diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 8c07123..2efc8ad 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ See [docs/decisions.md](docs/decisions.md) for the decision record and | Identifier | Status | What it specifies | Reference implementation(s) | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | [`io.modelcontextprotocol/trust-annotations`](specification/draft/trust-annotations.mdx) | Draft skeleton | **Primary extension.** A small, scheme-agnostic client-facing data-classification vocabulary (`sensitive`, `untrusted`) on result `_meta`, plus an optional `evidenceRef` pointer slot that carries richer payloads out-of-band. | Python SDK: [`kapil8811/mcp-trust-annotations`](https://github.com/kapil8811/mcp-trust-annotations) (138-test suite, healthcare demo, LLM usability study). | -| [`io.modelcontextprotocol/action-metadata`](specification/draft/action-metadata.mdx) | Draft skeleton | `inputMetadata` / `returnMetadata` / outcome classifiers (incl. `requires_review`) on `ToolAnnotations`, describing where inputs go, where outputs originate, and what real-world effects a tool can cause. | Carries forward [SEP-2061 (Action Security Metadata)](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2061) by [@rreichel3](https://github.com/rreichel3); reference impl per that proposal (`read_drafts` / `list_inbox` / `send_email`). | +| [`io.modelcontextprotocol/action-metadata`](specification/draft/action-metadata.mdx) | Draft skeleton | `inputMetadata` / `returnMetadata` / outcome classifiers (incl. `requires_review`) on `ToolAnnotations`, describing where inputs go, where outputs originate, and what real-world effects a tool can cause. | Originally [SEP-2061 (Action Security Metadata)](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2061) by [@rreichel3](https://github.com/rreichel3) — closed 2026-06-13 in favour of this extension; worked example `read_drafts` / `list_inbox` / `send_email`. | | [`io.modelcontextprotocol/ifc-fides`](specification/draft/ifc-fides.mdx) | Draft skeleton | A **profile** of the `trust-annotations` `evidenceRef` slot: `type: "ifc.fides.v1"` carrying an integrity + confidentiality label for deterministic information-flow control, following the FIDES paper ([arXiv:2505.23643](https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.23643)). | Emitter candidate: [`github-mcp-server`](https://github.com/github/github-mcp-server) (does not emit IFC labels today — closing that gap is the proof point). | ### Why FIDES is a profile, not a top-level extension diff --git a/docs/intent-comment.md b/docs/intent-comment.md index ecc3bca..7a99730 100644 --- a/docs/intent-comment.md +++ b/docs/intent-comment.md @@ -1,11 +1,12 @@ -# Intent comment (draft, pre-post review) +# Intent comments (posted) -This is the comment we plan to post on -[SEP-1913](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/1913), -with an abbreviated pointer version for -[SEP-2061](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2061). -Kept here so it can be reviewed and stays in sync with -[sep-disposition.md](./sep-disposition.md). +Both comments below have been **posted**. Kept here as the source of record, +in sync with [sep-disposition.md](./sep-disposition.md). + +- **SEP-1913** umbrella comment — [posted 2026-06-10](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/1913#issuecomment-4675047154). +- **SEP-2061** coordination note — [posted 2026-06-10](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2061#issuecomment-4675049171); + @localden then **closed SEP-2061 on 2026-06-13** in favour of the + `action-metadata` extension. --- diff --git a/docs/open-questions.md b/docs/open-questions.md index 57deb26..4d5749e 100644 --- a/docs/open-questions.md +++ b/docs/open-questions.md @@ -33,8 +33,12 @@ Tracked here rather than in the spec drafts, so the drafts stay non-temporal. ## ifc-fides - Inline `_meta.ifc` for low-friction adoption vs. always behind `evidenceRef`. -- GitHub Enterprise `internal` repo visibility → public/private/reader-set - mapping (audience is the whole org, broader than collaborators). +- GitHub Enterprise `internal` repo visibility → `public`/`private` mapping + (audience is the whole org, broader than collaborators; resolved host-side). +- Reader-set resolution is host-side by design — confidentiality join across two + `private` sources needs the intersection, which the opaque wire marker can't + express. Is the 3-step host resolution enough, or do some hosts need a + standard `evidenceRef.ref` shape to locate the originating system? ## Parked (SEP-1913 umbrella) diff --git a/docs/related-work.md b/docs/related-work.md index f5717fe..fdaf230 100644 --- a/docs/related-work.md +++ b/docs/related-work.