fix: record CIMD provenance as an issuer-keyed marker, not on the credential

Copilot review (#2287), three findings:

1. **invalid-client recovery lost the provenance.** SDK v2 `auth()` answers
   `invalid_client` / `unauthorized_client` with `invalidateCredentials("client")`
   and an immediate retry; our clear drops the registration *and* its kind, so
   the retry's URL-based client-ID save landed with nothing recorded and was
   stored as `dcr`. Provenance now lives in `cimdClientMetadataUrl`, an
   issuer-keyed marker on the issuer slot that records a property of the AS
   rather than a credential — `clearClientInformation` deliberately leaves it
   alone. `ensureCimdClientRegistration` writes it, and withdraws it when the AS
   stops advertising CIMD, on every connect.

2. **Discovery became a hard network dependency.** Moving the existing-client
   check after discovery meant a well-known outage could fail a reconnect the SDK
   would have served from its persisted discovery state. Reuse
   `provider.discoveryState()` first, and treat a discovery failure as "skip
   pre-registration" rather than an error — this helper is an optimization over
   what `auth()` does for itself.

3. **Dropped an unjustified double cast** in the test fetch helper; the async
   signature is directly assignable to `typeof fetch`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lmj6X2epWpPE7ScdSKQmtA
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
This commit is contained in:
cliffhall 2026-09-07 01:34:03 -04:00
commit 4297ef8449
9 changed files with 299 additions and 108 deletions

View file

@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ describe("ensureCimdClientRegistration", () => {
storage = {
getClientInformation: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
saveClientInformation: vi.fn(async () => {}),
getDiscoveryState: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
getCimdClientMetadataUrl: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
saveCimdClientMetadataUrl: vi.fn(async () => {}),
getScope: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
getTokens: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
saveTokens: vi.fn(async () => {}),
@ -72,6 +75,12 @@ describe("ensureCimdClientRegistration", () => {
},
{ registrationKind: "cimd", issuer: "http://127.0.0.1:9999" },
);
// The provenance marker for this AS, which outlives the credential.
expect(storage.saveCimdClientMetadataUrl).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
SERVER_URL,
"http://127.0.0.1:9999",
METADATA_URL,
);
});
it("does not register when the AS metadata omits CIMD support", async () => {
@ -102,6 +111,13 @@ describe("ensureCimdClientRegistration", () => {
});
expect(storage.saveClientInformation).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
// The marker is actively withdrawn, not merely left unwritten, so an AS that
// stops advertising CIMD stops being treated as one.
expect(storage.saveCimdClientMetadataUrl).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
SERVER_URL,
"http://127.0.0.1:9999",
undefined,
);
});
it("discovers protected-resource metadata at the challenge-advertised URL (#2071)", async () => {
@ -161,6 +177,57 @@ describe("ensureCimdClientRegistration", () => {
);
});
// #2242 (Copilot): the existing-client check moved after discovery, so this
// helper must not turn a well-known outage into a failed reconnect. It reuses
// the discovery state SDK `auth()` persists, and treats a discovery failure as
// "skip pre-registration" rather than an error.
it("reuses persisted discovery state instead of re-fetching", async () => {
storage.getDiscoveryState = vi.fn(async () => ({
authorizationServerUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:9999",
authorizationServerMetadata: {
issuer: "http://127.0.0.1:9999",
authorization_endpoint: "http://127.0.0.1:9999/oauth/authorize",
token_endpoint: "http://127.0.0.1:9999/oauth/token",
response_types_supported: ["code"],
client_id_metadata_document_supported: true,
},
}));
const fetchFn = vi.fn(async () => {
throw new Error("discovery must not run when state is cached");
});
await ensureCimdClientRegistration({
serverUrl: SERVER_URL,
provider: createProvider(storage),
fetchFn,
});
expect(fetchFn).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(storage.saveClientInformation).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
SERVER_URL,
{ client_id: METADATA_URL },
{ registrationKind: "cimd", issuer: "http://127.0.0.1:9999" },
);
});
it("skips pre-registration when discovery fails, rather than throwing", async () => {
const fetchFn = vi.fn(async () => {
throw new Error("well-known endpoint is down");
});
await expect(
ensureCimdClientRegistration({
serverUrl: SERVER_URL,
provider: createProvider(storage),
fetchFn,
}),
).resolves.toBeUndefined();
expect(storage.saveClientInformation).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
// No marker is invented either — nothing was learned about the AS.
expect(storage.saveCimdClientMetadataUrl).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("no-ops when client information is already stored for the discovered issuer", async () => {
// Dynamic slot only — a preregistered hit would short-circuit
// `clientInformation()` before it ever reaches the issuer-keyed read.

