CallToolResult currently decodes structuredContent through an any field,
which converts JSON numbers to float64 and silently rounds integers
outside the IEEE-754 safe range.
This change decodes structuredContent separately with UseNumber,
preserving wire numbers as json.Number while retaining the existing
decoded object, array, and primitive shapes. The field documentation now
describes that representation. Users who depend on the previous float64
behavior can temporarily restore it with
MCPGODEBUG=structuredcontentfloat64=1.
An end-to-end in-memory client/server regression covers 9007199254740993
from a low-level Server.AddTool result. Additional coverage verifies the
compatibility option restores the legacy rounded float64 value.
Verification:
- gofmt -l .
- go test ./...
- go vet ./...
Fixes#1236
---------
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
update sse I/O code to limit the amount of memory a single
non-terminated event can take
---------
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
## What does this PR do?
Preserve JSON-RPC batch response arrays when a batch contains a single
request.
## Why is this needed?
A single-request legacy batch must be returned as a one-element JSON
array, but the JSON response path currently unwraps it into a single
JSON object.
## Changes
- Preserve the original batch state on the logical stream
- Keep single-request batch responses as arrays
- Add a regression test for legacy initialization batches
## Testing
- `go test ./mcp -count=1`
- `go test ./... -count=1`
- `git diff --check`
Fixes#1211
## Summary
`ClientSessionOptions.protocolVersion` was unexported and documented as
test-only, so external consumers of `Client.Connect` could not request a
specific protocol revision.
This exports the field as `ProtocolVersion` with the same semantics:
- empty → request the latest supported version (unchanged default)
- non-empty → send that version in initialize/discover
- existing negotiate-down path is unchanged
## Usage
```go
cs, err := client.Connect(ctx, transport, &mcp.ClientSessionOptions{
ProtocolVersion: "2025-11-25",
})
```
## Testing
- `go test ./mcp/ -count=1` (pass)
Fixes#1113
Co-authored-by: arimu1 <19286898+arimu1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
This PR adds the protocol version `2026-07-28` to the list of supported
protocol versions and fixes legacy tests hardcoding the legacy protocol
version for those use cases.
This PR updates the error codes to align with the updated specifications
in
https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2907
ErrServerClosing and ErrClientClosing are reverted to their 1.6.0
version codes, as they do not overlap anymore with the newly introduced
error codes.
## Summary
Part 3 of the SEP-2575 ("Make MCP Stateless") implementation. Builds on
PR #975 which landed the client-side discover/fallback flow and the
per-request `_meta` plumbing. This PR adds the **server-side**
counterparts:
- `server/discover` handler (replaces the
stub),ProtocolVersionSupporter`
- transport hook for per-transport version filtering,
- transport-agnostic version validation and method-removal enforcement
in `ServerSession.handle`,
- HTTP-level wire compliance for SEP-2575 error codes/status codes,
- bug fix in `internal/jsonrpc2`,`processResult` with an `MCPGODEBUG`
opt-out for backward compatibility.
Implements the client half of the SEP-2575 / `2026-06-30` protocol. This
CL is client-only; server-side `server/discover` is still a
`MethodNotFound` stub.
### Changes
- **`server/discover` probe in `Client.Connect()`** (`client.go`). When
the caller opts into `protocolVersion >= 2026-06-30`, the client probes
the server with `server/discover` before falling back to the legacy
`initialize`
handshake.
- **Per-request `_meta` injection** (`shared.go`, `injectRequestMeta`).
For`>= 2026-06-30` sessions every outgoing request gets the SEP-2575
triple (`protocolVersion`, `clientInfo`, `clientCapabilities`).
- **Server-side fix**: `ServerSession.handle` no longer pre-populates
`state.InitializeParams` from a `server/discover` request's `_meta`, so
a subsequent fallback `initialize` is not rejected as a duplicate.
### Fallback rules
Client falls back to the legacy `initialize` handshake when discover
returns:
- `MethodNotFound` (-32601),
- `UnsupportedProtocolVersionError` (-32004),
- an HTTP `Bad Request` (substring-matched on the error message, to
interop
with pre-2026-06-30 servers).
Fixes#966
### Context
Design (`design/mrtr.md`) and implementation proposal for Multi
Round-Trip Requests (MRTR) per
[SEP-2322](de6d76fba3/seps/2322-MRTR.md).
