Implementation for SEP-2350 Client-side scope accumulation in step-up authorization (#1591)

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Tarek Mahmoud Sayed <tarekms@microsoft.com>
This commit is contained in:
Mike Kistler 2026-06-22 06:20:35 -07:00 • committed by GitHub
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@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
---
name: run-conformance-from-branch
description: Run MCP conformance tests in the C# SDK against a conformance branch (including forks) instead of the published npm version, then restore pinned dependencies.
compatibility: Requires npm, node, and dotnet SDK. Uses the csharp-sdk repo package.json/package-lock.json and tests/ModelContextProtocol.AspNetCore.Tests.
---
# Run Conformance From Branch
Run C# SDK conformance tests against an unpublished `modelcontextprotocol/conformance` branch (including branches in forks).
## Use Cases
- Validate a conformance PR before it is published to npm
- Validate C# SDK behavior against a fork with custom scenario changes
- Reproduce failures caused by conformance changes
## Safety / Repo Hygiene
1. Start from a clean git state.
2. Commit or stash local changes first.
3. Restore pinned dependencies when done (`npm ci`).
## Inputs
- **Source type**: `upstream-branch` or `fork-branch`
- **Source locator**:
- Upstream branch: `modelcontextprotocol/conformance#<branch>`
- Fork branch: `<owner>/conformance#<branch>`
- **Scenario** (optional): e.g. `auth/scope-step-up`
## Workflows
### A) Install directly from GitHub branch (upstream or fork)
From `csharp-sdk` root:
```bash
npm install --no-save @modelcontextprotocol/conformance@github:<owner>/conformance#<branch>
```
Examples:
```bash
npm install --no-save @modelcontextprotocol/conformance@github:modelcontextprotocol/conformance#main
npm install --no-save @modelcontextprotocol/conformance@github:myuser/conformance#sep-2350-check
```
## Run Tests
### Run client conformance tests with dotnet test filter:
```bash
dotnet test tests/ModelContextProtocol.AspNetCore.Tests/ModelContextProtocol.AspNetCore.Tests.csproj -f net10.0 --filter "FullyQualifiedName~ClientConformanceTests"
```
### Run server conformance tests with dotnet test filter:
```bash
dotnet test tests/ModelContextProtocol.AspNetCore.Tests/ModelContextProtocol.AspNetCore.Tests.csproj -f net10.0 --filter "FullyQualifiedName~ServerConformanceTests"
```
## Reporting
Always report:
1. Installed conformance source (`npm ls @modelcontextprotocol/conformance --depth=0`)
2. Scenario results (pass/fail/warnings)
3. Any new check IDs observed (for traceability)
## Cleanup / Restore
Return repo to pinned dependency state:
```bash
npm ci
```

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@ -48,6 +48,14 @@ internal sealed partial class ClientOAuthProvider : McpHttpClient
private string? _tokenEndpointAuthMethod;
private ITokenCache _tokenCache;
private AuthorizationServerMetadata? _authServerMetadata;
// The accumulated scope set lives for this provider's lifetime and is intentionally not keyed by
// resource or authorization server. This is safe today because one ClientOAuthProvider is created
// per HttpClientTransport, i.e. per endpoint/resource. If a provider were ever reused across
// multiple resources or auth servers, accumulated scopes could be sent to a server that rejects
// them (invalid_scope). Accumulation is scoped per "resource and operation" combination (SEP-2350).
private readonly HashSet<string> _accumulatedScopes = new(StringComparer.Ordinal);
private readonly object _scopeAccumulatorLock = new();
private bool _hasAttemptedStepUp;
/// <summary>
/// Initializes a new instance of the <see cref="ClientOAuthProvider"/> class using the specified options.
