feat: add conformance tests for iss parameter (SEP-2468) (#220)

* feat: add conformance tests for iss parameter (SEP-2468)

Adds 5 draft conformance scenarios testing RFC 9207 issuer parameter
validation in OAuth authorization responses:

- auth/iss-supported: server advertises support and sends correct iss
- auth/iss-not-advertised: server omits iss parameter entirely
- auth/iss-supported-missing: client must reject missing iss when required
- auth/iss-wrong-issuer: client must reject mismatched iss value
- auth/iss-unexpected: client must reject iss when not advertised

Also adds auth-test-iss-validation.ts, a reference client that correctly
validates iss per RFC 9207, and negative tests confirming the standard
client fails all three rejection scenarios.

TODO: Update RFC_9207_ISS_PARAMETER spec reference once SEP-2468
(modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol#2468) is merged.

* update scenarios

* fix: createAuthServer iss option type/guard and NotAdvertised scenario duplication

The doc comments said 'Default: not included' but the destructure defaulted
to true/'correct', and the `!== undefined` guard at L155 was unreachable —
so there was no way to omit the metadata field, and IssParameterNotAdvertised
silently advertised support (a duplicate of IssParameterSupported).

Kept the on-by-default behavior (mock AS models a well-behaved server) but
made issParameterSupported `boolean | null` so callers pass null to omit,
matching the codeChallengeMethodsSupported pattern. Doc comments now match.
Scenarios that need omission pass null/'omit' explicitly.

* fix: rejection scenarios silently pass when client never reaches auth endpoint

correctlyRejected = !tokenRequestMade reports SUCCESS if the client errors
out before hitting /authorize. Gate on authReached so a setup failure shows
as FAILURE with authReached:false in details.

* fix: iss-unexpected scenario contradicts SEP-2468 spec table row 3

The spec table says: supported=false/absent + iss present -> *Compare* to
the recorded issuer (not reject). The scenario sent a *correct* iss and
FAILed compliant clients for proceeding after a successful comparison.

Now sends a mismatched iss so the comparison fails and rejection is the
spec-required outcome. Reference client updated to compare-when-present
instead of throw-on-presence.

* refactor: replace harness-config checks with client-proceeded checks

iss-advertised-in-metadata / iss-sent-in-redirect (and the not-* variants)
fired in onAuthorizationRequest before the redirect happened, asserting only
that the harness was configured correctly — a client that ignores iss passes
identically. Replaced with one check per scenario keyed on tokenRequestMade,
which observes that the client actually proceeded through the iss path.

* refactor: rename check IDs to sep-2468-* and align with spec table rows

One ID per spec table row; auth/iss-supported and auth/iss-wrong-issuer
both emit sep-2468-client-compare-iss-supported (same comparison, opposite
input) per the same-slug-for-SUCCESS-and-FAIL convention.

* feat: add sep-2468.yaml requirement traceability

8 check rows (4 client table-row checks, 1 metadata-issuer, 2 AS-side,
1 no-normalization), 1 excluded (error-display is UI-facing). The
record-issuer MUST is merged into the compare-iss-supported row text
since it has no independent wire observation.

* fix: migrate iss scenarios specVersions->source (post-#265)

Replaces `specVersions: ['draft']` with `source: { introducedIn: DRAFT_PROTOCOL_VERSION }`
in the 5 iss-parameter scenarios.

This commit typechecks once the stack is rebased onto main >= #265 (the
ScenarioSource migration). Adding it now so the rebase is mechanical.

* fix: include application_type in iss-validation example DCR (post-#284)

The SEP-837 application_type check now runs in every auth scenario; the
hand-rolled DCR in auth-test-iss-validation.ts was omitting the field.

