Merge branch 'v2/main' into v2/feat/2234-skills-extension

clients/cli/__tests__/clear-stored-auth-for-relogin.test.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import {
   getStateFilePath,
   resetNodeOAuthStorageCache,
 } from "@inspector/core/auth/node/storage-node.js";
+import { MIN_REVOCATION_REQUEST_BUDGET_MS } from "@inspector/core/auth/revocation.js";
 import { clearStoredAuthForRelogin } from "../src/clear-stored-auth-for-relogin.js";
 
 const AS_ISSUER = "https://as.example.com";
@@ -379,6 +380,42 @@ describe("clearStoredAuthForRelogin", () => {
       }
     });
 
+    // The zero-budget case above passes under the old `remainingMs <= 0` bound
+    // too, so it says nothing about the floor. This one is the floor's own
+    // detector: a budget that is genuinely positive, and genuinely too small to
+    // complete a request, must be spent on no request at all (#2252). The
+    // budget only shrinks as the loop runs, so a slow machine cannot flip it.
+    it("issues no request for a positive budget below the minimum", async () => {
+      seedBothSpellings("live-r", "stale-r");
+      const fetchSpy = vi
+        .spyOn(globalThis, "fetch")
+        .mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 200 }));
+      // Frozen, so the remainder at the check is exactly the budget. Left to
+      // the real clock this is a one-sided detector: a worker preempted for
+      // more than the budget reaches the check with a NEGATIVE remainder, where
+      // the unfixed `remainingMs <= 0` bound takes the same branch and prints
+      // the same message — passing without the floor (Copilot).
+      const nowSpy = vi.spyOn(performance, "now").mockReturnValue(1_000);
+      try {
+        const outcome = await clearStoredAuthForRelogin("https://example.com", {
+          budgetMs: MIN_REVOCATION_REQUEST_BUDGET_MS - 1,
+        });
+        expect(fetchSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(outcome).toMatchObject({ status: "failed" });
+        // The *plan* was never attempted, so the report has to be this loop's
+        // own — naming the server URL — and not the per-grant one from inside
+        // `executeOAuthRevocation`. Without that distinction the assertion
+        // passes on the old `<= 0` bound too: the plan would be handed a 4ms
+        // budget, and core's identical floor would decline it one level down.
+        expect(outcome?.status === "failed" ? outcome.detail : "").toContain(
+          'budget was exhausted before "',
+        );
+      } finally {
+        nowSpy.mockRestore();
+        fetchSpy.mockRestore();
+      }
+    });
+
     it("reports a later failure over an earlier success", async () => {
       seedBothSpellings("live-r", "stale-r");
       const fetchSpy = vi

clients/cli/src/clear-stored-auth-for-relogin.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import {
 } from "@inspector/core/auth/node/storage-node.js";
 import {
   DEFAULT_REVOCATION_TIMEOUT_MS,
+  MIN_REVOCATION_REQUEST_BUDGET_MS,
   clearAndPlanRevocation,
   executeOAuthRevocation,
   type OAuthRevocationPlan,
@@ -113,17 +114,19 @@ async function sendPlans(
   budgetMs: number,
 ): Promise<TokenRevocationOutcome | undefined> {
   const fetchFn = createProxyFetch() ?? fetch;
-  const deadlineAt = Date.now() + budgetMs;
+  // Monotonic and epsilon-floored for the same reasons as the shared deadline
+  // inside `executeOAuthRevocation` — see MIN_REVOCATION_REQUEST_BUDGET_MS.
+  const deadlineAt = performance.now() + budgetMs;
   let reported: TokenRevocationOutcome | undefined;
   let lastSkip: TokenRevocationOutcome | undefined;
   for (const plan of plans) {
-    const remainingMs = deadlineAt - Date.now();
+    const remainingMs = deadlineAt - performance.now();
     // A plan that already knows its answer needs no network, so the budget is
     // irrelevant to it. Synthesising exhaustion here would warn that a grant
     // may still be live when the key held no grant at all — a false alarm, and
     // one that outranks the real outcome under the failure-first rule below.
     const needsNetwork = plan.outcome === undefined;
-    if (needsNetwork && remainingMs <= 0) {
+    if (needsNetwork && remainingMs <= MIN_REVOCATION_REQUEST_BUDGET_MS) {
       // Overrides an earlier success rather than deferring to it: this key's
       // grant may still be live at the authorization server, and that is the
       // thing the user needs to hear about. Same failure-first rule as below.

