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fix(auth): refuse a grant whose authorization server cannot be established (#2144)

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Copilot review round 15.

The issuer check still failed open for the legacy unkeyed grant. "Unkeyed"
means its authorization server is UNKNOWN, not that the cached endpoint is
proven to own it: server metadata is a single slot a later discovery
overwrites, while a pre-SEP-2352 token survives until the first issuer-stamped
save. So a clear could post an old bearer credential to an authorization server
that never minted it.

Such a grant is now cleared without being revoked, and reported as such with a
message saying re-authorizing makes future clears revocable. The cost is that
a pre-issuer-binding entry gets no revocation — which is exactly the behavior
it had before this feature existed, so nothing regresses — and it earns
revocation back on the next authorization. Not sending is the only answer that
cannot be wrong.

Every seed in the suite is now issuer-bound, which is what a real flow writes;
the two tests that were about the legacy grant now assert the refusal, since
that is the behavior worth pinning.

Also renamed the CLI test that still described the pre-round-13 ordering.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
This commit is contained in:
cliffhall 2026-08-28 06:18:58 -04:00
commit a4ee263365
1 changed files with 190 additions and 77 deletions
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8
clients/web/src/test/integration/auth/revocation-e2e.test.ts
View file

@ -138,7 +138,13 @@ describe("OAuth token revocation (RFC 7009)", () => {
}): Promise<BrowserOAuthStorage> {
const storage = new BrowserOAuthStorage();
await storage.clear(serverUrl);
await storage.saveTokens(serverUrl, { token_type: "Bearer", ...tokens });
// Issuer-bound and matching the discovered metadata: an unkeyed grant
// records no authorization server and is deliberately refused.
await storage.saveTokens(
serverUrl,
{ token_type: "Bearer", ...tokens },
{ issuer: metadata.issuer },
);
await storage.saveServerMetadata(serverUrl, metadata);
// Preconfigured, so it goes in the preregistered slot — the same one a
// server with `oauth.clientId` uses. That is the slot the revocation path