feat(web): add sandbox CSP builder library (closes #1558)
Add a pure, DOM-free CSP-builder library at clients/web/src/lib/sandbox-csp.ts that validates app-supplied `_meta.ui.csp` requests, filters them to safe sources, builds the locked-down Content-Security-Policy string, and wraps untrusted widget HTML in a fixed host shell whose first <head> child is the CSP meta. - SAFE_CSP_SOURCE: strict regex that rejects directive/attribute breakouts (`;`, `"`, `<`, `>`, whitespace). - approveCspSources(): drops unsafe entries (with a warning) and omits empty keys; echoes back only what the host will enforce. - buildSandboxCspPolicy(): `default-src 'none'` catch-all, `form-action 'none'`, source-allowlist filtering, `'unsafe-inline'` for the app's own inline script/style. - escapeHtmlAttr() / wrapSandboxedHtml(): defense-in-depth so untrusted bytes never precede the applied policy. Re-implements the sandbox-csp portion of PR #1510 (Wave 1 of #1579) as a standalone library; wiring into the app bridge is a follow-up issue. Adds full unit tests (100% lines/statements/functions/branches) and lists the file in the web coverage `include` so it is gated (the untested legacy src/lib siblings stay out until they get tests). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S3fTN8H3R8YV4yUGvZjYnX
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clients/web/src/lib/sandbox-csp.ts
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clients/web/src/lib/sandbox-csp.ts
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import type { McpUiResourceCsp } from "@modelcontextprotocol/ext-apps/app-bridge";
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/**
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* Allowed shapes for a CSP source-expression supplied by an app's
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* `_meta.ui.csp`. Each entry is server-supplied and untrusted: it MUST NOT
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* inject extra directives (`;`) or break out of the meta attribute
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* (`"`, `<`, `>`). Only common source forms are accepted —
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* `scheme://host[:port][/path]`, scheme-only (`data:`, `blob:`), `*`, and
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* wildcard hosts (`*.example.com`, `https://*.example.com`); anything else is
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* dropped by {@link approveCspSources}.
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*/
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export const SAFE_CSP_SOURCE =
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/^(?:\*|[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:(?:\/\/(?:\*\.)?[A-Za-z0-9._~%!$&'()*+,=@:-]+(?::\d+)?(?:\/[A-Za-z0-9._~%!$&'()*+,=@:/-]*)?)?|(?:\*\.)?[A-Za-z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9.-]*[A-Za-z0-9])?)$/;
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const CSP_KEYS = [
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"connectDomains",
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"resourceDomains",
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"frameDomains",
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"baseUriDomains",
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] as const satisfies readonly (keyof McpUiResourceCsp)[];
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/**
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* Filter an app-supplied {@link McpUiResourceCsp} down to the entries the host
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* will actually enforce. Unsafe values are dropped (and warned), and the
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* resulting object contains only keys with at least one accepted source. The
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* return value is what the host echoes back to the view via
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* `hostCapabilities.sandbox.csp` so the app sees what was granted, not what it
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* asked for.
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*/
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export function approveCspSources(
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csp: McpUiResourceCsp | undefined,
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): McpUiResourceCsp {
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const approved: McpUiResourceCsp = {};
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if (!csp) return approved;
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for (const key of CSP_KEYS) {
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const requested = csp[key];
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if (!Array.isArray(requested)) continue;
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const accepted: string[] = [];
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for (const entry of requested) {
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if (typeof entry === "string" && SAFE_CSP_SOURCE.test(entry)) {
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accepted.push(entry);
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} else {
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console.warn("[mcp-app sandbox] dropping unsafe CSP source:", entry);
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}
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}
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if (accepted.length > 0) approved[key] = accepted;
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}
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return approved;
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}
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function joinSources(list: string[] | undefined, fallback: string): string {
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return list && list.length > 0 ? list.join(" ") : fallback;
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}
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/**
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* Translate an approved {@link McpUiResourceCsp} into the Content-Security-Policy
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* string enforced on the inner sandboxed document. `default-src 'none'` is the
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* catch-all so any fetch type not explicitly mapped is denied. `script-src` /
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* `style-src` carry `'unsafe-inline'` because the app's own inline code ships
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* with the inline-delivered HTML and has no origin to allowlist; external loads
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* stay restricted to `resourceDomains`.
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*/
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export function buildSandboxCspPolicy(approved: McpUiResourceCsp): string {
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const resourceSrc = joinSources(approved.resourceDomains, "'none'");
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const inlineResource =
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resourceSrc === "'none'"
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? "'unsafe-inline'"
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: `'unsafe-inline' ${resourceSrc}`;
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return [
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"default-src 'none'",
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`connect-src ${joinSources(approved.connectDomains, "'none'")}`,
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`script-src ${inlineResource}`,
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`style-src ${inlineResource}`,
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`img-src ${resourceSrc}`,
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`font-src ${resourceSrc}`,
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`media-src ${resourceSrc}`,
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`frame-src ${joinSources(approved.frameDomains, "'none'")}`,
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`base-uri ${joinSources(approved.baseUriDomains, "'self'")}`,
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"form-action 'none'",
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"object-src 'none'",
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"worker-src 'none'",
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].join("; ");
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}
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/** HTML-attribute-encode a string (defense-in-depth for the CSP meta value). */
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export function escapeHtmlAttr(s: string): string {
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return s
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.replace(/&/g, "&")
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.replace(/"/g, """)
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.replace(/'/g, "'")
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.replace(/</g, "<")
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.replace(/>/g, ">");
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}
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/**
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* Wrap an app's untrusted HTML in a host-authored document whose first
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* `<head>` child is the CSP `<meta>`. The wrapper bytes are fixed — the
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* untrusted content lands inside `<body>` and never precedes the policy, so a
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* `<head>`/`<!-- -->` token in the app's HTML cannot push the meta inert or
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* load resources before the policy applies. If the app's HTML is itself a full
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* document, the second `<!doctype>`/`<html>`/`<head>` are parsed inside
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* `<body>` (the HTML parser ignores duplicate document-structure tags) while
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* its scripts and styles still run — governed by the already-applied policy.
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*/
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export function wrapSandboxedHtml(
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untrustedHtml: string,
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policy: string,
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): string {
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const meta = `<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="${escapeHtmlAttr(policy)}">`;
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return `<!DOCTYPE html><html><head>${meta}<meta charset="utf-8"></head><body>${untrustedHtml}</body></html>`;
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}
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