## Summary
Add DNS rebinding protection that is automatically enabled when requests
arrive via localhost (127.0.0.1, [::1]). This protects against malicious
websites using DNS rebinding to interact with local MCP servers.
(note: this was a claude assisted PR, mostly wanted to see how difficult
passing this test would be for this SDK)
## Design Goal: Secure by Default
The primary goal is to make it difficult to run a localhost server
without these protections by mistake. There are other approaches that
could provide secure defaults (e.g., a helper for `ListenAndServe` that
does the localhost check), but using `http.LocalAddrContextKey` for
runtime detection seemed like the most backwards compatible approach and
least likely to be disabled by accident.
With this implementation:
- **No code changes required** - existing servers get protection
automatically
- **No opt-in needed** - protection activates based on the connection's
local address
- **Explicit opt-out** - users must deliberately set
`DisableLocalhostProtection: true`
## Changes
- Add `DisableLocalhostProtection` option to `StreamableHTTPOptions`
- Add `isLocalhostAddr` and `isLocalhostHost` helper functions
- Validate Host header at start of `ServeHTTP`, rejecting non-localhost
Host headers with 403 Forbidden
## How it works
The protection uses `http.LocalAddrContextKey` to detect the
connection's local address at runtime. When a request arrives via
localhost (127.0.0.1 or [::1]), the handler validates that the Host
header also matches a localhost value. If not, the request is rejected
with 403 Forbidden.
This approach means:
- Protection is enabled for requests arriving via localhost, regardless
of whether the server listens on `127.0.0.1` or `0.0.0.0`
- Requests arriving via non-localhost IPs (e.g., external network
requests) are **not** affected
### Edge case: Reverse proxies
If a reverse proxy (e.g., Envoy, nginx) runs on the same host and
forwards requests to the MCP server via localhost while preserving the
original Host header, those requests would be rejected. In this case,
users should either:
1. Set `DisableLocalhostProtection: true`
2. Configure the proxy to rewrite the Host header to localhost
## Testing
- Added unit tests for `isLocalhostAddr` and `isLocalhostHost` helper
functions
- Added integration tests for the full protection flow
- Verified against the MCP conformance test suite:
- `localhost-host-rebinding-rejected`: PASS
- `localhost-host-valid-accepted`: PASS
## Related
- Spec:
https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/security_best_practices#local-mcp-server-compromise
- TypeScript SDK implementation: `localhostHostValidation()` middleware
- Conformance test: `dns-rebinding-protection` scenario
---------
Co-authored-by: Maciek Kisiel <mkisiel@google.com>
- implement all non-auth scenarios (client OAuth is not yet supported)
- sse-retry is also implemented, but failing due to a bug in the SDK
- configure client-conformance job in the conformance GitHub action
- create a client-conformance.sh script and rename conformance.sh to server-conformance.sh
- move the conformance related files to a dedicated directory
- simplify parts of the conformance script
- create a scaffolding for a new GitHub action to run conformance tests
- use the new --output-dir flag from the conformance suite for saving
results on demand