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Carleton <paulc@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Max Gerber 2026-05-19 15:42:35 -07:00 • committed by GitHub
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8 changed files with 740 additions and 3 deletions

View file

@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* Well-behaved client that validates the iss parameter in authorization responses.
*
* Per RFC 9207:
* - If the AS advertises authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true,
* the client MUST require iss in the redirect and MUST validate it against
* the AS metadata issuer.
* - If the AS does NOT advertise support, the client MUST reject any redirect
* that unexpectedly contains an iss parameter.
*/
import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'crypto';
import { Client } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js';
import { StreamableHTTPClientTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/streamableHttp.js';
import { extractWWWAuthenticateParams } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/auth.js';
import type { FetchLike } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/shared/transport.js';
import type { Middleware } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/middleware.js';
import { runAsCli } from './helpers/cliRunner';
import { logger } from './helpers/logger';
interface OAuthTokens {
access_token: string;
token_type: string;
expires_in?: number;
refresh_token?: string;
scope?: string;
}
function generateCodeVerifier(): string {
return randomBytes(32)
.toString('base64')
.replace(/\+/g, '-')
.replace(/\//g, '_')
.replace(/=+$/, '');
}
function computeS256Challenge(codeVerifier: string): string {
const hash = createHash('sha256').update(codeVerifier).digest();
return hash
.toString('base64')
.replace(/\+/g, '-')
.replace(/\//g, '_')
.replace(/=+$/, '');
}
/**
* OAuth flow that correctly validates the iss parameter per RFC 9207.
*/
async function oauthFlowWithIssValidation(
_serverUrl: string | URL,
resourceMetadataUrl: string | URL,
fetchFn: FetchLike
): Promise<OAuthTokens> {
// 1. Fetch Protected Resource Metadata
const prmResponse = await fetchFn(resourceMetadataUrl);
if (!prmResponse.ok) {
throw new Error(`Failed to fetch PRM: ${prmResponse.status}`);
}
const prm = await prmResponse.json();
const authServerUrl = prm.authorization_servers?.[0];
if (!authServerUrl) {
throw new Error('No authorization server in PRM');
}
// 2. Fetch Authorization Server Metadata
const asMetadataUrl = new URL(
'/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server',
authServerUrl
);
const asResponse = await fetchFn(asMetadataUrl.toString());
if (!asResponse.ok) {
throw new Error(`Failed to fetch AS metadata: ${asResponse.status}`);
}
const asMetadata = await asResponse.json();
const expectedIssuer: string = asMetadata.issuer;
const issParameterSupported: boolean =
asMetadata.authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported === true;
// 3. Register client (DCR)
const dcrResponse = await fetchFn(asMetadata.registration_endpoint, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
client_name: 'test-auth-client-iss-validation',
redirect_uris: ['http://localhost:3000/callback'],
application_type: 'native'
})
});
if (!dcrResponse.ok) {
throw new Error(`DCR failed: ${dcrResponse.status}`);
}
const clientInfo = await dcrResponse.json();
// 4. Build authorization URL with PKCE
const codeVerifier = generateCodeVerifier();
const codeChallenge = computeS256Challenge(codeVerifier);
const authUrl = new URL(asMetadata.authorization_endpoint);
authUrl.searchParams.set('response_type', 'code');