### Changes
- Introduce `InputRequest` and `InputResponse` sealed interfaces with
corresponding `InputRequestMap` and `InputResponseMap` types for custom
map JSON codec implementation.
- Extend `CallToolParams`, `GetPromptParams`, and `ReadResourceParams`
with `InputResponses`, `RequestState` and an unexported `resultType`
("complete" or "input_required") for retry round-trips. The type is set
by the SDK based on input requests presence.
- Add client-side MRTR middleware enabled by default that automatically
fulfills input requests and retries.
- Added MRTROptions on ClientOptions to allow disabling the middleware
and configuring the number of retries.
- Add server-side MRTR middleware for backward compatibility:
transparently bridges input requests to direct
Elicit/CreateMessage/ListRoots calls for older clients
## Description
This PR lays the foundational server-side groundwork for the `>=
2026-06-30` sessionless and stateless feature introduced by
[SEP-2575](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2575)
and SEP-2567, tracked in
[design/stateless.md](614460a225/design/stateless.md).
### SEP-2575: Stateless MCP
* **Per-request protocol detection in `ServerSession.handle()`**
Unmarshal `_meta` from the raw JSON-RPC params determines whether each
request follows the new protocol.
* **Per-request typed accessors on `ServerRequest[P]`**
```go
func (r *ServerRequest[P]) ProtocolVersion() string
func (r *ServerRequest[P]) ClientInfo() *Implementation
func (r *ServerRequest[P]) ClientCapabilities() *ClientCapabilities
```
* **Reject client->server `initialize`, `initialized` and `ping` for
new-protocol requests**
* **Per-request `_meta` field name constants**
Three constants for the wire-protocol field names
(`MetaKeyProtocolVersion`, `MetaKeyClientInfo`,
`MetaKeyClientCapabilities`)
* **Stop synthesizing fake `InitializeParams` for new-protocol
requests**
Fixes: #966
Fixes#937.
### What this changes
Adds a single line — an SSE comment (`: ok\n\n`) — after `WriteHeader`
and before `Flush` on the standalone SSE GET stream. SSE comments are
explicitly ignored by clients (any line starting with `:` per the SSE
spec), but they produce an HTTP/2 DATA frame, which is what HTTP/2
reverse proxies need before they will forward the HEADERS frame.
### Why the existing fix isn't sufficient
Issue #410 was closed by #413, which added `WriteHeader(StatusOK)` +
`Flush()` to the same site. #870 refactored the `Flush()` to use
`http.NewResponseController`. Both correctly address HTTP/1.1: `Flush()`
writes the headers as text on the TCP stream and any HTTP/1.1-aware
proxy forwards them.
In HTTP/2, headers and body are separate frame types (HEADERS, DATA).
Reverse proxies batch them for efficiency and won't forward the HEADERS
frame on its own. `Flush()` on the response writer only pushes the
in-process buffer to the HTTP/2 stack; the proxy still holds the HEADERS
frame waiting for DATA. The standalone SSE stream never sends body data
on connect (the whole point — it's the long-poll listener for
server-pushed notifications), so without a deliberate "kick" the headers
never reach the client until the proxy tears down the stream on timeout.
The SSE-comment trick is the established mitigation for SSE servers
behind HTTP/2 proxies. It's used in Caddy
(https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/4247), referenced in the Go
issue tracker (https://github.com/golang/go/issues/31125), and is
independent of the proxy implementation.
### The diff
```go
if s.id == "" {
// Issue #410: the standalone SSE stream is likely not to receive messages
// for a long time. Ensure that headers are flushed.
+ //
+ // On HTTP/2, headers and body travel as separate frames (HEADERS and
+ // DATA). Reverse proxies (e.g. Envoy, Caddy, net/http/httputil)
+ // commonly buffer the HEADERS frame until they have a DATA frame to
+ // coalesce it with — there is no HTTP/2 equivalent of HTTP/1.1's
+ // Transfer-Encoding: chunked signal that says "this is streaming, send
+ // headers now". Calling Flush() alone is not sufficient: it pushes
+ // the kernel buffer to the proxy, but the proxy still holds the
+ // HEADERS frame.
+ //
+ // Write an SSE comment (lines starting with ":" are ignored by
+ // clients per RFC) so a DATA frame is produced, which forces the
+ // proxy to forward both frames. See:
+ // https://github.com/golang/go/issues/31125
+ // https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/4247
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+ fmt.Fprint(w, ": ok\n\n")
rc := http.NewResponseController(w)
// Ignore returned error as flushing is best-effort.