@ -245,6 +253,28 @@ internal sealed partial class ClientOAuthProvider : McpHttpClient
ThrowFailedToHandleUnauthorizedResponse("No authorization servers found in authentication challenge");
}
// SEP-2350: A step-up may legitimately introduce new scopes, so at least one interactive
// (re-)authorization attempt is always allowed. However, once a step-up has already been
// attempted, a subsequent insufficient_scope challenge that introduces no scope beyond those
// already requested cannot make progress by re-running authorization. Treat that repeated,
// unproductive challenge as a permanent authorization failure instead of prompting the user
// again for the same resource and operation combination.
if (response.StatusCode == System.Net.HttpStatusCode.Forbidden)
{
bool introducesNewScopes = ChallengeIntroducesNewScopes(protectedResourceMetadata);
lock (_scopeAccumulatorLock)
{
if (_hasAttemptedStepUp && !introducesNewScopes)
{
ThrowFailedToHandleUnauthorizedResponse(
"A repeated insufficient_scope challenge added no scope beyond those already requested, " +
"so step-up authorization cannot satisfy the request.");
}
_hasAttemptedStepUp = true;
}
}
// Convert string URIs to Uri objects for the selector
List<Uri> authServerUris = [];
foreach (var serverUriString in availableAuthorizationServers)
@ -730,16 +760,92 @@ internal sealed partial class ClientOAuthProvider : McpHttpClient
private string? GetScopeParameter(ProtectedResourceMetadata protectedResourceMetadata)
{
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(protectedResourceMetadata.WwwAuthenticateScope))
// Determine the scopes for the current operation from the challenge or metadata.
var currentOperationScopes = GetCurrentOperationScopes(protectedResourceMetadata);
if (currentOperationScopes.Count == 0)
{
return protectedResourceMetadata.WwwAuthenticateScope;
lock (_scopeAccumulatorLock)
{
// If we have previously requested scopes but nothing new, return the accumulated set.
return _accumulatedScopes.Count > 0
? string.Join(" ", _accumulatedScopes.OrderBy(s => s, StringComparer.Ordinal))
: null;
}
else if (protectedResourceMetadata.ScopesSupported.Count > 0)
{
return string.Join(" ", protectedResourceMetadata.ScopesSupported);
}
return _configuredScopes;
// Per SEP-2350: Compute the union of previously requested scopes and newly challenged scopes
// to avoid losing permissions needed for other operations during step-up authorization.
// Note: the accumulator stores only server-challenged / scopes_supported / configured scopes.
// offline_access (AugmentScopeWithOfflineAccess) and any ScopeSelector are applied per request
// in ComputeEffectiveScope and are intentionally not accumulated, so the selector always sees
// the full union and the operation stays idempotent.
lock (_scopeAccumulatorLock)
{
foreach (var scope in currentOperationScopes)
{
_accumulatedScopes.Add(scope);
}
// Sort scopes for stable, deterministic output (scopes are unordered per RFC 6749 §3.3).
return string.Join(" ", _accumulatedScopes.OrderBy(s => s, StringComparer.Ordinal));
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Determines the scopes required for the current operation, preferring the <c>WWW-Authenticate</c>
/// challenge scope, then <c>scopes_supported</c> from the protected resource metadata, then the
/// configured scopes. Returns the individual scope tokens so callers can compare and accumulate them
/// without re-joining and re-splitting. This does not mutate the accumulated scope set.
/// </summary>
private IReadOnlyList<string> GetCurrentOperationScopes(ProtectedResourceMetadata protectedResourceMetadata)
{
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(protectedResourceMetadata.WwwAuthenticateScope))
{
return SplitScopes(protectedResourceMetadata.WwwAuthenticateScope!);
}
var scopesSupported = protectedResourceMetadata.ScopesSupported;
if (scopesSupported.Count > 0)
{
// scopes_supported is already a list of individual scopes; avoid join/split round-tripping.
return scopesSupported as IReadOnlyList<string> ?? [.. scopesSupported];
}
return _configuredScopes is null ? [] : SplitScopes(_configuredScopes);
}
private static string[] SplitScopes(string scopes) =>
scopes.Split(new[] { ' ' }, StringSplitOptions.RemoveEmptyEntries);
/// <summary>
/// Returns <see langword="true"/> if the current challenge requires at least one scope that has not
/// already been requested in a previous (re-)authorization. The caller combines this with step-up
/// attempt tracking: per SEP-2350, a step-up that adds a new scope is always allowed, but once a
/// step-up has been attempted, a later challenge that adds no new scope is treated as a permanent
/// failure because re-running interactive authorization cannot make progress.
