feat: Skills extension phase 3 — CLI, TUI, directory reads, frontmatter check

Closes #2248.

Completes SEP-2640 support across all three clients, and closes the one
obligation #2234 deliberately left open.

- `checkSkillFrontmatterMatch` compares a served SKILL.md's own YAML
  frontmatter against the entry the listing advertised, field by field. No
  digest can cover this: a digest is taken over the bytes the server served,
  so it proves the file was not altered in transit and says nothing about
  whether the listing described it honestly. Needs a real YAML parser; `yaml`
  was already a root dependency, so this adds no package — but it does newly
  put it on core/'s import graph, hence the three bundler `external` lists.

- `resources/directory/read`: result schemas defined against the normative
  text, `InspectorClient.readResourceDirectory`, a Directory section on the
  Skills screen, and `--method resources/directory/read` in the CLI. The
  client refuses the call locally when the server did not declare
  `directoryRead`, which is the SEP's MUST NOT. A child the directory lists
  but the entry does not is marked `not listed` rather than merged into the
  manifest — the SEP calls a directory result a live observation and forbids
  treating it as extending the manifest.

- CLI: `skills/list`, `skills/get` and `resources/directory/read`, plus
  `--verify` — one NDJSON report per skill, a summary on stderr, exit 7 on a
  violation. Reads are sequential; a conforming manifest may declare 512
  entries.

- TUI: a Skills pane, shown only when the server declares the extension. Each
  row carries its conformance verdict as a glyph as well as a colour, since
  the pane is read over ssh and through script(1). Enter verifies.

- `verifySkills` re-throws `AuthRecoveryRequiredError` rather than recording
  it per file: it says the session's authorization expired, so absorbing it
  would report N identical read failures and swallow the error the TUI and
  the web commands key off to reauthorize.

Two open questions settled, both in code comments where they will be found:
`skills/get` carries no caching attributes because SEP-2640 leaves the
question open in as many words, so requiring them would fail a conforming
server; and there is no `PagedSkillsState` because every consumer of this
list is a whole-catalog verdict — computed over page one of three, "this
server's skills conform" is not merely partial but wrong.

The fixture grows two skills, both for checks that were otherwise
undemonstrable: `lying-listing` (listing and file disagree, digest still
verifies) and `stale-manifest` (serves a file its manifest does not declare).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ND46Ci64DC3tzBy9aG81Nc
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
This commit is contained in:
cliffhall 2026-09-07 18:10:37 -04:00
commit 9a8488681e

