go-sdk/internal/oauthtest/fake_authorization_server.go
Thomas Bechtold d9728a88f3
auth: bind refreshing token source to a background context, not the request ctx (#988)
## Problem

`AuthorizationCodeHandler.exchangeAuthorizationCode` builds the
long-lived token source from the **request context** passed to
`Authorize()`:

```go
clientCtx := context.WithValue(ctx, oauth2.HTTPClient, h.config.Client)
...
h.tokenSource = cfg.TokenSource(clientCtx, token)
```

`golang.org/x/oauth2` captures that context and reuses it for **every**
future refresh:
- `oauth2.go`: `Config.TokenSource(ctx, …)` stores `ctx` in
`tokenRefresher{ctx}`
- `tokenRefresher.Token()` (no ctx arg) calls `retrieveToken(tf.ctx, …)`
- `internal/token.go`: `ContextClient(ctx).Do(req.WithContext(ctx))`

`Authorize()` is normally invoked from a request- or connect-scoped
context — e.g. the streamable client transport calls it during
`setMCPHeaders`/`initialize`, and that context is cancelled once the
operation completes. The cached access token works until expiry; the
**first refresh after expiry** then fails instantly with `context
canceled`, before any HTTP request is sent. The connection can no longer
refresh.

`setMCPHeaders` only re-invokes `Authorize()` for an `invalid_grant`
`oauth2.RetrieveError` (#917). A `context canceled` is not a
`RetrieveError`, so it is never recovered — the connection is wedged
until the client reconnects.

### Reproduce

1. Connect a `StreamableClientTransport` with an
`AuthorizationCodeHandler` to a server whose `initialize` returns 401
(so `Authorize()` runs during connect, under the connect context).
2. Let the connect context be cancelled after connect returns (the
common pattern: a `context.WithTimeout(parent, …)` + `defer cancel()`
bounding the interactive flow).
3. Wait for the access token to expire and issue a request.
4. Every request fails with `Post "<token endpoint>": context canceled`
and `dur≈0` — the refresh never hits the network.

## Fix

A token source outlives the request that created it, so bind its
refreshes to `context.Background()` (still carrying the configured HTTP
client via `oauth2.HTTPClient`). The one-shot token exchange keeps using
the request context.

```go
refreshCtx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), oauth2.HTTPClient, h.config.Client)
h.tokenSource = cfg.TokenSource(refreshCtx, token)
```

`auth` package tests pass. Behaviour is otherwise unchanged: the same
HTTP client value is carried; only the cancellation parent differs.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
2026-06-16 16:42:53 +02:00