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ annotation work. Several were surfaced in IG meetings (notably 2026-05-28). ## SEPs - [SEP-1913 — Trust and Sensitivity Annotations](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/1913) — the umbrella proposal these extensions derive from. -- [SEP-2061 — Action Security Metadata](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2061) — carried forward as `action-metadata`. +- [SEP-2061 — Action Security Metadata](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2061) — closed 2026-06-13; carried forward as `action-metadata`. - [SEP-1862 — Tool Resolution / pre-flight checks](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/1862) — core-protocol, composes with these extensions. - [SEP-2133 — Extensions](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/blob/main/seps/2133-extensions.md) — the framework this repo incubates under. - [SEP-2127 — Server Cards](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2893) — precedent for the Standards→Extensions Track refactor. diff --git a/docs/sep-disposition.md b/docs/sep-disposition.md index ab22421..18e2505 100644 --- a/docs/sep-disposition.md +++ b/docs/sep-disposition.md @@ -68,12 +68,13 @@ session-level propagation rules. See [open-questions.md](./open-questions.md). ### SEP-2061 — Action Security Metadata -**Proposed:** becomes the [`action-metadata`](../specification/draft/action-metadata.mdx) -extension. SEP-2061 is by [@rreichel3](https://github.com/rreichel3), who is -also an IG co-facilitator and SEP-1913 co-author, so this is a fold-in, not a -collision. Disposition mirrors 1913 option (A): keep the thread as the field- -semantics discussion, add a pointer comment linking it to the -`action-metadata` extension, refactor to Extensions Track when ready. +**Disposition:** **closed 2026-06-13** in favour of the +[`action-metadata`](../specification/draft/action-metadata.mdx) extension. +SEP-2061 is by [@rreichel3](https://github.com/rreichel3), who is also an IG +co-facilitator and SEP-1913 co-author, so this was a fold-in, not a collision. +[@localden](https://github.com/localden) closed the PR (no active sponsor) after +agreeing the extension is the right home; the extension now carries the field +semantics forward, with SEP-2061 preserved as the origin and credit. ### SEP-1862 — Tool Resolution (pre-flight checks) @@ -97,7 +98,7 @@ with it if it lands, but do not block on it. | SEP | Title | Proposed disposition | Extension home | | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | | 1913 | Trust & Sensitivity Annotations | Umbrella thread; schema moves to extensions | `trust-annotations` (+ `ifc-fides`) | -| 2061 | Action Security Metadata | Fold into extension | `action-metadata` | +| 2061 | Action Security Metadata | **Closed 2026-06-13**; lives as extension | `action-metadata` | | 1862 | Tool Resolution (pre-flight) | Stays core / Standards Track | — (composes, no dependency) | | 1984 | Comprehensive Tool Annotations | IG discussion item | — | | 2417 | Model Preferences for Tools | IG discussion item | — | diff --git a/specification/draft/action-metadata.mdx b/specification/draft/action-metadata.mdx index 5ea8d8c..dd27eee 100644 --- a/specification/draft/action-metadata.mdx +++ b/specification/draft/action-metadata.mdx @@ -10,8 +10,9 @@ title: Action Metadata > [SEP-2061: Action Security Metadata](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2061) > by [@rreichel3](https://github.com/rreichel3) into the IG's experimental repo, > per the May 28 2026 decision to pursue trust/privacy work as an extension -> first. SEP-2061 remains the canonical discussion thread for the field -> semantics. +> first. SEP-2061 was [closed](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2061#issuecomment-4675049171) +> on 2026-06-13 in favour of this extension as the home for the work; this draft +> is now the canonical place to discuss the field semantics. ## Abstract @@ -81,9 +82,9 @@ Carried under the extension-namespaced key