fix(auth): address review — observe SSE explicit fetch, isolate test state

- The SSE branch selects a caller-supplied `eventSourceInit.fetch` as-is, so
  it bypassed the challenge observer and a first-time legacy SSE
  authorization lost the advertised URL the same way. Observing is passive,
  so it is applied to that fetch too while the deliberate no-proxy-wrap rule
  stays. Covered behaviorally against a 401-serving server.

- Dropped an `as unknown as typeof fetch` from the new integration test
  (banned by AGENTS.md, and it erased the signature); the spy is typed as
  `typeof fetch` directly. The `as MCPServerConfig` beside it was
  unnecessary too.

- The integration test reused a per-pid OAuth storage file. SDK `auth()`
  persists the advertised URL in its discovery state, so a rerun could
  satisfy discovery from that cache and pass with the plumbing removed —
  which would have quietly falsified the regression check. Fresh mkdtemp
  per run, removed in teardown.

Adds observer unit tests (challenge reported, body untouched, 403 included,
silent on success).

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
This commit is contained in:
cliffhall 2026-08-24 21:21:38 -04:00
commit 48b393014a

View file

@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi } from "vitest";
import { createAuthChallengeInterceptFetch } from "@inspector/core/mcp/node/authChallengeFetch.js";
import {
createAuthChallengeInterceptFetch,
createAuthChallengeObserverFetch,
} from "@inspector/core/mcp/node/authChallengeFetch.js";
import { AuthChallengeError } from "@inspector/core/auth/challenge.js";
describe("createAuthChallengeInterceptFetch", () => {
@ -84,3 +87,63 @@ describe("createAuthChallengeInterceptFetch", () => {
);
});
});
describe("createAuthChallengeObserverFetch", () => {
const METADATA_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:3001/custom/protected-resource";
it("reports a challenge without altering the response or its body", async () => {
const baseFetch = vi.fn(
async () =>
new Response("payload", {
status: 401,
headers: {
"WWW-Authenticate": `Bearer resource_metadata="${METADATA_URL}"`,
},
}),
);
const onChallenge = vi.fn();
const fetchFn = createAuthChallengeObserverFetch(baseFetch, onChallenge);
const res = await fetchFn("https://example.com/mcp");
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
// The body must survive for the transport (or the interceptor above).
expect(await res.text()).toBe("payload");
expect(onChallenge).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ resourceMetadataUrl: METADATA_URL }),
);
});
it("reports a 403 challenge too", async () => {
const baseFetch = vi.fn(
async () =>
new Response(null, {
status: 403,
headers: { "WWW-Authenticate": 'Bearer error="insufficient_scope"' },
}),
);
const onChallenge = vi.fn();
await createAuthChallengeObserverFetch(
baseFetch,
onChallenge,
)("https://example.com/mcp");
expect(onChallenge).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ reason: "insufficient_scope" }),
);
});
it("stays silent on a non-challenge response", async () => {
const baseFetch = vi.fn(async () => new Response("ok", { status: 200 }));
const onChallenge = vi.fn();
const res = await createAuthChallengeObserverFetch(
baseFetch,
onChallenge,
)("https://example.com/mcp");
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(onChallenge).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});