Commit graph inspector/clients/tui
Author SHA1 Message Date
cliffhall
4b6d77dbd8 Merge origin/v2/main into v2/feat/2208-protocol-era-flag 2026-09-14 01:12:42 -04:00
cliffhall
55db703196 feat: add --protocol-era launch flag for ad-hoc servers (#2208)
An ad-hoc --server-url / command launch always negotiated the legacy era,
because protocolEra was only settable per server in mcp.json. A wrapper
that mints a short-lived bearer token therefore had to write that token to
disk to exercise a server under auto or modern.

--protocol-era <legacy|auto|modern> now feeds settings.protocolEra in all
three clients through a shared parseProtocolEra coercer:

- CLI/TUI overlay it in loadServerEntries alongside --header, onto an
  ad-hoc target and onto a --catalog/--config entry for that run.
- Web stamps it on the in-memory ad-hoc entry, which the backend lifts
  into settings like headers; as with --header it is rejected alongside
  --catalog/--config, but unlike --header it applies to stdio too.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SZ4rrvH6xaCfrst75gJh7x
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-14 00:11:56 -04:00
cliffhall
2c1d3fdba8 docs: add an environment-variable reference (#2365)
Every variable that changes runtime behavior now lives on one page,
docs/environment-variables.md: which client reads it, its default, and
its effect. It covers three variables that were undocumented
(MCP_LOG_FILE, MCP_INSPECTOR_LOG_DIR, LOG_LEVEL), the secret-store
variables previously only in the Docker guide, and the Node TLS
variables that answer #1936 (a self-signed https://localhost server).

The README docs table, the migration guide, docker.md and the four
client READMEs link to it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TRJ64MnDTg1TpzCTEV9Xva
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-13 23:35:30 -04:00
cliffhall
fe8b039030 chore: run each client's test suite once in local:gate, not twice (#2341)
`local:gate` ran every client's unit suite bare inside `validate` and
again instrumented inside `coverage` — ~80s of a ~370s run re-executing
exactly the files the coverage pass runs a few minutes later. CI pays
nothing for that duplication because its two jobs run in parallel; the
gate runs serially, so it paid all of it.

The gate's first stage is now `local:validate`: the same `validate:guards`
and `validate:core`, then each client's new `check` script (`format:check`
+ `lint` + `typecheck` + `build`) instead of its `validate`, which is now
literally `check && test`. `npm run validate` and both CI jobs are
unchanged; `local:validate` sits in the `local:` namespace so the
workflow guard keeps it out of CI by construction.

The "strict superset" claim in AGENTS.md is reworded to what is now
true — every CI *check*, not every CI *invocation* — with the reasoning:
`@vitest/coverage-v8` reads V8's precise-coverage profiler and rewrites
no source, so the instrumented pass runs byte-identical code and is only
slower, the stricter direction for the failure class this repo sees.

Measured on the same worktree: 370s -> 262s wall (EXIT=0 both), the
four removed legs summing to 78.5s in the baseline run's own profile.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PsmUAZ6aLUAFqenjJKSSRp
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-12 19:53:08 -04:00
cliffhall
69e6097b68 refactor: assert retry and asyncUtilTimeout at runtime, delete the source scanner
Round 8 of the review asked for an AST. That was the right diagnosis of the
wrong problem: the question was never which parser to use, it was why a
test-timeout guard was parsing JavaScript at all.

It got there one reasonable step at a time. The guard enforces two rules no
Vitest config can report — a per-test `retry`, and Testing Library's
`asyncUtilTimeout` — so it read them out of source text, and the review found a
new valid spelling it missed in five consecutive rounds: a trailing comment,
nested parens in `it.each([makeCase()])`, a member-access prefix, the shorthand
`{ retry }`, an aliased import, a non-literal title. Each fix was correct and
each made it more parser-shaped, until it carried eight helpers doing quote
tracking and bracket balancing.

Both rules are observable at runtime, exactly:

- `vitest.setup.shared.mts` is loaded by all six projects and reads
  `ctx.task.retry` — the value Vitest resolved for the test. That covers
  strictly more than the scan did: a per-test option, a `describe` option
  inherited by children, a project-level setting, and a `--retry` flag typed at
  a command line, which the scan could never see since it only read npm scripts.
- `clients/web/src/test/asyncUtilTimeout.test.ts` asserts
  `getConfig().asyncUtilTimeout`, the value this project's own waitFors read.

Neither has a spelling to anticipate, so neither can be outrun by a new one.
Both were observed firing before being trusted.

The guard keeps only what it can answer by asking Vitest: resolved budgets,
project-level retry, config discovery, and that each project still loads the
setup file — the one thing about the runtime assertion a config CAN report.
868 lines to 361, every scanner helper gone, and 33 of 48 unit tests deleted
because they pinned edge cases of a thing that no longer exists.

storybookSetup.ts goes with it. At the library's own value its configure() call
was a no-op, and the assertion is what pins the number.

AGENTS.md gains the general rule: a rule about what the code DOES is asserted at
runtime, not read out of the source — reach for a verify:* guard when the
question is about configuration, which a tool can be asked to resolve.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PsmUAZ6aLUAFqenjJKSSRp
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-12 15:58:19 -04:00
cliffhall
58e53d5a92 fix: state every test-gate timeout instead of inheriting a library default
Three of the six Vitest projects ran on Vitest's own testTimeout: 5000 and
five on its hookTimeout/teardownTimeout: 10000, and all 788 Testing Library
waits in the web unit project ran on asyncUtilTimeout: 1000. None of those
numbers was chosen here, and all of them were sized for an idle machine rather
than for three or four concurrent worktree sessions each running a full
local:gate on eight cores. #2292, #2278, #2250, #1942 and #1742 were each that
class, diagnosed one site at a time.