clients/web/src/components/groups/ServerImportJsonModal/ServerImportJsonModal.test.tsx

@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
 import { describe, it, expect, vi } from "vitest";
 import userEvent from "@testing-library/user-event";
 import {
+  act,
   renderWithMantine,
   screen,
   fireEvent,
   waitFor,
 } from "../../../test/renderWithMantine";
 import { setAceText } from "../../../test/aceEditor";
+import { VALIDATE_DEBOUNCE_MS } from "../../../hooks/useServerJsonImport";
 import { ServerImportJsonModal } from "./ServerImportJsonModal";
 
 const npmJson = JSON.stringify({
@@ -221,28 +223,41 @@ describe("ServerImportJsonModal", () => {
     expect(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Add Server" })).toBeDisabled();
   });
 
+  // The window this exercises is the one between an edit and the debounce that
+  // re-disables the button, so the whole test runs on fake timers: the pending
+  // re-validation then cannot land unless this test advances it, and the window
+  // stops depending on how long the machine takes to get from the paste to the
+  // click. On real timers a loaded box could spend more than
+  // VALIDATE_DEBOUNCE_MS there, re-disable the button, and turn the click into a
+  // no-op that sets no submit error at all (#2250).
   it("guards against a live edit made before the debounce re-validates", async () => {
-    const onAddServer = vi.fn();
-    renderWithMantine(
-      <ServerImportJsonModal
-        opened
-        existingIds={[]}
-        onClose={vi.fn()}
-        onAddServer={onAddServer}
-      />,
-    );
-    await pasteJson(npmJson);
-    await waitFor(() =>
-      expect(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Add Server" })).toBeEnabled(),
-    );
-    // Replace with invalid content; the button hasn't re-disabled yet (the
-    // debounce is still pending), so clicking exercises the submit-time guard.
-    await pasteJson("{not json");
-    fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Add Server" }));
-    expect(onAddServer).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    expect(
-      await screen.findByText(/Fix the validation errors/),
-    ).toBeInTheDocument();
+    vi.useFakeTimers();
+    try {
+      const onAddServer = vi.fn();
+      renderWithMantine(
+        <ServerImportJsonModal
+          opened
+          existingIds={[]}
+          onClose={vi.fn()}
+          onAddServer={onAddServer}
+        />,
+      );
+      await pasteJson(npmJson);
+      // Let the first validation land, so the button is enabled to click.
+      await act(async () => {
+        await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(VALIDATE_DEBOUNCE_MS);
+      });
+      expect(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Add Server" })).toBeEnabled();
+      // Replace with invalid content and do *not* advance: the debounce stays
+      // pending, the button stays enabled, and clicking exercises the
+      // submit-time guard that re-parses the live text.
+      await pasteJson("{not json");
+      fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Add Server" }));
+      expect(onAddServer).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(screen.getByText(/Fix the validation errors/)).toBeInTheDocument();
+    } finally {
+      vi.useRealTimers();
+    }
   });
 
