Add data-class scheme skeleton; separate label-schemes from host architectures

- schemes/data-class.md: skeleton for the structured classification taxonomy the
  trust-annotations 'sensitive' boolean deliberately omits (class + regulatory
  scope + org labels), shaped as open questions and attributed to the SEP-1913
  reviewers who pushed for it (JustinCappos, olaservo, Mossaka, krubenok, localden).
- schemes/README.md: list data-class under 'Schemes here'; add verified label-
  scheme candidates (Permissive IFC 2410.03055, AirGapAgent 2405.05175); move
  CaMeL and the design-pattern catalogue into a new 'Not schemes: host
  architectures' section, since they govern host control-flow rather than
  producing a per-result data label.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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Sam Morrow 2026-06-16 08:58:29 +02:00
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@ -17,17 +17,19 @@ here rather than as a top-level extension.
| Scheme | `evidenceRef.type` | Status | Source |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| [FIDES information-flow control](./ifc-fides.md) | `ifc.fides.v1` | Draft skeleton | [arXiv:2505.23643](https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.23643) |
| [Data classification](./data-class.md) | `data-class.v1` | Draft skeleton | SEP-1913 taxonomy (`class` + regulatory scope) |
## Candidate schemes (not yet drafted)
The open `type` slot is designed to carry the range of models raised in the
[SEP-1913](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/1913)
review and the surrounding literature. Each is a candidate for its own scheme doc:
review and the surrounding literature. Each is a candidate for its own scheme doc.
A scheme produces a **per-result data label** a server attaches:
| Approach | Likely `type` | Source |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Coarse data classification (level + regulatory scope) | `data-class.v1` | SEP-1913 taxonomy (e.g. `confidential:hipaa` shape) |
| Design-pattern controls (Plan-Then-Execute, Dual LLM, Map-Reduce) | — | [arXiv:2506.08837](https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.08837) |
| Permissive information-flow labels (influence-based propagation) | `ifc.permissive.v1` | [arXiv:2410.03055](https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.03055) |
| Contextual-integrity classification (per-task minimisation) | `ci.airgap.v1` | [arXiv:2405.05175](https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.05175) |
| ShardGuard | — | cited in SEP-1913 |
| Capability-token constraints (SINT) | — | SEP-1913 review thread |
| Caller/tool cosigning | — | SEP-1913 review thread |
@ -37,6 +39,18 @@ review and the surrounding literature. Each is a candidate for its own scheme do
These are leads, not commitments. A candidate becomes a scheme when someone
drafts it to the bar below; until then the slot simply stays open for it.
## Not schemes: host architectures
Some models raised in the same discussion are **host/client control-flow
architectures**, not data labels — they decide what to *do* with information,
they don't produce a per-result record a server attaches. They are prior art (see
[`related-work.md`](../docs/related-work.md)), not entries here:
| Approach | Why it isn't a scheme | Source |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| CaMeL (capability-based control/data-flow) | A host runtime; a capability token it issues *could* be referenced via `evidenceRef`, but the architecture isn't a label | [arXiv:2503.18813](https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.18813) |
| Design-pattern controls (Plan-Then-Execute, Dual LLM, Map-Reduce) | Client-side execution patterns, nothing on the wire | [arXiv:2506.08837](https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.08837) |
## Bar for adding a scheme
A scheme doc should state:

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schemes/data-class.md Normal file
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---
title: Data classification (data-labelling scheme)
---
> ⚠️ **Experimental scheme skeleton.** This is one **data-labelling scheme** that
> fills the [`trust-annotations`](../specification/draft/trust-annotations.mdx)
> `evidenceRef` slot via `type: "data-class.v1"`. It is **not** an MCP extension
> and **not** a sibling of the extensions — it is the home for the richer
> classification taxonomy that the extension's coarse `sensitive` boolean
> deliberately leaves out. See [Why a scheme](#why-a-scheme-not-a-wire-field).
**Scheme** — fills `trust-annotations`'s `evidenceRef` slot, selected by
`evidenceRef.type == "data-class.v1"`. Not an extension.
## Abstract
This scheme defines `data-class.v1`, an entry for the `trust-annotations`
`evidenceRef` slot that carries a **structured data classification**: a coarse
sensitivity level plus zero or more regulatory scopes and optional org-defined
labels. It is the structured counterpart to the extension's single
`sensitive: boolean`, for deployments that need to express *which* regulated
category a result falls under (e.g. HIPAA, GDPR, PCI-DSS) without putting that
taxonomy on the wire for every server.
