# Audit-ready checklist (Verae DataCubes + Peergos) Use this as a working list. Check items only when **evidence exists** (screenshot, log export, signed policy, ticket). This list is not a certificate. ## A. Scope and data map - [ ] Named legal entity and systems in scope (console, Drive, NATS, IPFS, ns1) - [ ] Data-flow diagram: endpoint → HPKE/NATS → cryptree/IPFS - [ ] What is PHI / personal data vs ciphertext vs routing metadata - [ ] Peergos verification file attached (`PEERGOS-VERIFICATION.md`) ## B. Keys and encryption - [ ] Customer holds Peergos/Drive keys; not on storage host - [ ] NPE/HPKE endpoint keys in directory; private 0600; no xor content - [ ] Signed Ed25519 config; unsigned rejected; admin-history prev+new+diff - [ ] HSM or documented lab-to-HSM path (`HSM-CUSTODY.md` in system-git-sync) ## C. Access - [ ] Console `PFC_REQUIRE_AUTH=1`, TOTP; Drive login separate - [ ] Inspect k-of-n; author is not an officer; log-before-reveal - [ ] Joiner / mover / leaver for console users - [ ] Google SSO does **not** unwrap cubes ## D. Integrity and backup - [ ] Cube chain append-only JSONL; dual hash - [ ] Hash registry: first SHA-256 and receipt win - [ ] Peergos/IPFS: hash-verified encrypted blocks (restore = re-fetch CIDs) - [ ] Restore test: recover a cube from content-addressed ciphertext without plaintext backup tapes ## E. Logging - [ ] Inspect audit events - [ ] SM summaries: codes + lookup_id only (no bodies) - [ ] Admin-history cube for config ## F. Contracts (counsel) - [ ] Written BA / not-a-BA determination for disk, VM, backup, IPFS - [ ] DPA Art. 28 where usernames/logs/IPs are processed - [ ] NATS operator: metadata vs content in the annex - [ ] Peergos component assurance: attach Cure53 2019 + ROS 2024 PDFs (public; not your org’s ISO/SOC report) ## G. Independent audit of *you* - [ ] SOC 2 Type I/II engagement **or** ISO 27001 registrar **or** HIPAA risk analysis + policies (pick the program you actually need) - [ ] Evidence window (Type II / surveillance) if applicable