Enforce PKCE metadata compliance in OAuth client (#730) (#1700)

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Pranav Senthilnathan 2026-07-21 08:24:25 -07:00 • committed by GitHub
commit 7369a265a8
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3 changed files with 230 additions and 10 deletions

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@ -366,8 +366,15 @@ internal sealed partial class ClientOAuthProvider : McpHttpClient
private async Task<AuthorizationServerMetadata> GetAuthServerMetadataAsync(Uri authServerUri, string? resourceUri, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
// Tracks whether at least one well-known endpoint returned a structurally valid metadata document.
// This distinguishes "no metadata document was found" (eligible for the 2025-03-26 legacy fallback)
// from "a metadata document exists but failed PKCE validation" (must not fall back to synthesized defaults).
var metadataDocumentFound = false;
McpException? pkceValidationFailure = null;
foreach (var wellKnownEndpoint in GetWellKnownAuthorizationServerMetadataUris(authServerUri))
{
AuthorizationServerMetadata? metadata;
try
{
var response = await _httpClient.GetAsync(wellKnownEndpoint, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
@ -377,7 +384,7 @@ internal sealed partial class ClientOAuthProvider : McpHttpClient
}
using var stream = await response.Content.ReadAsStreamAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
var metadata = await JsonSerializer.DeserializeAsync(stream, McpJsonUtilities.JsonContext.Default.AuthorizationServerMetadata, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
metadata = await JsonSerializer.DeserializeAsync(stream, McpJsonUtilities.JsonContext.Default.AuthorizationServerMetadata, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (metadata is null)
{
@ -395,23 +402,63 @@ internal sealed partial class ClientOAuthProvider : McpHttpClient
ThrowFailedToHandleUnauthorizedResponse($"AuthorizationEndpoint must use HTTP or HTTPS. '{metadata.AuthorizationEndpoint}' does not meet this requirement.");
}
metadata.ResponseTypesSupported ??= ["code"];
metadata.GrantTypesSupported ??= ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"];
metadata.TokenEndpointAuthMethodsSupported ??= ["client_secret_post"];
metadata.CodeChallengeMethodsSupported ??= ["S256"];
return metadata;
// A structurally valid metadata document was discovered. Even if it fails PKCE validation
// below, its existence disqualifies the legacy fallback that would otherwise synthesize S256.
metadataDocumentFound = true;
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
LogErrorFetchingAuthServerMetadata(ex, wellKnownEndpoint);
continue;
}
try
{
// Per the MCP spec, clients MUST verify PKCE support via authorization server metadata and refuse
// to proceed without it. Rather than failing on the first document that lacks it, skip to the next
// discovery endpoint: different well-known endpoints (OAuth 2.0 vs OpenID Connect) can return
// different documents for the same server, and OpenID Connect metadata commonly includes the field.
var codeChallengeMethods = metadata.CodeChallengeMethodsSupported;
if (codeChallengeMethods is null)
{
ThrowFailedToHandleUnauthorizedResponse(
$"Authorization server metadata from '{wellKnownEndpoint}' does not include 'code_challenge_methods_supported'. MCP clients require PKCE support and must refuse to proceed.");
}
if (!codeChallengeMethods.Contains("S256"))
{
var advertisedMethods = codeChallengeMethods.Count > 0
? string.Join(", ", codeChallengeMethods)
: "<none>";
ThrowFailedToHandleUnauthorizedResponse(
$"Authorization server metadata from '{wellKnownEndpoint}' does not advertise required PKCE method 'S256' in 'code_challenge_methods_supported'. Advertised methods: {advertisedMethods}.");
}
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
LogAuthServerMetadataMissingPkceSupport(ex, wellKnownEndpoint);
pkceValidationFailure = ex as McpException ?? new McpException(ex.Message, ex);
continue;
}
metadata.ResponseTypesSupported ??= ["code"];
metadata.GrantTypesSupported ??= ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"];
metadata.TokenEndpointAuthMethodsSupported ??= ["client_secret_post"];
return metadata;
}
// A discovered metadata document that failed PKCE validation must not be replaced with synthesized
// defaults. Surface the specific PKCE failure regardless of whether PRM was available.
if (metadataDocumentFound && pkceValidationFailure is not null)
{
throw pkceValidationFailure;
}
if (resourceUri is null)
{
// 2025-03-26 backcompat: when PRM is unavailable and auth server metadata discovery
// also fails, fall back to default endpoint paths per the 2025-03-26 spec.
