fix: carry the proxy deadline's identity, correct the rounding note (#2319 round 9)

A deadline enforced by the backend could not arrive as an
OAuthRequestTimeoutError: /api/fetch serialized it as a 500 and
createRemoteFetch turned that into a plain Error, so every instanceof
check downstream was false — including the one that lets a stalled
probe escape withRfc8414OidcCompat. That matters most where no
client-side wrapper exists to have fired first: the discovery the SDK
runs from inside the transport. The route now answers 504 with a typed
marker (OAUTH_TIMEOUT_WIRE_CODE plus url and timeoutMs) and
createRemoteFetch reconstructs the error from it, guarded by a shape
check so an upstream's own JSON cannot forge one.

The route's deadline becomes a `fetchTimeoutMs` option defaulting to
the shared constant, so the backstop can be proven to fire in
milliseconds instead of thirty seconds of wall clock — and because a
very slow authorization server is a legitimate reason to want a longer
one.

The rounding rationale was wrong: setTimeout accepts a fractional delay
and truncates it (verified on Node 26); ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE is
AbortSignal.timeout's behaviour, which this wrapper never calls. The
rounding stays, for the reason that is actually true — the budget is
interpolated into the message and exposed as timeoutMs, and a
performance.now() budget would otherwise report 1000.4000000953674ms.

Also drops a sentence in the discarded-stream test that contradicted
the qualification above it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YFnM6RqB4nXqNysgUYmjmq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>

core/mcp/remote/createRemoteFetch.ts

@@ -21,6 +21,11 @@
  *     the web client against a strict modern server, same as from the CLI/TUI.
  */
 
+import {
+  isOAuthRequestTimeoutWire,
+  OAuthRequestTimeoutError,
+} from "../../auth/requestTimeout.js";
+
 export interface RemoteFetchOptions {
   /** Base URL of the remote server (e.g. http://localhost:3000) */
   baseUrl: string;
@@ -158,6 +163,22 @@ export function createRemoteFetch(options: RemoteFetchOptions): typeof fetch {
 
     if (!res.ok) {
       const text = await res.text();
+      // A deadline the backend enforced arrives as an ordinary error response;
+      // rebuild the typed error from its marker so the `instanceof` checks
+      // downstream — most importantly the one that lets a stalled probe escape
+      // `withRfc8414OidcCompat` — still see a timeout for what it is (#2319,
+      // Copilot). This is the only path on which such a timeout can reach the
+      // browser without a client-side wrapper having fired first: the discovery
+      // the SDK runs from inside the transport has no wrapper at all.
+      let parsed: unknown;
+      try {
+        parsed = JSON.parse(text);
+      } catch {
+        parsed = undefined;
+      }
+      if (isOAuthRequestTimeoutWire(parsed)) {
+        throw new OAuthRequestTimeoutError(parsed.url, parsed.timeoutMs);
+      }
       throw new Error(`Remote fetch failed (${res.status}): ${text}`);
     }
 

core/mcp/remote/node/server.ts

@@ -28,7 +28,10 @@ import { bodyLimit } from "hono/body-limit";
 import { watch as chokidarWatch, type FSWatcher } from "chokidar";
 import { createTransportNode } from "../../node/transport.js";
 import { createProxyFetch } from "../../node/proxyFetch.js";
-import { DEFAULT_OAUTH_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS } from "../../../auth/requestTimeout.js";
+import {
+  DEFAULT_OAUTH_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS,
+  OAUTH_TIMEOUT_WIRE_CODE,
+} from "../../../auth/requestTimeout.js";
 import type {
   RemoteConnectRequest,
   RemoteSendRequest,
@@ -235,6 +238,21 @@ export interface RemoteServerOptions {
   /** Optional path for the user's server list file (/api/servers). Default: ~/.mcp-inspector/mcp.json */
   mcpConfigPath?: string;
 
+  /**
+   * Deadline for the outbound request `/api/fetch` makes, in milliseconds
+   * (#2319). Defaults to {@link DEFAULT_OAUTH_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS}, the same
+   * budget the browser-side `withOAuthRequestTimeout` uses, so the two agree on
+   * when an attempt is hopeless.
+   *
+   * This is the backstop for a client that vanishes without aborting; the
+   * primary mechanism is the caller's own signal, which `createRemoteFetch`
+   * forwards onto this hop. Exposed rather than hardcoded so a test can prove
+   * the backstop actually fires without spending thirty seconds of wall clock
+   * on it — and because a very slow authorization server is a legitimate reason
+   * to want a longer one.
+   */
+  fetchTimeoutMs?: number;
+
   /**
    * When false, the server list is read-only for this session: all
    * `/api/servers` mutations (POST/PUT/DELETE/order) are rejected with 403,
@@ -570,6 +588,10 @@ export function createRemoteApp(
   options: RemoteServerOptions,
 ): CreateRemoteAppResult {
   const dangerouslyOmitAuth = !!options.dangerouslyOmitAuth;
+  const fetchTimeoutMs = Math.max(
+    0,
+    Math.round(options.fetchTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_OAUTH_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS),
+  );
 
   // Determine auth token when auth is enabled: options > env var > generate
   const authToken = dangerouslyOmitAuth
@@ -1227,6 +1249,11 @@ export function createRemoteApp(
     // client that vanishes without aborting, and it matches the client-side
     // budget so the two agree on when this is hopeless.
     const controller = new AbortController();
+    // Set by the timer below and read in the `catch`. The fetch rejects with
+    // the signal's abort reason, but which of several aborts won is not worth
+    // inferring from the error — the flag says it directly, the same
+    // normalization `withOAuthRequestTimeout` uses.
+    let deadlineFired = false;
     const clientSignal: AbortSignal | undefined = c.req.raw.signal;
     const signal = clientSignal
       ? AbortSignal.any([controller.signal, clientSignal])
@@ -1235,15 +1262,14 @@ export function createRemoteApp(
     // the body has been either read or explicitly cancelled — this route never
     // hands a live stream to its caller, so there is nothing left for the timer
     // to protect and nothing it could sever.
-    const timer = setTimeout(
-      () =>
-        controller.abort(
-          new Error(
-            `proxied request to ${url} timed out after ${DEFAULT_OAUTH_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS}ms`,
-          ),
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+      deadlineFired = true;
+      controller.abort(
+        new Error(
+          `proxied request to ${url} timed out after ${fetchTimeoutMs}ms`,
         ),
-      DEFAULT_OAUTH_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS,
-    );
+      );
+    }, fetchTimeoutMs);
 
     try {
       // Proxy-aware, not the bare global. This route is the browser's ONLY way
@@ -1296,6 +1322,21 @@ export function createRemoteApp(
       });
     } catch (err) {
       const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+      if (deadlineFired) {
+        // Stamped so the browser can rebuild an `OAuthRequestTimeoutError`
+        // rather than receiving a plain `Error` that no `instanceof` check
+        // downstream can recognize (Copilot). 504 because that is what this
+        // is — the gateway gave up on the upstream, not a fault in the route.
+        return c.json(
+          {
+            error: msg,
+            code: OAUTH_TIMEOUT_WIRE_CODE,
+            url,
+            timeoutMs: fetchTimeoutMs,
+          },
+          504,
+        );
+      }
       return c.json({ error: msg }, 500);
     } finally {
       clearTimeout(timer);