diff --git a/clients/web/src/lib/sandbox-csp.test.ts b/clients/web/src/lib/sandbox-csp.test.ts
index 8beee978..3cd471c2 100644
--- a/clients/web/src/lib/sandbox-csp.test.ts
+++ b/clients/web/src/lib/sandbox-csp.test.ts
@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ describe("SAFE_CSP_SOURCE", () => {
     "data:",
     "blob:",
     "example.com",
+    // Schemes are case-insensitive per the URL spec, so a capitalized or
+    // mixed-case scheme is still a valid source (over-rejecting it would
+    // silently drop a restriction a server asked for).
+    "HTTPS://api.example.com",
+    "WSS://realtime.service.com",
+    "Https://*.cloudflare.com",
   ])("accepts %s", (s) => {
     expect(SAFE_CSP_SOURCE.test(s)).toBe(true);
   });
diff --git a/clients/web/src/lib/sandbox-csp.ts b/clients/web/src/lib/sandbox-csp.ts
index 7e607a88..b3d44004 100644
--- a/clients/web/src/lib/sandbox-csp.ts
+++ b/clients/web/src/lib/sandbox-csp.ts
@@ -10,14 +10,31 @@ import type { McpUiResourceCsp } from "@modelcontextprotocol/ext-apps/app-bridge
  * dropped by {@link approveCspSources}.
  */
 export const SAFE_CSP_SOURCE =
-  /^(?:\*|[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:(?:\/\/(?:\*\.)?[A-Za-z0-9._~%!$&'()*+,=@:-]+(?::\d+)?(?:\/[A-Za-z0-9._~%!$&'()*+,=@:/-]*)?)?|(?:\*\.)?[A-Za-z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9.-]*[A-Za-z0-9])?)$/;
+  /^(?:\*|[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*:(?:\/\/(?:\*\.)?[A-Za-z0-9._~%!$&'()*+,=@:-]+(?::\d+)?(?:\/[A-Za-z0-9._~%!$&'()*+,=@:/-]*)?)?|(?:\*\.)?[A-Za-z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9.-]*[A-Za-z0-9])?)$/;
 
-const CSP_KEYS = [
+/**
+ * Identity helper that pins `CSP_KEYS` to an exhaustive, valid key list at
+ * compile time. `satisfies readonly (keyof McpUiResourceCsp)[]` alone only
+ * proves every *listed* key is valid; it does NOT prove the list is *complete*.
+ * The intersected conditional adds the missing half: when `CSP_KEYS` covers
+ * every key, `keyof McpUiResourceCsp extends T[number]` holds and the parameter
+ * type is just `T`; if the upstream ext-apps type ever gains a new domain key,
+ * the conditional collapses the parameter type to `never` and the call fails to
+ * compile — forcing the key to be added here rather than being silently dropped
+ * (a vanished restriction) by {@link approveCspSources}.
+ */
+function exhaustiveCspKeys<const T extends readonly (keyof McpUiResourceCsp)[]>(
+  keys: T & (keyof McpUiResourceCsp extends T[number] ? unknown : never),
+): T {
+  return keys;
+}
+
+const CSP_KEYS = exhaustiveCspKeys([
   "connectDomains",
   "resourceDomains",
   "frameDomains",
   "baseUriDomains",
-] as const satisfies readonly (keyof McpUiResourceCsp)[];
+]);
 
 /**
  * Filter an app-supplied {@link McpUiResourceCsp} down to the entries the host
@@ -26,6 +43,16 @@ const CSP_KEYS = [
  * return value is what the host echoes back to the view via
  * `hostCapabilities.sandbox.csp` so the app sees what was granted, not what it
  * asked for.
+ *
+ * NOTE: this screens each source for *injection safety* only — it does NOT
+ * bound the *breadth* of a grant. A bare `*` (and a scheme-wildcard host) is a
+ * syntactically safe source, so `resourceDomains: ["*"]` is "approved" and maps
+ * to `script-src 'unsafe-inline' *` (scripts from anywhere), just as
+ * `connectDomains: ["*"]` maps to `connect-src *`. That breadth is acceptable
+ * here because the enforced document runs in an opaque-origin sandbox with no
+ * ambient credentials and nothing to exfiltrate beyond what the app already
+ * received; "approved" therefore means "cannot break out of the meta
+ * attribute," not "restrictive."
  */
 export function approveCspSources(
   csp: McpUiResourceCsp | undefined,
@@ -59,6 +86,14 @@ function joinSources(list: string[] | undefined, fallback: string): string {
  * `style-src` carry `'unsafe-inline'` because the app's own inline code ships
  * with the inline-delivered HTML and has no origin to allowlist; external loads
  * stay restricted to `resourceDomains`.
+ *
+ * `resourceDomains` intentionally feeds `script-src` (and `style-src`) in
+ * addition to `img-src`/`font-src`/`media-src`: the `McpUiResourceCsp` contract
+ * defines it as a single "static resources" allowlist that "Maps to CSP
+ * `img-src`, `script-src`, `style-src`, `font-src`, `media-src` directives," so
+ * an app that lists a CDN there is granted script execution from that origin by
+ * design. There is no narrower per-directive key in the contract; if the spec
+ * ever splits scripts out, update the mapping here accordingly.
  */
 export function buildSandboxCspPolicy(approved: McpUiResourceCsp): string {
   const resourceSrc = joinSources(approved.resourceDomains, "'none'");