fix(auth): address Copilot review on the secret-store PR

Six findings, all taken.

- The descriptor reported the *write policy*, not the file. Adding
  `MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_KEY` to an install that already has a plaintext
  file flipped `store.encrypted` immediately, so the banner and footer
  claimed "File (encrypted)" while the existing secrets sat readable
  until the next `set`. `FileSecretStore.readOnDiskEncryption()` now
  reads the envelope (never the payload, so it needs no passphrase) and
  the descriptor is built from that. The transitional state gets its own
  `pendingEncryption` flag, which changes the advice without softening
  the verdict — "set a passphrase" is the wrong thing to tell someone who
  already has, so the caveat names the pending write instead.

- The secrets file ignored the configured storage directory. A container
  mounting only that directory was judged unmounted, fell back to
  `memory`, and lost secrets the user had arranged to keep.
  `defaultSecretFilePath()` now follows `MCP_STORAGE_DIR` — the variable
  that already relocates OAuth tokens and `client.json` — between the
  explicit `MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_FILE` and the `~/.mcp-inspector`
  default. (The issue comment called it `MCP_INSPECTOR_STORAGE_DIR`; no
  such variable exists.)

- `version` was never checked before the plaintext branch, so a
  `{ version: 2, encryption: "none" }` file was read and silently
  rewritten as version 1, discarding whatever the newer format added —
  the same destroy-to-satisfy-an-additive-request case the encrypted
  branch already refuses. Checked first now, so the answer no longer
  depends on which encryption mode the newer writer chose.

- The doc comment claimed a per-file salt made "a short, memorable value
  safe to use". It does not: the salt defeats precomputation, not
  guessing, and the scrypt cost is deliberately a few milliseconds
  because it runs on every read and write. Both the comment and the
  README now say to use a high-entropy value, generated rather than
  chosen.

- `usableSecretStorage` validated only `kind`, so a partial
  `{ kind: "file" }` was cast through and — because a missing `plaintext`
  is falsy — rendered as the quiet, neutral *encrypted* file. That is the
  confident half-answer the guard exists to reject, produced by the
  absence of information rather than by any claim the backend made.
  `reason`, `durable`, and each kind's own required fields are checked.

- The footer's inline `Tooltip` carried four static props; extracted to a
  `CaveatTooltip` constant per the `.withProps()` rule.

Tests cover each: the policy/file disagreement in both directions and the
no-file-yet fallback, `MCP_STORAGE_DIR` and its precedence against
`MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_FILE`, the version refusal (asserting the bytes
survive it) split from the unrecognized-cipher refusal it used to be
conflated with, `readOnDiskEncryption` including the keyless and
unparseable cases, five new rejected descriptor shapes, and the changed
caveat. Full `npm run ci` green.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
This commit is contained in:
cliffhall 2026-08-22 12:26:33 -04:00
commit 3452a63101

View file

@ -42,12 +42,26 @@ export interface SecretStorageInfo {
*/
path?: string;
/**
* True when a file-backed store is writing secrets in the clear (no
* `MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_KEY`). Always false for the other kinds — a
* keychain is opaque to us and RAM is not "at rest" in the sense this
* flag is about.
* True when the secrets file is *currently* in the clear. Read off the
* file's own envelope rather than off whether a passphrase is
* configured, because those two disagree for a whole session: adding
* `MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_KEY` to an install that already has a plaintext
* file makes the next write encrypt, while the existing bytes stay
* readable until then. Reporting the intent would tell that user their
* secrets were encrypted while they were not.
*
* Always false for the other kinds — a keychain is opaque to us and RAM
* is not "at rest" in the sense this flag is about.
*/
plaintext?: boolean;
/**
* True in exactly the transitional state above: `plaintext` is still
* true, but a passphrase is set and the next write will encrypt. It
* changes the *advice* rather than the verdict — "set a passphrase" is
* the wrong thing to tell someone who already has, so the caveat says
* what will actually clear the condition.
*/
pendingEncryption?: boolean;
/**
* True when secrets outlive the process. False only for `memory`, and
* it is the *promise* being made rather than an implementation detail:
@ -104,7 +118,9 @@ export function secretStorageCaveat(
return "Secrets are not written anywhere and are lost when the Inspector exits.";
}
if (info.plaintext) {
return "Secrets are stored unencrypted (file mode 0600). Set MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_KEY to encrypt them.";
return info.pendingEncryption
? "Existing secrets in this file are still unencrypted (file mode 0600). They are re-encrypted the next time a secret is saved."
: "Secrets are stored unencrypted (file mode 0600). Set MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_KEY to encrypt them.";
}
return undefined;
}