445 lines
15 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2026 The Go MCP SDK Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by the license
// that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package oauthtest
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"maps"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"slices"
"testing"
internaljson "github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/internal/json"
"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/oauthex"
)
type ClientInfo struct {
Secret string
RedirectURIs []string
}
type MetadataEndpointConfig struct {
// Whether to serve the OAuth Authorization Server Metadata at
// /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server + issuerPath.
ServeOAuthInsertedEndpoint bool
// Whether to serve the OAuth Authorization Server Metadata at
// /.well-known/openid-configuration + issuerPath.
ServeOpenIDInsertedEndpoint bool
// Whether to serve the OAuth Authorization Server Metadata at
// issuerPath + /.well-known/openid-configuration.
// Should be used when issuerPath is not empty.
ServeOpenIDAppendedEndpoint bool
}
type RegistrationConfig struct {
// Whether the client ID metadata document is supported.
ClientIDMetadataDocumentSupported bool
// PreregisteredClients is a map of valid ClientIDs to ClientSecrets.
PreregisteredClients map[string]ClientInfo
// Whether dynamic client registration is enabled.
DynamicClientRegistrationEnabled bool
}
// JWTBearerConfig configures support for the JWT Bearer grant type (RFC 7523)
// on a [FakeAuthorizationServer].
type JWTBearerConfig struct {
// ValidAssertions is the set of assertion values that are accepted.
// If empty, any non-empty assertion is accepted.
ValidAssertions []string
}
// ClientCredentialsConfig configures support for the client_credentials
// grant type (RFC 6749 Section 4.4) on a [FakeAuthorizationServer].
type ClientCredentialsConfig struct {
// Enabled controls whether the /token endpoint accepts
// grant_type=client_credentials and returns an access token
// if client authentication succeeds.
Enabled bool
}
// Config holds configuration for FakeAuthorizationServer.
type Config struct {
// The optional path component of the issuer URL.
// If non-empty, it should start with a "/". It should not end with a "/".
// It affects the paths of the server endpoints.
IssuerPath string
// Configuration of the metadata endpoint.
MetadataEndpointConfig *MetadataEndpointConfig
// Configuration for client registration.
RegistrationConfig *RegistrationConfig
// JWTBearerConfig enables RFC 7523 JWT Bearer grant at the /token endpoint.
// If non-nil, the server accepts grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer.
JWTBearerConfig *JWTBearerConfig
// ClientCredentialsConfig enables RFC 6749 Section 4.4 client credentials
// grant at the /token endpoint.
ClientCredentialsConfig *ClientCredentialsConfig
// ScopesSupported is an optional list of scopes to advertise in the
// authorization server metadata.
ScopesSupported []string
// TokenScopeFunc, if set, is called with the scope from the authorization
// request and returns the scope string to include in the token response.
TokenScopeFunc func(requestedScope string) string
// AccessTokenTTL, if non-zero, is the expires_in (in seconds) returned by the
// /token endpoint for both the authorization_code and refresh_token grants.
// When zero a default of 3600 is used. Set it small to force a client's reuse
// token source to treat the access token as expired and refresh it.
AccessTokenTTL int
// IssueRefreshToken, if true, includes a refresh_token in token responses and
// enables grant_type=refresh_token at the /token endpoint.
IssueRefreshToken bool
}
// testRefreshToken is the refresh token issued and accepted by the fake server
// when Config.IssueRefreshToken is set.
const testRefreshToken = "test_refresh_token"
// accessTokenExpiresIn returns the expires_in value to use in token responses.
func (s *FakeAuthorizationServer) accessTokenExpiresIn() int {
if s.config.AccessTokenTTL != 0 {
return s.config.AccessTokenTTL
}
return 3600
}
// FakeAuthorizationServer is a fake OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server for testing.
type FakeAuthorizationServer struct {
server *httptest.Server
Mux *http.ServeMux
config Config
clients map[string]ClientInfo
codes map[string]codeInfo
}
type codeInfo struct {
CodeChallenge string
Scope string
}
// NewFakeAuthorizationServer creates a new FakeAuthorizationServer.
// The server is simple and should not be used outside of testing.
// It supports:
// - Only the authorization Code Grant
// - PKCE verification
// - Client tracking & dynamic registration
// - Client authentication
func NewFakeAuthorizationServer(config Config) *FakeAuthorizationServer {
