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fix: stop leaking metadata values into diagnostics, and salvage per key

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Two credential leaks, the same class already fixed for the client logger:
`serverList` printed the malformed entry verbatim — a legacy row missing `key`
still holds whatever the user configured — and the CLI overflow error echoed
the whole `key=value` pair into stderr and CI logs. Both now name the key and
the offending *type*; a test plants a `sk-live-…` and asserts it appears
nowhere while the key still does.

`normalizeStoredMetadata` now also drops a value that parses but cannot be
sent. A hand-edited catalog is the reachable source: it is parsed server-side,
so `1e400` really does become `Infinity` there, and the next write would store
`null`. Filtered per key, matching the per-item salvage this file already does
elsewhere, so one bad value does not cost the user the rest.

Deliberately *not* added to the `/api/servers` guard, which review also
suggested. Writing that test is what showed why: a client's own
`JSON.stringify` turns `Infinity` into `null` before the request is sent, so
the wire cannot carry the bad case at all — and the check made things worse,
rejecting the whole metadata field where the normalizer drops one key. The
guard stays a container check, with a comment recording both points.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
This commit is contained in:
cliffhall 2026-08-23 20:03:37 -04:00
commit 56d8644032
1 changed files with 129 additions and 11 deletions
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15
core/mcp/remote/node/server.ts
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@ -1213,9 +1213,18 @@ export function createRemoteApp(
// credentials are intentionally lost on first read (hard cutover per
// #1358 decision 4). Users re-enter via the form or hand-edit into the
// flat shape.
// A plain JSON object — the container `_meta` requires. Values are
// deliberately unchecked: `_meta` takes arbitrary JSON (#1910), and anything
// that survived `JSON.parse` already is.
// The *container* `_meta` requires — a plain JSON object.
//
// Value-level validity is deliberately not checked here. Values are
// arbitrary JSON (#1910), and the one class that survives `JSON.parse` yet
// cannot be sent — a non-finite number, from a literal like `1e400` in a
// hand-edited catalog — is filtered **per key** by
// `normalizeStoredMetadata`, which every read routes through. Rejecting the
// whole field here instead would cost a user every other key they had
// configured, for one bad value.
//
// Note the wire cannot carry the bad case at all: a client's own
// `JSON.stringify` turns `Infinity` into `null` before the request is sent.
const isJsonObject = (v: unknown): v is RequestMetadata =>
v !== null && typeof v === "object" && !Array.isArray(v);
const isStringRecord = (v: unknown): v is Record<string, string> => {