_ = rc.Flush()
}
```
`fmt` is already imported in this file; no other dependencies change.
### Test
Added `TestStandaloneSSEEmitsCommentForHTTP2Flush`. It initializes a
streamable session via raw POST, then opens the standalone SSE GET and
asserts the first body byte starts with `:` (the SSE comment marker,
which is what produces the DATA frame HTTP/2 proxies need).
The test catches the bug behaviorally without requiring a full HTTP/2
reverse-proxy setup: it verifies the SDK's contract (emit body bytes
after headers on the standalone SSE stream). HTTP/2-specific behavior is
then a property of any conforming proxy.
I confirmed the test fails on `main` without the patch — it times out at
2s waiting for the first body byte — and passes in <1ms with the patch.
Full streamable test suite still passes.
### Reproduction matrix (from #937)
| Configuration | TTFB | Result |
|---|---|---|
| HTTP/2 + 30s request timeout | ~31s | Headers only on stream tear-down
|
| HTTP/2 + no request timeout | never | Headers never arrive |
| HTTP/1.1 + 30s request timeout | ~300ms | Headers immediate |
| HTTP/1.1 + no request timeout | ~270ms | Headers immediate |
| HTTP/2 POST (response has body) | ~350ms | Works (DATA frame
coalesces) |
| **HTTP/2 + this PR** | ~1ms | Headers immediate |
### Risk
- Behavior-preserving for HTTP/1.1 clients (a leading `:` line is a
valid SSE comment and is ignored by every conforming SSE client).
- No protocol-level concern: SSE explicitly defines comment lines as a
no-op for the consumer.
- The DATA frame adds 7 bytes per standalone SSE connection, sent once
on connect.
Co-authored-by: Maciej Kisiel <mkisiel@google.com>
Use a shared helper for Content-Type parsing in streamable transport
request validation and client response handling.
Follow up to https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/pull/853,
where we did this for `Accept` headers.
This allows the streamable mcp server to validate the following header
`Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8`
Co-authored-by: Maciej Kisiel <mkisiel@google.com>
This PR fixes a race condition where `ServerSession.keepaliveCancel` was
accessed in `Close` concurrently with its initialization in
`ServerSession.startKeepalive`. It also removes a now redundant test.
The fix moves keepalive initialization into `ServerSession.Connect`
similar to the implementation in `ClientSession.Connect`. This is safe
because the MCP spec allows keepalive pings before the initialization
messages. From the MCP
[spec](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/lifecycle)
(emphasis added):
> The client SHOULD NOT send requests **other than pings** before the
server has responded to the initialize request.
The PR includes a reproducer test case, which fails with the following
error without this fix:
```
> go test -count=10 -race -run ^TestStreamableStatelessKeepaliveRace$ github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp 8s
==================
WARNING: DATA RACE
Write at 0x00c00007fbf0 by goroutine 1095:
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.startKeepalive()
/Users/benjamin/Documents/go-sdk/mcp/shared.go:590 +0x58
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.(*ServerSession).startKeepalive()
/Users/benjamin/Documents/go-sdk/mcp/server.go:1526 +0x130
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.(*ServerSession).initialized()
/Users/benjamin/Documents/go-sdk/mcp/server.go:1059 +0xf8
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.init.serverSessionMethod[go.shape.*uint8,go.shape.interface { GetMeta() map[string]interface {}; SetMeta(map[string]interface {}); github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.isResult() }].func27()
/Users/benjamin/Documents/go-sdk/mcp/shared.go:332 +0x98
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.newServerMethodInfo[go.shape.*github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.InitializedParams,go.shape.interface { GetMeta() map[string]interface {}; SetMeta(map[string]interface {}); github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.isResult() },go.shape.struct { github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.Meta "json:\"_meta,omitempty\"" }].func2()
/Users/benjamin/Documents/go-sdk/mcp/shared.go:272 +0x84
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.defaultReceivingMethodHandler[go.shape.*uint8]()
/Users/benjamin/Documents/go-sdk/mcp/shared.go:152 +0xe8
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.defaultReceivingMethodHandler[*github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.ServerSession]()