authUrl.searchParams.set('client_id', clientInfo.client_id);
authUrl.searchParams.set('redirect_uri', 'http://localhost:3000/callback');
authUrl.searchParams.set('state', 'test-state');
authUrl.searchParams.set('code_challenge', codeChallenge);
authUrl.searchParams.set('code_challenge_method', 'S256');
// 5. Fetch authorization endpoint (simulates redirect)
const authResponse = await fetchFn(authUrl.toString(), {
redirect: 'manual'
});
const location = authResponse.headers.get('location');
if (!location) {
throw new Error('No redirect from authorization endpoint');
}
const redirectUrl = new URL(location);
const authCode = redirectUrl.searchParams.get('code');
if (!authCode) {
throw new Error('No auth code in redirect');
}
// 6. Validate iss parameter per RFC 9207
const issInRedirect = redirectUrl.searchParams.get('iss');
if (issParameterSupported) {
// Server advertised support: iss MUST be present and MUST match metadata issuer
if (!issInRedirect) {
throw new Error(
'Server advertised authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported but iss is absent from redirect'
);
}
if (issInRedirect !== expectedIssuer) {
throw new Error(
`iss mismatch: expected '${expectedIssuer}', got '${issInRedirect}'`
);
}
} else {
// Server did NOT advertise support: if iss is present, compare anyway
// (SEP-2468 spec table row 3 — local-policy provision per RFC 9207 §2.4)
if (issInRedirect && issInRedirect !== expectedIssuer) {
throw new Error(
`iss mismatch: expected '${expectedIssuer}', got '${issInRedirect}'`
);
}
}
// 7. Exchange code for token with PKCE code_verifier
const tokenResponse = await fetchFn(asMetadata.token_endpoint, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
body: new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: 'authorization_code',
code: authCode,
redirect_uri: 'http://localhost:3000/callback',
client_id: clientInfo.client_id,
code_verifier: codeVerifier
}).toString()
});
if (!tokenResponse.ok) {
const error = await tokenResponse.text();
throw new Error(`Token request failed: ${tokenResponse.status} - ${error}`);
}
return tokenResponse.json();
}
/**
* Creates a fetch wrapper that uses OAuth with iss parameter validation.
*/
function withOAuthIssValidation(baseUrl: string | URL): Middleware {
let tokens: OAuthTokens | undefined;
return (next: FetchLike) => {
return async (
input: string | URL,
init?: RequestInit
): Promise<Response> => {
const makeRequest = async (): Promise<Response> => {
const headers = new Headers(init?.headers);
if (tokens) {
headers.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${tokens.access_token}`);
}
return next(input, { ...init, headers });
};
let response = await makeRequest();
if (response.status === 401) {
const { resourceMetadataUrl } = extractWWWAuthenticateParams(response);
if (!resourceMetadataUrl) {
throw new Error('No resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate');
}
tokens = await oauthFlowWithIssValidation(
baseUrl,
resourceMetadataUrl,
next
);
response = await makeRequest();
}
return response;
};
};
}
export async function runClient(serverUrl: string): Promise<void> {
const client = new Client(
{ name: 'test-auth-client-iss-validation', version: '1.0.0' },
{ capabilities: {} }
);
const oauthFetch = withOAuthIssValidation(new URL(serverUrl))(fetch);
const transport = new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(new URL(serverUrl), {
fetch: oauthFetch
});
await client.connect(transport);
logger.debug('Successfully connected to MCP server');
await client.listTools();
logger.debug('Successfully listed tools');
await transport.close();
logger.debug('Connection closed successfully');
}
runAsCli(runClient, import.meta.url, 'auth-test-iss-validation <server-url>');

