feat(auth): revoke OAuth tokens at the authorization server on clear (#2144)

Clearing the Inspector's OAuth state deleted the local copy of the tokens
and stopped there. The access token — and the refresh token, which is
long-lived by design — stayed valid at the authorization server until they
expired on their own, so a day of connect/disconnect iteration left it
holding grants for sessions that ended hours ago. RFC 7009 §1 describes
exactly that case, and nothing in the repo constructed a revocation
request, so a server author implementing `revocation_endpoint` had no way
to exercise it with the tool that exists to exercise this.

core/auth/revocation.ts builds and sends the request; the three clear paths
call it, so the behavior is written once — web's "Clear OAuth state and
disconnect" (both the active and stored-only paths), the TUI's Auth tab,
and the CLI's --relogin. It runs BEFORE the local clear, because the token,
the client credentials and the discovered `revocation_endpoint` all live in
the store the clear is about to empty. The request names the refresh token
when there is one: §2.1 asks the AS to also invalidate the access tokens
issued under the same grant, so one request covers both halves.

Best-effort by construction. Every path returns a TokenRevocationOutcome
rather than throwing: no advertised endpoint means nothing is sent and that
authorization server behaves exactly as before, and a network error, a
non-2xx, a 5s timeout or an unreadable store is reported and nothing more.
Forgetting the tokens is what the user asked for. `lost_authorization_state`
recovery deliberately skips it — it clears a half-finished flow to retry it,
and an authorization that never completed has no grant to revoke.

Client authentication resolves the preregistered slot first, mirroring
BaseOAuthClientProvider.clientInformation; reading only the dynamic slot
would send no authentication for a server configured with `oauth.clientId`.
The Basic credential is byte-identical to the SDK's applyBasicAuth so this
request and the token request cannot present the same secret differently.

Opt out per server with `oauth.revokeOnClear` (default on, only `false`
written to disk) or per CLI run with --no-revoke. Read at clear time rather
than connect time, so toggling needs no reconnect. Turning it off is a
testing affordance: a client that walks away still holding live tokens is a
case a server author may want to reproduce.

test-servers now advertises `revocation_endpoint` and serves POST
/oauth/revoke, faithful on §2.2 (an unknown token is a success) and §2.1
(revoking a refresh token invalidates the access tokens under the same
grant), with oauth-revocation-http.json / oauth-no-revocation-http.json as
showcase configs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
This commit is contained in:
cliffhall 2026-08-28 00:48:57 -04:00
commit 65fd2b9e35

View file

@ -2,6 +2,11 @@ import {
NodeOAuthStorage,
resetNodeOAuthStorageCache,
} from "@inspector/core/auth/node/storage-node.js";
import {
revokeStoredOAuthTokens,
type TokenRevocationOutcome,
} from "@inspector/core/auth/revocation.js";
import { createProxyFetch } from "@inspector/core/mcp/node/proxyFetch.js";
/** Same canonicalisation as CLI `normalizeServerUrl` (avoid cycles). */
function normalizeServerUrl(serverUrl: string): string {
@ -24,11 +29,24 @@ function normalizeServerUrl(serverUrl: string): string {
*/
export async function clearStoredAuthForRelogin(
serverUrl: string | undefined,
): Promise<void> {
if (!serverUrl?.trim()) return;
options?: { revoke?: boolean },
): Promise<TokenRevocationOutcome | undefined> {
if (!serverUrl?.trim()) return undefined;
const raw = serverUrl.trim();
const normalized = normalizeServerUrl(raw);
const storage = new NodeOAuthStorage();
// RFC 7009 (#2144): revoke before the clear, since the token, the client
// credentials and the discovered `revocation_endpoint` all live in the store
// this is about to empty. Best-effort — the outcome is returned for the
// caller to report, never thrown, so `--relogin` succeeds regardless.
//
// Only the key that actually holds the state is revoked from: the two keys
// below are two spellings of one server, so revoking from both would send a
// second request for a grant the first one already ended.
const revocation =
options?.revoke === false
? undefined
: await revokeFirstStoredKey(storage, [raw, normalized]);
await storage.clear(raw);
if (normalized !== raw) {
await storage.clear(normalized);
@ -36,4 +54,31 @@ export async function clearStoredAuthForRelogin(
// Drop the in-process singleton so the next connect cannot reuse a cleared
// entry from the NodeOAuthStorage cache.
resetNodeOAuthStorageCache();
return revocation;
}
/**
* Revoke against the first of `keys` that actually has a revocable token,
* returning that attempt's outcome. Reports the last "nothing to do" answer
* when no key holds one, so the caller can still distinguish "no tokens" from
* "this authorization server advertises no revocation endpoint".
*/
async function revokeFirstStoredKey(
storage: NodeOAuthStorage,
keys: string[],
): Promise<TokenRevocationOutcome | undefined> {
const fetchFn = createProxyFetch() ?? fetch;
let last: TokenRevocationOutcome | undefined;
for (const key of new Set(keys)) {
const outcome = await revokeStoredOAuthTokens({
serverUrl: key,
storage,
fetchFn,
});
if (!(outcome.status === "skipped" && outcome.reason === "no_tokens")) {
return outcome;
}
last = outcome;
}
return last;
}