docs: correct env-var reference per Copilot round 1 (#2365)
- MCP_AUTO_OPEN_ENABLED: the TUI never reads it; the CLI's unset default opens only on a stderr TTY. Migration guide row fixed too. - Drop the blanket "empty equals unset" rule, which HOST="" and the path variables contradict; state empty handling per row instead. - MCP_SANDBOX_PORT / MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT accept 0; only CLIENT_PORT must be fixed. - NO_COLOR: an empty value counts as unset. - MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_FILE default is ~/.mcp-inspector/secrets.json, beside the storage directory, not inside it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TRJ64MnDTg1TpzCTEV9Xva Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
This commit is contained in:
cliffhall
parent
2c1d3fdba8
commit
fde8fae0ff
2 changed files with 47 additions and 49 deletions
|
|
@ -4,78 +4,76 @@ Every environment variable that changes how the Inspector behaves at runtime, in
|
|||
|
||||
The **Read by** column names the client whose process reads the variable: **web** is the Node backend that `--web` starts (the browser itself reads no environment), **CLI** and **TUI** are those clients, and **launcher** is the `mcp-inspector` bin that picks one of them. A variable read in shared `core/` code is marked with every client that reaches it.
|
||||
|
||||
Unless a row says otherwise, an unset variable and an empty one behave the same.
|
||||
⚠️ **Unset a variable rather than setting it to an empty string.** The two are not interchangeable: `HOST=""` is read as an all-interfaces bind and refused, and an empty path variable such as `MCP_STORAGE_DIR=` or `MCP_INSPECTOR_LOG_DIR=` can resolve relative to the working directory instead of falling back to the default. A row says so explicitly where an empty value is treated as unset.
|
||||
|
||||
## Authentication and network exposure
|
||||
|
||||
These guard the web backend, which spawns processes on request. Read [Host binding and the origin allow-list](../clients/web/README.md#host-binding--the-origin-allow-list) before widening any of them.
|
||||
|
||||
| Variable | Read by | Default | Effect |
|
||||
| --------------------------------- | -------- | ------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN` | web, CLI | a random token per launch | Bearer token guarding every `/api/*` route (`x-mcp-remote-auth: Bearer <token>`). Set it to use a known token instead of the generated one printed in the launch banner. The CLI reads it only to fill the `autoConnect` parameter of the deep link it emits. |
|
||||
| `MCP_PROXY_AUTH_TOKEN` | web | — | **Deprecated** v1 name for `MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN`, used only when the new name is unset. |
|
||||
| `DANGEROUSLY_OMIT_AUTH` | web | unset | Disables the API token entirely. ⚠️ **Any non-empty value turns auth off, including `false` and `0`** — unset the variable to keep auth on. |
|
||||
| `HOST` | web, CLI | `127.0.0.1` | Address the web server binds. An all-interfaces host (`0.0.0.0`, `::`, and equivalent spellings) is **refused** unless `DANGEROUSLY_BIND_ALL_INTERFACES` is enabled. The CLI reads it only to build its deep link. |
|
||||
| `DANGEROUSLY_BIND_ALL_INTERFACES` | web | off | Opts in to an all-interfaces `HOST`. Only `true` or `1` (case-insensitive) enable it, so `false` reads as off. The Docker image sets it. |
|
||||
| `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` | web | the loopback origins | Comma-separated origins allowed to call the API. **Replaces** the default list rather than adding to it, so list every form you browse from. Each entry must include the scheme (`http://localhost:6274`). |
|
||||
| Variable | Read by | Default | Effect |
|
||||
