conformance/src/scenarios/client/auth/helpers/dpopResourceAuth.test.ts
PieterKas 6e726734f5
Client Auth: DPoP Sender-Constrained Tokens (SEP-1932) (#394)
* Add DPoP client conformance scenario + shared DPoP helpers (SEP-1932, #368)

Client-anchored packaging: carries the shared DPoP foundation (dpopProof /
dpopToken helpers, the createAuthServer DPoP core, and sep-1932.yaml) together
with the client scenario, so it can merge first; the server (#369) and
authorization-server (#370) scenarios are follow-ups that depend on it.

DPoP is treated as a draft/not-yet-official feature (mirroring the WIF SEP-1933
scenario): the scenario's source is `introducedIn: DRAFT_PROTOCOL_VERSION` and
it is registered in draftScenariosList (informational, not scored). It is NOT
registered in EXTENSION_IDS, since the ext-auth DPoP extension is still on a
branch rather than merged.

Client checks (the two extension MUSTs, RFC 9449 §7.1 / §4.2-4.3):
- sep-1932-client-dpop-auth-scheme — token presented with the DPoP scheme.
- sep-1932-client-fresh-proof — a fresh, well-formed DPoP proof per request.

The test MCP server judges the client via an opt-in DPoP middleware
(dpopResourceAuth) passed through createServer's authMiddleware hook; a compliant
example client (covered by the Client Draft Scenarios loop) plus deliberately-
broken bearer/replay variants drive the pass/fail acceptance tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* client/dpop: split into nonce-less baseline + nonce-required scenario

Server-provided nonces are optional in RFC 9449 (AS §8 "MAY", RS §9 "can
also choose"), and the nonce-less flow is the common case. The single
auth/dpop scenario hard-wired nonce enforcement on both the test AS and
MCP server, so a plain nonce-less proof was never accepted end-to-end and
a client that only does plain proofs was never exercised on its happy path.

Parameterize DPoPClientScenario with `requireNonce` and register it twice:
- auth/dpop        (requireNonce=false) — nonce-less baseline; emits the
  three baseline checks (token-request-proof, dpop-auth-scheme, fresh-proof).
- auth/dpop-nonce  (requireNonce=true)  — prior behavior; adds as-nonce and
  rs-nonce (five checks).

Check IDs are reused (no new IDs, no sep-1932.yaml change); the two nonce
checks are emitted only by auth/dpop-nonce, so traceability stays intact.

Add auth-test-dpop-no-nonce.ts (nonce-incapable but otherwise compliant)
asserting SUCCESS against auth/dpop — proof that a client with no nonce
handling still completes DPoP when the server does not require a nonce.
Baseline negatives stay on auth/dpop (nonce-independent); the two nonce
negatives are re-pointed to auth/dpop-nonce.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* client/dpop: round-4 nonce-surface correctness fixes

Address review findings on the auth/dpop-nonce posture:

- Record the token-request proof observation BEFORE the §8 nonce challenge,
  so a client that is challenged but does not retry is no longer mis-reported
  by token-request-proof as "never completed a token request" (its proof was
  just validated). (#2)
- Record the resource-request jti/replay on ANY valid proof (before the §9
  nonce gate), so fresh-proof is never asserted on zero evidence and a client
  that never honours the RS nonce fails ONLY rs-nonce. (#5)
- Require challengeIssued && honored for as-nonce/rs-nonce SUCCESS, closing a
  vacuous-pass path (a client that pre-sends the nonce is never challenged). (#3a)
- Gate the AS nonce observation on the authorization_code exchange, matching
  recordTokenRequestProof (a refresh exchange must not satisfy §8). (#3c)
- Collapse duplicate shared token-flow check IDs (token-request, pkce-*) that
  the §8 round-trip re-POST would otherwise emit twice. (#4)
- Example client: retry the token request only on a use_dpop_nonce error code,
  not any 400 carrying a DPoP-Nonce header (consistent with the RS path). (#6)
- Fix the DpopTokenRequestObservation docstring ("last write wins" →
  sticky-failure). (#7)