View file

@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ function createStorage(
getCodeVerifier: vi.fn(),
getDiscoveryState: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
saveDiscoveryState: vi.fn(),
getCimdClientMetadataUrl: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
saveCimdClientMetadataUrl: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
clearDiscoveryState: vi.fn(),
};
}

View file

@ -221,6 +221,8 @@ describe("OAuthNavigation", () => {
getScope: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
getClientInformation: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
getClientRegistrationKind: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
getCimdClientMetadataUrl: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
saveCimdClientMetadataUrl: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
saveClientInformation: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
savePreregisteredClientInformation: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
saveScope: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
@ -641,20 +643,16 @@ describe("OAuthNavigation", () => {
const ISSUER = "https://as.example.com";
const METADATA_URL = "https://app.example.com/client-metadata.json";
/** Storage already holding the CIMD pre-registration for METADATA_URL. */
/** Storage holding this AS's CIMD marker for METADATA_URL. */
function makeCimdStorage(): OAuthStorage {
const storage = makeStorage();
vi.mocked(storage.getClientInformation).mockImplementation(
async (_url: string, preregistered?: boolean) =>
preregistered ? undefined : { client_id: METADATA_URL },
);
vi.mocked(storage.getClientRegistrationKind).mockResolvedValue(
"cimd",
vi.mocked(storage.getCimdClientMetadataUrl).mockResolvedValue(
METADATA_URL,
);
return storage;
}
it("keeps cimd when CIMD is configured and the stored registration matches", async () => {
it("keeps cimd when CIMD is configured and this issuer carries the marker", async () => {
const storage = makeCimdStorage();
const provider = makeProvider(storage, vi.fn(), {
clientMetadataUrl: METADATA_URL,
@ -665,11 +663,8 @@ describe("OAuthNavigation", () => {
{ issuer: ISSUER },
);
// Reads the dynamic slot for this issuer, which falls back to the
// unkeyed slot the pre-registration wrote.
expect(storage.getClientInformation).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect(storage.getCimdClientMetadataUrl).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
SERVER,
false,
ISSUER,
);
expect(storage.saveClientInformation).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
@ -679,6 +674,31 @@ describe("OAuthNavigation", () => {
);
});
// SDK v2 `auth()` answers `invalid_client` / `unauthorized_client` with
// `invalidateCredentials("client")` and an immediate retry. That clears
// the stored registration *and* its kind, so provenance read off the
// credential would be gone by the time the retry's CIMD save lands
// (Copilot). The marker is not a credential and survives.
it("keeps cimd through invalid-client recovery, which clears the credential", async () => {
const storage = makeCimdStorage();
const provider = makeProvider(storage, vi.fn(), {
clientMetadataUrl: METADATA_URL,
});
await provider.invalidateCredentials("client");
await provider.saveClientInformation(
{ client_id: METADATA_URL },
{ issuer: ISSUER },
);
expect(storage.clearClientInformation).toHaveBeenCalledWith(SERVER);
expect(storage.saveClientInformation).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
SERVER,
{ client_id: METADATA_URL },
{ registrationKind: "cimd", issuer: ISSUER },
);
});
it("records dcr for a server-minted client_id while CIMD is configured", async () => {
const storage = makeCimdStorage();
const provider = makeProvider(storage, vi.fn(), {
@ -690,10 +710,8 @@ describe("OAuthNavigation", () => {
{ issuer: ISSUER },
);
// The id is not the metadata URL, so nothing is read and nothing is
// carried forward.
expect(storage.getClientInformation).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(storage.getClientRegistrationKind).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
// The id is not the metadata URL, so the marker is never consulted.
expect(storage.getCimdClientMetadataUrl).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(storage.saveClientInformation).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
SERVER,
{ client_id: "dcr-minted-id" },
