diff --git a/docs/decisions.md b/docs/decisions.md
index a451955..e3a574b 100644
--- a/docs/decisions.md
+++ b/docs/decisions.md
@@ -117,3 +117,31 @@ that extension's `evidenceRef` slot.
 **Rationale.** Separate PRs let each piece be reviewed and graduate on its own
 clock. FIDES stacks on `trust-annotations` because a scheme has no meaning
 without the slot it fills.
+
+## 2026-06-17 — Schemes carry data labels; host architectures do not
+
+**Decision.** `schemes/` holds **data-labelling** approaches a server attaches to
+a result (FIDES, Permissive IFC, AirGapAgent, `data-class`, attestation
+envelopes). **Host architectures** — control-flow designs the client/host runs
+(CaMeL, the "Design Patterns for Securing LLM Agents" catalogue, Dual-LLM) — are
+prior art in [`related-work.md`](./related-work.md), not candidate schemes.
+
+**Rationale.** A scheme produces a label; an architecture decides what to do with
+one. Conflating them would invite a `schemes/camel.md` that has no per-result
+payload to define. A capability token such an architecture issues can still be
+*referenced* through `evidenceRef`, but the architecture itself is not a scheme.
+
+## 2026-06-17 — Early SEP-1913 feedback recorded as cited open questions
+
+**Decision.** The substantive concerns from the original issue (#711) and SEP
+(#1913) review — the set-theoretic critique of linear sensitivity, org-defined
+vocabularies, the class+regulatory pairing, taint persistence across storage,
+per-block byte ranges, sequence-shape, and the false-security risk — are
+captured with reviewer attributions in [`open-questions.md`](./open-questions.md)
+rather than silently dropped by the narrower cut.
+
+**Rationale.** The narrow first cut (`sensitive: boolean`) deliberately omits a
+lot of debated design. Recording *why*, with links to the people who raised each
+point, keeps the history visible and gives each parked item a home to graduate
+from (a scheme, an `action-metadata` field, or a future extension) instead of
+being re-litigated from scratch.
diff --git a/docs/open-questions.md b/docs/open-questions.md
index 7adb9d9..8432a37 100644
--- a/docs/open-questions.md
+++ b/docs/open-questions.md
@@ -16,13 +16,50 @@ Tracked here rather than in the spec drafts, so the drafts stay non-temporal.
 
 ## trust-annotations
 
-- Is `sensitive` the right single coarse signal, or do we need the
-  `data-class.v1` profile from day one?
+- **Shape of the sensitivity signal.** Is `sensitive: boolean` the right single
+  coarse signal, or does the narrow cut overcorrect? The SEP-1913 thread rejected
+  a linear `sensitiveHint: low|medium|high` because sensitivity is set-theoretic,
+  not a scale ([@JustinCappos](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/issues/711#issuecomment-2967516811):
+  medical results to a mail MCP *and* a card number to a payment MCP, but neither
+  crossed). Reviewers then pushed for org-defined vocabularies
+  ([@olaservo](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/issues/711#issuecomment-2968743154),
+  [@Mossaka](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/issues/711#issuecomment-2971788308))
+  and a class+regulatory pairing such as `confidential:hipaa`
+  ([@krubenok](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/1913#discussion_r3103485194)).
+  Against that, [@localden](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/1913#issuecomment-4037623595)
+  warned a baked-in taxonomy is hard to remove. Open: keep the boolean and let
+  the [`data-class.v1` scheme](../schemes/data-class.md) carry the taxonomy, or
+  also expose a structured escape hatch on the wire so regulated flows are
+  expressible without a scheme?
+- **Enforcement vs. advisory.** A self-declared `sensitive: true` from a
+  poorly-configured or malicious server could create a false sense of security
+  ([@localden](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/1913#issuecomment-4037623595)).
+  [docs/trust-model.md](./trust-model.md) puts verification in registries; is
+  that enough without a normative client-side check path?
 - Content-block-level vs. result-level attachment — does the draft need a
-  worked multi-result example before it's implementable?
+  worked multi-result example before it's implementable? Per-block annotation
+  with **byte/codepoint ranges** was requested so clients can highlight the
+  flagged span, not just the whole result
+  ([@connor4312](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/1913#issuecomment-3849207989)).
 - `list_changed`: confirmed response-level annotations don't participate; revisit
   only if trust vocabulary ever attaches to tool definitions.
 
+## Naming (under review)
+
+These are explicitly unsettled and are being reviewed against the SEP-1913
+record before any rename lands:
+
+- **Umbrella name.** The original SEP was "Trust *& Sensitivity* Annotations" —
+  two axes (integrity *and* confidentiality). `trust-annotations` reads as the
+  integrity half; does the name hide the `sensitive` (confidentiality) half?
+- **`untrusted` vs `openWorldHint`.** Same concept, different layer (result vs.
+  tool definition). Share a name/vocabulary, or keep them deliberately distinct?
+- **`evidenceRef.type` vs `evidenceRef.scheme`.** The repo calls these values
+  "schemes" (`schemes/`); the selector field is `type`. Align the field name?
+- **`evidenceRef` itself.** Its ancestor is [@pshkv](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/1913#issuecomment-4196867926)'s
+  `decision_ref` / `attestation_ref` / `policy_profile`. Is `evidenceRef` the
+  clearest umbrella, or should the pointer name the kind of thing it references?
+
 ## action-metadata
 
 - Coexistence vs. replacement of legacy `destructiveHint` / `readOnlyHint` /
@@ -42,8 +79,20 @@ Tracked here rather than in the spec drafts, so the drafts stay non-temporal.
 