Adds an expectedSuccessSlugs option to the client test helper and tightens the
two nonce negative tests to pin the now-clean behavior (token-request-proof
SUCCESS for no-as-nonce; only rs-nonce fails for no-rs-nonce).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* client/dpop: round-5 fixes — dedupe masking, wording, replay decision

- dedupeSharedChecks was masking failures: it kept the last occurrence of a
  duplicate check ID regardless of status and ran in BOTH postures, so a
  FAILURE on a challenged POST (or an earlier attempt in a restarted flow) was
  silently dropped. Replace with an exported, unit-tested collapseDuplicateChecks
  that prefers the MOST-SEVERE occurrence, and only apply it in the nonce
  posture (the baseline keeps genuinely distinct repeated attempts). (R5 #1)
- Reword the token-request-proof description: it can be SUCCESS for a client
  that presented a valid proof but never obtained a token (challenged, no
  retry), so it no longer claims "obtaining a DPoP-bound access token". (R5 #2)
- Reword the as-nonce/rs-nonce failure messages to cover a client that DID
  retry but whose retry proof was rejected (not only "did not retry"). (R5 #3)
- Document the deliberate replay decision: recording jti on challenged requests
  means re-sending the identical proof across the challenge/retry boundary trips
  replay detection — a genuine RFC 9449 §4.2 jti-uniqueness violation. (R5 #5)

Adds src/scenarios/client/auth/dpop.test.ts unit-testing collapseDuplicateChecks
(prefers failures, keeps INFO, preserves order) — the dedupe fix is now pinned.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* client/dpop: round-6 polish — pin collapse wiring; docstring

- Add an integration assertion that the §8/§9 double-POST is collapsed to one
  token-request/pkce-* entry each in auth/dpop-nonce, so the requireNonce gating
  of collapseDuplicateChecks can't be silently deleted or inverted (previously
  mutation-survivable). runClientAgainstScenario now returns the emitted checks
  so callers can make occurrence-level assertions (backward-compatible).
- Docstring: note the severity ladder ranks SKIPPED below SUCCESS, and that
  equal-severity ties keep the last occurrence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 17:13:02 +01:00