## Why a scheme, not a wire field
The `trust-annotations` extension keeps only `sensitive: boolean` on the wire.
That coarse signal is universally client-actionable and cheap, and — critically
— it cannot become wrong as regulation changes. A richer classification was
asked for repeatedly in review, in three different shapes:
- a **linear** `sensitiveHint: low | medium | high`, which
[@JustinCappos](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/issues/711#issuecomment-2967516811)
rejected: sensitivity is set-theoretic (a card number and a medical record are
both sensitive but to *different* readers), not a single scale;
- **org-defined vocabularies** rather than a fixed enum
([@olaservo](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/issues/711#issuecomment-2968743154);
[@Mossaka](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/issues/711#issuecomment-2971788308)
proposed reverse-DNS `classification.labels`);
- a **class + regulatory scope** pairing such as `confidential:hipaa`
([@krubenok](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/1913#discussion_r3103485194);
carried into SEP-2061 by @rreichel3).
Against all three, [@localden](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/1913#issuecomment-4037623595)
warned that a taxonomy baked into the protocol is very hard to remove if it turns
out wrong. A scheme resolves the tension: the taxonomy evolves behind a `type`
value, on its own clock, while the wire keeps the boolean that can never rot.
## Motivation
A regulated deployment needs to know not just *that* a result is sensitive but
*under which regime*, so the host can apply the matching control (HIPAA minimum-
necessary, GDPR purpose limitation, PCI-DSS storage rules). The boolean cannot
carry that, and encoding it inline would force every server and client to agree
on a regulatory taxonomy. This scheme lets a server that already knows the
classification (a healthcare record store, a payments API) attach it as evidence,
while a client that does not implement the scheme still sees `sensitive: true`.
## Specification
### Scheme identity
A `data-class.v1` record is selected by `evidenceRef.type == "data-class.v1"` on
a `trust-annotations` annotation whose `sensitive` is `true`. The
`digest`/`canonicalization` pair over the record is required exactly as for any
other scheme.
### Payload (skeleton)
The record is a JSON object. Shapes below are **open questions**, not settled:
```json
{
"class": "confidential",
"regulatory": ["hipaa"],
"labels": ["com.example.pii.ssn"],
"policyRef": "https://policy.example.com/classes/confidential"
}
```
- `class` — a coarse level. Candidate set `public | internal | confidential |
restricted` (four levels, from the original SEP-1913 taxonomy). Whether the set
is fixed or registry-curated is open.
- `regulatory` — zero or more regulatory scopes the result falls under. Open
strings, not an enum (so a new regime doesn't need a schema change). This is
the `:scope` half of @krubenok's `confidential:hipaa`.
- `labels` — optional org-defined tags, reverse-DNS namespaced per @Mossaka, for
vocabularies a deployment defines for itself.
- `policyRef` — optional pointer to the policy that defines the classes, so the
record is interpretable by a host that hasn't pre-agreed the vocabulary.
### Graceful degradation
A client that does not implement `data-class.v1` ignores the record and relies on
the `trust-annotations` `sensitive` boolean, which remains meaningful on its own.
The scheme only ever *refines* the boolean; it never contradicts it (a
`data-class.v1` record only appears where `sensitive` is already `true`).
## Producer / consumer
- **Producer (candidate).** A server fronting a regulated store (health records,
payments) that already classifies its data internally.
- **Consumer (candidate).** A host policy engine that maps `class` + `regulatory`
to a control (block, redact, prompt). The same host-side resolution model as
the FIDES scheme applies: the wire marker is advisory; the regulated semantics
are host-resolved against the deployment's policy.
## Open questions
- Is the `class` set fixed (`public/internal/confidential/restricted`) or
registry-curated? @localden's removability concern argues against fixing it.
- Do `regulatory` and `labels` overlap enough to collapse into one open-string
list, or are "named regime" and "org-defined tag" usefully distinct?
- Should `data-class.v1` ever be expressible **on the wire** as a structured
escape hatch (tracked in [open-questions.md](../docs/open-questions.md)),
or is keeping it strictly behind `evidenceRef` the right boundary?
- How does this relate to SEP-2061's `DataClass` / `RegulatoryScope` — is this
scheme the migration target for that work, or a parallel encoding?
## Changelog
- **2026-06-17** — Initial skeleton. Payload shapes are candidates pending the
open questions above.