docs(core): clarify redaction scope + add nested request-body test
Address round-1 review feedback on fetchTracking redaction: - Cross-reference REDACTED_VALUE / REDACTED_HEADER_VALUE so a reader understands why two identical "[REDACTED]" constants coexist. - Document that redactBody deliberately scopes to form-encoded + JSON (multipart/binary bodies pass through; OAuth never uses multipart). - Add a tracker-path test asserting a nested sensitive key in a JSON request body is redacted in the recorded copy while the live outbound body stays byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S3fTN8H3R8YV4yUGvZjYnX
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2 changed files with 40 additions and 1 deletions
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@ -477,6 +477,35 @@ describe("createFetchTracker", () => {
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expect(bodies[0]!.body).toBe('{"tools":[]}');
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expect(bodies[0]!.body).toBe('{"tools":[]}');
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});
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});
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it("redacts a nested sensitive key in a JSON request body through the tracker", async () => {
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let outboundInit: RequestInit | undefined;
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const baseFetch = vi.fn(
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async (_input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
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outboundInit = init;
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return new Response("ok");
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},
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);
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const tracked: FetchRequestEntryBase[] = [];
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const fetcher = createFetchTracker(baseFetch as typeof fetch, {
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trackRequest: (entry) => tracked.push(entry),
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});
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const liveBody = JSON.stringify({
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params: { arguments: { access_token: "sekret", page: 2 } },
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});
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await fetcher("https://example.com/mcp", {
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method: "POST",
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
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body: liveBody,
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});
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// Recorded copy has the nested secret masked; non-sensitive siblings kept.
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expect(JSON.parse(tracked[0]!.requestBody!)).toEqual({
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params: { arguments: { access_token: REDACTED_VALUE, page: 2 } },
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});
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expect(JSON.stringify(tracked[0])).not.toContain("sekret");
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// The live outbound request body is byte-identical (unredacted).
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expect(outboundInit?.body).toBe(liveBody);
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});
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it("does not throw on a malformed body — logs it as-is", async () => {
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it("does not throw on a malformed body — logs it as-is", async () => {
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const baseFetch = vi.fn(async () => new Response("ok"));
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const baseFetch = vi.fn(async () => new Response("ok"));
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const tracked: FetchRequestEntryBase[] = [];
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const tracked: FetchRequestEntryBase[] = [];
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@ -41,7 +41,12 @@ const SENSITIVE_BODY_FIELDS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
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"token",
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"token",
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]);
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]);
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/** Placeholder substituted for sensitive body / URL values in recorded entries. */
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/**
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* Placeholder substituted for sensitive body / URL values in recorded entries.
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* Deliberately kept separate from {@link REDACTED_HEADER_VALUE} (even though both
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* are `"[REDACTED]"` today) so the header and body/URL redaction paths can evolve
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* their sentinels independently.
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*/
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export const REDACTED_VALUE = "[REDACTED]";
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export const REDACTED_VALUE = "[REDACTED]";
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/** Whether `name` (any casing) is a known-sensitive field / query-param name. */
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/** Whether `name` (any casing) is a known-sensitive field / query-param name. */
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@ -124,6 +129,11 @@ function redactJsonValue(value: unknown): unknown {
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* values change. Best-effort and never throws: an empty, non-string, or
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* values change. Best-effort and never throws: an empty, non-string, or
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* unparseable body is returned unchanged. Only the recorded copy is redacted;
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* unparseable body is returned unchanged. Only the recorded copy is redacted;
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* the live request body is never touched.
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* the live request body is never touched.
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*
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* Scope is deliberately limited to `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` and JSON:
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* these cover the OAuth token flows this redaction targets. `multipart/form-data`
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* (and other binary/opaque bodies) are passed through verbatim — OAuth never uses
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* multipart, so the risk is low; revisit if a multipart secret path appears.
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*/
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*/
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export function redactBody(
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export function redactBody(
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body: string | undefined,
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body: string | undefined,
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