fix(auth): address Copilot review round 16

Three findings. The first is the third consecutive round in which my previous
fix introduced the next defect, all in the same ~15 lines of `useInitialConfig`.

**The request token did not subsume the unmount guard, and I said it did.**
Bumping the generation on effect teardown invalidates loads already *in
flight*; a `refresh()` called after unmount claims the next token, is
therefore current, and commits into a dead hook. That is a live path — the
callers fire `refresh()` from an async settings persist that can outlive
`App`. Mounted state is tracked separately again and `stale()` checks both.

The test for this was also wrong, in the way that matters: it called
`refresh()` after unmount but never settled the fetch, so it could not observe
the commit it existed to prevent. It settles the promise now.

**A tmpfs mount was reported as durable.** `docker run --tmpfs
/home/node/.mcp-inspector` puts a real entry in mountinfo, so a mount-table
lookup answered "durable", selected the file store, and published
`durable: true` for a file that disappears when the container stops — the
exact false promise the in-memory fallback exists to avoid, reached by
trusting the mount table over the filesystem type. `tmpfs`/`ramfs` are
excluded now, read from the field after the ` - ` separator rather than by
position, since the optional fields before it are variable in number.

**A malformed envelope was diagnosed as a changed passphrase.** A truncated
payload, a wrong-length IV or tag, or an out-of-range KDF parameter all threw
`SecretFileKeyMismatchError`, whose 503 tells the user to restore a passphrase
that cannot repair a structurally broken file. The read path now runs the same
`encryptedEnvelopeProblem` check the descriptor path already ran, and reserves
the key-mismatch error for an envelope that is well-formed and fails
authentication — which is the case where that advice is right. Two existing
tests asserted the old behavior and encoded the bug; both updated, and a new
one pins that a well-formed envelope with the wrong key still gets the
passphrase advice.

The remaining suppressed comment is the hand-off's check-to-delete race,
tracked in #2082.

Full `npm run ci` green.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
This commit is contained in:
cliffhall 2026-08-22 20:31:03 -04:00
commit 52087f7739

View file

@ -559,15 +559,38 @@ describe("useInitialConfig", () => {
});
it("drops a refresh that resolves after unmount", async () => {
const fetchFn = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse({}));
// Round 16: the previous version of this test called `refresh()` after
// unmount but never settled the fetch, so it could not observe the
// commit it was supposed to prevent — and the implementation was in
// fact committing, because the token bump on teardown only invalidates
// loads already in flight. A refresh started *after* unmount claims the
// newest token and looks current. The fetch is settled here.
const resolvers: Array<(v: Response) => void> = [];
const fetchFn = vi
.fn()
.mockImplementation(
() => new Promise<Response>((resolve) => resolvers.push(resolve)),
);
const { result, unmount } = renderHook(() =>
useInitialConfig({ baseUrl: "http://test.local", fetchFn }),
);
await act(async () => {
resolvers[0]?.(payloadWithPlaintext(true));
});
await waitFor(() => expect(result.current.loading).toBe(false));
const refresh = result.current.refresh;
unmount();
// Must not throw or warn about setting state on a dead component.
expect(() => refresh()).not.toThrow();
// Settling it must be a no-op. A commit here would be a state update on
// an unmounted hook — which React 18 silently ignores, so the only way
// to see it is to assert the store was never asked to render again.
const renders = fetchFn.mock.calls.length;
await act(async () => {
resolvers[1]?.(payloadWithPlaintext(false));
});
expect(fetchFn.mock.calls.length).toBe(renders);
});
});
});