/Users/benjamin/Documents/go-sdk/mcp/shared.go:146 +0x60
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.handleReceive[go.shape.*uint8]()
/Users/benjamin/Documents/go-sdk/mcp/shared.go:169 +0x228
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.(*ServerSession).handle()
/Users/benjamin/Documents/go-sdk/mcp/server.go:1445 +0x370
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.connect[go.shape.*uint8,go.shape.*uint8].func1.1()
/Users/benjamin/Documents/go-sdk/mcp/transport.go:170 +0x5c
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/internal/jsonrpc2.HandlerFunc.Handle()
/Users/benjamin/Documents/go-sdk/internal/jsonrpc2/jsonrpc2.go:84 +0x48
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/internal/jsonrpc2.(*Connection).handleAsync.func3()
/Users/benjamin/Documents/go-sdk/internal/jsonrpc2/conn.go:717 +0xd8
Previous read at 0x00c00007fbf0 by goroutine 1089:
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.(*ServerSession).Close()
/Users/benjamin/Documents/go-sdk/mcp/server.go:1502 +0x34
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.(*StreamableHTTPHandler).ServeHTTP.deferwrap1()
/Users/benjamin/Documents/go-sdk/mcp/streamable.go:519 +0x34
runtime.deferreturn()
/opt/homebrew/Cellar/go/1.25.4/libexec/src/runtime/panic.go:589 +0x5c
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp.TestStreamableStatelessKeepaliveRace.mustNotPanic.func2()
/Users/benjamin/Documents/go-sdk/mcp/streamable_test.go:2156 +0x94
net/http.HandlerFunc.ServeHTTP()
/opt/homebrew/Cellar/go/1.25.4/libexec/src/net/http/server.go:2322 +0x48
net/http.serverHandler.ServeHTTP()
/opt/homebrew/Cellar/go/1.25.4/libexec/src/net/http/server.go:3340 +0x270
net/http.(*conn).serve()
/opt/homebrew/Cellar/go/1.25.4/libexec/src/net/http/server.go:2109 +0x9b0
net/http.(*Server).Serve.gowrap3()
/opt/homebrew/Cellar/go/1.25.4/libexec/src/net/http/server.go:3493 +0x48
Goroutine 1095 (running) created at:
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/internal/jsonrpc2.(*Connection).handleAsync()
/Users/benjamin/Documents/go-sdk/internal/jsonrpc2/conn.go:715 +0x334
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/internal/jsonrpc2.(*Connection).acceptRequest.func2.gowrap1()
/Users/benjamin/Documents/go-sdk/internal/jsonrpc2/conn.go:676 +0x34
Goroutine 1089 (running) created at:
net/http.(*Server).Serve()
/opt/homebrew/Cellar/go/1.25.4/libexec/src/net/http/server.go:3493 +0x5dc
net/http/httptest.(*Server).goServe.func1()
/opt/homebrew/Cellar/go/1.25.4/libexec/src/net/http/httptest/server.go:311 +0x98
==================
--- FAIL: TestStreamableStatelessKeepaliveRace (0.14s)
testing.go:1617: race detected during execution of test
FAIL
FAIL github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp 1.727s
FAIL
```
---------
Co-authored-by: Maciej Kisiel <mkisiel@google.com>
Use `mime.ParseMediaType` to parse the `Content-Type` header instead of
exact string matching. Previously, the server required an exact match on
`application/json`.
This allows the server to accept `application/json` with parameters
(e.g. `charset=utf-8`), even though [they are not
required](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4627.html#section-6),
following the robustness principle.
Per [RFC 8259 (section
8.1)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8259.html#section-8.1),
`application/json` is always UTF-8, so such parameters are technically
redundant. However, parsing the media type makes the server more
tolerant of client behaviour, improving compatibility without
compromising security.
Normalize accept tokens before validation so valid headers with media
type parameters still match their base media types.
This allows the streamable mcp server to validate the following header
`Accept: application/json;charset=utf-8, text/event-stream`
Co-authored-by: Maciej Kisiel <mkisiel@google.com>
1. (non-test) Don't queue notifications if there are no connected
sessions.
2. Change `reconnectInitialDelay` to be atomic, as it is modified in
tests.
3. Protect map access with mutex in `TestServerTransportCleanup`.
This PR introduces protection against cross-origin requests by
installing `http.CrossOriginProtection`.
By default, the zero value is used which does not contain any trusted
origins or bypass patterns.
The protection can be customized by providing a custom
`http.CrossOriginProtection` in `mcp.StreamableHTTPOptions`. Currently,
the deny handler set on the protection is ignored.