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@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import {
handle401
} from './helpers/withOAuthRetry.js';
import { ConformanceOAuthProvider } from './helpers/ConformanceOAuthProvider.js';
import { runClient as issValidationClient } from './auth-test-iss-validation.js';
import { logger } from './helpers/logger.js';
/**
@ -270,7 +271,10 @@ registerScenarios(
'auth/resource-mismatch',
// SEP-2207: Offline access / refresh token guidance (draft)
'auth/offline-access-scope',
'auth/offline-access-not-supported'
'auth/offline-access-not-supported',
// SEP-2468: ISS parameter - positive scenarios (standard client is fine)
'auth/iss-supported',
'auth/iss-not-advertised'
],
runAuthClient
);
@ -342,6 +346,16 @@ async function runAuthMigrationClient(serverUrl: string): Promise<void> {
registerScenario('auth/authorization-server-migration', runAuthMigrationClient);
// SEP-2468: ISS parameter - rejection scenarios use iss-validating client
registerScenarios(
[
'auth/iss-supported-missing',
'auth/iss-wrong-issuer',
'auth/iss-unexpected'
],
issValidationClient
);
// ============================================================================
// Elicitation defaults scenario
// ============================================================================

View file

@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ export interface AuthServerOptions {
disableDynamicRegistration?: boolean;
/** PKCE code_challenge_methods_supported. Set to null to omit from metadata. Default: ['S256'] */
codeChallengeMethodsSupported?: string[] | null;
/** Advertise authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported in AS metadata. Default: true. Pass null to omit. */
issParameterSupported?: boolean | null;
/** What iss value to include in authorization redirect. Default: 'correct'. */
issInRedirect?: 'correct' | 'wrong' | 'omit';
tokenVerifier?: MockTokenVerifier;
onTokenRequest?: (requestData: {
scope?: string;
@ -86,6 +90,8 @@ export function createAuthServer(
clientIdMetadataDocumentSupported,
disableDynamicRegistration = false,
codeChallengeMethodsSupported = ['S256'],
issParameterSupported = true,
issInRedirect = 'correct',
tokenVerifier,
onTokenRequest,
onAuthorizationRequest,
@ -146,6 +152,9 @@ export function createAuthServer(
...(codeChallengeMethodsSupported !== null && {
code_challenge_methods_supported: codeChallengeMethodsSupported
}),
...(issParameterSupported !== null && {
authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: issParameterSupported
}),
token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: tokenEndpointAuthMethodsSupported,
...(tokenEndpointAuthSigningAlgValuesSupported && {
token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported:
@ -244,6 +253,13 @@ export function createAuthServer(
redirectUrl.searchParams.set('state', state);
}
// ISS: Include iss parameter in redirect if configured
if (issInRedirect === 'correct') {
redirectUrl.searchParams.set('iss', `${getAuthBaseUrl()}${routePrefix}`);
} else if (issInRedirect === 'wrong') {
redirectUrl.searchParams.set('iss', 'https://evil.example.com');
}
res.redirect(redirectUrl.toString());
});

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@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import { runClient as noRetryLimitClient } from '../../../../examples/clients/ty
import { runClient as noPkceClient } from '../../../../examples/clients/typescript/auth-test-no-pkce';
import { runClient as reuseCredsClient } from '../../../../examples/clients/typescript/auth-test-reuse-credentials';
import { runClient as noAppTypeClient } from '../../../../examples/clients/typescript/auth-test-no-application-type';
import { runClient as noIssValidationClient } from '../../../../examples/clients/typescript/auth-test';
import { getHandler } from '../../../../examples/clients/typescript/everything-client';
import { setLogLevel } from '../../../../examples/clients/typescript/helpers/logger';
@ -34,7 +35,11 @@ const allowClientErrorScenarios = new Set<string>([
'auth/resource-mismatch',
// The post-migration retry path may surface as a client error after
// re-registering; the SEP-2352 checks are evaluated in getChecks()
'auth/authorization-server-migration'
'auth/authorization-server-migration',
// Client is expected to error when iss validation fails
'auth/iss-supported-missing',
'auth/iss-wrong-issuer',
'auth/iss-unexpected'
]);
describe('Client Auth Scenarios', () => {
@ -174,4 +179,28 @@ describe('Negative tests', () => {
]
});
});
test('client does not reject missing iss when server requires it', async () => {
const runner = new InlineClientRunner(noIssValidationClient);
await runClientAgainstScenario(runner, 'auth/iss-supported-missing', {
expectedFailureSlugs: ['sep-2468-client-reject-missing-iss'],
allowClientError: true
});
});
test('client does not reject mismatched iss', async () => {
const runner = new InlineClientRunner(noIssValidationClient);
await runClientAgainstScenario(runner, 'auth/iss-wrong-issuer', {
expectedFailureSlugs: ['sep-2468-client-compare-iss-supported'],
allowClientError: true
});
});
test('client does not reject unexpected iss', async () => {
const runner = new InlineClientRunner(noIssValidationClient);
await runClientAgainstScenario(runner, 'auth/iss-unexpected', {
expectedFailureSlugs: ['sep-2468-client-compare-iss-unadvertised'],
allowClientError: true
});
});
});