s := &FakeAuthorizationServer{
Mux: http.NewServeMux(),
config: config,
codes: make(map[string]codeInfo),
}
if config.RegistrationConfig != nil {
s.clients = maps.Clone(config.RegistrationConfig.PreregisteredClients)
}
if s.clients == nil {
s.clients = make(map[string]ClientInfo)
}
s.Mux.HandleFunc(s.config.IssuerPath+"/authorize", s.handleAuthorize)
s.Mux.HandleFunc(s.config.IssuerPath+"/token", s.handleToken)
if config.MetadataEndpointConfig != nil {
if config.MetadataEndpointConfig.ServeOAuthInsertedEndpoint {
s.Mux.HandleFunc("/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server"+s.config.IssuerPath, s.handleMetadata)
}
if config.MetadataEndpointConfig.ServeOpenIDInsertedEndpoint {
s.Mux.HandleFunc("/.well-known/openid-configuration"+s.config.IssuerPath, s.handleMetadata)
}
if config.MetadataEndpointConfig.ServeOpenIDAppendedEndpoint && s.config.IssuerPath != "" {
s.Mux.HandleFunc(s.config.IssuerPath+"/.well-known/openid-configuration", s.handleMetadata)
}
} else {
// Serve the default OAuth endpoint.
s.Mux.HandleFunc("/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server", s.handleMetadata)
}
if config.RegistrationConfig != nil && config.RegistrationConfig.DynamicClientRegistrationEnabled {
s.Mux.HandleFunc(s.config.IssuerPath+"/register", s.handleRegister)
}
s.server = httptest.NewUnstartedServer(s.Mux)
return s
}
// Start starts the HTTP server and registers a cleanup function on t to close the server.
func (s *FakeAuthorizationServer) Start(t testing.TB) {
s.server.Start()
t.Cleanup(s.server.Close)
}
// URL returns the base URL of the server (Issuer).
func (s *FakeAuthorizationServer) URL() string {
return s.server.URL
}
func (s *FakeAuthorizationServer) handleMetadata(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
cimdSupported := false
var registrationEndpoint string
if s.config.RegistrationConfig != nil {
cimdSupported = s.config.RegistrationConfig.ClientIDMetadataDocumentSupported
if s.config.RegistrationConfig.DynamicClientRegistrationEnabled {
registrationEndpoint = s.URL() + s.config.IssuerPath + "/register"
}
}
meta := &oauthex.AuthServerMeta{
Issuer: s.URL() + s.config.IssuerPath,
AuthorizationEndpoint: s.URL() + s.config.IssuerPath + "/authorize",
TokenEndpoint: s.URL() + s.config.IssuerPath + "/token",
RegistrationEndpoint: registrationEndpoint,
ScopesSupported: s.config.ScopesSupported,
ResponseTypesSupported: []string{"code"},
CodeChallengeMethodsSupported: []string{"S256"},
ClientIDMetadataDocumentSupported: cimdSupported,
TokenEndpointAuthMethodsSupported: []string{"client_secret_post", "client_secret_basic"},
// Advertise RFC 9207 support: the authorize endpoint includes "iss" in responses.
AuthorizationResponseIssParameterSupported: true,
}
// Set CORS headers for cross-origin client discovery.
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, OPTIONS")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type")
// Handle CORS preflight requests
if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
return
}
// Only GET allowed for metadata retrieval
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(meta); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "Failed to encode metadata", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
}
func (s *FakeAuthorizationServer) handleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
var metadata oauthex.ClientRegistrationMetadata
body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "failed to read request body", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if err := internaljson.Unmarshal(body, &metadata); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "failed to parse request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
clientID := rand.Text()
ci := ClientInfo{
Secret: rand.Text(),
RedirectURIs: metadata.RedirectURIs,
}
s.clients[clientID] = ci
metadata.TokenEndpointAuthMethod = "client_secret_basic"
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(&oauthex.ClientRegistrationResponse{
ClientID: clientID,
ClientSecret: ci.Secret,
ClientRegistrationMetadata: metadata,
})
}
func (s *FakeAuthorizationServer) handleAuthorize(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
clientID := r.URL.Query().Get("client_id")
clientInfo, ok := s.clients[clientID]
if !ok {
http.Error(w, "unknown client_id", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
redirectURI := r.URL.Query().Get("redirect_uri")
if redirectURI == "" {
http.Error(w, "missing redirect_uri", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if !slices.Contains(clientInfo.RedirectURIs, redirectURI) {
http.Error(w, "invalid redirect_uri", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
codeChallenge := r.URL.Query().Get("code_challenge")
if codeChallenge == "" {
http.Error(w, "missing code_challenge", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