/// </summary>
private bool ChallengeIntroducesNewScopes(ProtectedResourceMetadata protectedResourceMetadata)
{
var currentOperationScopes = GetCurrentOperationScopes(protectedResourceMetadata);
if (currentOperationScopes.Count == 0)
{
// No concrete scope to request, so a re-authorization cannot add anything new.
return false;
}
lock (_scopeAccumulatorLock)
{
foreach (var scope in currentOperationScopes)
{
if (!_accumulatedScopes.Contains(scope))
{
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
/// <summary>

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@ -190,7 +190,8 @@ public sealed class ProtectedResourceMetadata
/// The scopes included in the WWW-Authenticate challenge MAY match scopes_supported, be a subset or superset of it,
/// or an alternative collection that is neither a strict subset nor superset. Clients MUST NOT assume any particular
/// set relationship between the challenged scope set and scopes_supported. Clients MUST treat the scopes provided
/// in the challenge as authoritative for satisfying the current request.
/// in the challenge as authoritative for the current operation. When re-authorizing, clients SHOULD include these
/// scopes alongside any previously granted scopes to avoid losing permissions needed for other operations (SEP-2350).
///
/// https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/authorization#protected-resource-metadata-discovery-requirements
/// </summary>

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@ -409,7 +409,9 @@ public class AuthTests : OAuthTestBase
await using var client = await McpClient.CreateAsync(
transport, loggerFactory: LoggerFactory, cancellationToken: TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
Assert.Equal("mcp:tools files:read", requestedScope);
var requestedScopeSet = new HashSet<string>(requestedScope!.Split(' '));
Assert.Contains("mcp:tools", requestedScopeSet);
Assert.Contains("files:read", requestedScopeSet);
}
[Fact]
@ -473,9 +475,13 @@ public class AuthTests : OAuthTestBase
McpServerTool.Create([McpServerTool(Name = "admin-tool")]
(ClaimsPrincipal user) =>
{
// Tool now just checks if user has the required scopes
// If they don't, it shouldn't get here due to middleware
Assert.True(user.HasClaim("scope", adminScopes), "User should have admin scopes when tool executes");
// Verify the user's scope claim contains all required admin scopes.
// With scope accumulation (SEP-2350), the token scope will be the union
// of previously granted and newly challenged scopes.
var scopeClaim = user.FindFirst("scope")?.Value ?? "";
var scopeSet = new HashSet<string>(scopeClaim.Split(' '));
Assert.Contains("admin:read", scopeSet);
Assert.Contains("admin:write", scopeSet);
return "Admin tool executed.";
}),
]);
@ -510,9 +516,11 @@ public class AuthTests : OAuthTestBase
if (toolCallParams?.Name == "admin-tool")
{
// Check if user has required scopes
// Check if user has required scopes (scope claim contains all admin scopes)
var user = context.User;
if (!user.HasClaim("scope", adminScopes))
var scopeClaim = user.FindFirst("scope")?.Value ?? "";
var scopeSet = new HashSet<string>(scopeClaim.Split(' '));
if (!scopeSet.Contains("admin:read") || !scopeSet.Contains("admin:write"))
{
// User lacks required scopes, return 403 before MapMcp processes the request
context.Response.StatusCode = StatusCodes.Status403Forbidden;
@ -554,7 +562,315 @@ public class AuthTests : OAuthTestBase
var adminResult = await client.CallToolAsync("admin-tool", cancellationToken: TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
Assert.Equal("Admin tool executed.", adminResult.Content[0].ToString());
Assert.Equal(adminScopes, requestedScope);
// SEP-2350: Verify that the step-up authorization request includes the union
// of previously requested scopes (mcp:tools) and newly challenged scopes (admin:read admin:write).
var requestedScopeSet = new HashSet<string>(requestedScope!.Split(' '));
Assert.Contains("mcp:tools", requestedScopeSet);
Assert.Contains("admin:read", requestedScopeSet);
Assert.Contains("admin:write", requestedScopeSet);
}
[Fact]
public async Task AuthorizationFlow_AccumulatesScopesAcrossMultipleStepUps()
{
// SEP-2350: Verify scope accumulation across multiple step-up authorization challenges.