View file

@ -29,6 +29,13 @@ import {
OfflineAccessNotSupportedScenario
} from './offline-access';
import { AuthorizationServerMigrationScenario } from './authorization-server-migration';
import {
IssParameterSupportedScenario,
IssParameterNotAdvertisedScenario,
IssParameterSupportedMissingScenario,
IssParameterWrongIssuerScenario,
IssParameterUnexpectedScenario
} from './issuer-parameter';
// Auth scenarios (required for tier 1)
export const authScenariosList: Scenario[] = [
@ -63,5 +70,10 @@ export const draftScenariosList: Scenario[] = [
new ResourceMismatchScenario(),
new OfflineAccessScopeScenario(),
new OfflineAccessNotSupportedScenario(),
new AuthorizationServerMigrationScenario()
new AuthorizationServerMigrationScenario(),
new IssParameterSupportedScenario(),
new IssParameterNotAdvertisedScenario(),
new IssParameterSupportedMissingScenario(),
new IssParameterWrongIssuerScenario(),
new IssParameterUnexpectedScenario()
];

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@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
import type { Scenario, ConformanceCheck } from '../../../types.js';
import { ScenarioUrls, DRAFT_PROTOCOL_VERSION } from '../../../types.js';
import { createAuthServer } from './helpers/createAuthServer.js';
import { createServer } from './helpers/createServer.js';
import { ServerLifecycle } from './helpers/serverLifecycle.js';
import { SpecReferences } from './spec-references.js';
import { MockTokenVerifier } from './helpers/mockTokenVerifier.js';
const specRefs = [SpecReferences.RFC_9207_ISS_PARAMETER];
/**
* Scenario: ISS Parameter Supported (positive)
*
* Server advertises authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true and
* includes the correct iss value in the authorization redirect. A conformant
* client should validate iss and proceed normally.
*/
export class IssParameterSupportedScenario implements Scenario {
name = 'auth/iss-supported';
readonly source = { introducedIn: DRAFT_PROTOCOL_VERSION } as const;
description =
'Tests that client accepts authorization response when server advertises and sends correct iss parameter';
private authServer = new ServerLifecycle();
private server = new ServerLifecycle();
private checks: ConformanceCheck[] = [];
private tokenRequestMade = false;
async start(): Promise<ScenarioUrls> {
this.checks = [];
this.tokenRequestMade = false;
const tokenVerifier = new MockTokenVerifier(this.checks, []);
const authApp = createAuthServer(this.checks, this.authServer.getUrl, {
tokenVerifier,
issParameterSupported: true,
issInRedirect: 'correct',
onTokenRequest: () => {
this.tokenRequestMade = true;
return { token: `test-token-${Date.now()}`, scopes: [] };
}
});
await this.authServer.start(authApp);
const app = createServer(
this.checks,
this.server.getUrl,
this.authServer.getUrl,
{ requiredScopes: [], tokenVerifier }
);
await this.server.start(app);
return { serverUrl: `${this.server.getUrl()}/mcp` };
}
async stop() {
await this.authServer.stop();
await this.server.stop();
}
getChecks(): ConformanceCheck[] {
const timestamp = new Date().toISOString();
this.checks.push({
id: 'sep-2468-client-compare-iss-supported',
name: 'Client accepts matching iss when advertised',
description: this.tokenRequestMade
? 'Client compared advertised iss against recorded issuer and proceeded to token exchange'
: 'Client did not proceed to token exchange after receiving a correct iss from a server that advertised support',
status: this.tokenRequestMade ? 'SUCCESS' : 'FAILURE',
timestamp,
specReferences: specRefs,
details: { tokenRequestMade: this.tokenRequestMade }
});
return this.checks;
}
}
/**
* Scenario: ISS Parameter Not Advertised (positive)
*
* Server does not advertise authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported and
* does not include iss in the redirect. A conformant client should proceed normally.
*/
export class IssParameterNotAdvertisedScenario implements Scenario {
name = 'auth/iss-not-advertised';
readonly source = { introducedIn: DRAFT_PROTOCOL_VERSION } as const;
description =
'Tests that client accepts authorization response when server does not advertise or send iss parameter';
private authServer = new ServerLifecycle();
private server = new ServerLifecycle();
private checks: ConformanceCheck[] = [];
private tokenRequestMade = false;
async start(): Promise<ScenarioUrls> {
this.checks = [];
this.tokenRequestMade = false;