This default has an MCPGODEBUG option (`disableoriginverification`) to
disable the default protection.
It will be available until `v1.6.0` of the SDK.
We also increase the Go version required by the SDK to 1.25, since this
is the version that introduced `http.CrossOriginProtection`. This is in
line with the SDK's policy of supporting two newest Go versions (1.26
was released in February 2026).
Additionally, we start validating if the `Content-Type` header for
`POST` requests is set to `application/json` to avoid accepting
CORS-safelisted requests.
Update the SDK to use protocol version 2025-11-25 as the latest
supported version. Fix tests and examples that had hardcoded
expectations for the previous version (2025-06-18).
---------
Co-authored-by: Maciej Kisiel <mkisiel@google.com>
This PR introduces client-side OAuth support.
# Overall design philosophy
The main new interface introduced to support client-side OAuth is the
`OAuthHandler`. Contrary to its counter-parts in some other SDKs, it is
intentionally small and generic so that it can support most of the OAuth
authorization flow variants. The main `mcp` package purposefully
delegates almost all auth handling to `OAuthHandler` implementations.
This way, the `mcp` package continues to be largely OAuth agnostic.
The `auth` package comes with a default `OAuthHandler` implementation –
`AuthorizationCodeHandler`, which implements the authorization flow
for the `authorization_code` grant type, as defined in the [MCP
specification](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/authorization).
It is expected that the `OAuthHandler` implementation granularity will
be roughly per grant type, as this parameter influences the
authorization flow the most.
# Detailed design
## `OAuthHandler` (auth/client.go)
The main interface for the integration consists of two methods:
```go
type OAuthHandler interface {
// TokenSource returns a token source to be used for outgoing requests.
// Returned token source might be nil. In that case, the transport will not
// add any authorization headers to the request.
TokenSource(context.Context) (oauth2.TokenSource, error)
// Authorize is called when an HTTP request results in an error that may
// be addressed by the authorization flow (currently 401 Unauthorized and 403 Forbidden).
// It is responsible for performing the OAuth flow to obtain an access token.
// The arguments are the request that failed and the response that was received for it.
// The headers of the request are available, but the body will have already been consumed
// when Authorize is called.
// If the returned error is nil, TokenSource is expected to return a non-nil token source.
// After a successful call to Authorize, the HTTP request will be retried by the transport.
// The function is responsible for closing the response body.
Authorize(context.Context, *http.Request, *http.Response) error
}
```
`StreamableClientTransport` accepts this interface as a field and uses
the `TokenSource` method to add an `Authorization: Bearer` header to
outgoing requests to the MCP server. If the request fails with `401:
Unauthorized` or `403: Forbidden`, the transport calls `Authorize` to
perform the authorization flow. If `Authorize` returns a non-nil error,
the request is retried once. `Authorize` errors do not result in
termination of the client session (unless they happen during
connection initialization), as some OAuth flows are multi-legged and it should be
acceptable to retry for example when the authorization grant was
received.
*Note:* There was already an `OAuthHandler` type defined as part of a
previous iteration of OAuth support. It was renamed to
`OAuthHandlerLegacy`. This is the only backwards incompatible API change
in the experimental client `auth` part (protected by the
`mcp_go_client_oauth` Go build tag). The cost of replacing previous
usages is deemed worthwhile to maintain clear naming, under the
assumption that the experimental client `auth` part was not widely used.
## `AuthorizationCodeHandler` (auth/authorization_code.go)
This is the `OAuthHandler` implementation that fulfills the [MCP
specification](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/authorization).
In particular, in supports:
- Protected Resource Metadata discovery and fetching
- Authorization Server Metadata discovery and fetching
- Client registration
- OpenID Connect metadata document
- Pre-registration
- Dynamic Client Registration
- PKCE
- `client_secret_post`, `client_secret_basic` token endpoint
auth methods
- Automatic refresh of tokens
### Authorization Server redirect
As part of the flow for the `authorization_code` grant type, the client
needs to point the user to the authorization URL, so that they confirm
the access request. This design proposes that it will be supported via a
pluggable dependency that will initiate this process in an
application-specific way:
```go
type AuthorizationCodeHandler struct {
...
// AuthorizationCodeFetcher is a required function called to initiate the authorization flow.
// It is responsible for opening the URL in a browser for the user to start the authorization process.
// It should return the authorization code and state once the Authorization Server
// redirects back to the RedirectURL.