@ -701,7 +719,7 @@ describe("OAuthNavigation", () => {
);
});
it("records dcr when CIMD is not configured, even if storage says cimd", async () => {
it("records dcr when CIMD is not configured, even if the marker is set", async () => {
const storage = makeCimdStorage();
const provider = makeProvider(storage);
@ -717,29 +735,11 @@ describe("OAuthNavigation", () => {
);
});
it("records dcr when the metadata URL differs from the configured one", async () => {
const storage = makeCimdStorage();
const provider = makeProvider(storage, vi.fn(), {
clientMetadataUrl: "https://other.example.com/client-metadata.json",
});
await provider.saveClientInformation(
{ client_id: METADATA_URL },
{ issuer: ISSUER },
);
expect(storage.saveClientInformation).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
SERVER,
{ client_id: METADATA_URL },
{ registrationKind: "dcr", issuer: ISSUER },
);
});
it("records dcr when no CIMD registration was ever stored", async () => {
// The AS returns the configured metadata URL from a real registration
// (RFC 7591 §3.2 leaves the id opaque). With nothing recorded as CIMD
// under that id, the save is still DCR.
it("records dcr when the marker names a different metadata URL", async () => {
const storage = makeStorage();
vi.mocked(storage.getCimdClientMetadataUrl).mockResolvedValue(
"https://other.example.com/client-metadata.json",
);
const provider = makeProvider(storage, vi.fn(), {
clientMetadataUrl: METADATA_URL,
});
@ -756,13 +756,11 @@ describe("OAuthNavigation", () => {
);
});
it("records dcr when the stored kind under that id is not cimd", async () => {
it("records dcr when this issuer carries no marker", async () => {
// The AS returns the configured metadata URL from a real registration
// (RFC 7591 §3.2 leaves the id opaque). With no marker for this AS,
// the save is still DCR.
const storage = makeStorage();
vi.mocked(storage.getClientInformation).mockImplementation(
async (_url: string, preregistered?: boolean) =>
preregistered ? undefined : { client_id: METADATA_URL },
);
vi.mocked(storage.getClientRegistrationKind).mockResolvedValue("dcr");
const provider = makeProvider(storage, vi.fn(), {
clientMetadataUrl: METADATA_URL,
});
@ -802,8 +800,8 @@ describe("OAuthNavigation", () => {
* has to name the AS, so that the RFC 8414 §3.3 issuer echo the SDK
* enforces resolves against the AS URL rather than the resource's.
*/
function discoveryFetch(issuer: string, cimd: boolean) {
return (async (input: RequestInfo | URL) => {
function discoveryFetch(issuer: string, cimd: boolean): typeof fetch {
return async (input: RequestInfo | URL) => {
const url = String(input);
if (url.includes("/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource")) {
return new Response(
@ -827,7 +825,7 @@ describe("OAuthNavigation", () => {
);
}
throw new Error(`unexpected fetch: ${url}`);
}) as unknown as typeof fetch;
};
}
/** Issuer A pre-registers via CIMD, then the SDK binds it. */
@ -900,6 +898,43 @@ describe("OAuthNavigation", () => {
).toBe("cimd");
});
// The provenance marker's whole reason for existing: SDK v2 `auth()`
// answers `invalid_client` with `invalidateCredentials("client")` and
// an immediate retry, and that clear removes the credential *and* its
// registration kind. Asserted against real storage, since the point is
// what `clearClientInformation` does and does not touch (Copilot).
it("keeps the CIMD marker through invalid-client credential invalidation", async () => {
const storage = makeRealStorage();
const provider = await bindIssuerA(storage);
expect(await storage.getCimdClientMetadataUrl(SERVER, ISSUER)).toBe(
METADATA_URL,
);
await provider.invalidateCredentials("client");
// The credential and its kind are gone...
expect(
await storage.getClientInformation(SERVER, false, ISSUER),
).toBeUndefined();
expect(
await storage.getClientRegistrationKind(SERVER, ISSUER),
).toBeUndefined();
// ...but the marker is not a credential, so it survives.
expect(await storage.getCimdClientMetadataUrl(SERVER, ISSUER)).toBe(
METADATA_URL,
);
// The SDK's retry re-runs its URL-based client-ID branch.
await provider.saveClientInformation(
{ client_id: METADATA_URL },
{ issuer: ISSUER },
);
expect(
await storage.getClientRegistrationKind(SERVER, ISSUER),
).toBe("cimd");
});
it("records dcr for a second issuer that mints its own client_id", async () => {
const storage = makeRealStorage();
const provider = await bindIssuerA(storage);

