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docs: state the exemption's canonicalization contract, and fix the smoke recipe's cwd

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Copilot review round 2.

The exemption compares the WHATWG-canonicalized `URL.hostname`, so it covers
alternate spellings of three loopback *addresses* rather than three input
strings: `127.1`, `2130706433`, `0x7f.0.0.1`, `[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]` and a
root-anchored `127.0.0.1.` all pass. The behavior is right — the security
argument is about the address the request reaches, and all of these are the
loopback interface — but the comment described it as a literal-input match,
which it is not. It now states the contract, and six regression cases pin the
aliases alongside the existing near-miss cases.

This is also still an exact match for the SDK: `assertSecureTokenEndpoint` tests
`url.hostname` against the same three values after the same `new URL`
canonicalization, so an alias accepted here is one the SDK accepts too.

Separately, the smoke guide's fixture recipe left the shell in `clients/web`
after the build line, so the repo-root-relative paths on the next line resolved
under `clients/web` and the copy-pasted setup failed before the server started.
The build now runs in a subshell, and the block notes that the server announces
its URL on stderr and walks past a taken port.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GfHQ8vMm5NBgzbUJ6UwxmB
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
This commit is contained in:
cliffhall 2026-09-11 03:12:07 -04:00
commit a21fd0c161
1 changed files with 49 additions and 10 deletions
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31
core/client/config-parse.ts
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@ -83,19 +83,34 @@ export const CIMD_METADATA_URL_HTTPS_ERROR =
* validation would not let anyone enter, and CIMD could not be driven against
* any fixture in this repo (#2305).
*
* ⚠️ This is the SDK's *three-literal* list, deliberately, and not the broader
* `isLoopbackHost` in `core/node/hostUrl.ts` — which imports `node:net` and so
* cannot be reached from this browser-safe module. Matching the SDK literal for
* literal also keeps the two allow-lists from disagreeing about the same URL.
* `::1` arrives from `URL.hostname` bracketed, which is the form stored here.
* ⚠️ This is the SDK's own list, matched member for member — not the broader
* `isLoopbackHost` in `core/node/hostUrl.ts`, which imports `node:net` and so
* cannot be reached from this browser-safe module. The SDK's
* `assertSecureTokenEndpoint` tests `url.hostname` against exactly
* `localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `[::1]` (plus a `::1` arm `URL.hostname` never
* produces, since it brackets IPv6 literals). Keeping the two identical is what
* stops them disagreeing about one URL.
*
* ⚠️ **The comparison is against the WHATWG-canonicalized `URL.hostname`, so it
* covers alternate spellings of these three *addresses*, not three input
* strings.** `http://127.1/…`, `http://2130706433/…`, `http://0x7f.0.0.1/…` and
* `http://[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]/…` all canonicalize into the set and are accepted;
* so is a root-anchored `http://127.0.0.1./…`, which WHATWG strips the dot from
* for IP literals but *not* for `localhost.`. That is deliberate on both counts:
* the security argument is about the address the request actually reaches, and
* every one of these is the loopback interface. It is also exactly what the SDK
* does — it canonicalizes through `new URL` the same way — so an alias accepted
* here is an alias the SDK accepts too.
*/
const CIMD_HTTP_EXEMPT_HOSTS = new Set(["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "[::1]"]);
/**
* True when a plain-`http:` CIMD metadata URL on this host is acceptable. Takes
* the bare host (`URL.hostname`), never a `host:port`. Not exported: the only
* caller is the validator below, and the exemption is exercised through it
* rather than through a second public surface that could drift from it.
* the already-canonicalized `URL.hostname`, never a raw authority or a
* `host:port` — passing an unparsed string would compare the wrong thing and
* silently reject every alias above. Not exported: the only caller is the
* validator below, and the exemption is exercised through it rather than
* through a second public surface that could drift from it.
*/
function isCimdHttpExemptHost(hostname: string): boolean {
return CIMD_HTTP_EXEMPT_HOSTS.has(hostname);