428 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
428 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Security E2E tests for MCP Apps
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*
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* These tests verify the security boundaries and origin validation in:
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* 1. Sandbox proxy - origin validation for host and app messages
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* 2. Iframe isolation - ensuring proper sandboxing
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* 3. Communication channels - verifying secure message passing
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*
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* Note: True cross-origin attack testing would require a multi-origin test
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* setup. These tests verify the security infrastructure is in place and
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* functioning correctly for valid communication paths.
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*/
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import { test, expect, type Page, type ConsoleMessage } from "@playwright/test";
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/**
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* Capture console messages matching a pattern
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*/
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function captureConsoleLogs(page: Page, pattern: RegExp): string[] {
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const logs: string[] = [];
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page.on("console", (msg: ConsoleMessage) => {
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const text = msg.text();
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if (pattern.test(text)) {
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logs.push(text);
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}
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});
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return logs;
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}
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/**
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* Wait for the host UI to fully load with servers connected
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*/
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async function waitForHostReady(page: Page) {
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await page.goto("/");
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// Wait for servers to connect (select becomes enabled)
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await expect(page.locator("select").first()).toBeEnabled({ timeout: 30000 });
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}
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/**
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* Load a specific server's app
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*/
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async function loadServer(page: Page, serverName: string) {
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await waitForHostReady(page);
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await page.locator("select").first().selectOption({ label: serverName });
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await page.click('button:has-text("Call Tool")');
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// Wait for app to load in nested iframes
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const outerFrame = page.frameLocator("iframe").first();
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await expect(outerFrame.locator("iframe")).toBeVisible({ timeout: 10000 });
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}
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/**
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* Get the app frame (inner iframe inside sandbox)
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*/
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function getAppFrame(page: Page) {
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return page.frameLocator("iframe").first().frameLocator("iframe").first();
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}
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test.describe("Sandbox Security", () => {
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test("valid messages are not rejected during normal operation", async ({
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page,
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}) => {
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// Capture any rejection messages from sandbox
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const rejectionLogs = captureConsoleLogs(
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page,
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/\[Sandbox\].*Rejecting|unexpected origin/i,
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);
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await loadServer(page, "Integration Test Server");
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// Verify the app loaded and is functional
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const appFrame = getAppFrame(page);
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await expect(appFrame.locator("body")).toBeVisible();
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// Trigger app-to-host communication
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const sendMessageBtn = appFrame.locator('button:has-text("Send Message")');
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await expect(sendMessageBtn).toBeVisible({ timeout: 5000 });
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await sendMessageBtn.click();
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await page.waitForTimeout(500);
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// Valid messages should NOT trigger rejection logs
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expect(rejectionLogs.length).toBe(0);
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});
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test("host does not log unknown source warnings during normal operation", async ({
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page,
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}) => {
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// Capture HOST console messages
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const hostLogs = captureConsoleLogs(page, /\[HOST\]/);
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await loadServer(page, "Integration Test Server");
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// Verify the app is functional
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const appFrame = getAppFrame(page);
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await expect(appFrame.locator("body")).toBeVisible();
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// Trigger communication
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const sendMessageBtn = appFrame.locator('button:has-text("Send Message")');
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await expect(sendMessageBtn).toBeVisible({ timeout: 5000 });
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await sendMessageBtn.click();
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await page.waitForTimeout(500);
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// Check that there are no "unknown source" rejections from HOST
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const unknownSourceLogs = hostLogs.filter(
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(log) =>
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log.includes("unknown source") || log.includes("Ignoring message"),
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);
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expect(unknownSourceLogs.length).toBe(0);
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});
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test("app-to-host message is received by host", async ({ page }) => {
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const hostLogs = captureConsoleLogs(page, /\[HOST\]/);
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await loadServer(page, "Integration Test Server");
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const appFrame = getAppFrame(page);
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// Click the "Send Message" button in the integration test app
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const sendMessageBtn = appFrame.locator('button:has-text("Send Message")');
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await expect(sendMessageBtn).toBeVisible({ timeout: 5000 });
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await sendMessageBtn.click();
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// Wait for the message to be processed
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await page.waitForTimeout(500);
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// Check that the host received the message
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// Host logs: "[HOST] Message from MCP App:" when onmessage is called
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const messageReceivedLogs = hostLogs.filter((log) =>
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log.includes("Message from MCP App"),
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);
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expect(messageReceivedLogs.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
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});
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test("outer sandbox iframe has restricted permissions", async ({ page }) => {
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await loadServer(page, "Integration Test Server");
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// Get the outer sandbox iframe
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const outerIframe = page.locator("iframe").first();
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await expect(outerIframe).toBeVisible();
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// Check the sandbox attribute exists and has restrictions
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const sandboxAttr = await outerIframe.getAttribute("sandbox");
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expect(sandboxAttr).toBeTruthy();
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expect(sandboxAttr).toContain("allow-scripts");
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});
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test("inner app iframe has sandbox attribute", async ({ page }) => {
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await loadServer(page, "Integration Test Server");
