## Summary
Fixes the open **critical** code scanning alert
(`actions/code-injection/critical`) in
`.github/workflows/status-check.yml`.
The "Get PR number" step interpolated `${{
github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}` directly into a `run:` shell
script. A PR author controls their own branch name, so a branch named
`rce$(...)` executes arbitrary commands on the runner — which holds a
`GITHUB_TOKEN` with `statuses: write` and `checks: write`. This is a
live target: PR #32's branch name is a working injection payload against
this exact line.
## Fix
Move the branch name (and the other two templated values in the step)
into `env:` and reference them as quoted shell variables. GitHub Actions
template expansion no longer touches the script body, so
attacker-controlled input can't break out of the string.
No behavior change for legitimate runs.
## Not addressed here
The other open alert — critical vitest advisory (Dependabot #4) — is
already covered by open PR #14, so it's intentionally left out of this
PR.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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