Merge branch 'v2/main' into v2/fix/2064-csp-drop-warning

clients/web/src/test/core/auth/connection-state.test.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ import { describe, it, expect, vi } from "vitest";
 import {
   buildOAuthConnectionState,
   hasPersistedOAuthServerState,
+  isAccessTokenProvablyUnexpired,
+  isAccessTokenUsable,
   isServerOAuthConfigured,
   protocolFromOAuthConfig,
 } from "@inspector/core/auth/connection-state.js";
@@ -257,3 +259,102 @@ describe("buildOAuthConnectionState", () => {
     expect(state.ema).not.toHaveProperty("idToken");
   });
 });
+
+/** Minimal unsigned JWT carrying only `exp` (epoch seconds). */
+function jwtWithExp(expSec: number): string {
+  const payload = btoa(JSON.stringify({ exp: expSec }))
+    .replace(/\+/g, "-")
+    .replace(/\//g, "_")
+    .replace(/=+$/, "");
+  return `header.${payload}.sig`;
+}
+
+const nowSec = () => Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+
+describe("isAccessTokenProvablyUnexpired", () => {
+  it("is true for a JWT whose exp is in the future", () => {
+    expect(
+      isAccessTokenProvablyUnexpired({
+        access_token: jwtWithExp(nowSec() + 3600),
+        token_type: "Bearer",
+      }),
+    ).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("is false for a JWT whose exp has passed", () => {
+    expect(
+      isAccessTokenProvablyUnexpired({
+        access_token: jwtWithExp(nowSec() - 60),
+        token_type: "Bearer",
+      }),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("is false inside the 60s expiry skew window", () => {
+    expect(
+      isAccessTokenProvablyUnexpired({
+        access_token: jwtWithExp(nowSec() + 30),
+        token_type: "Bearer",
+      }),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("is false for an opaque token, where isAccessTokenUsable is true", () => {
+    // The #2051 regression: no local expiry evidence must not read as "valid".
+    const tokens = { access_token: "opaque-tok", token_type: "Bearer" };
+    expect(isAccessTokenProvablyUnexpired(tokens)).toBe(false);
+    expect(isAccessTokenUsable(tokens)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("is false for a JWT carrying no exp claim", () => {
+    const payload = btoa(JSON.stringify({ sub: "user" }))
+      .replace(/\+/g, "-")
+      .replace(/\//g, "_")
+      .replace(/=+$/, "");
+    expect(
+      isAccessTokenProvablyUnexpired({
+        access_token: `header.${payload}.sig`,
+        token_type: "Bearer",
+      }),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("is false for a two-segment token whose payload decodes to an exp", () => {
+    // jwtExpiresAtMs only requires two dot-separated segments, so a structured
+    // opaque token carrying a decodable `{"exp":...}` would otherwise read as
+    // proof of validity. isJwtFormat is what rejects it.
+    const payload = btoa(JSON.stringify({ exp: nowSec() + 3600 }))
+      .replace(/\+/g, "-")
+      .replace(/\//g, "_")
+      .replace(/=+$/, "");
+    expect(
+      isAccessTokenProvablyUnexpired({
+        access_token: `opaque.${payload}`,
+        token_type: "Bearer",
+      }),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("is false for a four-segment token carrying a decodable exp", () => {
+    const payload = btoa(JSON.stringify({ exp: nowSec() + 3600 }))
+      .replace(/\+/g, "-")
+      .replace(/\//g, "_")
+      .replace(/=+$/, "");
+    expect(
+      isAccessTokenProvablyUnexpired({
+        access_token: `header.${payload}.sig.extra`,
+        token_type: "Bearer",
+      }),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("is false when there is no access token", () => {
+    expect(isAccessTokenProvablyUnexpired(undefined)).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      isAccessTokenProvablyUnexpired({
+        access_token: "",
+        token_type: "Bearer",
+      }),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

clients/web/src/test/core/mcp/oauthManager.test.ts

@@ -27,6 +27,15 @@ const mockedMcpAuth = vi.mocked(mcpAuth);
 
 const SERVER_URL = "https://example.com/mcp";
 
