fix(auth): revoke every issuer-bound grant, not just the active one (#2144)
Copilot review round 3. `clear(serverUrl)` deletes EVERY `byIssuer` slot, but revocation read only the context-free (active-issuer) token. A server that had authorized against issuers A and B therefore revoked B, then destroyed the local record of A while A's grant stayed live at its authorization server — the same leak this feature exists to close, one level down. - `OAuthStorage.listIssuers(serverUrl)` is the new seam (one implementation: every backend extends `OAuthStorageBase`). `collectGrants` walks it plus the ctx-less read, deduping by token, so every grant the clear will delete is covered. - Metadata is cached once per server, not per issuer, so a grant bound to an issuer the cached document does not describe cannot be revoked: sending its token to that endpoint would hand a credential to a server that never minted it. That grant is reported as failed — dropped unrevoked — rather than silently discarded or misdirected. - `aggregateOutcomes` gives a failure precedence over another grant's success, so one live grant cannot hide behind another's 200. Exported for its own test, since `computeOutcome` returns early on the empty case. Also from that round: - The fixture's /oauth/revoke now verifies token ownership (RFC 7009 §2.1). Access tokens record their owning `client_id`; a token belonging to another client is left alone and still answered 200 (§2.2 — the response must not tell one client whether another's token exists). New e2e case proves a second registered client cannot revoke the first's grant. - The TUI rendered the revocation-failure note in cyan, the informational tone. It is a partial success — the local clear really happened — so it is not an `error` status, but the grant may still be live and cyan understated that. `AuthTab` takes an `oauthMessageTone`; the message says so explicitly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
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@ -1407,9 +1407,18 @@ describe("App (mid-session auth lifecycle events)", () => {
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});
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const r = await mount(oneHttp());
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await press(r, ["a", "s"]);
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// The detail is what identifies the failure; the tone the message renders
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// in is asserted against `AuthTab` directly, where the branch lives.
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await expectFrame(r, "unreachable");
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});
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it("says nothing when there was nothing to revoke", async () => {
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const r = await mount(oneHttp());
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await press(r, ["a", "s"]);
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await waitUntil(() => h.clientSpies.clearOAuthTokens.mock.calls.length > 0);
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expect(r.lastFrame() ?? "").not.toContain("authorization server failed");
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});
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const stepUpChallenge = {
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reason: "insufficient_scope" as const,
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requiredScopes: ["env:read"],
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