const tokenVerifier = new MockTokenVerifier(this.checks, []);
const authApp = createAuthServer(this.checks, this.authServer.getUrl, {
tokenVerifier,
issParameterSupported: null,
issInRedirect: 'omit',
onTokenRequest: () => {
this.tokenRequestMade = true;
return { token: `test-token-${Date.now()}`, scopes: [] };
}
});
await this.authServer.start(authApp);
const app = createServer(
this.checks,
this.server.getUrl,
this.authServer.getUrl,
{ requiredScopes: [], tokenVerifier }
);
await this.server.start(app);
return { serverUrl: `${this.server.getUrl()}/mcp` };
}
async stop() {
await this.authServer.stop();
await this.server.stop();
}
getChecks(): ConformanceCheck[] {
const timestamp = new Date().toISOString();
this.checks.push({
id: 'sep-2468-client-proceed-no-iss',
name: 'Client proceeds when iss absent and not advertised',
description: this.tokenRequestMade
? 'Client proceeded to token exchange when neither metadata advertised iss support nor redirect contained iss'
: 'Client did not proceed to token exchange — should proceed when iss is absent and not advertised',
status: this.tokenRequestMade ? 'SUCCESS' : 'FAILURE',
timestamp,
specReferences: specRefs,
details: { tokenRequestMade: this.tokenRequestMade }
});
return this.checks;
}
}
/**
* Scenario: ISS Parameter Advertised but Missing from Redirect (client must reject)
*
* Server advertises authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true but
* omits iss from the redirect. A conformant client MUST reject this response.
*/
export class IssParameterSupportedMissingScenario implements Scenario {
name = 'auth/iss-supported-missing';
readonly source = { introducedIn: DRAFT_PROTOCOL_VERSION } as const;
description =
'Tests that client rejects authorization response when server advertised iss support but omitted iss from redirect';
allowClientError = true;
private authServer = new ServerLifecycle();
private server = new ServerLifecycle();
private checks: ConformanceCheck[] = [];
private authReached = false;
private tokenRequestMade = false;
async start(): Promise<ScenarioUrls> {
this.checks = [];
this.authReached = false;
this.tokenRequestMade = false;
const tokenVerifier = new MockTokenVerifier(this.checks, []);
const authApp = createAuthServer(this.checks, this.authServer.getUrl, {
tokenVerifier,
issParameterSupported: true,
issInRedirect: 'omit', // advertise support but don't send iss
onAuthorizationRequest: () => {
this.authReached = true;
},
onTokenRequest: () => {
this.tokenRequestMade = true;
return { token: `test-token-${Date.now()}`, scopes: [] };
}
});
await this.authServer.start(authApp);
const app = createServer(
this.checks,
this.server.getUrl,
this.authServer.getUrl,
{ requiredScopes: [], tokenVerifier }
);
await this.server.start(app);
return { serverUrl: `${this.server.getUrl()}/mcp` };
}
async stop() {
await this.authServer.stop();
await this.server.stop();
}
getChecks(): ConformanceCheck[] {
const timestamp = new Date().toISOString();
if (
!this.checks.some((c) => c.id === 'sep-2468-client-reject-missing-iss')
) {
const correctlyRejected = this.authReached && !this.tokenRequestMade;
this.checks.push({
id: 'sep-2468-client-reject-missing-iss',
name: 'Client rejects missing iss when required',
description: correctlyRejected
? 'Client correctly rejected authorization response missing required iss parameter'
: 'Client MUST reject authorization response when server advertised iss support but iss is absent from redirect',
status: correctlyRejected ? 'SUCCESS' : 'FAILURE',
timestamp,
specReferences: specRefs,
details: {
serverAdvertisedSupport: true,
issSentInRedirect: false,
authReached: this.authReached,
tokenRequestMade: this.tokenRequestMade
}
});
}
return this.checks;
}
}
/**
* Scenario: ISS Parameter Has Wrong Value (client must reject)
*
* Server advertises authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true and
* includes an iss value that does not match the server's actual issuer. A
* conformant client MUST reject this response.
*/
export class IssParameterWrongIssuerScenario implements Scenario {
name = 'auth/iss-wrong-issuer';
readonly source = { introducedIn: DRAFT_PROTOCOL_VERSION } as const;
description =
'Tests that client rejects authorization response when iss does not match the authorization server issuer';
allowClientError = true;
private authServer = new ServerLifecycle();
private server = new ServerLifecycle();
private checks: ConformanceCheck[] = [];
private authReached = false;