// First call requires "files:read", second call requires "files:write".
// The second authorization request should include both "mcp:tools files:read files:write".
Builder.Services.AddMcpServer()
.WithTools([
McpServerTool.Create([McpServerTool(Name = "read-tool")]
(ClaimsPrincipal user) =>
{
return "Read tool executed.";
}),
McpServerTool.Create([McpServerTool(Name = "write-tool")]
(ClaimsPrincipal user) =>
{
return "Write tool executed.";
}),
]);
List<string?> requestedScopes = [];
await using var app = await StartMcpServerAsync(configureMiddleware: app =>
{
app.Use(async (context, next) =>
{
if (context.Request.Method == HttpMethods.Post && context.Request.Path == "/")
{
context.Request.EnableBuffering();
var message = await JsonSerializer.DeserializeAsync(
context.Request.Body,
McpJsonUtilities.DefaultOptions.GetTypeInfo(typeof(JsonRpcMessage)),
context.RequestAborted) as JsonRpcMessage;
context.Request.Body.Position = 0;
if (message is JsonRpcRequest request && request.Method == "tools/call")
{
var toolCallParams = JsonSerializer.Deserialize(
request.Params,
McpJsonUtilities.DefaultOptions.GetTypeInfo(typeof(CallToolRequestParams))) as CallToolRequestParams;
var user = context.User;
var scopeClaim = user.FindFirst("scope")?.Value ?? "";
var scopeSet = new HashSet<string>(scopeClaim.Split(' '));
if (toolCallParams?.Name == "read-tool" && !scopeSet.Contains("files:read"))
{
context.Response.StatusCode = StatusCodes.Status403Forbidden;
context.Response.Headers.WWWAuthenticate = $"Bearer error=\"insufficient_scope\", resource_metadata=\"{McpServerUrl}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource\", scope=\"files:read\"";
await context.Response.StartAsync(context.RequestAborted);
await context.Response.Body.FlushAsync(context.RequestAborted);
return;
}
if (toolCallParams?.Name == "write-tool" && !scopeSet.Contains("files:write"))
{
context.Response.StatusCode = StatusCodes.Status403Forbidden;
context.Response.Headers.WWWAuthenticate = $"Bearer error=\"insufficient_scope\", resource_metadata=\"{McpServerUrl}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource\", scope=\"files:write\"";
await context.Response.StartAsync(context.RequestAborted);
await context.Response.Body.FlushAsync(context.RequestAborted);
return;
}
}
}
await next(context);
});
});
await using var transport = new HttpClientTransport(new()
{
Endpoint = new(McpServerUrl),
OAuth = new()
{
ClientId = "demo-client",
ClientSecret = "demo-secret",
RedirectUri = new Uri("http://localhost:1179/callback"),
AuthorizationRedirectDelegate = (uri, redirect, ct) =>
{
var query = QueryHelpers.ParseQuery(uri.Query);
requestedScopes.Add(query["scope"].ToString());
return HandleAuthorizationUrlAsync(uri, redirect, ct);
},
},
}, HttpClient, LoggerFactory);
await using var client = await McpClient.CreateAsync(
transport, loggerFactory: LoggerFactory, cancellationToken: TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
// Initial auth gets "mcp:tools" from protected resource metadata
Assert.Single(requestedScopes);
Assert.Equal("mcp:tools", requestedScopes[0]);
// First step-up: read-tool requires "files:read"
var readResult = await client.CallToolAsync("read-tool", cancellationToken: TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
Assert.Equal("Read tool executed.", readResult.Content[0].ToString());
Assert.Equal(2, requestedScopes.Count);
var secondScopeSet = new HashSet<string>(requestedScopes[1]!.Split(' '));
Assert.Contains("mcp:tools", secondScopeSet);
Assert.Contains("files:read", secondScopeSet);
// Second step-up: write-tool requires "files:write"
var writeResult = await client.CallToolAsync("write-tool", cancellationToken: TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
Assert.Equal("Write tool executed.", writeResult.Content[0].ToString());
Assert.Equal(3, requestedScopes.Count);
var thirdScopeSet = new HashSet<string>(requestedScopes[2]!.Split(' '));
Assert.Contains("mcp:tools", thirdScopeSet);
Assert.Contains("files:read", thirdScopeSet);
Assert.Contains("files:write", thirdScopeSet);
}
[Fact]
public async Task AuthorizationFlow_StopsSteppingUpWhenChallengeAddsNoNewScope()
{
// SEP-2350: A misconfigured server repeats the same insufficient_scope challenge even after the
// client has already requested that scope. Re-running interactive authorization cannot make
// progress, so the client must treat it as a permanent failure rather than prompting the user
// again on every call to the same resource and operation.