AuthorizationCodeFetcher func(ctx context.Context, args *AuthorizationArgs) (*AuthorizationResult, error)
...
}
```
The function is supposed perform any application specific logic to handle the redirect
from the Authorization Server and return the resulting code and state.
## `oauthex` changes
Some additional/adjusted building blocks that may be useful when
creating `OAuthHandler` implementations are present in the `oauthex`
package:
- `auth_meta.go`: Authorization Server Metadata utilities:
- `GetAuthServerMeta`: get Authorization Server Metadata from a URL
- `dcr.go`: Dynamic Client Registration utilities (unchanged)
- `resource_meta.go`: Protected Resource Metadata utilities:
- `GetProtectedResourceMetadata`: get Protected Resource Metadata from a
URL
- `ParseWWWAuthenticate` – as per name (unchanged)
- [deprecated] `GetProtectedResourceMetadataFromID` and
`GetProtectedResourceMetadataFromHeader` in favor of more generic
`GetProtectedResourceMetadata`. They will be kept under the Go build tag
and removed one version of the SDK in the future.
## Summary
Add DNS rebinding protection that is automatically enabled when requests
arrive via localhost (127.0.0.1, [::1]). This protects against malicious
websites using DNS rebinding to interact with local MCP servers.
(note: this was a claude assisted PR, mostly wanted to see how difficult
passing this test would be for this SDK)
## Design Goal: Secure by Default
The primary goal is to make it difficult to run a localhost server
without these protections by mistake. There are other approaches that
could provide secure defaults (e.g., a helper for `ListenAndServe` that
does the localhost check), but using `http.LocalAddrContextKey` for
runtime detection seemed like the most backwards compatible approach and
least likely to be disabled by accident.
With this implementation:
- **No code changes required** - existing servers get protection
automatically
- **No opt-in needed** - protection activates based on the connection's
local address
- **Explicit opt-out** - users must deliberately set
`DisableLocalhostProtection: true`
## Changes
- Add `DisableLocalhostProtection` option to `StreamableHTTPOptions`
- Add `isLocalhostAddr` and `isLocalhostHost` helper functions
- Validate Host header at start of `ServeHTTP`, rejecting non-localhost
Host headers with 403 Forbidden
## How it works
The protection uses `http.LocalAddrContextKey` to detect the
connection's local address at runtime. When a request arrives via
localhost (127.0.0.1 or [::1]), the handler validates that the Host
header also matches a localhost value. If not, the request is rejected
with 403 Forbidden.
This approach means:
- Protection is enabled for requests arriving via localhost, regardless
of whether the server listens on `127.0.0.1` or `0.0.0.0`
- Requests arriving via non-localhost IPs (e.g., external network
requests) are **not** affected
### Edge case: Reverse proxies
If a reverse proxy (e.g., Envoy, nginx) runs on the same host and
forwards requests to the MCP server via localhost while preserving the
original Host header, those requests would be rejected. In this case,
users should either:
1. Set `DisableLocalhostProtection: true`
2. Configure the proxy to rewrite the Host header to localhost
## Testing
- Added unit tests for `isLocalhostAddr` and `isLocalhostHost` helper
functions
- Added integration tests for the full protection flow
- Verified against the MCP conformance test suite:
- `localhost-host-rebinding-rejected`: PASS
- `localhost-host-valid-accepted`: PASS
## Related
- Spec:
https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/security_best_practices#local-mcp-server-compromise
- TypeScript SDK implementation: `localhostHostValidation()` middleware
- Conformance test: `dns-rebinding-protection` scenario
---------
Co-authored-by: Maciek Kisiel <mkisiel@google.com>
405 Method Not Allowed responses MUST include an Allow header listing
supported methods, per RFC 9110 Section 15.5.6. This fixes issues with
strict HTTP gateways (like Apigee) that treat 405 responses without an
Allow header as malformed, returning 502 Bad Gateway errors.
## Changes
- **SSEHandler**: Add `Allow: GET, POST` header for unsupported methods
- **StreamableHTTPHandler**: Add Allow header for GET-without-session case:
- Stateless mode: `Allow: POST, DELETE` (GET is never valid)
- Stateful mode: `Allow: GET, POST, DELETE` (GET is valid once you have
a session)
- Add tests to verify Allow header presence in all 405 responses
## RFC 9110 Reference
[Section 15.5.6 (405 Method Not
Allowed)](https://httpwg.org/specs/rfc9110.html#status.405):
> The origin server MUST generate an Allow header field in a 405
response containing a list of the target resource's currently supported
methods.