   it("loads server.json from a chosen file", async () => {

clients/web/src/test/core/auth/revocation.test.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import type { OAuthMetadata } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
 import { BrowserOAuthStorage } from "@inspector/core/auth/browser/storage.js";
 import {
   DEFAULT_REVOCATION_TIMEOUT_MS,
+  MIN_REVOCATION_REQUEST_BUDGET_MS,
   aggregateOutcomes,
   buildRevocationRequest,
   revocationAuthMethods,
@@ -431,6 +432,27 @@ describe("revokeToken", () => {
     expect(seen?.signal).toBeInstanceOf(AbortSignal);
     expect(DEFAULT_REVOCATION_TIMEOUT_MS).toBeGreaterThan(0);
   });
+
+  // What is left of a shared deadline is measured with a sub-millisecond clock,
+  // so the budget handed down here is routinely fractional — and Node's
+  // `AbortSignal.timeout` throws `ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE` on a non-integer delay,
+  // before the fetch, turning a perfectly good request into a revocation failure
+  // that never left the process (#2252).
+  it("accepts a fractional budget and still sends the request", async () => {
+    const fetchFn = vi.fn<typeof fetch>(
+      async () => new Response(null, { status: 200 }),
+    );
+    const outcome = await revokeToken({
+      endpoint: REVOKE_URL,
+      token: "r",
+      tokenTypeHint: "refresh_token",
+      supportedAuthMethods: [],
+      fetchFn,
+      timeoutMs: 19.996,
+    });
+    expect(fetchFn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(outcome).toMatchObject({ status: "revoked" });
+  });
 });
 
 /**
@@ -838,6 +860,58 @@ describe("revokeStoredOAuthTokens (plan + execute)", () => {
     expect(fetchFn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
   });
 
+  // The boundary the shared budget used to be decided on was `remainingMs > 0`,
+  // which timer resolution can land either side of: a grant that finished a
+  // hair before the deadline left a fractional budget behind, and the next grant
+  // spent it on a request that could not possibly complete (#2252). The floor
+  // makes that decision the same on every run.
+  it("does not issue a request with less than the minimum budget left", async () => {
+    const grant = (n: string) => ({
+      issuer: "https://as.example.com",
+      token: `r-${n}`,
+      tokenTypeHint: "refresh_token" as const,
+    });
+    const timeoutMs = 40;
+    // The clock is stubbed rather than slept against. A real sleep makes this a
+    // ONE-SIDED detector: under contention the first request overruns, the
+    // remainder goes negative, and the unfixed `remainingMs <= 0` bound skips
+    // the second grant for the wrong reason — so the test passes on an
+    // implementation that has no floor at all. Advancing a stub inside the
+    // fetch puts the second grant's remainder at exactly
+    // `MIN_REVOCATION_REQUEST_BUDGET_MS - 1` on every machine: positive, and
+    // under the floor, which is the only state that tells the two apart.
+    let now = 1_000;
+    const nowSpy = vi.spyOn(performance, "now").mockImplementation(() => now);
+    const fetchFn = vi.fn<typeof fetch>(async () => {
+      now += timeoutMs - MIN_REVOCATION_REQUEST_BUDGET_MS + 1;
+      return new Response(null, { status: 200 });
+    });
+
+    try {
+      const outcome = await executeOAuthRevocation(
+        {
+          serverUrl: SERVER_URL,
+          grants: [grant("a"), grant("b")],
+          failures: [],
+          endpoint: REVOKE_URL,
+          supportedAuthMethods: [],
+          metadataIssuer: "https://as.example.com",
+        },
+        { fetchFn, timeoutMs },
+      );
+
+      expect(fetchFn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+      // The unattempted grant outranks the first one's success, so the caller
+      // hears that a grant may still be live rather than that all was well.
+      expect(outcome).toMatchObject({ status: "failed" });
+      expect(outcome.status === "failed" ? outcome.detail : "").toContain(
+        "budget was exhausted",
+      );
+    } finally {
+      nowSpy.mockRestore();
+    }
+  });
+
   // A grant bound to an issuer the cached metadata does not describe cannot be
   // revoked — that endpoint belongs to a different authorization server, and
   // sending it another AS's token would hand a credential to a server that