on `ToolAnnotations`: | `outcome` | Real-world effect class: `benign` / `consequential` / `irreversible`. | | `requiresReview` | The tool author signals that a host SHOULD obtain explicit human confirmation before invocation. | -> Exact enum value sets are inherited from SEP-2061 and are **not** re-litigated -> here; this draft tracks that proposal. Where SEP-2061 evolves, this file -> follows. +> Exact enum value sets are inherited from SEP-2061 as the starting point and +> are **not** re-litigated here. With SEP-2061 now closed, this draft is where +> they evolve. ### `requiresReview` lives here, deliberately @@ -130,3 +131,4 @@ would anchor the draft in a real ecosystem. | Date | Change | | ---------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- | | 2026-06-10 | Initial draft skeleton, carrying SEP-2061 into the experimental repo; absorbed `requiresReview` from the trust taxonomy. | +| 2026-06-15 | SEP-2061 closed in favour of this extension; this draft is now the canonical home for the field semantics. | diff --git a/specification/draft/ifc-fides.mdx b/specification/draft/ifc-fides.mdx index 328ed17..7f9af0a 100644 --- a/specification/draft/ifc-fides.mdx +++ b/specification/draft/ifc-fides.mdx @@ -44,11 +44,12 @@ integrity (is this data trusted) as context accumulates across tool calls, and deny or prompt before a flow violates policy. A public MCP server is the natural emitter. [`github-mcp-server`](https://github.com/github/github-mcp-server) -returns repository data whose confidentiality is determined by repo visibility -and collaborator sets — exactly the public/private signal above — but does -**not** emit IFC labels today. Closing that emitter gap is the concrete proof -point for this profile: a host-side consumer of the label shape already exists, -so the missing half is a server willing to emit it. +returns repository data whose confidentiality follows from repository visibility +and collaborator sets — the same public/private signal — but does **not** emit +IFC labels today. Closing that emitter gap is the concrete proof point for this +profile: a host-side consumer of the label shape already exists, so the missing +half is a server willing to emit it, classifying each resource it returns (see +[per-resource classification](#reference-implementation)). ## Specification @@ -67,32 +68,62 @@ be inlined by deployments that accept the wire cost) has the shape: ```jsonc { "integrity": "trusted", // "trusted" | "untrusted" (FIDES §4.1 two-level lattice) - "confidentiality": "public" // "public" | "private" | ["login1","login2", …] + "confidentiality": "public" // "public" | "private" } ``` | Field | Meaning | | :--- | :--- | | `integrity` | Two-level integrity lattice (`trusted` ⊑ `untrusted`): trusted data may flow to untrusted sinks, not vice versa. | -| `confidentiality` | `"public"` = world-readable; `"private"` = an opaque marker the host resolves to a reader set (e.g. repo collaborators); an explicit `string[]` = pre-resolved reader logins. Fewer readers = more confidential = higher in the lattice. | +| `confidentiality` | `"public"` = world-readable; `"private"` = an opaque marker meaning "restricted to some reader set". The concrete reader set is resolved host-side at policy-decision time (see [Reader-set resolution](#reader-set-resolution)). | + +> **Confidentiality is `public` / `private` only — never a reader list on the +> wire.** Emitting concrete reader identities (e.g. logins) is out of scope: user +> identity is not uniform across servers using different auth methods, the +> identities are themselves access-restricted data, and a single resource can +> have hundreds of readers. The opaque marker keeps the wire shape stable and the +> sensitive resolution host-side. ### Label semantics - **Join on accumulation.** As a session ingests labeled results, the context label is the *join* of what it has seen: integrity degrades toward - `untrusted`, confidentiality narrows toward the smallest reader set. + `untrusted`, confidentiality narrows toward the smallest permitted reader set. + The **integrity join is total and computable from the wire values alone** + (`untrusted` dominates). The **confidentiality join is NOT computable from the + opaque wire markers alone** — see [Reader-set resolution](#reader-set-resolution). - **Policy check before egress.