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// Access the sandbox frame and check its inner iframe
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const sandboxFrame = page.frameLocator("iframe").first();
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const innerIframe = sandboxFrame.locator("iframe").first();
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await expect(innerIframe).toBeVisible();
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// The inner iframe should also have sandbox restrictions
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const sandboxAttr = await innerIframe.getAttribute("sandbox");
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expect(sandboxAttr).toBeTruthy();
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// Inner iframe needs allow-same-origin for srcdoc to work
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expect(sandboxAttr).toContain("allow-scripts");
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expect(sandboxAttr).toContain("allow-same-origin");
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});
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});
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test.describe("Host Resilience", () => {
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test("host UI loads even when servers are slow to connect", async ({
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page,
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}) => {
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await page.goto("/");
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// The select should eventually become enabled
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await expect(page.locator("select").first()).toBeEnabled({
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timeout: 30000,
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});
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// Should have server options available
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const options = await page
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.locator("select")
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.first()
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.locator("option")
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.count();
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expect(options).toBeGreaterThan(0);
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});
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test("host displays server count correctly", async ({ page }) => {
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await waitForHostReady(page);
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// Count available servers in the dropdown
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const serverSelect = page.locator("select").first();
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const options = await serverSelect.locator("option").allTextContents();
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// Should have multiple servers (we run 12 example servers)
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expect(options.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
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});
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});
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test.describe("Origin Validation Infrastructure", () => {
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test("sandbox cross-origin boundary prevents direct frame access", async ({
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page,
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}) => {
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await loadServer(page, "Integration Test Server");
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const appFrame = getAppFrame(page);
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await expect(appFrame.locator("body")).toBeVisible();
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// Verify that the sandbox creates a cross-origin boundary
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// This is the primary security mechanism that prevents cross-app attacks:
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// - The outer iframe has sandbox attribute creating a unique origin
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// - The page cannot access contentDocument of the sandboxed iframe
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// - This prevents any direct DOM manipulation or message injection
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const canAccessInnerFrame = await page.evaluate(() => {
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const outerIframe = document.querySelector("iframe");
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if (!outerIframe) return { hasOuterIframe: false };
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// contentDocument should be null due to cross-origin restriction
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const hasContentDocumentAccess = outerIframe.contentDocument !== null;
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// contentWindow should exist (for postMessage) but not expose internals
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const hasContentWindow = outerIframe.contentWindow !== null;
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return {
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hasOuterIframe: true,
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hasContentWindow,
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hasContentDocumentAccess,
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};
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});
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// The outer iframe should exist
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expect(canAccessInnerFrame.hasOuterIframe).toBe(true);
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// contentWindow exists (needed for postMessage communication)
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expect(canAccessInnerFrame.hasContentWindow).toBe(true);
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// contentDocument should be null (cross-origin boundary enforced)
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expect(canAccessInnerFrame.hasContentDocumentAccess).toBe(false);
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});
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test("app communication completes round-trip successfully", async ({
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page,
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}) => {
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await loadServer(page, "Integration Test Server");
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const appFrame = getAppFrame(page);
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// Test multiple communication types from the integration server
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// 1. Send Message
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const sendMessageBtn = appFrame.locator('button:has-text("Send Message")');
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await expect(sendMessageBtn).toBeVisible({ timeout: 5000 });
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await sendMessageBtn.click();
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// 2. Send Log
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const sendLogBtn = appFrame.locator('button:has-text("Send Log")');
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if (await sendLogBtn.isVisible()) {
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await sendLogBtn.click();
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}
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// 3. Open Link
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const openLinkBtn = appFrame.locator('button:has-text("Open Link")');
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if (await openLinkBtn.isVisible()) {
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await openLinkBtn.click();
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}
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// Wait for all messages to process
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await page.waitForTimeout(500);
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// If we got here without errors, the secure channel is working
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// The app should still be functional
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await expect(appFrame.locator("body")).toBeVisible();
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});
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test("sandbox enforces iframe isolation", async ({ page }) => {
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await loadServer(page, "Integration Test Server");
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// The sandbox should prevent the inner iframe from accessing parent directly
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// We can verify this by checking the sandbox attributes are properly set
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const outerIframe = page.locator("iframe").first();
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const outerSandbox = await outerIframe.getAttribute("sandbox");
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// Outer frame should NOT have allow-same-origin (different origin from host)
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// This ensures the sandbox cannot access host window properties
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expect(outerSandbox).not.toContain("allow-top-navigation");
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// The app should still function despite the restrictions
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const appFrame = getAppFrame(page);
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await expect(appFrame.locator("body")).toBeVisible();
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});
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});
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test.describe("Cross-App Message Injection Protection", () => {
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/**
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* This tests protection against the attack where a malicious app tries to
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* inject messages into another app via:
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* window.parent.parent.frames[i].frames[0].postMessage(fakeResponse, "*")
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*
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* The protection is that PostMessageTransport validates event.source matches
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* the expected source (window.parent for apps), so messages from other apps
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* are rejected.
