BAAs and DPAs when ciphertext has no host keys
==============================================

This is **guidance for an evidence pack**, not legal advice.

The operator statement
----------------------

Data at rest lives in the **encrypted Peergos cryptree**. Restore uses
**distributed, hash-verified, encrypted IPFS blocks**. Hosts and backup
media see **opaque blobs** (and random CHAMP labels), not filenames, not
PHI, not social graph — if keys never leave the client / customer HSM.

That is **true of the Peergos design** (see :doc:`verification`).
It **changes the BAA/DPA conversation**. It does **not** auto-delete the
need for contracts.

HIPAA (US) — Business Associate
-------------------------------

A Business Associate is a person who **creates, receives, maintains, or
transmits ePHI** for a covered entity.

**Technical argument you can make (and should document):**

1. ePHI is encrypted **before** it leaves the endpoint (Peergos client /
   DataCube writer).
2. The storage node, IPFS, disk, and backup hold **ciphertext + hashes**.
3. Private keys **do not** reside on the storage host (customer HSM /
   client). Hash verification detects tampering.
4. Therefore the host **cannot maintain ePHI in intelligible form**.

HHS distinguishes **conduits** and parties that never have access to
ePHI. Many programs still **sign a BAA** when a vendor touches
infrastructure, because misconfiguration, support exports, or logs could
later expose plaintext. OCR looks at **your** risk analysis.

**Practical pack:** risk analysis memo citing cryptree + IPFS hash checks
+ key custody; BAA **or** written determination that the vendor is
**not** a BA because they cannot decrypt; list every party with
disk/backup (ns1, IPFS cluster, offsite replica).

GDPR (EU/UK) — processor vs technical measure
---------------------------------------------

Encrypted data can still be **personal data** if it is reasonably
attributable (usernames, IPs, invoice identity). GDPR **Art. 32** lists
encryption as a security measure.

Peergos is designed so the **server is an adversary** for content and
most metadata. EU-based **independent pentests** (Cure53 DE, ROS NL)
evaluated that design. Processing location for **self-host** is *your*
ns1 / customer region, not peergos.net’s Germany hosting, unless you use
peergos.net.

You may still need a **DPA (Art. 28)** with anyone who **processes**
personal data (usernames, logs, billing). Ciphertext-only storage
**narrows** the DPA’s technical annex.

NATS operators
--------------

NATS is an **untrusted broker**. Content is HPKE; destinations and
subjects are in the clear. A NATS operator **cannot** read bodies without
endpoint private keys; **can** see routing metadata; **can** drop/delay
copy **ciphertext**. Treat like a transit provider: DPA/BAA depends on
whether routing metadata is personal data in your jurisdiction.

What “making yourself audit-ready” means
----------------------------------------

You are **not** buying Peergos’s Cure53/ROS reports as *your* SOC 2.
You are **reusing** those public evaluations as **vendor/component
assurance**, then adding your scope, RoPA, key-custody, inspect k-of-n,
admin-history, instance evidence, and contracts that match who can
actually see plaintext.