View file

@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ function createMockParams(
takeRevocationSnapshot: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ byIssuer: {} }),
getDiscoveryState: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
saveDiscoveryState: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
getCimdClientMetadataUrl: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
saveCimdClientMetadataUrl: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
clearDiscoveryState: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
};

View file

@ -27,50 +27,69 @@ export async function ensureCimdClientRegistration(params: {
const clientMetadataUrl = params.provider.clientMetadataUrl?.trim();
if (!clientMetadataUrl) return;
let resourceMetadata;
try {
resourceMetadata = await discoverOAuthProtectedResourceMetadata(
params.serverUrl,
{ resourceMetadataUrl: params.resourceMetadataUrl },
// The same fetch the AS-metadata leg below uses. On web that is
// `createRemoteFetch`, which proxies through the backend to sidestep
// CORS — on the global `fetch` this leg would fail in the browser, be
// swallowed by the catch, and leave CIMD probing the wrong
// authorization server (Copilot).
params.fetchFn,
// Prefer the discovery state SDK `auth()` itself persists and reuses. Without
// this, moving the existing-client check after discovery would turn a
// temporary well-known outage into a failed reconnect, even where the SDK
// could have proceeded from cache (Copilot).
let metadata = (await params.provider.discoveryState())
?.authorizationServerMetadata;
if (!metadata) {
let resourceMetadata;
try {
resourceMetadata = await discoverOAuthProtectedResourceMetadata(
params.serverUrl,
{ resourceMetadataUrl: params.resourceMetadataUrl },
// The same fetch the AS-metadata leg below uses. On web that is
// `createRemoteFetch`, which proxies through the backend to sidestep
// CORS — on the global `fetch` this leg would fail in the browser, be
// swallowed by the catch, and leave CIMD probing the wrong
// authorization server (Copilot).
params.fetchFn,
);
} catch {
resourceMetadata = undefined;
}
try {
// Walks the path-scoped authorization-server URL before the bare origin, so
// a server hosted under a path is probed where it actually publishes its
// metadata rather than only at the domain root (#2110).
metadata = await discoverAuthorizationServerMetadataForServer(
params.serverUrl,
resourceMetadata,
params.fetchFn,
);
} catch {
// Pre-registration is an optimization over what SDK `auth()` does for
// itself, so a discovery failure here must never fail the connection: bail
// out and let `auth()` run its own discovery and error handling.
return;
}
}
const issuer = metadata?.issuer;
// Record — or withdraw — this AS's CIMD marker before anything else, so it
// stays current rather than only ever being written once. It is keyed by
// issuer and is not a credential, so `invalidateCredentials("client")` leaves
// it alone; see `IssuerBoundOAuthState.cimdClientMetadataUrl`.
if (issuer) {
await params.provider.saveCimdClientMetadataUrl(
issuer,
metadata?.client_id_metadata_document_supported
? clientMetadataUrl
: undefined,
);
} catch {
resourceMetadata = undefined;
}
// Walks the path-scoped authorization-server URL before the bare origin, so a
// server hosted under a path is probed where it actually publishes its
// metadata rather than only at the domain root (#2110).
const metadata = await discoverAuthorizationServerMetadataForServer(
params.serverUrl,
resourceMetadata,
params.fetchFn,
);
if (!metadata?.client_id_metadata_document_supported) return;
// SEP-2352 keys a registration to the authorization server that issued it, so
// the record this writes is bound to the issuer we just discovered rather than
// to the server as a whole. That binding is what makes the provenance
// trustworthy later: `BaseOAuthClientProvider.saveClientInformation` preserves
// `cimd` only for an issuer this function recorded it for, having first
// confirmed *that* AS advertises `client_id_metadata_document_supported`
// (#2242, Copilot). A second AS behind the same resource therefore gets its own
// determination — pre-registered here when it too supports CIMD, and left to
// dynamic registration when it does not.
//
// ⚠️ This is why the "do we already have a client?" check below sits *after*
// discovery rather than short-circuiting it, at the cost of a discovery round
// trip on each connect attempt rather than only the first. Read ctx-less — as
// it was — it resolves through the *active* issuer and so early-returns for
// every subsequent issuer, leaving them with no CIMD record at all. It still
// ⚠️ Keyed by the issuer just resolved, not read ctx-less. A ctx-less read
// resolves through the *active* issuer, so it early-returns for every
// subsequent issuer and leaves them with no CIMD record at all. It still
// answers the static case first, since `clientInformation` checks the
// preregistered slot before any issuer slot.
const issuer = metadata.issuer;
const existing = await params.provider.clientInformation(
issuer ? { issuer } : undefined,
);

