fix(web): guard the app-origin port and the trusted-origin grant

Copilot review round 3 on #2100.

- MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT could equal CLIENT_PORT or MCP_SANDBOX_PORT. The
  app-origin listener starts BEFORE the web server binds, so that is not a
  race it loses — it wins the port and the Inspector dies with EADDRINUSE.
  `CLIENT_PORT=6278` was a valid config before this feature existed. It now
  resolves to a dynamic port with a warning: of the three listeners this is
  the only one that can move, and refusing to boot would cost the user the
  whole Inspector over a feature they may not be using.
- The proxy's same-origin refusal covered only its own origin. An app served
  from the INSPECTOR's origin is no safer: same-origin with the top document
  means direct access to window.top, its DOM and its storage, and the
  cross-origin frame in between buys nothing. Both trusted origins are now
  refused before allow-same-origin is granted.
- Replaced the `as unknown as number` on `server.address()` with a real
  narrowing of the string/null members of its return type.
- MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT added to the v1→v2 migration guide's env table, its
  Docker recipe, and a troubleshooting entry for the symptom this actually
  produces (the app renders, but its own backend rejects `Origin: null`).
- clients/web/README.md now states which failure is outside the fallback
  guarantee — a published document the browser cannot reach — and why there
  is no honest signal to fall back on. Docs and code no longer disagree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
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cliffhall 2026-08-24 00:35:21 -04:00 • committed by GitHub
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@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ Stdout is otherwise compatible: the default `text` format still pretty-prints th
| — | `DANGEROUSLY_BIND_ALL_INTERFACES` | New opt-in for a wildcard bind (the Docker image sets it) |
| — | `MCP_CATALOG_PATH` | Default catalog path |
| — | `MCP_SANDBOX_PORT` | MCP Apps sandbox server port (fixed `6275` by default) |
| — | `MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT` | Dedicated app-origin server port (fixed `6278` by default), used only by an MCP App whose UI resource declares `_meta.ui.domain` |
| — | `MCP_STORAGE_DIR`, `MCP_INSPECTOR_OAUTH_STATE_PATH`, `MCP_CLIENT_CONFIG_PATH` | Storage and OAuth state locations |
| — | `MCP_OAUTH_CALLBACK_URL` | CLI/TUI OAuth loopback callback |
@ -339,6 +340,15 @@ Notes:
Publish it on the **same port number** inside and out: the sandbox URL is handed to the browser via `/api/config` as `http://localhost:<container port>/sandbox`, so remapping it advertises a port the browser can't reach. To use a different number, move both ends — `-e MCP_SANDBOX_PORT=6280 -p 127.0.0.1:6280:6280`.
- **And a third port for an App that declares `_meta.ui.domain`.** That spec field asks the host for a stable, dedicated origin, which v2 answers with a further listener on `MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT` (fixed `6278` by default) that the browser also reaches directly. Apps declaring no `domain` never touch it, so publish it only if you need one:
```bash
docker run --rm -p 127.0.0.1:6274:6274 -p 127.0.0.1:6275:6275 -p 127.0.0.1:6278:6278 \
ghcr.io/modelcontextprotocol/inspector:latest
```
Same-number rule and same remap escape hatch (`-e MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT=6281 -p 127.0.0.1:6281:6281`). Unpublished, such an app still renders — at an opaque origin, with a console warning — so this one degrades rather than blanking. Nothing in v1 corresponds to it.
- The v2 image sets `DANGEROUSLY_BIND_ALL_INTERFACES=true` internally (a container must bind `0.0.0.0` to be reachable through `-p`). Setting a bare `HOST=0.0.0.0` **outside** a container now exits with an error.
- **If you remap the published port** (`-p 8080:6274`), the browser's origin no longer matches the in-container port, so set `ALLOWED_ORIGINS=http://localhost:8080,http://127.0.0.1:8080` (or run `-e CLIENT_PORT=8080 -p 8080:8080`) or connects will 403.
- The image runs as non-root and has a `HEALTHCHECK` that assumes `--web`; add `--no-healthcheck` when running `--cli` / `--tui`.
@ -358,6 +368,8 @@ Notes:
**"The Apps tab is blank in Docker / over SSH."** The MCP Apps sandbox is a second port (`6275` by default). Publish/forward it too — see [MCP Apps caveats](../clients/web/README.md#hosting-on-a-network).
**"One particular App renders, but its requests are rejected by its own backend."** That App declares `_meta.ui.domain` and is being served from the opaque-origin fallback, so its requests carry `Origin: null`. It needs the **third** port (`MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT`, `6278` by default) published or forwarded as well; the console carries a warning naming the field. See [MCP App dedicated origins](../clients/web/README.md#mcp-app-dedicated-origins-metauidomain).
**"The page never loads inside a VS Code dev container."** Fixed in the release carrying #1951 — upgrade; on an older version, work around it with `HOST=127.0.0.1`. Before that fix the default `HOST=localhost` bound IPv6 loopback **only** on Linux, so anything connecting over IPv4 `127.0.0.1` was refused — which is what a dev container's port forwarder does. The terminal printed a normal banner while the browser spun forever; the failure is a **hang** rather than a connection error because the forwarder accepts on the host side before failing to connect inward. The same fix covers an `ssh -L 6274:127.0.0.1:6274` tunnel and a container healthcheck. It does **not** describe the official Docker image (it binds `0.0.0.0`, so it was never affected) or a plain `docker run -p` against a loopback bind, which is unreachable across the network namespace for an unrelated reason.
**"`HOST=0.0.0.0` exits with an error."** That's the wildcard-bind guard. Bind a specific address instead, or set `DANGEROUSLY_BIND_ALL_INTERFACES=true` if you genuinely need all interfaces. See [Host binding & the origin allow-list](../clients/web/README.md#host-binding--the-origin-allow-list).