test(oauth): prove the opt-out against a real authorization server
Copilot review round 3 on #2114. The unit tests asserted our own `grant_types` array and stopped there. What actually unblocks an Entra tenant is what the SDK puts in the authorize URL, and nothing covered that — so an SDK change that stopped keying its augmentation off `grant_types` would leave AADSTS90094 intact with every test green. Adds the complementary case to the existing e2e suite, against a real AS advertising `offline_access`: with the grant declined, the authorize URL carries neither `offline_access` nor `prompt=consent`, while the configured scope still goes out. Verified non-vacuous by reverting the provider conditional — it fails. The positive test alongside it now also asserts `prompt=consent` is present, which was unasserted despite being the literal failure in the issue. Drops an unjustified `as unknown as ServerEntry` I added in the App test — AGENTS.md forbids it, and it hid a real mismatch (a partial settings object against a complete one). Typed `ServerEntry` / `InspectorServerSettings` fixtures instead, so a field added to that interface later is a compile error rather than a missing value at runtime. The `constructedOAuth` helper reads through the constructor's own parameter type and needs no cast at all now. Scopes the two doc comments that still claimed the flag removes every `offline_access` — `StoredMCPServer.oauth` and `OAuthProviderConfig`, both contradicting the caveat already stated elsewhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013hzwzS8UvBsr4yZm7o7sev Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
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2 changed files with 125 additions and 22 deletions
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@ -116,8 +116,13 @@ export type OAuthProviderConfig = {
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* `startAuthorization()` then appends `prompt=consent` whenever
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* `offline_access` is in scope. Against Microsoft Entra ID, that forced
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* consent prompt routes a non-admin user into the admin-consent workflow and
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* fails with `AADSTS90094` even after a tenant admin has consented. Dropping
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* the grant here breaks that chain at its source.
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* fails with `AADSTS90094` even after a tenant admin has consented.
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*
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* It removes that *automatic* augmentation only. `startAuthorization()` reads
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* the scope, never `grant_types`, so an `offline_access` the caller passed in
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* `scope` — or one the resource advertises when `scope` is unset, which
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* `determineScope` falls back to — still produces the prompt. This is not on
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* its own a guarantee that `prompt=consent` is absent.
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*/
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requestRefreshToken?: boolean;
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};
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@ -205,9 +210,10 @@ export class BaseOAuthClientProvider implements OAuthClientProvider {
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redirect_uris: this.redirect_uris,
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token_endpoint_auth_method: "none",
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// #2068: `refresh_token` is declared by default, and dropped when the
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// server's "Request refresh token" setting is off — which also stops the
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// SDK adding `offline_access` (and therefore `prompt=consent`) to the
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// authorization request. See `OAuthProviderConfig.requestRefreshToken`.
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// server's "Request refresh token" setting is off — which stops the SDK
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// *adding* `offline_access` (and so the `prompt=consent` it forces). It
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// does not remove an `offline_access` that reaches the scope another way.
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// See `OAuthProviderConfig.requestRefreshToken`.
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grant_types: this.requestRefreshToken
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? ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"]
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: ["authorization_code"],
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@ -184,9 +184,12 @@ export type StoredMCPServer = MCPServerConfig & {
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* Whether the Inspector declares the `refresh_token` grant when it
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* registers. Defaults to `true`; only `false` is written to disk, so an
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* entry that never touched the setting keeps a minimal diff. Turning it off
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* also stops the SDK adding `offline_access` to the requested scope and
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* `prompt=consent` to the authorization request. Inspector-specific.
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* (#2068)
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* stops the SDK's *automatic* `offline_access` augmentation, and so the
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* `prompt=consent` that scope forces — but only that one: an
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* `offline_access` from `scopes` here, or from the resource's advertised
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* scopes when `scopes` is unset, still reaches the authorization request.
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* See {@link InspectorServerSettings.oauthRequestRefreshToken}.
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* Inspector-specific. (#2068)
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*/
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requestRefreshToken?: boolean;
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/**
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