fix(auth): address Copilot review round 2 on the RFC 7009 revocation (#2144)
- `revokeStoredKeys`' pre-read of `getTokens` sat outside the best-effort catch. `getTokens` parses through `OAuthTokensSchema`, so a persisted token that no longer validates rejected and abandoned the local delete `--relogin` promises — over a grant that could not have been revoked anyway. Caught and retained as a failed outcome; the clear proceeds. - The multi-key bookkeeping was wrong twice. A token is now marked spent only on a `revoked` outcome, so a failed or unsupported attempt no longer skips a duplicate entry under the other key that may hold the credentials or metadata that would have worked. And a failure now outranks an earlier success for reporting, so a stale grant left live cannot be hidden behind the first key's 200. - `--no-revoke` is now rejected without `--relogin`, ahead of the short-circuit returns, matching the parser's existing stance on accepted-but-inert flags (`--strict`). On its own it reads as "this run will not revoke anything", true only because nothing was being cleared. - Extracted the App draft merge as `utils/serverWithDraftSettings`, so the rule has a test. The hook tests receive whatever they are handed and cannot tell a draft from a persisted entry, and `App.test.tsx`'s settings harness connects a stdio server where the OAuth section never renders. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
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1 changed files with 278 additions and 20 deletions
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@ -70,13 +70,19 @@ export async function clearStoredAuthForRelogin(
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* under the other spelling is still a live grant at the authorization server,
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* and deleting it locally without revoking is the leak this whole change
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* closes. Two keys holding the *same* token are one grant, so the duplicate is
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* skipped rather than producing a second request for something already ended.
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* skipped rather than producing a second request for something already ended —
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* but only once one has actually been *revoked*, since a failed or unsupported
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* attempt has ended nothing and the other key may hold the credentials that
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* would have worked.
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*
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* The reported outcome is the first key's that was not "nothing to do", which
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* with `keys` in `findStoredServerState` precedence means the grant the CLI
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* would actually have connected with. When no key holds a token, the last
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* "nothing to do" answer is returned so the caller can still tell "no tokens"
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* from "this authorization server advertises no revocation endpoint".
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* Reporting prefers a **failure** over any earlier success — a grant still live
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* at the authorization server is what the user needs to hear about, and an
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* earlier success would otherwise silence the warning. Failing that, it is the
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* first key's outcome that was not "nothing to do", which with `keys` in
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* `findStoredServerState` precedence means the grant the CLI would actually
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* have connected with. When no key holds a token, the last "nothing to do"
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* answer is returned so the caller can still tell "no tokens" from "this
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* authorization server advertises no revocation endpoint".
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*/
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async function revokeStoredKeys(
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storage: NodeOAuthStorage,
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@ -87,7 +93,21 @@ async function revokeStoredKeys(
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let reported: TokenRevocationOutcome | undefined;
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let lastSkip: TokenRevocationOutcome | undefined;
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for (const key of new Set(keys)) {
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const token = selectRevocableToken(await storage.getTokens(key))?.token;
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// This read is OUTSIDE `revokeStoredOAuthTokens`'s own best-effort catch,
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// so it needs its own: `getTokens` parses through `OAuthTokensSchema` and
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// rejects on a persisted token that no longer validates. Letting that
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// escape would abandon the *local* delete `--relogin` promises, over a
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// grant we could not have revoked anyway.
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let token: string | undefined;
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try {
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token = selectRevocableToken(await storage.getTokens(key))?.token;
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} catch (err) {
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reported ??= {
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status: "failed",
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detail: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
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};
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continue;
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}
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if (token !== undefined && revokedTokens.has(token)) continue;
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const outcome = await revokeStoredOAuthTokens({
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serverUrl: key,
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@ -98,8 +118,21 @@ async function revokeStoredKeys(
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lastSkip = outcome;
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continue;
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}
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if (token !== undefined) revokedTokens.add(token);
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reported ??= outcome;
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// Only a token the authorization server actually accepted counts as spent.
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// Marking one revoked on a `failed` or `no_endpoint` outcome would skip a
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// duplicate entry under the other key that may carry usable metadata or
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// credentials — the one chance left to end that grant.
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if (token !== undefined && outcome.status === "revoked") {
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revokedTokens.add(token);
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}
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// A failure outranks an earlier success for reporting: a grant that is
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// still live is what the user needs to hear about, and reporting the
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// success would print no warning while a stale grant survives.
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if (outcome.status === "failed") {
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if (reported?.status !== "failed") reported = outcome;
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} else {
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reported ??= outcome;
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}
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}
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return reported ?? lastSkip;
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}
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