View file

@ -186,6 +186,34 @@ export class OAuthStorageBase implements OAuthStorage {
);
}
async getCimdClientMetadataUrl(
serverUrl: string,
issuer?: string,
): Promise<string | undefined> {
await this.ensureLoaded();
const state = this.memory.getState().getServerState(serverUrl);
return this.issuerSlot(state, issuer)?.cimdClientMetadataUrl;
}
async saveCimdClientMetadataUrl(
serverUrl: string,
issuer: string,
clientMetadataUrl: string | undefined,
): Promise<void> {
await this.ensureLoaded();
// Not a save of credentials, so it must not promote this issuer to
// `activeIssuer` — the marker is written during discovery, before anything
// has been authorized against this AS.
this.updateIssuerSlot(
serverUrl,
issuer,
{ cimdClientMetadataUrl: clientMetadataUrl },
{},
false,
);
await this.persist();
}
async saveClientInformation(
serverUrl: string,
clientInformation: OAuthClientInformation,

View file

@ -321,38 +321,35 @@ export class BaseOAuthClientProvider implements OAuthClientProvider {
* Connection Info the moment the SDK bound it to an issuer (#2242).
*
* The claim is deliberately narrow — three conditions must all hold, and the
* decisive one is a registration *we ourselves recorded* as CIMD, not an
* inference about what the authorization server returned:
* decisive one is a fact *we recorded about this authorization server*, not an
* inference about what it returned:
*
* 1. CIMD is configured for this connection right now, and
* 2. the incoming `client_id` is exactly that metadata-document URL, and
* 3. the registration stored **for this issuer** under that same `client_id`
* is recorded as `cimd` — written by `ensureCimdClientRegistration`, which
* reaches that line only after confirming *that* AS advertises
* `client_id_metadata_document_supported`.
* 3. `ensureCimdClientRegistration` recorded that same URL as the CIMD marker
* **for this issuer**, having read `client_id_metadata_document_supported`
* from *that* AS's own metadata.
*
* RFC 7591 §3.2 makes a dynamically issued `client_id` opaque, so a client may
* not assume its format — which is why (2) is not load-bearing on its own. For
* a `registerClient` result to be mislabeled here, the AS would have to mint an
* identifier byte-identical to the HTTPS URL we configured *and* be an AS we
* had already recorded a CIMD registration for — that is, one that advertises
* CIMD and then dynamically registers anyway. Anything else — a fresh DCR, a
* different id, CIMD switched off, no prior CIMD registration for this issuer —
* falls through to `"dcr"`.
* identifier byte-identical to the HTTPS URL we configured *and* be an AS that
* currently advertises CIMD and dynamically registered anyway. Anything else —
* a fresh DCR, a different id, CIMD switched off, an AS that does not advertise
* CIMD — falls through to `"dcr"`.
*
* ⚠️ (3) is scoped to the issuer on purpose, and the lookup deliberately does
* **not** fall back to the server's active issuer. SEP-2352 keys registrations
* per AS, so a second AS behind the same resource is a separate determination:
* it may well not support CIMD and register dynamically, and RFC 7591 permits
* it to mint the very URL the first AS uses as a CIMD `client_id` (Copilot).
* `ensureCimdClientRegistration` binds the record to the issuer it discovered,
* which is what lets this stay issuer-scoped without losing a genuine
* second-issuer CIMD registration.
* ⚠️ (3) reads the **marker**, not the stored registration kind, and the two
* differ in exactly one place that matters: `invalidateCredentials("client")`
* clears the credential and its kind, and SDK v2 `auth()` calls it on an
* `invalid_client` / `unauthorized_client` response before retrying. The
