fix(auth): revoke every issuer-bound grant, not just the active one (#2144)

Copilot review round 3.

`clear(serverUrl)` deletes EVERY `byIssuer` slot, but revocation read only the
context-free (active-issuer) token. A server that had authorized against
issuers A and B therefore revoked B, then destroyed the local record of A while
A's grant stayed live at its authorization server — the same leak this feature
exists to close, one level down.

- `OAuthStorage.listIssuers(serverUrl)` is the new seam (one implementation:
  every backend extends `OAuthStorageBase`). `collectGrants` walks it plus the
  ctx-less read, deduping by token, so every grant the clear will delete is
  covered.
- Metadata is cached once per server, not per issuer, so a grant bound to an
  issuer the cached document does not describe cannot be revoked: sending its
  token to that endpoint would hand a credential to a server that never minted
  it. That grant is reported as failed — dropped unrevoked — rather than
  silently discarded or misdirected.
- `aggregateOutcomes` gives a failure precedence over another grant's success,
  so one live grant cannot hide behind another's 200. Exported for its own
  test, since `computeOutcome` returns early on the empty case.

Also from that round:

- The fixture's /oauth/revoke now verifies token ownership (RFC 7009 §2.1).
  Access tokens record their owning `client_id`; a token belonging to another
  client is left alone and still answered 200 (§2.2 — the response must not
  tell one client whether another's token exists). New e2e case proves a
  second registered client cannot revoke the first's grant.
- The TUI rendered the revocation-failure note in cyan, the informational
  tone. It is a partial success — the local clear really happened — so it is
  not an `error` status, but the grant may still be live and cyan understated
  that. `AuthTab` takes an `oauthMessageTone`; the message says so explicitly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
This commit is contained in:
cliffhall 2026-08-28 02:40:28 -04:00
commit 781aa69d19

View file

@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ import type { OAuthMetadata } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
const CLIENT_ID = "test-2144-revocation";
const CLIENT_SECRET = "test-2144-secret";
const REDIRECT_URL = "http://localhost:3000/oauth/callback";
/** A second registered client, used to prove tokens are not cross-revocable. */
const OTHER_CLIENT_ID = "test-2144-other";
const OTHER_CLIENT_SECRET = "test-2144-other-secret";
function base64Url(buffer: Buffer): string {
return buffer
@ -50,6 +53,11 @@ describe("OAuth token revocation (RFC 7009)", () => {
clientSecret: CLIENT_SECRET,
redirectUris: [REDIRECT_URL],
},
{
clientId: OTHER_CLIENT_ID,
clientSecret: OTHER_CLIENT_SECRET,
redirectUris: [REDIRECT_URL],
},
],
}),
});
@ -163,6 +171,27 @@ describe("OAuth token revocation (RFC 7009)", () => {
expect(response.status).toBe(401);
});
// RFC 7009 §2.1: only the client a token was issued to may revoke it. The
// response stays 200 (§2.2 — it must not tell one client whether another's
// token exists), so the assertion is that the token still works.
it("does not revoke a token belonging to a different client", async () => {
const tokens = await authorize();
const response = await fetch(`${serverUrl}/oauth/revoke`, {
method: "POST",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
Authorization: `Basic ${Buffer.from(`${OTHER_CLIENT_ID}:${OTHER_CLIENT_SECRET}`).toString("base64")}`,
},
body: new URLSearchParams({
token: tokens.refresh_token,
token_type_hint: "refresh_token",
}),
});
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(await tokenAccepted(tokens.access_token)).toBe(true);
});
it("advertises a revocation endpoint", () => {
expect(metadata.revocation_endpoint).toBe(`${serverUrl}/oauth/revoke`);
});