cli: stored-auth injection honors refresh_token, not just access_token (#1665)
Closes #1665 `--use-stored-auth` previously injected the stored access token blindly, so an expired token failed even with a valid refresh_token on disk. Now, when a `refresh_token` is stored, the CLI runs the OAuth refresh grant and injects the fresh access token, persisting the rotation. - New exported `refreshStoredAuthToken(serverUrl, statePath, deps?)`: reuses the SDK's `refreshAuthorization` (not a hand-rolled token request) with the stored `clientInformation` + `serverMetadata` (discovered via core `getAuthorizationServerUrl` + SDK `discoverAuthorizationServerMetadata` when the metadata wasn't persisted). Rotated tokens are written back through `serializeOAuthPersistBlob` under the same `{servers,idpSessions}` key, so web and CLI stay consistent. Missing refresh_token/clientInformation or a failed grant throw `CliExitCodeError(AUTH_REQUIRED)` with a clear message + envelope code (`no_stored_token` / `refresh_failed`). - `--use-stored-auth` prefers refresh when a refresh_token is present (covers both absent and expired access tokens — the stored blob has no expiry, so the refresh token is the durable credential); falls back to injecting the stored access token otherwise (unchanged). - `deps` are injectable so the refresh/discovery are unit-tested without a live token endpoint; an e2e test drives the real SDK path against a mock token endpoint and asserts the refreshed token is injected + the rotation persisted. - CLI README updated (removed the "blind injection" caveat). CLI coverage gate green (cli.ts 100/92/100/100). Part of the #1579 decomposition (Wave 4, CLI lane). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BrihGWcrM9JGRyu41nzZYw
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@ -193,14 +193,14 @@ For the common case where OAuth was already completed in the **web inspector on
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| Option | Description |
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| ----------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `--use-stored-auth` | Read the stored access token for `--server-url` and inject it as `Authorization: Bearer`. Exits `3` (`no_stored_token`) — listing the stored keys — when no token matches. Requires `--server-url`. |
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| `--use-stored-auth` | Read the stored auth for `--server-url` and inject `Authorization: Bearer`. When a `refresh_token` is stored, the CLI runs the OAuth refresh grant first and injects the **fresh** access token (persisting the rotation); otherwise it injects the stored access token. Exits `3` (`no_stored_token`) — listing the stored keys — when nothing matches. Requires `--server-url`. |
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| `--wait-for-auth <sec>` | Poll the OAuth state file (500 ms interval) until a token for `--server-url` appears, then proceed as if `--use-stored-auth` were set. Times out at `<sec>` with exit `3` (`auth_wait_timeout`). Use after handing off to a human to complete OAuth in a browser. |
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| `--list-stored-auth` | Print `{ oauthStatePath, storedServerUrls }` (the server keys that currently have a token) and exit. No server connection is made. |
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| `--print-handoff` | Print a JSON handoff block (`deepLink`, `portForwardCmd`, `oauthStatePath`, `apiToken`) for `--server-url` and exit — everything a script/remote VM needs to drive the browser-side OAuth dance. Requires `--server-url`. |
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**State-file resolution** follows `MCP_INSPECTOR_OAUTH_STATE_PATH` → `<MCP_STORAGE_DIR>/oauth.json` → `~/.mcp-inspector/storage/oauth.json` — the same precedence the rest of the Inspector uses, so the CLI and web backend agree on the file. Server keys are canonicalised with `new URL().href` (the scheme the web store writes), so a trailing-slash or case mismatch between the URL a human opened and the one the agent passed still resolves.
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**Blind injection.** The token is injected as-is; the CLI does not validate or refresh it (a stored `refresh_token` is not yet used — a natural follow-up). A stale/expired access token surfaces as an HTTP `401` on the first request → exit `3` (`auth_required`). Re-complete the flow in the web inspector (or use `--wait-for-auth`) and retry.
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**Token refresh (#1665).** When the stored server state carries a `refresh_token` (plus the `clientInformation` the web inspector persists after a completed flow), `--use-stored-auth` runs the SDK's OAuth `refresh_token` grant to mint a fresh access token before connecting, then writes the rotated tokens back to the state file so web and CLI stay consistent. The auth-server metadata is reused from the stored state, or discovered from `--server-url` when absent. This covers both an absent and an expired stored access token — the persisted blob carries no expiry, so the refresh token is treated as the durable credential. A failed refresh (revoked/expired refresh token) exits `3` (`auth_required`, envelope `refresh_failed`); re-complete the flow in the web inspector and retry. Without a stored `refresh_token` the access token is injected as-is, and a stale one surfaces as an HTTP `401` → exit `3`.
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**Short-circuit modes.** `--list-stored-auth` and `--print-handoff` each print their output and exit without connecting to a server; they ignore the method/target flags. They are mutually exclusive — if both are passed, `--list-stored-auth` takes precedence.
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