** Before a write/egress tool call, the host checks whether the current context label may flow to the call's target. When a label is absent, the host falls back to its default (trusted-action) policy rather than assuming the worst — labels are an *additive* signal. -- **Confidentiality resolution.** `"private"` is intentionally opaque on the - wire; resolving it to a concrete reader set (e.g. via a collaborators lookup) - is a host concern, so servers need not enumerate audiences inline. > The normative integrity/confidentiality lattice definitions follow the FIDES > paper, §4.1 and §4.3. This draft references the model rather than restating > the proofs. +### Reader-set resolution + +`"private"` is intentionally opaque on the wire. Two distinct `"private"` +markers (e.g. file contents from two different private repositories) are **not +equal**, and their confidentiality join is **not** the same `"private"` token: +data derived from both may flow only to principals who can read *both* sources — +the intersection of their reader sets. The opaque marker cannot express this +intersection, so a host that needs to make a precise cross-source flow decision +MUST resolve each `"private"` marker to a concrete reader set before joining. + +Resolution is a host-side concern, performed at policy-decision time: + +1. The host maps each contributing `"private"` label back to its source (e.g. + via the `evidenceRef.ref` locator, or its own record of which tool result + carried the label). +2. The host queries the originating system for the current reader set (e.g. a + repository collaborators lookup) using its own credentials. +3. The host computes the flow decision over the resolved sets (intersection for + a join of multiple private sources) and then discards them. + +Keeping resolution host-side is what lets the wire stay at `public` / `private` +while still supporting precise multi-source decisions. + ### Relationship to `trust-annotations` `ifc-fides` never appears without a host `trust-annotations` annotation @@ -106,17 +137,24 @@ the IFC label is the precise, host-checkable evidence behind them. applies a flow policy before egress operations already exists in practice. (Linked once a public reference is available.) - **Emitter (gap / proof point):** [`github-mcp-server`](https://github.com/github/github-mcp-server) - is the candidate — it already knows repo visibility and collaborator sets, - which are exactly the confidentiality inputs. + is the candidate — it already knows repository visibility and collaborator + sets, which are the confidentiality inputs. Repository visibility is only a + *default* hint, not the whole story: a public repository can serve + sub-resources that are **not** world-readable (draft security advisories, + draft releases, the collaborator roster itself, authenticated-user fields), so + a correct emitter MUST classify **per resource returned**, not per repository. + That makes the emitter a non-trivial proof point rather than a one-line + `repo.private` read. ## Open questions - Should the label be inlinable on `_meta.ifc` directly for low-friction adoption, or always behind `evidenceRef` for schema minimalism? (Lean: permit both; `evidenceRef` is canonical, inline is a convenience.) -- How does GitHub Enterprise `internal` repo visibility map onto the - public/private/reader-set confidentiality model? (Audience is the whole org, - strictly broader than collaborators — likely falls back to default policy.) +- How does GitHub Enterprise `internal` repository visibility map onto the + `public` / `private` confidentiality model? (Audience is the whole org, + strictly broader than collaborators — likely classified `private` and resolved + host-side, or falls back to default policy.) - Registry coordination with other attestation/evidence profiles (e.g. SEP-2787) so `evidenceRef.type` values don't collide. @@ -125,3 +163,4 @@ the IFC label is the precise, host-checkable evidence behind them. | Date | Change | | ---------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ | | 2026-06-10 | Initial draft skeleton. Reframed from a top-level `ifc` extension to a `trust-annotations` `evidenceRef` profile (`ifc.fides.v1`). | +| 2026-06-15 | Confidentiality limited to `public` / `private` on the wire (dropped reader-list); added Reader-set resolution section; emitter classifies per resource, not per repository. (Review: @JoannaaKL.) |