private tokenRequestMade = false;
async start(): Promise<ScenarioUrls> {
this.checks = [];
this.authReached = false;
this.tokenRequestMade = false;
const tokenVerifier = new MockTokenVerifier(this.checks, []);
const authApp = createAuthServer(this.checks, this.authServer.getUrl, {
tokenVerifier,
issParameterSupported: true,
issInRedirect: 'wrong', // send iss that doesn't match metadata issuer
onAuthorizationRequest: () => {
this.authReached = true;
},
onTokenRequest: () => {
this.tokenRequestMade = true;
return { token: `test-token-${Date.now()}`, scopes: [] };
}
});
await this.authServer.start(authApp);
const app = createServer(
this.checks,
this.server.getUrl,
this.authServer.getUrl,
{ requiredScopes: [], tokenVerifier }
);
await this.server.start(app);
return { serverUrl: `${this.server.getUrl()}/mcp` };
}
async stop() {
await this.authServer.stop();
await this.server.stop();
}
getChecks(): ConformanceCheck[] {
const timestamp = new Date().toISOString();
if (
!this.checks.some((c) => c.id === 'sep-2468-client-compare-iss-supported')
) {
const correctlyRejected = this.authReached && !this.tokenRequestMade;
this.checks.push({
id: 'sep-2468-client-compare-iss-supported',
name: 'Client rejects mismatched iss',
description: correctlyRejected
? 'Client correctly rejected authorization response with mismatched iss parameter'
: 'Client MUST reject authorization response when iss does not match the authorization server issuer',
status: correctlyRejected ? 'SUCCESS' : 'FAILURE',
timestamp,
specReferences: specRefs,
details: {
serverAdvertisedSupport: true,
issSentInRedirect: 'https://evil.example.com',
authReached: this.authReached,
tokenRequestMade: this.tokenRequestMade
}
});
}
return this.checks;
}
}
/**
* Scenario: ISS Parameter Sent but Not Advertised, Mismatched (client must reject)
*
* Server does not advertise authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported but
* includes a mismatched iss value in the redirect. Per the SEP-2468 spec table
* row 3, a conformant client MUST compare a present iss against the recorded
* issuer regardless of metadata advertisement, and reject on mismatch.
*/
export class IssParameterUnexpectedScenario implements Scenario {
name = 'auth/iss-unexpected';
readonly source = { introducedIn: DRAFT_PROTOCOL_VERSION } as const;
description =
'Tests that client compares iss against recorded issuer even when not advertised, and rejects on mismatch';
allowClientError = true;
private authServer = new ServerLifecycle();
private server = new ServerLifecycle();
private checks: ConformanceCheck[] = [];
private authReached = false;
private tokenRequestMade = false;
async start(): Promise<ScenarioUrls> {
this.checks = [];
this.authReached = false;
this.tokenRequestMade = false;
const tokenVerifier = new MockTokenVerifier(this.checks, []);
const authApp = createAuthServer(this.checks, this.authServer.getUrl, {
tokenVerifier,
issParameterSupported: null,
issInRedirect: 'wrong', // send mismatched iss without advertising support
onAuthorizationRequest: () => {
this.authReached = true;
},
onTokenRequest: () => {
this.tokenRequestMade = true;
return { token: `test-token-${Date.now()}`, scopes: [] };
}
});
await this.authServer.start(authApp);
const app = createServer(
this.checks,
this.server.getUrl,
this.authServer.getUrl,
{ requiredScopes: [], tokenVerifier }
);
await this.server.start(app);
return { serverUrl: `${this.server.getUrl()}/mcp` };
}
async stop() {
await this.authServer.stop();
await this.server.stop();
}
getChecks(): ConformanceCheck[] {
const timestamp = new Date().toISOString();
if (
!this.checks.some(
(c) => c.id === 'sep-2468-client-compare-iss-unadvertised'
)
) {
const correctlyRejected = this.authReached && !this.tokenRequestMade;
this.checks.push({
id: 'sep-2468-client-compare-iss-unadvertised',
name: 'Client compares unadvertised iss and rejects mismatch',
description: correctlyRejected
? 'Client correctly compared unadvertised iss against recorded issuer and rejected the mismatch'
: 'Client MUST compare a present iss against the recorded issuer regardless of metadata advertisement, and reject on mismatch',
status: correctlyRejected ? 'SUCCESS' : 'FAILURE',
timestamp,
specReferences: specRefs,
details: {
serverAdvertisedSupport: false,
issSentInRedirect: 'https://evil.example.com',
authReached: this.authReached,
tokenRequestMade: this.tokenRequestMade
}
});
}
return this.checks;
}
}