239 lines
6.6 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import {
generateDpopKeyPair,
buildDpopProof,
type DpopKeyPair
} from './dpopProof';
import { generateIssuerKey, mintDpopBoundToken } from './dpopToken';
import { validateResourceProof } from './dpopResourceAuth';
const ISSUER = 'https://auth.example.com';
const RESOURCE = 'https://mcp.example.com/mcp';
/** Mint a DPoP-bound token for `kp`'s key, optionally bound to a foreign key. */
async function boundToken(
kp: DpopKeyPair,
jktOverride?: string
): Promise<string> {
const issuerKey = await generateIssuerKey();
return mintDpopBoundToken({
issuerKey,
issuer: ISSUER,
audience: RESOURCE,
jkt: kp.thumbprint,
...(jktOverride ? { jktOverride } : {})
});
}
describe('validateResourceProof — accepts a well-formed resource proof', () => {
it('accepts a valid proof bound to the presented token', async () => {
const kp = await generateDpopKeyPair();
const token = await boundToken(kp);
const proof = await buildDpopProof({
keyPair: kp,
htm: 'POST',
htu: RESOURCE,
accessToken: token
});
const result = await validateResourceProof(proof, token, 'POST', RESOURCE);
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
});
it('accepts an htu that differs only by normalization (trailing slash)', async () => {
const kp = await generateDpopKeyPair();
const token = await boundToken(kp);
const proof = await buildDpopProof({
keyPair: kp,
htm: 'POST',
htu: `${RESOURCE}/`,
accessToken: token
});
const result = await validateResourceProof(proof, token, 'POST', RESOURCE);
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('validateResourceProof — rejects each single defect', () => {
async function expectRejected(
build: Parameters<typeof buildDpopProof>[0],
method = 'POST',
tokenJktOverride?: string
): Promise<string> {
const kp = (build.keyPair as DpopKeyPair) ?? (await generateDpopKeyPair());
const token = await boundToken(kp, tokenJktOverride);
const proof = await buildDpopProof({ ...build, keyPair: kp });
const result = await validateResourceProof(proof, token, method, RESOURCE);
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
return result.ok ? '' : result.error;
}
it('rejects a missing proof', async () => {
const kp = await generateDpopKeyPair();
const token = await boundToken(kp);
const result = await validateResourceProof(
undefined,
token,
'POST',
RESOURCE
);
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects a wrong typ', async () => {
const kp = await generateDpopKeyPair();
expect(
await expectRejected({
keyPair: kp,
htm: 'POST',
htu: RESOURCE,
typ: 'jwt'
})
).toMatch(/typ/);
});
it('rejects a symmetric algorithm', async () => {
const kp = await generateDpopKeyPair();
expect(
await expectRejected({
keyPair: kp,
htm: 'POST',
htu: RESOURCE,
symmetric: true
})
).toMatch(/alg/);
});
it('rejects a private key embedded in the jwk header', async () => {
const kp = await generateDpopKeyPair();
expect(
await expectRejected({
keyPair: kp,
htm: 'POST',
htu: RESOURCE,
embedPrivateKey: true
})
).toMatch(/private key/);
});
it('rejects a tampered signature', async () => {
const kp = await generateDpopKeyPair();
expect(
await expectRejected({
keyPair: kp,
htm: 'POST',
htu: RESOURCE,
tamperSignature: true
})
).toMatch(/signature/);
});
it('rejects a missing jti', async () => {
const kp = await generateDpopKeyPair();
expect(
await expectRejected({
keyPair: kp,
htm: 'POST',
htu: RESOURCE,
omit: ['jti']
})
).toMatch(/jti/);
});
it('rejects an htm that does not match the request method', async () => {
const kp = await generateDpopKeyPair();
// proof says GET, request is POST
expect(
await expectRejected({ keyPair: kp, htm: 'GET', htu: RESOURCE }, 'POST')
).toMatch(/htm/);
});
it('rejects an htu that does not match the request URI', async () => {
const kp = await generateDpopKeyPair();
expect(
await expectRejected({
keyPair: kp,
htm: 'POST',
htu: 'https://elsewhere.example.com/mcp'
})
).toMatch(/htu/);
});
it('rejects a stale iat', async () => {
const kp = await generateDpopKeyPair();
expect(
await expectRejected({
keyPair: kp,
htm: 'POST',
htu: RESOURCE,
iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 3600
})
).toMatch(/iat/);
});
it('rejects a wrong ath', async () => {
const kp = await generateDpopKeyPair();
expect(
await expectRejected({
keyPair: kp,
htm: 'POST',
htu: RESOURCE,
athOverride: 'not-the-token-hash'
})
).toMatch(/ath/);
});
it('rejects a token bound to a different key (cnf.jkt mismatch)', async () => {
const kp = await generateDpopKeyPair();
const foreign = await generateDpopKeyPair();
const token = await boundToken(kp, foreign.thumbprint);
const proof = await buildDpopProof({
keyPair: kp,
htm: 'POST',
htu: RESOURCE,
accessToken: token
});
const result = await validateResourceProof(proof, token, 'POST', RESOURCE);
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
expect(result.ok ? '' : result.error).toMatch(/cnf\.jkt/);
});
it('rejects an htu containing a query string (RFC 9449 §4.2)', async () => {
const kp = await generateDpopKeyPair();
expect(
await expectRejected({ keyPair: kp, htm: 'POST', htu: `${RESOURCE}?x=1` })
).toMatch(/query or fragment/);
});
it('rejects an htu containing a fragment (RFC 9449 §4.2)', async () => {
const kp = await generateDpopKeyPair();
expect(
await expectRejected({
keyPair: kp,
htm: 'POST',
htu: `${RESOURCE}#frag`
})
).toMatch(/query or fragment/);
});
it('rejects two comma-joined proofs — multiple DPoP headers (RFC 9449 §4.2)', async () => {
const kp = await generateDpopKeyPair();
const token = await boundToken(kp);
const proof = await buildDpopProof({
keyPair: kp,
htm: 'POST',
htu: RESOURCE,
accessToken: token
});
// Node joins duplicate DPoP headers into one comma-separated value.
const result = await validateResourceProof(
`${proof}, ${proof}`,
token,
'POST',
RESOURCE
);
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
expect(result.ok ? '' : result.error).toMatch(
/multiple DPoP proof headers/
);
});
});