Builder.Services.AddMcpServer()
.WithTools([
McpServerTool.Create([McpServerTool(Name = "deny-tool")]
(ClaimsPrincipal user) =>
{
return "Deny tool executed.";
}),
]);
List<string?> requestedScopes = [];
await using var app = await StartMcpServerAsync(configureMiddleware: app =>
{
app.Use(async (context, next) =>
{
if (context.Request.Method == HttpMethods.Post && context.Request.Path == "/")
{
context.Request.EnableBuffering();
var message = await JsonSerializer.DeserializeAsync(
context.Request.Body,
McpJsonUtilities.DefaultOptions.GetTypeInfo(typeof(JsonRpcMessage)),
context.RequestAborted) as JsonRpcMessage;
context.Request.Body.Position = 0;
if (message is JsonRpcRequest request && request.Method == "tools/call")
{
var toolCallParams = JsonSerializer.Deserialize(
request.Params,
McpJsonUtilities.DefaultOptions.GetTypeInfo(typeof(CallToolRequestParams))) as CallToolRequestParams;
// Always reject "deny-tool" with the same challenge, regardless of the token's scopes.
if (toolCallParams?.Name == "deny-tool")
{
context.Response.StatusCode = StatusCodes.Status403Forbidden;
context.Response.Headers.WWWAuthenticate = $"Bearer error=\"insufficient_scope\", resource_metadata=\"{McpServerUrl}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource\", scope=\"files:read\"";
await context.Response.StartAsync(context.RequestAborted);
await context.Response.Body.FlushAsync(context.RequestAborted);
return;
}
}
}
await next(context);
});
});
await using var transport = new HttpClientTransport(new()
{
Endpoint = new(McpServerUrl),
OAuth = new()
{
ClientId = "demo-client",
ClientSecret = "demo-secret",
RedirectUri = new Uri("http://localhost:1179/callback"),
AuthorizationRedirectDelegate = (uri, redirect, ct) =>
{
var query = QueryHelpers.ParseQuery(uri.Query);
requestedScopes.Add(query["scope"].ToString());
return HandleAuthorizationUrlAsync(uri, redirect, ct);
},
},
}, HttpClient, LoggerFactory);
await using var client = await McpClient.CreateAsync(
transport, loggerFactory: LoggerFactory, cancellationToken: TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
// Initial auth gets "mcp:tools" from protected resource metadata.
Assert.Single(requestedScopes);
// First call introduces a new scope ("files:read"), so exactly one step-up authorization occurs.
await Assert.ThrowsAnyAsync<Exception>(
() => client.CallToolAsync("deny-tool", cancellationToken: TestContext.Current.CancellationToken).AsTask());
Assert.Equal(2, requestedScopes.Count);
// Second call repeats the same challenge with no new scope. The client must NOT prompt again;
// it surfaces a permanent authorization failure instead of re-running interactive authorization.