// 2025-03-26 backcompat: when PRM is unavailable and no auth server metadata document was
// discovered, fall back to default endpoint paths per the 2025-03-26 spec.
return BuildDefaultAuthServerMetadata(authServerUri);
}
@ -1155,6 +1202,9 @@ internal sealed partial class ClientOAuthProvider : McpHttpClient
[LoggerMessage(Level = LogLevel.Error, Message = "Error fetching auth server metadata from {Endpoint}")]
partial void LogErrorFetchingAuthServerMetadata(Exception ex, Uri endpoint);
[LoggerMessage(Level = LogLevel.Warning, Message = "Authorization server metadata from {Endpoint} does not satisfy PKCE requirements; skipping it and trying the next discovery endpoint.")]
partial void LogAuthServerMetadataMissingPkceSupport(Exception ex, Uri endpoint);
[LoggerMessage(Level = LogLevel.Information, Message = "Performing dynamic client registration with {RegistrationEndpoint}")]
partial void LogPerformingDynamicClientRegistration(Uri registrationEndpoint);

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@ -131,6 +131,85 @@ public class AuthTests : OAuthTestBase
transport, loggerFactory: LoggerFactory, cancellationToken: TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
}
[Fact]
public async Task CannotAuthenticate_WhenMetadataOmitsPkceMethods()
{
TestOAuthServer.CodeChallengeMethodsSupported = null;
await using var app = await StartMcpServerAsync();
await using var transport = new HttpClientTransport(new()
{
Endpoint = new(McpServerUrl),
OAuth = new()
{
ClientId = "demo-client",
ClientSecret = "demo-secret",
RedirectUri = new Uri("http://localhost:1179/callback"),
AuthorizationRedirectDelegate = HandleAuthorizationUrlAsync,
},
}, HttpClient, LoggerFactory);
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<McpException>(() => McpClient.CreateAsync(
transport, loggerFactory: LoggerFactory, cancellationToken: TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
// No discovery endpoint advertises PKCE, so metadata discovery is exhausted. The precise PKCE reason
// is logged as each endpoint is skipped.
Assert.Contains(
MockLoggerProvider.LogMessages,
m => m.Exception?.Message.Contains("code_challenge_methods_supported") == true);
}
[Fact]
public async Task CannotAuthenticate_WhenMetadataLacksS256PkceMethod()
{
TestOAuthServer.CodeChallengeMethodsSupported = ["plain"];
await using var app = await StartMcpServerAsync();
await using var transport = new HttpClientTransport(new()
{
Endpoint = new(McpServerUrl),
OAuth = new()
{
ClientId = "demo-client",
ClientSecret = "demo-secret",
RedirectUri = new Uri("http://localhost:1179/callback"),
AuthorizationRedirectDelegate = HandleAuthorizationUrlAsync,
},
}, HttpClient, LoggerFactory);
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<McpException>(() => McpClient.CreateAsync(
transport, loggerFactory: LoggerFactory, cancellationToken: TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
Assert.Contains(
MockLoggerProvider.LogMessages,
m => m.Exception?.Message.Contains("required PKCE method 'S256'") == true);
}
[Fact]
public async Task CanAuthenticate_WhenFirstMetadataEndpointOmitsPkce_ButAnotherAdvertisesIt()
{
// The OAuth 2.0 authorization server metadata endpoint is tried before the OpenID Connect one.
// Simulate a server where only the OpenID Connect document advertises PKCE support, and verify the
// client falls through to it rather than failing on the first PKCE-less document.
TestOAuthServer.MetadataPathsWithoutPkceSupport.Add("/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server");
await using var app = await StartMcpServerAsync();
await using var transport = new HttpClientTransport(new()
{
Endpoint = new(McpServerUrl),
OAuth = new()
{
ClientId = "demo-client",
ClientSecret = "demo-secret",
RedirectUri = new Uri("http://localhost:1179/callback"),
AuthorizationRedirectDelegate = HandleAuthorizationUrlAsync,
},
}, HttpClient, LoggerFactory);
await using var client = await McpClient.CreateAsync(
transport, loggerFactory: LoggerFactory, cancellationToken: TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
}
[Fact]
public async Task UsesDynamicClientRegistration_WhenCimdNotSupported()
{
@ -1671,6 +1750,81 @@ public class AuthTests : OAuthTestBase
transport, loggerFactory: LoggerFactory, cancellationToken: TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
}
[Fact]
public async Task CannotAuthenticate_WithLegacyServerWhoseMetadataOmitsPkceMethods()
{
// 2025-03-26 backcompat regression guard: PRM is unavailable (resourceUri is null), but the server
// DOES serve an auth server metadata document that omits 'code_challenge_methods_supported'.