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*/
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test("app rejects messages from sources other than its parent", async ({
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page,
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}) => {
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// Capture any "unknown source" rejection logs
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const rejectionLogs: string[] = [];
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page.on("console", (msg) => {
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const text = msg.text();
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if (
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text.includes("unknown source") ||
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text.includes("Ignoring message")
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) {
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rejectionLogs.push(text);
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}
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});
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await loadServer(page, "Integration Test Server");
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const appFrame = getAppFrame(page);
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await expect(appFrame.locator("body")).toBeVisible();
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// Try to inject a message from the page context (simulating cross-app attack)
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// This simulates what would happen if another app tried to postMessage to this app
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await page.evaluate(() => {
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// Get reference to the inner app iframe
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const outerIframe = document.querySelector("iframe");
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if (!outerIframe?.contentWindow) return;
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const innerIframe = outerIframe.contentDocument?.querySelector("iframe");
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if (!innerIframe?.contentWindow) return;
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// Try to send a fake JSON-RPC message (simulating malicious app)
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// This should be rejected because event.source won't match window.parent
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innerIframe.contentWindow.postMessage(
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{
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jsonrpc: "2.0",
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result: { content: [{ type: "text", text: "Injected!" }] },
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id: 999,
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},
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"*",
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);
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});
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// Wait for message to be processed
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await page.waitForTimeout(500);
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// The injected message should have been rejected
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// (it won't cause visible harm even if not logged, but ideally we see rejection)
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// The app should still be functional (not corrupted by the injection)
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await expect(appFrame.locator("body")).toBeVisible();
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// Verify legitimate communication still works after attempted injection
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const sendMessageBtn = appFrame.locator('button:has-text("Send Message")');
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if (await sendMessageBtn.isVisible()) {
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await sendMessageBtn.click();
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await page.waitForTimeout(300);
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// If we get here without errors, the app wasn't corrupted
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}
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});
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test("PostMessageTransport is configured with source validation", async ({
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page,
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}) => {
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// This test verifies that the App's transport is set up correctly
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// by checking that valid parent->app communication works
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await loadServer(page, "Integration Test Server");
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const appFrame = getAppFrame(page);
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// The app should receive messages from parent (valid source)
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// If source validation was broken, the app wouldn't work at all
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await expect(appFrame.locator("body")).toBeVisible();
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// Trigger a host->app notification (resize, theme change, etc.)
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// by resizing the page - this sends a message from host to app
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await page.setViewportSize({ width: 800, height: 600 });
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await page.waitForTimeout(300);
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// App should still be responsive
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const buttons = appFrame.locator("button");
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await expect(buttons.first()).toBeVisible();
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});
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});
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test.describe("Security Self-Test", () => {
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test("sandbox security self-test passes (window.top inaccessible)", async ({
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page,
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}) => {
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// The sandbox.ts has a security self-test that throws if window.top is accessible
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// If the app loads, it means the self-test passed
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const errorLogs: string[] = [];
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page.on("console", (msg) => {
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if (msg.type() === "error") {
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errorLogs.push(msg.text());
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}
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});
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await loadServer(page, "Integration Test Server");
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// App loading successfully means:
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// 1. Sandbox security self-test passed (window.top was inaccessible)
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// 2. Origin validation passed
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// 3. All security checks completed
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const appFrame = getAppFrame(page);
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await expect(appFrame.locator("body")).toBeVisible();
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// Should not have any "sandbox is not setup securely" errors
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const securityErrors = errorLogs.filter(
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(log) =>
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log.includes("sandbox is not setup securely") ||
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log.includes("window.top"),
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);
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expect(securityErrors.length).toBe(0);
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});
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test("referrer validation prevents loading from disallowed origins", async ({
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page,
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}) => {
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// The sandbox.ts checks document.referrer against ALLOWED_REFERRER_PATTERN
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// For localhost testing, this should pass
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// If we can load the app, referrer validation passed
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await loadServer(page, "Integration Test Server");
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const appFrame = getAppFrame(page);
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await expect(appFrame.locator("body")).toBeVisible();
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// This test passing confirms localhost is in the allowed referrer list
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});
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});
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