| --------------------------------- | -------- | ------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN` | web, CLI | a random token per launch | Bearer token guarding every `/api/*` route (`x-mcp-remote-auth: Bearer <token>`). Set it to use a known token instead of the generated one printed in the launch banner. The CLI reads it only to fill the `autoConnect` parameter of the deep link it emits. |
|
||||
| `MCP_PROXY_AUTH_TOKEN` | web | — | **Deprecated** v1 name for `MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN`, used only when the new name is unset. |
|
||||
| `DANGEROUSLY_OMIT_AUTH` | web | unset | Disables the API token entirely. ⚠️ **Any non-empty value turns auth off, including `false` and `0`** — unset the variable to keep auth on. |
|
||||
| `HOST` | web, CLI | `127.0.0.1` | Address the web server binds. An all-interfaces host (`0.0.0.0`, `::`, an empty string, and equivalent spellings) is **refused** unless `DANGEROUSLY_BIND_ALL_INTERFACES` is enabled. The CLI reads it only to build its deep link. |
|
||||
| `DANGEROUSLY_BIND_ALL_INTERFACES` | web | off | Opts in to an all-interfaces `HOST`. Only `true` or `1` (case-insensitive) enable it, so `false` reads as off. The Docker image sets it. |
|
||||
| `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` | web | the loopback origins | Comma-separated origins allowed to call the API. **Replaces** the default list rather than adding to it, so list every form you browse from. Each entry must include the scheme (`http://localhost:6274`). |
|
||||
|
||||
## Ports
|
||||
|
||||
The web client needs **fixed** ports: the origin allow-list and the MCP Apps sandbox CSP are both derived from them.
|
||||
| Variable | Read by | Default | Effect |
|
||||
| --------------------- | -------- | ------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `CLIENT_PORT` | web, CLI | `6274` | Web UI port. Must be a **fixed** integer in 1–65535: `0` (an OS-assigned port) is rejected at startup, because the origin allow-list and the MCP Apps sandbox CSP are derived from it. |
|
||||
| `MCP_SANDBOX_PORT` | web, CLI | `6275` | Port of the MCP Apps sandbox server, 0–65535. `0` asks the OS for a free port. An invalid value is ignored with a warning. |
|
||||
| `SERVER_PORT` | web | — | v1's proxy port, now only a fallback for `MCP_SANDBOX_PORT` when that is unset. |
|
||||
| `MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT` | web, CLI | `6278` | Port of the dedicated app-origin server, used only by an MCP App whose UI resource declares `_meta.ui.domain`; 0–65535, where `0` asks the OS for a free port. An invalid value is ignored with a warning. Pin it if your app's backend allowlists that origin. |
|
||||
|
||||
| Variable | Read by | Default | Effect |
|
||||
| --------------------- | -------- | ------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `CLIENT_PORT` | web, CLI | `6274` | Web UI port. Must be an integer in 1–65535; `0` (a dynamic port) is rejected at startup. |
|
||||
| `MCP_SANDBOX_PORT` | web, CLI | `6275` | Port of the MCP Apps sandbox server. An invalid value is ignored with a warning. |
|
||||
| `SERVER_PORT` | web | — | v1's proxy port, now only a fallback for `MCP_SANDBOX_PORT` when that is unset. |
|
||||
| `MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT` | web, CLI | `6278` | Port of the dedicated app-origin server, used only by an MCP App whose UI resource declares `_meta.ui.domain`. An invalid value is ignored with a warning. |
|
||||
|
||||
The CLI reads the three port variables and `HOST` only to build the deep link and port list it hands to a web session; it binds none of them.
|
||||
The CLI reads `CLIENT_PORT`, `MCP_SANDBOX_PORT`, `MCP_APP_ORIGIN_PORT` and `HOST` only to build the deep link and port list it hands to a web session; it binds none of them.
|
||||
|
||||
## Behavior
|
||||
|
||||
| Variable | Read by | Default | Effect |
|
||||
| ------------------------ | ------------- | ------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `MCP_AUTO_OPEN_ENABLED` | web, CLI, TUI | open | `false` never opens a browser; `true` always does. In the CLI and TUI it also governs the interactive OAuth flow, and `true` opens the browser even when stderr is not a TTY. Any other value behaves as unset. |
|
||||
| `MCP_CATALOG_PATH` | web, CLI, TUI | `~/.mcp-inspector/mcp.json` | Default writable catalog, used when no `--catalog` is given. The CLI honors it only when no ad-hoc target (positional command, `--server-url`, or `--transport`) is given. See [MCP server configuration](./mcp-server-configuration.md). |
|
||||
| `MCP_OAUTH_CALLBACK_URL` | CLI, TUI | `http://127.0.0.1:6276/oauth/callback` | Loopback redirect URL for the CLI/TUI OAuth flow. `--callback-url` takes precedence. |
|
||||
| `NO_COLOR` | CLI | unset | Any value disables ANSI styling in the CLI's human-readable output. |
|
||||
| Variable | Read by | Default | Effect |
|
||||
| ------------------------ | ------------- | -------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `MCP_AUTO_OPEN_ENABLED` | web, CLI | see effect | Whether a browser is opened for you. `false` never opens one; `true` always does. Unset (or any other value), the web client opens the UI at launch, and the CLI opens the OAuth authorization page only when stderr is a TTY. **The TUI does not read it** and always opens the OAuth page. |
|
||||
| `MCP_CATALOG_PATH` | web, CLI, TUI | `~/.mcp-inspector/mcp.json` | Default writable catalog, used when no `--catalog` is given. The CLI honors it only when no ad-hoc target (positional command, `--server-url`, or `--transport`) is given. See [MCP server configuration](./mcp-server-configuration.md). |
|
||||
| `MCP_OAUTH_CALLBACK_URL` | CLI, TUI | `http://127.0.0.1:6276/oauth/callback` | Loopback redirect URL for the CLI/TUI OAuth flow. `--callback-url` takes precedence. |
|
||||
| `NO_COLOR` | CLI | unset | Any non-empty value disables ANSI styling in the CLI's human-readable output. An empty `NO_COLOR=` counts as unset. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Storage and state
|
||||
|
||||
| Variable | Read by | Default | Effect |
|
||||
| -------------------------------- | ------------- | ------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `MCP_STORAGE_DIR` | web, CLI, TUI | `~/.mcp-inspector/storage` | Storage directory. Relocates the OAuth state file (`oauth.json`) and the secrets file (`secrets.json`) for every client. For the **web** backend it also relocates `client.json`; the CLI and TUI find `client.json` through `MCP_CLIENT_CONFIG_PATH` instead. |
|
||||
| `MCP_INSPECTOR_OAUTH_STATE_PATH` | web, CLI, TUI | `<MCP_STORAGE_DIR>/oauth.json` | Names the OAuth state file outright. Lookup order: this variable, then `<MCP_STORAGE_DIR>/oauth.json`, then `~/.mcp-inspector/storage/oauth.json`. ⚠️ Setting `MCP_STORAGE_DIR` alone does not isolate a run if this variable is also exported. |
|
||||
| `MCP_CLIENT_CONFIG_PATH` | CLI, TUI | `~/.mcp-inspector/storage/client.json` | Install-level client config (CIMD, enterprise IdP). `--client-config` takes precedence. |
|
||||
| Variable | Read by | Default | Effect |
|
||||
| -------------------------------- | ------------- | -------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `MCP_STORAGE_DIR` | web, CLI, TUI | `~/.mcp-inspector/storage` | Storage directory. Relocates the OAuth state file (`oauth.json`) and the secrets file (`secrets.json`) for every client. For the **web** backend it also relocates `client.json`; the CLI and TUI find `client.json` through `MCP_CLIENT_CONFIG_PATH` instead. |
|
||||
| `MCP_INSPECTOR_OAUTH_STATE_PATH` | web, CLI, TUI | `~/.mcp-inspector/storage/oauth.json` | Names the OAuth state file outright. Lookup order: this variable, then `<MCP_STORAGE_DIR>/oauth.json`, then `~/.mcp-inspector/storage/oauth.json`. ⚠️ Setting `MCP_STORAGE_DIR` alone does not isolate a run if this variable is also exported. |
|
||||
| `MCP_CLIENT_CONFIG_PATH` | CLI, TUI | `~/.mcp-inspector/storage/client.json` | Install-level client config (CIMD, enterprise IdP). `--client-config` takes precedence. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Secret store
|
||||
|
||||
Where server secrets (headers, client secrets) are kept. The details — the keychain probe, the file format, encryption and locking — are in the [Docker guide](./docker.md); these variables apply to every install, not only containers.
|
||||
|
||||
| Variable | Read by | Default | Effect |
|
||||
| ---------------------------- | ------------- | ------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
||||
| `MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_STORE` | web, CLI, TUI | probe the OS keychain | `keyring`, `file`, or `memory` (case-insensitive) picks the store outright and skips the probe. Any other value is ignored with a warning. |
|
||||
| `MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_FILE` | web, CLI, TUI | `<MCP_STORAGE_DIR>/secrets.json` | Path of the file store. Falls back to `secrets.json` in `MCP_STORAGE_DIR`, then to `~/.mcp-inspector/secrets.json`. |
|
||||
| `MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_KEY` | web, CLI, TUI | unset (file is plaintext, `0600`) | Passphrase that encrypts the file store. Use a generated, high-entropy value. ⚠️ Changing or losing it makes the existing file unreadable; see the Docker guide before rotating it. |
|
||||
| Variable | Read by | Default | Effect |
|
||||
| ---------------------------- | ------------- | --------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
||||
| `MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_STORE` | web, CLI, TUI | probe the OS keychain | `keyring`, `file`, or `memory` (case-insensitive) picks the store outright and skips the probe. Any other value is ignored with a warning. |
|
||||
| `MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_FILE` | web, CLI, TUI | `~/.mcp-inspector/secrets.json` | Path of the file store. Lookup order: this variable, then `secrets.json` in `MCP_STORAGE_DIR` when that is set, then `~/.mcp-inspector/secrets.json`. ⚠️ The default sits **beside** the storage directory, not inside it. |
|
||||
| `MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_KEY` | web, CLI, TUI | unset (file is plaintext, `0600`) | Passphrase that encrypts the file store; an empty or whitespace-only value counts as unset. Use a generated, high-entropy value. ⚠️ Changing or losing it makes the existing file unreadable; see the Docker guide before rotating it. |
|
||||
|
||||
When no store is configured, the choice also depends on whether the Inspector is running in a container, which it detects from `KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST` (or Docker's and Podman's marker files). That variable is set by the orchestrator, not by you.
|
||||
|
||||
## Logging and debugging
|
||||
|
||||
| Variable | Read by | Default | Effect |
|
||||
| ----------------------- | -------- | ------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `MCP_DEBUG` / `DEBUG` | launcher | off | Prints the full stack trace when the launcher exits on an error. Any value other than `0` or `false` (case-insensitive) turns it on. |
|
||||
| `MCP_LOG_FILE` | web | unset (no log) | Appends the web backend's structured (pino, JSON lines) log to this file, creating its directory if needed. |
|
||||
| `MCP_INSPECTOR_LOG_DIR` | TUI | `~/.mcp-inspector` | Directory of the TUI's `auth.log`. The TUI logs to a file so its output does not corrupt the terminal UI. |
|
||||
| `LOG_LEVEL` | TUI | `info` | Level of the TUI's `auth.log` (`trace`, `debug`, `info`, `warn`, `error`, `fatal`, `silent`). |
|
||||
| Variable | Read by | Default | Effect |
|
||||
| ----------------------- | -------- | ------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `MCP_DEBUG` / `DEBUG` | launcher | off | Prints the full stack trace when the launcher exits on an error. Any value other than empty, `0` or `false` (case-insensitive) turns it on. |
|
||||
| `MCP_LOG_FILE` | web | unset (no log) | Appends the web backend's structured (pino, JSON lines) log to this file, creating its directory if needed. An empty value counts as unset. |
|
||||
| `MCP_INSPECTOR_LOG_DIR` | TUI | `~/.mcp-inspector` | Directory of the TUI's `auth.log`. The TUI logs to a file so its output does not corrupt the terminal UI. |
|
||||
| `LOG_LEVEL` | TUI | `info` | Level of the TUI's `auth.log`: one of `trace`, `debug`, `info`, `warn`, `error`, `fatal`, `silent`. An empty value is not replaced by `info`. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Outbound proxy
|
||||
|
||||
| Variable | Read by | Default | Effect |
|
||||
| ------------------------------- | ------------- | ------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `HTTPS_PROXY` / `HTTP_PROXY` | web, CLI, TUI | unset | Route connections to remote HTTP/SSE servers, including OAuth discovery and token requests, through a proxy. Lowercase forms are honored too. See [HTTP proxy support](../clients/cli/README.md#http-proxy-support). |
|
||||
| `NO_PROXY` | web, CLI, TUI | unset | Hosts exempted from the proxy. |
|
||||
| Variable | Read by | Default | Effect |
|
||||
| ---------------------------- | ------------- | ------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `HTTPS_PROXY` / `HTTP_PROXY` | web, CLI, TUI | unset | Route connections to remote HTTP/SSE servers, including OAuth discovery and token requests, through a proxy. Lowercase forms are honored too. See [HTTP proxy support](../clients/cli/README.md#http-proxy-support). |
|
||||
| `NO_PROXY` | web, CLI, TUI | unset | Hosts exempted from the proxy. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Node.js variables
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -101,7 +99,7 @@ NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector
|
|||
|
||||
⚠️ This disables certificate verification for **every** TLS connection the Inspector process makes — every MCP server, every OAuth authorization server and token endpoint — not just the one you are testing, and Node prints a warning saying so. A connection that would have been refused for impersonation is then accepted. Never set it in a shell profile, a shared environment, or a deployment.
|
||||
|
||||
| Variable | Default | Effect |
|
||||
| ------------------------------ | ------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` | unset | PEM file of extra CA certificates to trust, in addition to Node's bundled ones. Read once at startup. |
|
||||
| `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` | `1` | `0` disables TLS certificate verification for the whole process. Development only. |
|
||||
| Variable | Default | Effect |
|
||||
| ------------------------------ | ------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` | unset | PEM file of extra CA certificates to trust, in addition to Node's bundled ones. Read once at startup. |
|
||||
| `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` | `1` | `0` disables TLS certificate verification for the whole process. Development only. |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ This table maps v1 names to v2. Defaults, accepted values, and the variables wit
|
|||
| `HOST` | same, **guarded** | An all-interfaces host (`0.0.0.0`, `::`, and equivalent spellings) is now **refused** unless `DANGEROUSLY_BIND_ALL_INTERFACES=true`. Binding a specific IP or hostname needs no opt-in |
|
||||
| `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` | same | Still comma-separated, still **replaces** the default list rather than merging. Entries must include the scheme |
|
||||
| `DANGEROUSLY_OMIT_AUTH` | same | |
|
||||
| `MCP_AUTO_OPEN_ENABLED` | same | Also gates non-TTY interactive OAuth in the CLI/TUI |
|
||||
| `MCP_AUTO_OPEN_ENABLED` | same | Also governs opening the OAuth page in the CLI (`true` opens it even when stderr is not a TTY). The TUI does not read it |
|
||||
| — | `DANGEROUSLY_BIND_ALL_INTERFACES` | New opt-in for a wildcard bind (the Docker image sets it) |
|
||||
| — | `MCP_CATALOG_PATH` | Default catalog path |
|
||||
| — | `MCP_SANDBOX_PORT` | MCP Apps sandbox server port (fixed `6275` by default) |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue