fix: restore auth binding requirement to Security Considerations (#9)
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@ -900,6 +900,7 @@ The `tasks/get` endpoint returns exactly what the underlying request would have
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## Security Considerations
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- **Task ID unguessability.** A server **MAY** use task IDs as bearer tokens for a server's stored state. Servers **MUST** generate them with sufficient entropy that a third party cannot enumerate or guess them.
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- **Auth binding.** Servers **MUST** perform authentication and authorization checks on each task-related request to ensure that the client has permission to access a task.
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- **Cross-caller correlation.** Because there is no `tasks/list`, a server cannot inadvertently leak the existence of one caller's tasks to another. This is an improvement over the `2025-11-25` tasks specification, in which a poorly-scoped list could expose unrelated task IDs.
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- **Input-request trust model.** `inputRequests` carry elicitation and sampling payloads from the server through the client to the user or model. Hosts **MUST** apply the same trust model to these payloads as they would to standard elicitation/sampling requests. A task is not a higher-trust channel.
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