feat(auth): give the secrets file a real cross-process lock (#2082)
#1950 shipped FileSecretStore without cross-process mutual exclusion, by decision: an earlier revision hand-rolled a `mkdir` election with an owner stamp, a heartbeat and a stale-takeover, and three consecutive review rounds found a real race in it. The last one is not closable with what Node exposes — claiming a stale lock atomically needs compare-and-swap on a directory entry (`renameat2(RENAME_EXCHANGE)`) — so it was replaced with optimistic verify-and-retry and the residual documented. #2082 settles that as "borrow, don't hand-roll". `proper-lockfile` is what npm itself locks with, and stale-takeover is precisely the problem it has already solved: it re-stats the lock directory after claiming it and gives the lock up when the mtime is not the one it wrote, so the loser of a takeover race releases instead of proceeding. - core/auth/node/file-lock.ts: `withSecretFileLock`. `realpath: false` so a file can be locked into existence (the very first `set` has no `secrets.json`, and the library's default resolves through `fs.realpath`); a warning in place of the library's `onCompromised`, which throws from a timer and would take the session down; and a degrade-with-one-warning path rather than a throw when no lock can be taken — this store exists for boxes missing the usual mechanism (#1848, #1905) and must not gain a new way to be unavailable. - FileSecretStore.mutate holds it across the whole read-modify-write. The optimistic verify stays underneath and is not redundant: a lock is advisory between the processes that take it, so the verify covers a writer outside this codebase and covers the degrade path. The in-process queue stays too, and gains a second job — proper-lockfile is not reentrant, so serializing per path keeps ELOCKED meaning "another process". - absorbFileSecretsIntoKeyring takes the same lock around orphan adoption and the atomic claim, behind a lock-free `readdir` fast path so the common startup (keychain available, no file ever written) neither creates a lock directory nor warns about one it could not create. proper-lockfile is a root `dependency` per the placement rule, and is named in all three bundler `external` lists: tsup externalizes what the *client's* manifest declares, so a root-only CJS package was being inlined into the ESM bundles, leaving esbuild's `Dynamic require of "path" is not supported` shim that killed `--cli` at import time. That rule was undocumented; it is now in AGENTS.md beside the placement rule that creates it, and mirrored into .github/copilot-instructions.md. Tests: 7 new in file-lock.test.ts driving a real second process (the existing suite structurally cannot — `serialize` orders in-process callers before the lock sees them), plus two for the migration fast path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTHVxSu8AUgHRLvo1ntZ8H Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
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AGENTS.md
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AGENTS.md
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@ -68,7 +68,15 @@ v2/main/
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│ │ │ # throws and the routes turn into a 503, and the keychain
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│ │ │ # probe), file-secret-store.ts (0600 JSON, AES-256-GCM when
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│ │ │ # MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_KEY is set — refuses to overwrite a
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│ │ │ # file it cannot decrypt rather than destroying it), and
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│ │ │ # file it cannot decrypt rather than destroying it),
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│ │ │ # file-lock.ts (withSecretFileLock: the cross-process
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│ │ │ # mutual exclusion #2082 settled on — proper-lockfile,
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│ │ │ # borrowed rather than hand-rolled, because stale-takeover
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│ │ │ # is what three review rounds of a mkdir election failed to
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│ │ │ # get right; DEGRADES rather than throws when no lock can
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│ │ │ # be taken, since this store exists for boxes missing the
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│ │ │ # usual mechanism and must not gain a new way to fail),
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│ │ │ # and
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│ │ │ # secret-store-selection.ts (the POLICY: explicit
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│ │ │ # MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_STORE wins, else probe the keychain,
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│ │ │ # else fall back LOUDLY — to memory in a container with
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@ -222,6 +230,8 @@ The same **placement** rule covers anything reached only through **root-owned co
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- A package only the tests, the test servers, or the build tooling need belongs in **`devDependencies`** — `express`, added there by #1970.
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- `yaml` is in `dependencies` today even though its only importer is `test-servers/src/load-config.ts`. Left as-is deliberately (moving it changes what ships, which is not a docs change); if you touch it, confirm no published path reads YAML first.
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**A root-declared package that `core/` imports at runtime must also be named in each client's bundler `external` list.** tsup and Vite externalize what the *client's* `package.json` declares, and a root-only dependency is in none of them — so it gets **bundled**, silently, and the placement rule above is what guarantees every such package is root-only. For a CJS package inlined into an ESM bundle that is fatal rather than merely wasteful: esbuild leaves a `Dynamic require of "path" is not supported` shim that throws at *import* time, so the binary dies before it parses a flag. `proper-lockfile` hit exactly that in #2082; `@napi-rs/keyring` is listed in all three for the same reason. The three lists are `clients/cli/tsup.config.ts`, `clients/tui/tsup.config.ts`, and `clients/web/tsup.runner.config.ts` — add a new package to **all** of them, since which client reaches it is a function of what `core/` imports, not of what the client's own code names.
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**A dependency that renders React components must be bundled into the client that uses it, and is then not a root dependency.** An externalized package resolves its own `react` from wherever npm placed **it** in the consumer's tree, and npm places a package beside a React satisfying *that package's* peer range — looser than ours in every case here, which is all it takes to split React. `ink-form` and `ink-scroll-view` declare `">=18"`, satisfied by a consumer's React 18 while our React 19 nests underneath: the bundle renders through one React, those packages call hooks on another, and the TUI crashes on the first hook (#1952). Both are inlined by `clients/tui/tsup.config.ts` (`noExternal`) and declared only in `clients/tui/package.json`, where the build resolves them — declaring an inlined package at the root would just make consumers install a second, unused copy.
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**`ink` is the single exemption, and it is justified by cost, not by safety.** Bundling it works but adds ~1.4MB (`react-reconciler` + `yoga-layout`, plus a `createRequire` banner, since inlined CJS calls `require` at runtime and esbuild's ESM interop rejects that without a real `require` in scope). **Never justify an exemption by a peer range** — `ink` briefly carried "its `">=19"` peer keeps npm honest", which is false: a consumer pinning React 19.0 satisfies `">=19"` while a narrower range of ours nests underneath. What actually makes the exemption safe is a *different* lever: the **root `react` range stays open to the whole major (`^19.0.0`)**, so npm can dedupe our React with whatever React 19 a consumer pins and an external `ink` lands on the same copy the bundle uses. Narrowing it (e.g. back to `^19.2.4`) silently reopens the crash for the renderer itself, which breaks TUI *startup*, not just its forms. `clients/tui/__tests__/tsupConfig.test.ts` enforces all of it: React-rendering deps inlined, each exempt package both external and root-declared, and the root range pinned to `ink`'s peer floor.
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