* retry's URL-based client-ID save would then find no kind and be recorded as
* DCR. The marker describes the AS rather than the credential, so it survives
* that clear (#2242, Copilot).
*
* The read is still issuer-*keyed* rather than issuer-*only*: `getClientInformation`
* falls back to the unkeyed slot when no `byIssuer` entry exists, which is how a
* pre-registration written before an issuer was known is still found on the save
* that first binds one.
* ⚠️ (3) is issuer-scoped with no fallback to the server's active issuer. A
* second AS behind one resource is a separate determination: it may not support
* CIMD and may register dynamically, and RFC 7591 permits it to mint the very
* URL the first AS uses as its CIMD `client_id`.
*/
private async resolveSdkRegistrationKind(
clientInformation: OAuthClientInformation,
@ -365,19 +362,28 @@ export class BaseOAuthClientProvider implements OAuthClientProvider {
) {
return "dcr";
}
const stored = await this.storage.getClientInformation(
this.serverUrl,
false,
issuer,
);
if (stored?.client_id !== clientMetadataUrl) return "dcr";
const storedKind = await this.storage.getClientRegistrationKind(
const marker = await this.storage.getCimdClientMetadataUrl(
this.serverUrl,
issuer,
);
// `"static"` lives in the preregistered slot, never this one, so `"cimd"`
// is the only kind worth carrying forward.
return storedKind === "cimd" ? "cimd" : "dcr";
return marker === clientMetadataUrl ? "cimd" : "dcr";
}
/** @see OAuthStorage.getCimdClientMetadataUrl */
async cimdClientMetadataUrl(issuer?: string): Promise<string | undefined> {
return await this.storage.getCimdClientMetadataUrl(this.serverUrl, issuer);
}
/** @see OAuthStorage.saveCimdClientMetadataUrl */
async saveCimdClientMetadataUrl(
issuer: string,
clientMetadataUrl: string | undefined,
): Promise<void> {
await this.storage.saveCimdClientMetadataUrl(
this.serverUrl,
issuer,
clientMetadataUrl,
);
}
async saveScope(scope: string | undefined): Promise<void> {

View file

@ -81,6 +81,23 @@ export interface OAuthStorage {
issuer?: string,
): Promise<OAuthClientRegistrationKind | undefined>;
/**
* The CIMD client-metadata URL this authorization server was confirmed to
* accept as a `client_id`. Survives {@link clearClientInformation}, because it
* records a property of the AS rather than a credential (#2242).
*/
getCimdClientMetadataUrl(
serverUrl: string,
issuer?: string,
): Promise<string | undefined>;
/** Write (or, with `undefined`, clear) the marker above for one issuer. */
saveCimdClientMetadataUrl(
serverUrl: string,
issuer: string,
clientMetadataUrl: string | undefined,
): Promise<void>;
/**
* Save client information (dynamically registered)
*/

View file

@ -30,6 +30,21 @@ export interface IssuerBoundOAuthState {
/** Set when {@link clientInformation} is saved — DCR vs CIMD. */
clientRegistrationKind?: OAuthClientRegistrationKind;
tokens?: OAuthTokens;
/**
* The CIMD client-metadata URL this AS was confirmed to accept as a `client_id`
* — written by `ensureCimdClientRegistration` after reading
* `client_id_metadata_document_supported` from *this* issuer's metadata, and
* refreshed (or cleared) on every connect because that check now runs each time.
*
* Deliberately **not** a credential, and so deliberately **not** cleared by
* {@link OAuthStorage.clearClientInformation}. It records a property of the
* authorization server and our own configuration, which an `invalid_client`
* response says nothing about: SDK v2 `auth()` answers that error by calling
* `invalidateCredentials("client")` and retrying, and the retry's URL-based
* client-ID save would otherwise land with no provenance and be recorded as
* DCR (#2242, Copilot).
*/
cimdClientMetadataUrl?: string;
}
/**