 ## Parked (SEP-1913 umbrella)
 
-- **`maliciousActivityHint`** — if it returns, it is per-`ContentBlock` with
-  spans, driven by the host's own detection, not a server-attested boolean.
+- **`maliciousActivityHint`** — killed in review on three grounds
+  ([@connor4312](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/1913#issuecomment-3849207989)):
+  it can't be resolved before execution for dynamic tools; a boolean gives no
+  UX or ranges; and clients won't trust a server's self-report of its own
+  maliciousness. If it returns, it is per-`ContentBlock` with spans, driven by
+  the **host's** own detection, not a server-attested boolean.
+- **Taint persistence across the store boundary** — a label must survive
+  round-tripping through storage: write a card number to a file, read it back,
+  and the sensitivity label must not silently disappear
+  ([@JustinCappos](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/issues/711#issuecomment-2967516811)).
+  This is a propagation property no single response annotation can guarantee on
+  its own; it needs the taxonomy and `evidenceRef` stable first.
 - **Session-level propagation rules** — escalation semantics and the
-  sequence-shape gap ("this was call N in a flagged sequence" has no response
-  annotation surface today).
+  **sequence-shape** gap: "this was call N in a flagged sequence" has no response
+  annotation surface today ([marras0914](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/1913)).
+  A candidate `evidenceRef` scheme could carry a sequence assertion; tracked in
+  [`schemes/README.md`](../schemes/README.md).
diff --git a/docs/related-work.md b/docs/related-work.md
index 5cdb88f..858391f 100644
--- a/docs/related-work.md
+++ b/docs/related-work.md
@@ -15,10 +15,22 @@ annotation work. Several were surfaced in IG meetings (notably 2026-05-28).
 ## Research
 
 - **FIDES** — *Information-flow control for LLM agents.* [arXiv:2505.23643](https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.23643). Basis for the `ifc.fides.v1` scheme in [`schemes/`](../schemes/).
-- **Design Patterns for Securing LLM Agents** — IBM/Google/Microsoft. [arXiv:2506.08837](https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.08837). Plan-Then-Execute, Dual LLM, Map-Reduce, etc.
+- **Permissive Information-Flow Analysis for LLMs** — relaxes IFC join so a label propagates only when an input actually influences an output. [arXiv:2410.03055](https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.03055). Candidate `evidenceRef` scheme (per-result label), like FIDES.
+- **AirGapAgent** — contextual-integrity minimisation: restrict per-task data to what the context warrants. [arXiv:2405.05175](https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.05175). Candidate scheme: emits a contextual-integrity classification per result.
+- **CaMeL — Defeating Prompt Injections by Design** — capability-based control/data-flow extraction. [arXiv:2503.18813](https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.18813). A **host architecture**, not a data-label scheme (see note below); a capability token it issues could be referenced via `evidenceRef`, but the architecture itself is not a scheme.
+- **Design Patterns for Securing LLM Agents** — IBM/Google/Microsoft. [arXiv:2506.08837](https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.08837). Plan-Then-Execute, Dual LLM, Map-Reduce, etc. Also **host architectures**, not schemes.
 - **Trail of Bits** — prompt-injection via hidden content in GitHub issues. [blog](https://blog.trailofbits.com/2025/08/06/prompt-injection-engineering-for-attackers-exploiting-github-copilot/).
 - **OpenAI Auto Review** — https://alignment.openai.com/auto-review/ (shared in IG chat).
 
+### Schemes vs. host architectures
+
+The `evidenceRef` slot carries **data labels** — a per-result record a server
+can attach (FIDES, Permissive IFC, AirGapAgent, data-class, attestation
+envelopes). It does **not** carry **host architectures** — control-flow designs
+the *client/host* runs (CaMeL, the Design-Patterns catalogue, Dual-LLM). These
+are complementary: an architecture decides what to do with a label, the label is
+what a scheme produces. Only the former belong in [`schemes/`](../schemes/).
+
 ## Implementations & tooling
 
 - [`kapil8811/mcp-trust-annotations`](https://github.com/kapil8811/mcp-trust-annotations) — reference Python SDK PoC for `trust-annotations`.
diff --git a/specification/draft/trust-annotations.mdx b/specification/draft/trust-annotations.mdx
index 395e3c8..4ed0689 100644
--- a/specification/draft/trust-annotations.mdx
+++ b/specification/draft/trust-annotations.mdx
@@ -137,6 +137,26 @@ are present, the content-block annotation refines the result-level one for that
 block; it MUST NOT *weaken* a result-level claim (union semantics — once
 `true`, stays `true`).
 
+### Relationship to existing `*Hint` annotations
+
+MCP tool definitions already carry an `openWorldHint` (alongside `readOnlyHint` /
+`destructiveHint` / `idempotentHint`). `untrusted` is deliberately **not** a
+synonym for `openWorldHint`:
+
+- `openWorldHint` is a property of the **tool definition** — "this tool reaches
+  an open, attacker-influenceable world" (e.g. a web fetch). It is known at
+  registration time and does not vary per call.
+- `untrusted` is a property of a **specific result** — "*this* returned data
+  originated from an open-world / untrusted source." A tool whose `openWorldHint`
+  is `true` may still return trusted data on a given call, and a tool whose
+  `openWorldHint` is `false` can surface untrusted data it read from storage.
+
+The original SEP-1913 proposal reused `openWorldHint` for the result-level
+"untrusted source" signal and then drew exactly this distinction
+([issue #711](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/issues/711)).
+Whether the two should share a name or vocabulary is an
+[open question](../../docs/open-questions.md).
+
 ### Lifecycle and `list_changed`
 
 Trust annotations defined here are **response-level**: they describe a specific