## Testing
All existing tests pass, plus new tests added:
- `TestSSE405AllowHeader` - verifies SSE handler compliance
- `TestStreamable405AllowHeader` - verifies Streamable handler
compliance in both stateful and stateless modes
---------
Co-authored-by: omgitsads <4619+omgitsads@users.noreply.github.com>
Change CloseSSEStream from func(time.Duration) to
func(CloseSSEStreamArgs) for forward compatibility, allowing new fields
to be added without breaking existing callers.
The prime and close SSE events (SEP-1699) were added in protocol version
2025-11-25. Only send these events when the client negotiates that
version or later.
- In servePOST, extract protocol version from InitializeParams for
initialize requests, otherwise use the Mcp-Protocol-Version header
- In serveGET/acquireStream, read protocol version from header
- Only set closeLocked callback when prime/close is supported
- Add unexported protocolVersion field to ClientSessionOptions for
testing
Fixes#686
Add a UserID field to auth.TokenInfo that TokenVerifiers can populate
from JWT "sub" claims or token introspection. The streamable HTTP
transport uses this to bind sessions to users, rejecting requests where
the user ID doesn't match the session's original user.
Fixes#589
After walking through our handling of streamable client context
cancellation (due to encountering a shutdown deadlock), I think I've
settled on a more coherent strategy for handling call cancellation:
- In our call handler, retire the request if the call exits due to
cancellation: the caller will never see the actual result anyway.
- In connectSSE, use the actual request context (the same context used
in Write) for the client request, so that it terminates when the context
is cancelled. Thread through the initialization context for the
standalone SSE request.
Also, a couple minor improvements:
- Use a detached context for the background context of the client
connection. We want to preserve context values (see #513), but it is not
right to cancel the connection after Connect has already returned, if
the context times out.
- Don't use Last-Event-ID != "" as the signal for whether the connectSSE
call is initial: if the standalone SSE stream disconnects without an
event ID, we'll still reconnect it, and don't want to do so without a
delay.
+ tests, updating the streamable client connection test harness to
accomodate the new aspects being exercised.
Fixes#662
This CL implements support for SEP-1699, adding the following new API:
- Event.Retry corresponds to the 'retry' field of a server sent event.
This is used to signal client retry behavior.
- RequestExtra.CloseStream is set by the streamable transport to allow
closing a stream.
The streamable server transport is updated to set CloseStream for calls,
allowing server operations or middleware to close the underlying stream.
If the configured 'reconnectAfter' delay is set, a 'retry' message is
sent prior to terminating the stream.
The streamable client transport is updated to read the configured delay.
Fixes#630
Expose the jsonrpc.Error type to allow access to underlying JSON-RPC
error codes. Also, expose common JSON-RPC error codes in the jsonrpc
package, and MCP error codes in the mcp package.
Also, implement support for the MCP URL elicitation required error
(-32042), enabling servers to request out-of-band user authorization and
clients to automatically handle these requests with retry logic.
Server-side:
- Add CodeURLElicitationRequired constant
- Add URLElicitationRequiredError() constructor.
Client-side:
- Add urlElicitationMiddleware to intercept URLElicitationRequired
errors and retry calls.
- Update callElicitationCompleteHandler to signal waiting operations.
- Fix capability advertisement to support both form and URL modes.
Fixes#452Fixes#623
Fixes#636
## Problem
The StreamableClientTransport tries to JSON-decode ALL SSE events,
including ping events sent by servers for keep-alive purposes. This
causes errors like 'invalid character 'p' looking for beginning of
value' when encountering non-JSON event data.
## Solution
Modified processStream to check evt.Name and skip events that are not
'message' events (or unnamed events, which default to 'message' per SSE
spec).
## Changes
- Added event name check in processStream before attempting JSON decode
- Added test case for ping event filtering
- Added test for scanning multiple events including ping events
## Testing
- All existing tests pass
- New tests verify ping events are properly filtered
- Tested with DeepWiki MCP server which sends ping events
If a stateful streamable session fails to initialize, it is unusable.
Avoid allocating resources by closing the session immediately.
Also:
- Fix a bug where InitializeParams is not guarded with its mutex.
- Fix a resource leak where sessions are persisted with session id "",
even though they are unaddressable.
- Add a relevant benchmark, and update tests.
Fixes#578