View file

@ -89,6 +89,11 @@ export const SpecReferences: { [key: string]: SpecReference } = {
id: 'MCP-PKCE-requirement',
url: 'https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/authorization#authorization-code-protection'
},
// TODO: Update to MCP spec URL once SEP-2468 (modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol#2468) is merged
RFC_9207_ISS_PARAMETER: {
id: 'RFC-9207-iss-parameter',
url: 'https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9207.html#section-2'
},
RFC_8693_TOKEN_EXCHANGE: {
id: 'RFC-8693-Token-Exchange',
url: 'https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8693'

23
src/seps/sep-2468.yaml Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
sep: 2468
spec_url: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/draft/basic/authorization#authorization-response-validation
requirements:
- check: sep-2468-client-validate-metadata-issuer
text: 'After retrieving a metadata document, MCP clients MUST validate it as required by RFC8414 Section 3.3 or OpenID Connect Discovery Section 4.3: the issuer value in the document MUST be identical to the issuer identifier used to construct the well-known URL. If they differ, the client MUST NOT use the metadata.'
url: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/draft/basic/authorization#authorization-server-metadata-discovery
- check: sep-2468-as-include-iss
text: 'MCP authorization servers SHOULD include the iss parameter in authorization responses, including error responses, as defined in RFC9207 Section 2.'
- check: sep-2468-as-advertise-iss-supported
text: 'Authorization servers that include the iss parameter MUST advertise this by setting authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported to true in their metadata (RFC9207 Section 2.3).'
- check: sep-2468-client-compare-iss-supported
text: 'On receiving the authorization response, MCP clients MUST apply the validation in RFC9207 Section 2.4 before transmitting the authorization code to any token endpoint: authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported true, iss present -> Compare to the recorded issuer using simple string comparison / Before redirecting the user-agent, the client MUST record the issuer value from the selected authorization server validated metadata document and associate it with the same per-request record used to store the PKCE code verifier.'
- check: sep-2468-client-reject-missing-iss
text: 'On receiving the authorization response, MCP clients MUST apply the validation in RFC9207 Section 2.4 before transmitting the authorization code to any token endpoint: authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported true, iss absent -> Reject the response.'
- check: sep-2468-client-compare-iss-unadvertised
text: 'On receiving the authorization response, MCP clients MUST apply the validation in RFC9207 Section 2.4 before transmitting the authorization code to any token endpoint: authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported false or absent, iss present -> Compare to the recorded issuer using simple string comparison.'
- check: sep-2468-client-proceed-no-iss
text: 'On receiving the authorization response, MCP clients MUST apply the validation in RFC9207 Section 2.4 before transmitting the authorization code to any token endpoint: authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported false or absent, iss absent -> Proceed.'
- check: sep-2468-client-no-normalization
text: 'After decoding the iss value from the application/x-www-form-urlencoded response per RFC 9207 Section 2.4, clients MUST NOT apply scheme or host case folding, default-port elision, trailing-slash, or percent-encoding normalization (RFC 3986 Sections 6.2.2-6.2.3) before comparison.'
- text: 'This validation applies equally to error responses - on mismatch the client MUST NOT act on or display error, error_description, or error_uri.'
excluded: 'display is UI-facing; act-on has no protocol-observable signal beyond the existing reject-on-mismatch checks'