+/** Minimal unsigned JWT carrying only `exp` (epoch seconds). */
+function jwtWithExp(expSec: number): string {
+  const payload = btoa(JSON.stringify({ exp: expSec }))
+    .replace(/\+/g, "-")
+    .replace(/\//g, "_")
+    .replace(/=+$/, "");
+  return `header.${payload}.sig`;
+}
+
 function createMockParams(
   overrides?: Partial<OAuthManagerParams>,
 ): OAuthManagerParams {
@@ -988,10 +997,10 @@ describe("OAuthManager", () => {
       ).toBe(false);
     });
 
-    it("returns true for token_expired when a usable access token exists", async () => {
+    it("returns true for token_expired when a provably unexpired JWT exists", async () => {
       const params = createMockParams();
       storageOf(params).getTokens.mockResolvedValue({
-        access_token: "tok",
+        access_token: jwtWithExp(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 3600),
         token_type: "Bearer",
       });
       const manager = new OAuthManager(params);
@@ -1001,6 +1010,36 @@ describe("OAuthManager", () => {
       ).toBe(true);
     });
 
+    it("returns false for token_expired when the stored JWT has expired", async () => {
+      const params = createMockParams();
+      storageOf(params).getTokens.mockResolvedValue({
+        access_token: jwtWithExp(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60),
+        token_type: "Bearer",
+      });
+      const manager = new OAuthManager(params);
+
+      expect(
+        await manager.checkAuthChallengeSatisfied({ reason: "token_expired" }),
+      ).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it("returns false for token_expired when the stored token is opaque", async () => {
+      // Regression guard for #2051: an opaque token has no local expiry
+      // evidence, so it must not outvote the resource server's verdict and
+      // short-circuit re-authorization into replaying a dead credential.
+      const params = createMockParams();
+      storageOf(params).getTokens.mockResolvedValue({
+        access_token: "opaque-tok",
+        token_type: "Bearer",
+        expires_in: 900,
+      });
+      const manager = new OAuthManager(params);
+
+      expect(
+        await manager.checkAuthChallengeSatisfied({ reason: "token_expired" }),
+      ).toBe(false);
+    });
+
     it("returns false for invalid_token even when a locally valid token exists", async () => {
       const params = createMockParams();
       storageOf(params).getTokens.mockResolvedValue({

core/auth/connection-state.ts

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import type {
 import type { EnterpriseManagedAuthIdpConfig } from "../client/types.js";
 import { getEmaIdpLoginState, normalizeIdpIssuer } from "./ema/idpSession.js";
 import { idpOAuthStorageKey } from "./ema/storage.js";
-import { isJwtExpired } from "./ema/jwt.js";
+import { isJwtExpired, isJwtFormat, jwtExpiresAtMs } from "./ema/jwt.js";
 import type { OAuthStorage } from "./storage.js";
 import type {
   AuthProtocol,
@@ -24,12 +24,48 @@ export interface BuildOAuthConnectionStateParams {
   flowState?: OAuthFlowState;
 }
 
-/** True when persisted tokens include a non-expired access token (JWT exp when parseable). */
+/**
+ * True when persisted tokens include a non-expired access token (JWT exp when parseable).
+ *
+ * Optimistic: an access token whose expiry cannot be determined locally — an
+ * opaque token, or a JWT with no `exp` — counts as usable. Storage keeps no
+ * absolute expiry for those, because `expires_in` is relative to an issuance
+ * instant that is never recorded. That is the right default for *displaying*
+ * authorization state (an opaque-token server would otherwise always read as
+ * unauthorized), and the wrong one once a resource server has actually rejected
+ * the credential — see {@link isAccessTokenProvablyUnexpired}.
+ */
 export function isAccessTokenUsable(tokens: OAuthTokens | undefined): boolean {
   if (!tokens?.access_token) return false;
   return !isJwtExpired(tokens.access_token);
 }
 