View file

@ -108,11 +108,12 @@ Options that specify the MCP server (catalog/config file, ad-hoc command/URL, en
| Option | Description |
| ----------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `--method <method>` | MCP method to invoke. Supports `initialize` (connect-only probe → `{serverInfo, protocolVersion, capabilities, instructions}`), `tools/list`, `tools/call`, `resources/list`, `resources/read`, `resources/templates/list`, `prompts/list`, `prompts/get`, `logging/setLevel`, plus catalog-only `servers/list` / `servers/show` (no MCP connect). Stream / session-only methods (e.g. `logging/tail`) are rejected. |
| `--method <method>` | MCP method to invoke. Supports `initialize` (connect-only probe → `{serverInfo, protocolVersion, capabilities, instructions}`), `tools/list`, `tools/call`, `resources/list`, `resources/read`, `resources/templates/list`, `prompts/list`, `prompts/get`, `logging/setLevel`, `skills/list`, `skills/get`, `resources/directory/read`, plus catalog-only `servers/list` / `servers/show` (no MCP connect). Stream / session-only methods (e.g. `logging/tail`) are rejected. |
| `--tool-name <name>` | Tool name (for `tools/call`). |
| `--tool-arg <key=value>` | Tool argument; repeat for multiple. Use `key='{"json":true}'` for JSON. Values are coerced (JSON-parsed, so `count=1` becomes a number). |
| `--tool-args-json <json>` | Tool arguments as a single JSON object (e.g. `'{"zip":"10001"}'`). Passed verbatim — no `key=value` coercion, so `"012"` stays a string. Mutually exclusive with `--tool-arg`. |
| `--uri <uri>` | Resource URI (for `resources/read`). |
| `--uri <uri>` | Resource URI (`resources/read`), directory URI (`resources/directory/read`), or skill URI (`skills/get`). |
| `--cursor <cursor>` | Opaque pagination cursor for `resources/directory/read` — pass back the `nextCursor` from the previous page. The listing is not recursive and pages are not aggregated: SEP-2640 gives the cursor to the client, and descending is the caller's job. |
| `--prompt-name <name>` | Prompt name (for `prompts/get`). |
| `--prompt-args <key=value>` | Prompt arguments; repeat for multiple. |
| `--log-level <level>` | Logging level for `logging/setLevel` (e.g. `debug`, `info`). |
@ -121,6 +122,7 @@ Options that specify the MCP server (catalog/config file, ad-hoc command/URL, en
| `--connect-timeout <ms>` | Connection timeout in ms. Defaults to `15000` for ad-hoc `--server-url`/target runs (so a black-holed host fails fast) and to the file-level timeout for `--catalog`/`--config` runs. `0` disables the timeout. |
| `--app-info` | Probe a tool's MCP App UI metadata without invoking it. With `--method tools/call --tool-name <name>`: prints one JSON line (`hasApp`, `resourceUri`, `csp`, `permissions`, `domain`, …) and exits `0` if the tool has an app or `2` (`no_app`) if not. With `--method tools/list`: emits NDJSON — one app-info line per tool over a single connection. |
| `--strict` | With `--method tools/list`: report tool-schema portability problems in full (path, issue, suggested fix) on stderr, and exit `6` if any is error-severity. Without it, a one-line count is printed instead. See [Schema portability](#schema-portability---strict). |
| `--verify` | With `--method skills/list` or `--method skills/get`: run the SEP-2640 conformance, digest and frontmatter checks over the skills returned, emit one JSON report per skill on stdout, and exit `7` if any fails. See [Skill verification](#skill-verification---verify). |
| `--format <text\|json>` | Output format. `text` (default) pretty-prints the result. `json` emits a single JSON object on stdout (`{ "result": … }`, plus `{ "appInfo": … }` as a sibling key for App tools) with no banners, so the whole output pipes cleanly into `jq`. |
| `--relogin` | Delete stored OAuth for this server URL from the shared store before connect; interactive login still only runs if the server requires auth. Requires an HTTP/SSE URL (rejected for stdio). Conflicts with `--stored-auth-only` / `--use-stored-auth` / `--wait-for-auth` / catalog short-circuits. |
| `--no-revoke` | With `--relogin`, skip the [RFC 7009](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7009) revocation request that would otherwise end the grant at the authorization server when the local state is deleted. The per-server `oauth.revokeOnClear` setting is the persistent form of the same opt-out; either one is enough to skip it. See [Revoking on `--relogin`](#revoking-on---relogin). |
@ -333,6 +335,65 @@ mcp-inspector --cli --transport http --server-url https://api.example/mcp \
--wait-for-auth 120 --method tools/list
```
#### Skill verification (`--verify`)
SEP-2640 puts real obligations on whoever consumes a skill: verify each fetched
file against the digest its manifest advertised, check that the served
`SKILL.md`'s frontmatter matches the one the listing advertised, and honour the
per-skill limits. `--verify` runs all of them over a whole catalog and turns the
answer into an exit code, so a server author can gate CI on it:
```sh
mcp-inspector --cli <server> --method skills/list --verify
```
Stdout is **NDJSON, one report per skill**, in listing order:
```json
{
"uri": "skill://tampered-notes/SKILL.md",
"name": "tampered-notes",
"conformance": [],
"frontmatter": [],
"files": [
{ "uri": "skill://tampered-notes/SKILL.md", "status": "verified", "…": "…" },
{ "uri": "skill://tampered-notes/notes.md", "status": "mismatch", "…": "…" }
],
"ok": false
}
```
Stderr gets a one-line summary, so a reader who piped stdout into `jq` still
sees the verdict. `--method skills/get --uri <skill>` verifies exactly one
skill, in the same shape.
**What fails the run.** `ok` is false — and the exit code is `7` — for anything
SEP-2640 makes a MUST: an error-severity conformance finding, a digest or size
mismatch, or a manifest file that could not be read. A **warning** does not fail
it. That distinction matters most for `resources: "dynamic"`, which is a
*conforming* wire form for generated content: it means integrity cannot be
verified, which is worth reporting, but failing CI for it would tell server
authors their valid skill is broken.
**Three checks, three different jobs**, and the second is the one nothing else
covers:
- **Conformance** — structural checks against the entry as listed (name grammar,
the name/URI invariant, digest and size formats, manifest completeness, the
interoperability limits).
- **Frontmatter** — the served `SKILL.md`'s own YAML frontmatter, compared field
by field against the frontmatter the listing advertised. A digest cannot cover
this: it is taken over the bytes the server served, so it proves the file was
not altered in transit and says nothing about whether the *listing* described
it honestly. A server can advertise one description, serve another, and pass
every digest check.
- **Files** — each manifest entry fetched and hashed. Reads are sequential: a
conforming manifest may declare 512 entries, and a parallel walk would open
512 `resources/read` calls against the server under test.
A read failure is recorded against the file it happened on and the walk
continues, so one unreadable file never hides the findings after it.
## Exit codes & error envelopes
Every non-zero exit maps to a stable failure class, so a programmatic caller
@ -348,6 +409,7 @@ prose from stderr:
| `4` | Server unreachable (DNS, connection refused, timeout, `fetch failed`). |
| `5` | Tool error (`tools/call` returned `isError:true`, or the tool was not found). |
| `6` | `--strict` found an error-severity tool-schema portability problem (`schema_unportable` — the schema is valid JSON Schema, just not portable). |
| `7` | `--verify` found a SEP-2640 violation (`skills_nonconformant` — a conformance error, a digest or size mismatch, or an unreadable manifest file). |
On any non-zero exit the CLI also writes a single JSON line to **stderr** — the
`ErrorEnvelope`: