fix: validate authorizationParams off disk; note the EMA exception (#2018)

Copilot round 5 — three of four findings implemented.

- `cleanAuthorizationParams` validates the field as it comes off disk. Only the
  web client's /api/servers route checked the shape; the CLI and TUI read
  mcp.json directly, so `authorizationParams: "oops"` enumerated as the
  character-indexed pairs 0=o, 1=o, … and `{ audience: 5 }` reached
  URLSearchParams.set, which stringifies it — either way the Inspector sent
  query parameters the user never wrote. Now validated in shared code so all
  three clients enforce the documented string→string contract, warning on each
  rejection. Follows `cleanRoots`, which guards the same class for `roots`.

- The form's description now states that these parameters are not sent while
  Enterprise-managed authorization is on. The EMA leg authorizes against the
  enterprise IdP — a different authorization server — and deliberately sends
  none of them, so the copy was presenting a configured-but-inert value as
  active.

- The /api/servers malformed-`oauth` warning listed an expected shape omitting
  `onInsufficientScope`, which the validator accepts and the docs describe, so
  it told users a valid config was malformed.

Ten new cases, all verified to fail against the pre-fix sources.

Declined: recording the authorize URL in the Network tab (repeat of round 2) —
that URL is reached by a top-level browser navigation rather than a tracked
fetch, so it has never appeared there for any authorization request; adding a
synthetic entry changes every OAuth flow and is a product decision for a
maintainer, not a change to make inside this PR.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
This commit is contained in:
cliffhall 2026-08-15 22:10:36 -04:00
commit e6e4600a73
2 changed files with 173 additions and 9 deletions

View file

@ -903,6 +903,36 @@ describe("ServerSettingsForm", () => {
);
});
// #2018 — the EMA leg authorizes against the enterprise IdP, a different
// authorization server, and deliberately sends none of these parameters. The
// description has to say so, or the form shows a configured value as active
// when it will not be sent.
it("warns that authorization parameters are unused under enterprise-managed auth", () => {
const { rerender } = renderWithMantine(
<ServerSettingsForm
{...baseHandlers}
settings={{ ...emptySettings, enterpriseManaged: true }}
expandedSections={["oauth"]}
/>,
);
expect(
screen.getByText(/Not sent while Enterprise-managed authorization is on/),
).toBeInTheDocument();
rerender(
<ServerSettingsForm
{...baseHandlers}
settings={{ ...emptySettings, enterpriseManaged: false }}
expandedSections={["oauth"]}
/>,
);
expect(
screen.queryByText(
/Not sent while Enterprise-managed authorization is on/,
),
).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("does not flag a blank authorization-parameter row as reserved", () => {
renderWithMantine(
<ServerSettingsForm

View file

@ -835,6 +835,9 @@ export function ServerSettingsForm({
only — never the token request. Use them for provider-specific
hints such as kc_idp_hint, login_hint, prompt, acr_values, or
audience.
{settings.enterpriseManaged
? " Not sent while Enterprise-managed authorization is on: that flow authorizes against the enterprise IdP, a different authorization server."
: ""}
</FieldDescription>
{authorizationParams.length === 0 ? (
<EmptyHint>No additional parameters configured</EmptyHint>