannot silently swap bytes).
  Client verifies hashes and signatures of data from a Peergos server.
  [book.peergos.org/security/trust.html](https://book.peergos.org/security/trust.html)
- **CHAMP**: encrypted cryptree nodes under **random 32-byte labels**; server
  cannot deduce file size or directory shape from the label graph.
- Sharing: hybrid **X25519 + ML-KEM-1024** (post-quantum hybrid) for follow
  requests.

That is an **append-mostly / capability / content-addressed** encrypted
filesystem. “Append-only” in Verae DataCubes is the **cube chain JSONL**
(application integrity). Peergos itself uses signed updates and immutable
blocks; directory pointers move forward. Do not conflate the two layers in
an audit interview.

## Not verified / do not claim

| Phrase | Status |
|---|---|
| “Peergos is HIPAA certified” | **False.** HIPAA is not a product certificate. |
| “Peergos is SOC 2 / ISO 27001 certified” | **Not shown** in the public materials above. The published work is **security pentest/code audit**, not a Type II or ISO registrar certificate. |
| “EU evaluated Peergos as a certified secure filesystem under a government FS standard” | **Overstated.** What exists: EU **grant funding**, NLNet-funded **ROS pentest**, Cure53 **Berlin** design+code audit. |
| “Hosts with disk/backup never need a BAA/DPA” | **Legal conclusion — not a technical fact.** See `BAA-DPA.md`. Encryption + no keys at the host is a **strong Art. 32 / HIPAA Security Rule argument**; counsel still decides. |

## How Verae uses this

Verae DataCubes sit **on** Peergos cryptree (Drive) plus a **console** identity
plane (TOTP, k-of-n inspect). Backup of cubes is **content-addressed encrypted
blocks** (Peergos/IPFS), not a plaintext dump. That is the technical story to
hand an auditor, with the sources in this file.