Commit graph go-sdk/mcp/streamable_headers.go
Author SHA1 Message Date
akashjainn
f99cdb649b
mcp: base64-encode a non-header-safe Mcp-Name (#1246)
Fixes: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/issues/1243

The 2026-07-28 transport spec only SHOULD-constrains names to
header-safe characters, and lets a client Base64-wrap one that is not,
using the `=?base64?...?=` sentinel. `setStandardHeaders` set `Mcp-Name`
raw, while the sibling `Mcp-Param-*` path already ran its values through
`encodeHeaderValue`, so a name outside the safe set went out unencoded.

This routes `Mcp-Name` through `encodeHeaderValue` as well.

#1242 landed the other direction — the server decoding the sentinel
before comparing — so the two together close the round trip. Worth
noting they interact: after #1242, a name that is literally shaped like
the sentinel (`=?base64?abc?=`) is now rejected as invalid Base64,
because the server tries to decode a value the client never encoded. The
new test covers that case, and it fails on `main` today.

`extractName` also covers `resources/read`, so this applies to resource
URIs, which is where non-ASCII is most likely to show up in practice.

## Testing

`TestMcpNameHeaderEncodingRoundTrip` drives `setStandardHeaders` and
then feeds its output to `validateMcpHeaders`, so it pins the client and
server halves against each other rather than asserting the encoding in
isolation. Cases: an ASCII-safe name (must stay unencoded, no churn for
the common path), non-ASCII, a leading space, a control character, and
the sentinel-shaped literal above.

Verified failing before the change and passing after. `go test ./...`
passes.

A note on process:
[@remote-controlled-man](https://github.com/remote-controlled-man) asked
about this issue earlier today and proposed much the same scope. I had
the change written before I saw that comment and thought the #1242
interaction was worth surfacing either way, but I'm happy to close this
if they'd rather carry it — please just say so.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

https://claude.ai/code/session_011Wf643Lx36V5wdwuuf2EdT
2026-09-07 10:16:16 +02:00
ARPAN MONDAL
a5026ea7b7
mcp: decode a Base64-wrapped Mcp-Name before comparing it to the body (#1242)
The 2026-07-28 transport spec lets a client Base64-wrap a name or
resource URI that is not header-safe (`=?base64?...?=`) and requires the
server to decode it before comparing. `validateMcpHeaders` decoded
`Mcp-Param-*` values that way but compared `Mcp-Name` raw, so a
spec-legal encoded name was refused as a header mismatch.

This decodes `Mcp-Name` before comparing, mirroring the existing
`Mcp-Param-*` path, and rejects an invalid Base64 wrapper with a clear
error. Added table cases covering a valid encoded name and an invalid
one (red before, green after).

Fixes #1234

Co-authored-by: Arpan Mondal <arpanmondal@Arpans-MacBook-Pro.local>
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
2026-09-06 12:06:58 +02:00
n0liu
7743b71b1c
mcp: fix ListTools panic and null normalization on malformed tools (#1120)
Fixes #1119.

`ClientSession.ListTools` post-processes the server response through
`filterValidTools`, which has two problems on malformed input:

1. **Nil-pointer panic on `"tools":[null]`.** A `nil` `*Tool` element
reaches `validateParamHeaderAnnotations(tool)`, which dereferences
`tool.InputSchema`, crashing the client on untrusted server input.
2. **`"tools":null` is normalized into a non-nil empty slice.**
`make([]*Tool, 0, len(tools))` is always non-nil, so a nil `Tools` slice
from a malformed response is silently laundered into valid-looking data.

Reproduction:

```go
filterValidTools(nil, []*Tool{nil}) // panics: nil pointer dereference
filterValidTools(nil, nil)          // returns non-nil slice (len 0), want nil
```

Fix (`mcp/streamable_headers.go`):

- Skip (log and exclude) nil tool elements instead of dereferencing
them, so a malformed `"tools":[null]` can no longer crash the client.
This is consistent with the function’s existing contract of excluding
invalid tools.
- Return early with `nil` for a nil input slice so a `"tools":null`
response is preserved as nil rather than normalized into an empty slice.

Added `TestFilterValidToolsNilHandling` covering both defects plus the
mixed valid/nil case. `go test ./mcp/` passes; `gofmt` and `go vet` are
clean.

Note on scope: this keeps the change minimal and within
`filterValidTools`’s existing signature. If maintainers would rather
surface a hard protocol error for a malformed `"tools":null` /
`"tools":[null]` response at the `ListTools` level (rather than
tolerating and filtering it), I’m happy to follow up with that larger
change.
2026-07-30 10:06:14 +02:00
Guglielmo Colombo
17029489ff
mcp: bump protocol version from 2026-06-30 to 2026-07-28 (#1015)
The new official date for the protocol version has been moved to
'2026-07-28'. Update all the references in the code of the old version.
2026-06-22 09:53:04 +02:00
Guglielmo Colombo
91c010f664
mcp: fix http-standardization (SEP-2243) (#1010)
Fixes #905
2026-06-16 09:20:53 +00:00
Guglielmo Colombo
909372d8d1
mcp: HTTP Header Standardization for x-mcp-header (#915)
## Description

Implements
[SEP-2243](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/seps/2243-http-standardization)
(HTTP Header Standardization) for x-mcp-param custom header.

Fixes https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/issues/905

---------

Co-authored-by: Maciej Kisiel <mkisiel@google.com>
2026-05-08 12:39:18 +02:00
Guglielmo Colombo
e01639a318
feat: HTTP Header Standardization for method and name (#907)
## Description

Implements SEP-2243
(https://modelcontextprotocol.io/seps/2243-http-standardization) (HTTP
Header Standardization) for Mcp-Method and Mcp-Name standard headers
(x-mcp-param custom headers will be covvered in separate PR).

Fixes #905
2026-04-29 17:33:39 +02:00