code := rand.Text()
s.codes[code] = codeInfo{
CodeChallenge: codeChallenge,
Scope: r.URL.Query().Get("scope"),
}
state := r.URL.Query().Get("state")
issuer := s.URL() + s.config.IssuerPath
redirectURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s?code=%s&state=%s&iss=%s", redirectURI, code, state, url.QueryEscape(issuer))
http.Redirect(w, r, redirectURL, http.StatusFound)
}
func (s *FakeAuthorizationServer) handleToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "failed to parse form", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
if err := s.authenticateClient(r); err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
grantType := r.Form.Get("grant_type")
switch grantType {
case "authorization_code":
s.handleAuthorizationCodeGrant(w, r)
case "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer":
s.handleJWTBearerGrant(w, r)
case "client_credentials":
s.handleClientCredentialsGrant(w, r)
case "refresh_token":
s.handleRefreshTokenGrant(w, r)
default:
http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("unsupported grant_type: %s", grantType), http.StatusBadRequest)
}
}
func (s *FakeAuthorizationServer) handleAuthorizationCodeGrant(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
code := r.Form.Get("code")
if code == "" {
http.Error(w, "missing code", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
codeInfo, ok := s.codes[code]
if !ok {
http.Error(w, "unknown authorization code", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
verifier := r.Form.Get("code_verifier")
if verifier == "" {
http.Error(w, "missing code_verifier", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
sha := sha256.Sum256([]byte(verifier))
expectedChallenge := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sha[:])
if expectedChallenge != codeInfo.CodeChallenge {
http.Error(w, "PKCE verification failed", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
resp := map[string]any{
"access_token": "test_access_token",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_in": s.accessTokenExpiresIn(),
}
if s.config.IssueRefreshToken {
resp["refresh_token"] = testRefreshToken
}
if s.config.TokenScopeFunc != nil {
if scope := s.config.TokenScopeFunc(codeInfo.Scope); scope != "" {
resp["scope"] = scope
}
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)
}
// handleRefreshTokenGrant implements grant_type=refresh_token (RFC 6749 Section
// 6) when Config.IssueRefreshToken is set, returning a distinct access token so
// callers can observe that a refresh occurred.
func (s *FakeAuthorizationServer) handleRefreshTokenGrant(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !s.config.IssueRefreshToken {
http.Error(w, "refresh_token grant not supported", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if r.Form.Get("refresh_token") != testRefreshToken {
http.Error(w, "invalid refresh_token", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
"access_token": "test_access_token_refreshed",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_in": s.accessTokenExpiresIn(),
"refresh_token": testRefreshToken,
})
}
func (s *FakeAuthorizationServer) handleJWTBearerGrant(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if s.config.JWTBearerConfig == nil {
http.Error(w, "JWT bearer grant not supported", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
assertion := r.Form.Get("assertion")
if assertion == "" {
http.Error(w, "missing assertion", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if len(s.config.JWTBearerConfig.ValidAssertions) > 0 {
if !slices.Contains(s.config.JWTBearerConfig.ValidAssertions, assertion) {
http.Error(w, "invalid assertion", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
"access_token": "test_access_token",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_in": 3600,
})
}
func (s *FakeAuthorizationServer) handleClientCredentialsGrant(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if s.config.ClientCredentialsConfig == nil || !s.config.ClientCredentialsConfig.Enabled {
http.Error(w, "client_credentials grant not supported", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
resp := map[string]any{
"access_token": "test_access_token",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_in": 3600,
}
if s.config.TokenScopeFunc != nil {
if scope := s.config.TokenScopeFunc(r.Form.Get("scope")); scope != "" {
resp["scope"] = scope
}
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)
}
func (s *FakeAuthorizationServer) authenticateClient(r *http.Request) error {
clientID, clientSecret, ok := r.BasicAuth()
if !ok {
clientID = r.Form.Get("client_id")
clientSecret = r.Form.Get("client_secret")
}
clientInfo, ok := s.clients[clientID]
if !ok || clientInfo.Secret != clientSecret {
return errors.New("client not found")
}
return nil
}