* Require PKCE and bind redirect_uri in lazy-auth-server token exchange
Hardens the example's mock authorization server:
- /authorize now requires a PKCE S256 code_challenge (the MCP auth
spec mandates PKCE for clients; previously a code issued without a
challenge skipped verification at the token endpoint)
- /token rejects authorization-code exchanges where a provided
redirect_uri does not match the authorization request (RFC 6749
§4.1.3); OAuth 2.1 clients that omit it still work, relying on the
now-mandatory PKCE binding
* Enforce single-use authorization codes
Track redeemed code IDs (jti) in memory until the code's own 5-minute
expiry; replaying a code at the token endpoint now fails with
invalid_grant (RFC 6749 §4.1.2). Also documents why wildcard CORS is
intentional for this demo (browser-based hosts must read
WWW-Authenticate; no ambient credentials exist to protect).
No SDK API changes since 1.7.2.
Examples:
- Add lazy-auth-server example (#679)
- Publish lazy-auth-server to npm (added to publish workflows)
Also syncs example dependency ranges to ^1.7.0 (output of npm run bump).
Adds an example MCP App server demonstrating lazy (on-demand) OAuth:
the server connects and lists tools without authentication, and only
prompts for auth when a protected tool is called, by responding 401
with a WWW-Authenticate header pointing at protected-resource metadata.
- Public `show_auth_button` app calls the protected `get_secret` tool
via callServerTool; the host runs the OAuth flow on 401 and retries
- Embedded mock authorization server (authorization-code + PKCE,
short-lived HS256 tokens, refresh + session revocation) so the whole
flow runs from a single process
- TTL-scoped endpoint paths (/ttl/<seconds>/mcp) let slow or automated
clients request longer-lived tokens per connection, threaded through
OAuth via RFC 8707 resource indicators
- `elicit_url` / `elicit_by_error` tools demonstrating URL elicitation
