fix: log the rejected progressToken's type, not its value

The warning added one commit earlier echoed the rejected value. That is the
same leak class as the `servers/show` fix: `_meta` now carries arbitrary JSON,
so an invalid `progressToken` can be an object holding credentials — and this
logger is persisted by real clients (`clients/tui/src/logger.ts` writes it to
`~/.mcp-inspector/auth.log` via `pino.destination`, append mode).

Log `{ received: describeJsonType(value) }` instead — "object", "array",
"number". That is what makes the warning actionable; the value itself only
leaks.

Test asserts the record is exactly `{ received: "object" }` and that the
planted secret appears nowhere in the captured calls.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
This commit is contained in:
cliffhall 2026-08-23 14:19:48 -04:00
commit ae9536b171
2 changed files with 60 additions and 1 deletions

View file

@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ import type {
FetchRequestEntryBase,
RequestMetadata,
} from "@inspector/core/mcp/types.js";
import type { InspectorLogger } from "@inspector/core/logging/logger.js";
import type { JsonValue } from "@inspector/core/json/jsonUtils.js";
import type {
TypedEvent,
@ -1464,6 +1465,49 @@ describe("InspectorClient", () => {
},
);
it("warns with the rejected progressToken's type, never its value", async () => {
// This logger is persisted by real clients (the TUI writes it to
// `~/.mcp-inspector/auth.log`), and an invalid `progressToken` can now be
// an object holding credentials — so the warning must not echo it.
const warn = vi.fn();
const noop = () => {};
const logger: InspectorLogger = {
level: "warn",
fatal: noop,
error: noop,
warn,
info: noop,
debug: noop,
trace: noop,
silent: noop,
child: () => logger,
};
client = new InspectorClient(
{
type: "stdio",
command: serverCommand.command,
args: serverCommand.args,
},
{
environment: { transport: createTransportNode, logger },
progress: false,
defaultMetadata: {
progressToken: { accessToken: "sk-live-should-not-appear" },
},
},
);
await client.connect();
await client.listTools();
const call = warn.mock.calls.find((c) =>
String(c[1]).includes("progressToken"),
);
expect(call).toBeDefined();
expect(call![0]).toEqual({ received: "object" });
// Belt and braces: the secret must not appear anywhere in the record.
expect(JSON.stringify(warn.mock.calls)).not.toContain("sk-live");
});
it.each([
["a string", "tok-1"],
["an integer", 7],

View file

@ -369,6 +369,16 @@ interface ToolCallRequest {
// server can't spin a tight zero-delay loop; a successful acknowledgement resets
// the count, and past the cap we give up (mark the stream ended) rather than
// retry a persistently-failing re-list forever.
/**
* A one-word name for a JSON value's type, for diagnostics that must not
* disclose the value itself.
*/
function describeJsonType(value: unknown): string {
if (value === null) return "null";
if (Array.isArray(value)) return "array";
return typeof value;
}
/**
* Whether a `_meta.progressToken` value is one the protocol allows.
*
@ -1078,8 +1088,13 @@ export class InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget {
// the request stays well-formed and simply asks for no progress. Warn,
// because a silently dropped key the user typed is worse than a noisy one.
if ("progressToken" in merged && !isProgressToken(merged.progressToken)) {
// Log the rejected value's *type*, never the value. `_meta` now carries
// arbitrary JSON, so an invalid `progressToken` can be an object holding
// credentials — and this logger is persisted by real clients (the TUI
// writes it to `~/.mcp-inspector/auth.log`). The type is what makes the
// warning actionable anyway; the value would only leak.
this.logger.warn(
{ progressToken: merged.progressToken },
{ received: describeJsonType(merged.progressToken) },
"Dropping `_meta.progressToken` — expected a string or an integer.",
);
delete merged.progressToken;