* chore: remove tamper-detection.ts (not meant to be submitted) Follow-up to PR #234. This file was accidentally included. * revert to srcdoc Follow-up to PR #234 per domfarolino's review feedback. * regen * regen
129 lines
5 KiB
TypeScript
129 lines
5 KiB
TypeScript
import type { McpUiSandboxProxyReadyNotification, McpUiSandboxResourceReadyNotification } from "../../../dist/src/types";
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import { buildAllowAttribute } from "../../../dist/src/app-bridge";
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const ALLOWED_REFERRER_PATTERN = /^http:\/\/(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1)(:|\/|$)/;
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if (window.self === window.top) {
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throw new Error("This file is only to be used in an iframe sandbox.");
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}
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if (!document.referrer) {
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throw new Error("No referrer, cannot validate embedding site.");
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}
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if (!document.referrer.match(ALLOWED_REFERRER_PATTERN)) {
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throw new Error(
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`Embedding domain not allowed in referrer ${document.referrer}. (Consider updating the validation logic to allow your domain.)`,
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);
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}
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// Extract the expected host origin from the referrer for origin validation.
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// This is the origin we expect all parent messages to come from.
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const EXPECTED_HOST_ORIGIN = new URL(document.referrer).origin;
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const OWN_ORIGIN = new URL(window.location.href).origin;
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// Security self-test: verify iframe isolation is working correctly.
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// This MUST throw a SecurityError -- if `window.top` is accessible, the sandbox
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// configuration is dangerously broken and untrusted content could escape.
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try {
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window.top!.alert("If you see this, the sandbox is not setup securely.");
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throw "FAIL";
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} catch (e) {
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if (e === "FAIL") {
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throw new Error("The sandbox is not setup securely.");
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}
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// Expected: SecurityError confirms proper sandboxing.
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}
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// Double-iframe sandbox architecture: THIS file is the outer sandbox proxy
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// iframe on a separate origin. It creates an inner iframe for untrusted HTML
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// content. Per the specification, the Host and the Sandbox MUST have different
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// origins.
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const inner = document.createElement("iframe");
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inner.style = "width:100%; height:100%; border:none;";
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inner.setAttribute("sandbox", "allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms");
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// Note: allow attribute is set later when receiving sandbox-resource-ready notification
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// based on the permissions requested by the app
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document.body.appendChild(inner);
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const RESOURCE_READY_NOTIFICATION: McpUiSandboxResourceReadyNotification["method"] =
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"ui/notifications/sandbox-resource-ready";
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const PROXY_READY_NOTIFICATION: McpUiSandboxProxyReadyNotification["method"] =
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"ui/notifications/sandbox-proxy-ready";
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// Message relay: This Sandbox (outer iframe) acts as a bidirectional bridge,
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// forwarding messages between:
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//
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// Host (parent window) ↔ Sandbox (outer frame) ↔ Guest UI (inner iframe)
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//
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// Reason: the parent window and inner iframe have different origins and can't
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// communicate directly, so the outer iframe forwards messages in both
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// directions to connect them.
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//
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// Special case: The "ui/notifications/sandbox-proxy-ready" message is
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// intercepted here (not relayed) because the Sandbox uses it to configure and
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// load the inner iframe with the Guest UI HTML content.
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//
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// Security: CSP is enforced via HTTP headers on sandbox.html (set by serve.ts
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// based on ?csp= query param). This is tamper-proof unlike meta tags.
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window.addEventListener("message", async (event) => {
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if (event.source === window.parent) {
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// Validate that messages from parent come from the expected host origin.
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// This prevents malicious pages from sending messages to this sandbox.
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if (event.origin !== EXPECTED_HOST_ORIGIN) {
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console.error(
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"[Sandbox] Rejecting message from unexpected origin:",
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event.origin,
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"expected:",
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EXPECTED_HOST_ORIGIN
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);
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return;
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}
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if (event.data && event.data.method === RESOURCE_READY_NOTIFICATION) {
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const { html, sandbox, permissions } = event.data.params;
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if (typeof sandbox === "string") {
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inner.setAttribute("sandbox", sandbox);
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}
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// Set Permission Policy allow attribute if permissions are requested
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const allowAttribute = buildAllowAttribute(permissions);
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if (allowAttribute) {
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console.log("[Sandbox] Setting allow attribute:", allowAttribute);
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inner.setAttribute("allow", allowAttribute);
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}
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if (typeof html === "string") {
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inner.srcdoc = html;
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} else {
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console.error("[Sandbox] Missing or invalid HTML content in sandbox-resource-ready notification.");
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}
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} else {
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if (inner && inner.contentWindow) {
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inner.contentWindow.postMessage(event.data, "*");
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}
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}
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} else if (event.source === inner.contentWindow) {
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if (event.origin !== OWN_ORIGIN) {
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console.error(
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"[Sandbox] Rejecting message from inner iframe with unexpected origin:",
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event.origin,
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"expected:",
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OWN_ORIGIN
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);
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return;
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}
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// Relay messages from inner frame to parent window.
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// Use specific origin instead of "*" to prevent message interception.
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window.parent.postMessage(event.data, EXPECTED_HOST_ORIGIN);
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}
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});
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// Notify the Host that the Sandbox is ready to receive Guest UI HTML.
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// Use specific origin instead of "*" to ensure only the expected host receives this.
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window.parent.postMessage({
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jsonrpc: "2.0",
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method: PROXY_READY_NOTIFICATION,
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params: {},
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}, EXPECTED_HOST_ORIGIN);
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