// The client must refuse to proceed rather than falling back to synthesized S256 defaults, since a
// discovered metadata document that fails PKCE validation disqualifies the legacy default fallback.
TestOAuthServer.ExpectResource = false;
// Use JwtBearer as the challenge scheme so the 401 response does NOT include resource_metadata.
Builder.Services.Configure<AuthenticationOptions>(options => options.DefaultChallengeScheme = JwtBearerDefaults.AuthenticationScheme);
Builder.Services.Configure<JwtBearerOptions>(JwtBearerDefaults.AuthenticationScheme, options =>
{
options.TokenValidationParameters.ValidateAudience = false;
});
await using var app = Builder.Build();
app.Use(async (context, next) =>
{
// Return 404 for PRM to simulate a legacy server that doesn't support RFC 9728.
if (context.Request.Path.StartsWithSegments("/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"))
{
context.Response.StatusCode = StatusCodes.Status404NotFound;
return;
}
// Serve auth server metadata that omits 'code_challenge_methods_supported' entirely.
if (context.Request.Path.StartsWithSegments("/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server") ||
context.Request.Path.StartsWithSegments("/.well-known/openid-configuration"))
{
context.Response.ContentType = "application/json";
await context.Response.WriteAsync($$"""
{
"issuer": "{{OAuthServerUrl}}",
"authorization_endpoint": "{{McpServerUrl}}/authorize",
"token_endpoint": "{{McpServerUrl}}/token",
"registration_endpoint": "{{McpServerUrl}}/register",
"response_types_supported": ["code"],
"grant_types_supported": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
"token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": ["client_secret_post"]
}
""");
return;
}
await next();
});
app.UseAuthentication();
app.UseAuthorization();
app.MapMcp().RequireAuthorization();
await app.StartAsync(TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
await using var transport = new HttpClientTransport(new()
{
Endpoint = new(McpServerUrl),
OAuth = new()
{
ClientId = "demo-client",
ClientSecret = "demo-secret",
RedirectUri = new Uri("http://localhost:1179/callback"),
AuthorizationRedirectDelegate = HandleAuthorizationUrlAsync,
},
}, HttpClient, LoggerFactory);
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<McpException>(() => McpClient.CreateAsync(
transport, loggerFactory: LoggerFactory, cancellationToken: TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
// The specific PKCE failure reason is surfaced rather than a generic discovery failure or a
// silently-synthesized S256 fallback.
Assert.Contains("code_challenge_methods_supported", ex.Message);
}
[Fact]
public async Task AuthorizationFlow_AppendsOfflineAccess_WhenServerAdvertisesIt()
{

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@ -100,6 +100,20 @@ public sealed class Program
/// </remarks>
public bool IncludeOfflineAccessInMetadata { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Gets or sets the code challenge methods advertised by metadata endpoints.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// The default value is <c>["S256"]</c>.
/// </remarks>
public List<string>? CodeChallengeMethodsSupported { get; set; } = ["S256"];
/// <summary>
/// Gets the set of metadata paths that should omit <c>code_challenge_methods_supported</c> from their
/// response, simulating a server whose discovery endpoints advertise differing PKCE support.
/// </summary>
public HashSet<string> MetadataPathsWithoutPkceSupport { get; } = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
public HashSet<string> DisabledMetadataPaths { get; } = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
public IReadOnlyCollection<string> MetadataRequests => _metadataRequests.ToArray();
@ -237,7 +251,9 @@ public sealed class Program
: ["openid", "profile", "email", "mcp:tools"],
TokenEndpointAuthMethodsSupported = ["client_secret_post"],
ClaimsSupported = ["sub", "iss", "name", "email", "aud"],
CodeChallengeMethodsSupported = ["S256"],
CodeChallengeMethodsSupported = MetadataPathsWithoutPkceSupport.Contains(context.Request.Path)
? null
: CodeChallengeMethodsSupported,
GrantTypesSupported = ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
IntrospectionEndpoint = $"{_url}/introspect",
RegistrationEndpoint = $"{_url}/register",