fix(web): guard the app-origin port and the trusted-origin grant
Copilot review round 3 on #2100. - MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT could equal CLIENT_PORT or MCP_SANDBOX_PORT. The app-origin listener starts BEFORE the web server binds, so that is not a race it loses — it wins the port and the Inspector dies with EADDRINUSE. `CLIENT_PORT=6278` was a valid config before this feature existed. It now resolves to a dynamic port with a warning: of the three listeners this is the only one that can move, and refusing to boot would cost the user the whole Inspector over a feature they may not be using. - The proxy's same-origin refusal covered only its own origin. An app served from the INSPECTOR's origin is no safer: same-origin with the top document means direct access to window.top, its DOM and its storage, and the cross-origin frame in between buys nothing. Both trusted origins are now refused before allow-same-origin is granted. - Replaced the `as unknown as number` on `server.address()` with a real narrowing of the string/null members of its return type. - MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT added to the v1→v2 migration guide's env table, its Docker recipe, and a troubleshooting entry for the symptom this actually produces (the app renders, but its own backend rejects `Origin: null`). - clients/web/README.md now states which failure is outside the fallback guarantee — a published document the browser cannot reach — and why there is no honest signal to fall back on. Docs and code no longer disagree. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
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1 changed files with 118 additions and 14 deletions
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@ -298,12 +298,15 @@ export function createAppOriginController(
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server.listen(port, host, () => {
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const addr = server!.address();
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const actualPort =
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typeof addr === "object" && addr !== null && "port" in addr
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? addr.port
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: /* v8 ignore next -- unreachable for a TCP listen; `address()`
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returns AddressInfo. */
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(addr as unknown as number);
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/* v8 ignore next 4 -- unreachable for a TCP listen: inside the
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`listening` callback `address()` returns an AddressInfo. The guard
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is a narrowing for the string (pipe/socket) and null members of the
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return type, not a case this listener can produce. */
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if (typeof addr !== "object" || addr === null) {
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settle({ port: 0, url: "" });
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return;
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}
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const actualPort = addr.port;
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// A wildcard bind isn't reachable as `http://0.0.0.0:PORT`, but it
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// does serve loopback — advertise `localhost` there, and otherwise
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// the same canonical host the origin allow-list emits.
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