+/**
+ * Pessimistic counterpart to {@link isAccessTokenUsable}: true only when the
+ * access token is a JWT carrying an `exp` that is still in the future (same 60s
+ * skew as {@link isJwtExpired}).
+ *
+ * Absence of local expiry evidence returns `false` rather than `true`, so it
+ * cannot outvote a resource server that has explicitly said the token is
+ * expired. Use this — not `isAccessTokenUsable` — to decide whether a
+ * `token_expired` challenge is already satisfied.
+ *
+ * The shape is checked with {@link isJwtFormat} before the `exp` is trusted.
+ * {@link jwtExpiresAtMs} is deliberately lenient — it parses the second of any
+ * two-or-more dot-separated segments — so a structured opaque token that merely
+ * happens to carry a decodable `{"exp":…}` segment would otherwise be read as
+ * proof, which is exactly the "guess beats the server" failure this predicate
+ * exists to remove.
+ */
+export function isAccessTokenProvablyUnexpired(
+  tokens: OAuthTokens | undefined,
+): boolean {
+  if (!tokens?.access_token) return false;
+  if (!isJwtFormat(tokens.access_token)) return false;
+  if (jwtExpiresAtMs(tokens.access_token) === undefined) return false;
+  return !isJwtExpired(tokens.access_token);
+}
+
 function resolveClient(
   preregistered: OAuthClientInformation | undefined,
   dynamic: OAuthClientInformation | undefined,

core/mcp/oauthManager.ts

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ import {
 import {
   buildOAuthConnectionState,
   hasPersistedOAuthServerState,
-  isAccessTokenUsable,
+  isAccessTokenProvablyUnexpired,
   isServerOAuthConfigured,
   protocolFromOAuthConfig,
 } from "../auth/connection-state.js";
@@ -494,9 +494,12 @@ export class OAuthManager {
    * satisfied without an authorization-server round-trip.
    *
    * Returns `true` for `insufficient_scope` when stored + token scope cover the
-   * SEP-2350 union. For `token_expired`, returns `true` when a usable access
-   * token is already in storage. `invalid_token` and `unauthorized` always
-   * return `false` — the resource server explicitly rejected the credential.
+   * SEP-2350 union. For `token_expired`, returns `true` only when storage holds
+   * a *provably* unexpired token — a JWT whose `exp` is still in the future. An
+   * opaque token carries no local expiry evidence, so the resource server's
+   * verdict stands and re-authorization proceeds. `invalid_token` and
+   * `unauthorized` always return `false` — the resource server explicitly
+   * rejected the credential.
    */
   async checkAuthChallengeSatisfied(
     challenge: AuthChallenge,
@@ -514,7 +517,8 @@ export class OAuthManager {
 
     if (challenge.reason !== "insufficient_scope") {
       return (
-        challenge.reason === "token_expired" && isAccessTokenUsable(tokens)
+        challenge.reason === "token_expired" &&
+        isAccessTokenProvablyUnexpired(tokens)
       );
     }
 

specification/v2_auth_mid_session.md

@@ -206,7 +206,8 @@ export type AuthChallengeOutcome =
 
 Read-only check against **current storage** (and token expiry helpers). Used before starting visible OAuth — especially when a background browser tab regains focus and another tab may have already re-authenticated. Does **not** call the authorization server.
 
-- **`token_expired` / `unauthorized`:** valid non-expired access token in storage.
+- **`token_expired`:** a **provably** unexpired access token in storage — a JWT whose `exp` is still in the future (60s skew). Storage records no absolute expiry for an opaque token (`expires_in` is relative to an issuance instant that is never persisted), so "expiry unknown" returns **false**: the resource server has said the credential is dead, and no local evidence contradicts it. Otherwise an opaque token would be replayed forever ([#2051](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector/issues/2051)).
+- **`invalid_token` / `unauthorized`:** always **false** — the resource server explicitly rejected the credential.
 - **`insufficient_scope`:** stored/token scope is a superset of required / union scopes. Empty scope on an `insufficient_scope` challenge returns **false** (do not short-circuit).
 
 ### Strategy by protocol