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAnyAsync<Exception>(
() => client.CallToolAsync("deny-tool", cancellationToken: TestContext.Current.CancellationToken).AsTask());
Assert.Contains("added no scope beyond those already requested", ex.ToString());
// No additional authorization prompt was triggered by the second call.
Assert.Equal(2, requestedScopes.Count);
}
[Fact]
public async Task AuthorizationFlow_AllowsOneStepUpEvenWhenChallengeAddsNoNewScope()
{
// SEP-2350 (strict reading): A step-up authorization is always allowed at least once, even when
// the challenged scope was already requested during the initial authorization. Only a *repeated*
// challenge that still adds no new scope is treated as permanent. Here the server always rejects
// "deny-tool" with the same "mcp:tools" scope that the client already requested on initial connect.
Builder.Services.AddMcpServer()
.WithTools([
McpServerTool.Create([McpServerTool(Name = "deny-tool")]
(ClaimsPrincipal user) =>
{
return "Deny tool executed.";
}),
]);
List<string?> requestedScopes = [];
await using var app = await StartMcpServerAsync(configureMiddleware: app =>
{
app.Use(async (context, next) =>
{
if (context.Request.Method == HttpMethods.Post && context.Request.Path == "/")
{
context.Request.EnableBuffering();
var message = await JsonSerializer.DeserializeAsync(
context.Request.Body,
McpJsonUtilities.DefaultOptions.GetTypeInfo(typeof(JsonRpcMessage)),
context.RequestAborted) as JsonRpcMessage;
context.Request.Body.Position = 0;
if (message is JsonRpcRequest request && request.Method == "tools/call")
{
var toolCallParams = JsonSerializer.Deserialize(
request.Params,
McpJsonUtilities.DefaultOptions.GetTypeInfo(typeof(CallToolRequestParams))) as CallToolRequestParams;
// Always reject "deny-tool" challenging "mcp:tools", which the client already
// requested on initial connect, so the challenge never introduces a new scope.
if (toolCallParams?.Name == "deny-tool")
{
context.Response.StatusCode = StatusCodes.Status403Forbidden;
context.Response.Headers.WWWAuthenticate = $"Bearer error=\"insufficient_scope\", resource_metadata=\"{McpServerUrl}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource\", scope=\"mcp:tools\"";
await context.Response.StartAsync(context.RequestAborted);
await context.Response.Body.FlushAsync(context.RequestAborted);
return;
}
}
}
await next(context);
});
});
await using var transport = new HttpClientTransport(new()
{
Endpoint = new(McpServerUrl),
OAuth = new()
{
ClientId = "demo-client",
ClientSecret = "demo-secret",
RedirectUri = new Uri("http://localhost:1179/callback"),
AuthorizationRedirectDelegate = (uri, redirect, ct) =>
{
var query = QueryHelpers.ParseQuery(uri.Query);
requestedScopes.Add(query["scope"].ToString());
return HandleAuthorizationUrlAsync(uri, redirect, ct);
},
},
}, HttpClient, LoggerFactory);
await using var client = await McpClient.CreateAsync(
transport, loggerFactory: LoggerFactory, cancellationToken: TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
// Initial auth already requests "mcp:tools" from protected resource metadata.
Assert.Single(requestedScopes);
Assert.Equal("mcp:tools", requestedScopes[0]);
// First call: even though the challenged scope is not new, one step-up attempt is still allowed,
// so a second authorization request is made.
await Assert.ThrowsAnyAsync<Exception>(
() => client.CallToolAsync("deny-tool", cancellationToken: TestContext.Current.CancellationToken).AsTask());
Assert.Equal(2, requestedScopes.Count);
// Second call: the step-up has already been attempted and the challenge still adds no new scope,
// so the client surfaces a permanent failure without prompting again.
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAnyAsync<Exception>(
() => client.CallToolAsync("deny-tool", cancellationToken: TestContext.Current.CancellationToken).AsTask());
Assert.Contains("added no scope beyond those already requested", ex.ToString());
Assert.Equal(2, requestedScopes.Count);
}
[Fact]