* fix(auth): offer explicit re-authorize when callback state is lost (#1808) A `/oauth/callback` that arrives with no recorded SEP-2352 discovery state made the SDK throw `AuthorizationServerMismatchError` and the Inspector dead-ended, surfacing the raw SDK text with no path forward. The SDK folds two very different failures into that one error class, so `core/auth/issuerBinding.ts` classifies them structurally: a recoverable "lost authorization state" (the SDK puts prose, not an issuer URL, in the `recordedIssuer` slot) versus a genuine cross-AS `issuer_mismatch`. Only the first gets a recovery affordance. Web: the callback failure now raises a dedicated banner ("Authorization state was lost" / "Authorize again") whose action clears the stale OAuth state for that server and starts a fresh authorization. A genuine mismatch stays a red, non-dismissible security notification with both issuers named and no one-click retry. Node runners (CLI/TUI): the same classification rewrites the callback rejection into the shared actionable copy instead of the SDK text. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016S7h83UKNQ7kvSiFDNksCt * fix(auth): detect the SDK mismatch error via isInstance (#1808) The callback-leg classifier gated on `err.mcpBrand`, but the SDK declares that brand in a `static {}` block, so it lives on the constructor and is never reachable from an instance. The predicate always returned false, so `findIssuerBindingFailure()` never matched and the #1808 recovery banner was inert in production — the callback dead-ended exactly as before. Use the SDK's own `AuthorizationServerMismatchError.isInstance()`, which is cross-copy safe by construction (it consults a `Symbol.for()`-keyed brand set), with a `name` fallback for a serialization boundary. Correct the module doc, which cited cross-bundle safety as the reason to avoid `instanceof` — the very thing the SDK's branded `hasInstance` provides. Every fixture now constructs a real `AuthorizationServerMismatchError` instead of a hand-rolled object with an own `mcpBrand`, which is why a green `npm run ci` hid this. Adds a test pinning the brand's placement so the feature cannot silently go inert again. Review follow-ups: drop the unused `isLostAuthorizationStateError`, remove the duplicated banner title default, resolve the banner title/action label where the banner is raised, keep the clear-failure notification open, and bound remote-supplied issuers in user-facing copy. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016S7h83UKNQ7kvSiFDNksCt --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
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import type { AuthChallenge } from "./challenge.js";
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import type { IssuerBindingFailure } from "./issuerBinding.js";
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export type OAuthInteractiveAuthKind = "step_up" | "reauth";
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@ -224,6 +225,101 @@ export function isReAuthBannerReason(
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);
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}
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/** Banner/alert heading when the recorded authorization state was lost. */
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export function lostAuthorizationStateTitle(): string {
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return "Authorization state was lost";
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}
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/**
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* Plain-language explanation for a callback that arrived with no recorded
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* discovery state (SEP-2352). Deliberately does not surface the SDK's
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* `AuthorizationServerMismatchError` text — that wording reads like a security
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* failure, and this case is ordinary bookkeeping loss.
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*/
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export function lostAuthorizationStateMessage(options?: {
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serverName?: string;
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}): string {
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const target = options?.serverName
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? `"${options.serverName}"`
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: "this server";
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return (
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`The stored authorization state for ${target} was lost before the ` +
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"authorization server sent you back, so the sign-in could not be " +
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"completed. This usually means a new browser session, a different tab, or " +
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"authorization state that was cleared while the flow was in progress. " +
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"Authorize again to reconnect."
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);
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}
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/** Action label for the lost-authorization-state recovery affordance. */
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export function lostAuthorizationStateActionLabel(): string {
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return "Authorize again";
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}
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/** Heading for a genuine cross-authorization-server mismatch (a security signal). */
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export function issuerMismatchTitle(): string {
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return "Authorization server mismatch";
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}
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/**
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* Longest issuer we will echo back into user-facing copy.
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*
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* `currentIssuer` is remote-supplied (it comes from the configured server's AS
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* metadata), so an overlong value could be used to abuse the notification
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* layout. Rendering is escaped, so this is a presentation bound, not an
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* injection defence.
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*/
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const MAX_DISPLAYED_ISSUER_LENGTH = 120;
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/** Bound an issuer for display, marking any truncation. */
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export function truncateIssuerForDisplay(issuer: string): string {
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return issuer.length > MAX_DISPLAYED_ISSUER_LENGTH
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? `${issuer.slice(0, MAX_DISPLAYED_ISSUER_LENGTH)}…`
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: issuer;
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}
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/**
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* Copy for a genuine SEP-2352 issuer mismatch. This is *not* offered a
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* one-click recovery: the authorization code and PKCE verifier are bound to the
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* server that minted them, and a different server answering the callback is a
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* credential-exfiltration signal the user must investigate.
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*/
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export function issuerMismatchMessage(options: {
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recordedIssuer: string;
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currentIssuer: string;
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serverName?: string;
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}): string {
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const target = options.serverName ? `"${options.serverName}"` : "this server";
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return (
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`Authorization for ${target} was stopped: the flow started at ` +
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`${truncateIssuerForDisplay(options.recordedIssuer)} but the callback ` +
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`resolved ${truncateIssuerForDisplay(options.currentIssuer)}. ` +
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"The authorization code was not exchanged. " +
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"Verify the server's authorization configuration before trying again."
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);
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}
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/** Title + message for a callback-leg issuer-binding failure. */
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export function issuerBindingFailureCopy(
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failure: IssuerBindingFailure,
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options?: { serverName?: string },
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): { title: string; message: string } {
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if (failure.kind === "lost_authorization_state") {
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return {
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title: lostAuthorizationStateTitle(),
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message: lostAuthorizationStateMessage(options),
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};
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}
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return {
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title: issuerMismatchTitle(),
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message: issuerMismatchMessage({
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recordedIssuer: failure.recordedIssuer,
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currentIssuer: failure.currentIssuer,
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serverName: options?.serverName,
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}),
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};
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}
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export function reAuthBannerMessage(options: {
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serverName?: string;
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detail?: string;
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