This is the complement of #1596, not a retreat from it: every fix that issue
produced stands, and no race is hidden here. What changes is that a correct,
deterministic test is no longer cut off by a budget nobody picked.

- vitest.shared.mts exports frozen TIMEOUTS / INTEGRATION_TIMEOUTS; all six
  projects spread one of them, clients/launcher importing the shared module for
  the first time to do so.
- Both web projects configure Testing Library's asyncUtilTimeout. The storybook
  one needs its own setup file, deliberately outside .storybook/ and free of
  setProjectAnnotations so the automatic preview-annotation provisioning
  (#1898) is untouched.
- 28 per-suite restatements of the integration project's own budget are gone,
  so raising the shared value now moves every site under it. The handful that
  genuinely differ — cross-process lock contention, a full OAuth round trip —
  keep their budget as a named constant that says why.
- AppRenderer's waitFor no longer asks for exactly its enclosing budget, which
  it could never win (#2292's shape); cli's e2e child timer drops below the
  project budget so the bound carrying the diagnostic is the one that fires.
- The transition auto-settle's slack term is named RAF_SLACK_MS and raised;
  the term derived from HEADER_ANIM_MS is untouched. The two answer to
  different things and must not be scaled as one number.
- The 19 Playwright budgets scattered across three web smokes become four
  named constants in scripts/lib/browser-timeouts.mjs.

scripts/verify-test-timeouts.mjs resolves each project through Vitest itself
and asserts the budgets, the asyncUtilTimeout sites, and that retry stays
unset. It was observed red against the pre-change config: unit/tui/launcher at
testTimeout 5000, five projects at hookTimeout 10000, both asyncUtilTimeout
sites unmet.

Closes #2323

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PsmUAZ6aLUAFqenjJKSSRp
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-12 08:32:34 -04:00
cliffhall
9117f633aa fix: address Copilot review round 17 on #2248
Four of the five findings share one root cause: the tri-state `outcome`
added in round 15 was not propagated to consumers, which kept branching
on `ok` — true for an `incomplete` report, since nothing that was checked
was wrong.

- CLI `summarizeSkillVerification` counts off `outcome`, not `ok`, so a
  truncated walk no longer prints "no conformance errors" one line before
  exiting SKILL_INCOMPLETE. A mixed failed/incomplete catalog reports
  both counts rather than letting the louder verdict hide the quieter.
- `verifySkills` sets the truncation reason only when entries were
  actually left unread. A file crossing the byte budget as the FINAL
  entry stopped nothing, and "Stopped after 3 of 3" both read as a
  contradiction and demoted a fully-read skill out of `verified`.
- The TUI status line switches on `outcome` through a `Record` over the
  union, so the INCOMPLETE arm is reachable and a fourth outcome would
  be a type error rather than a silently missing label.
- The `incomplete` doc paragraph said it makes `ok` false. It does not,
  deliberately — corrected, and it now names `outcome` as the thing a
  consumer must branch on.
- The web sidebar composes in the per-URI `duplicate-name` warning, so
  two colliding skills are badged in the catalog instead of looking
  clean until one is selected.

The suppressed `selfAttempted` finding is stale — fixed in round 16.

The existing TUI INCOMPLETE test was passing for the wrong reason: its
fixture understated every size, which is itself a mismatch, so the report
was `failed` and only the old `ok`-first branch printed INCOMPLETE. It is
rebuilt with honest digests and sizes, so truncation comes from the
declared-size prefilter and the report is genuinely incomplete.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ND46Ci64DC3tzBy9aG81Nc
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-07 23:12:28 -04:00
cliffhall
89438d1a4b fix: address Copilot review round 15 on #2248
**Verification is a tri-state now, because two states could not be right.**
Round 12 was correct that `ok: true` for a manifest whose unread 513th file
may be tampered with is a false pass. Round 15 is correct that forcing `ok:
false` calls a server nonconformant for exceeding limits SEP-2640 states as
SHOULD NOT, with hosts free to support more — contradicting this module's own
rule that a warning never fails a report. Both hold, so:

  verified   -> exit 0   everything checked, everything passed
  failed     -> exit 7   a MUST was broken
  incomplete -> exit 8   nothing checked was wrong; the walk was cut short

`ok` keeps its narrow meaning, `allSkillsVerified` is stricter than
`every(r => r.ok)` since it selects the exit code, and `anySkillFailed`
separates 7 from 8. A job that tolerates oversized catalogs can allow 8 and
still fail on 7.

**`manifestKey` still used `JSON.stringify` on the entry** — the same crash I
fixed in the TUI in round 12, one file over.

**Directory children were navigable outside the skill root.** A server could
return `skill://other-skill/...` and clicking it left the tree, with "Up"
only comparing equality against the root. Containment is checked on the
normalized URI now, and an outside child renders as text rather than a link.
Worth recording from the tests: `..` cannot escape the authority, so
`skill://a/nested/../x.md` resolves back inside and must stay navigable.

**The TUI matched report rows by raw URI**, which missed a row recorded under
an equivalent spelling while `extraReportFiles` suppressed it as covered.
Normalized, like the membership test beside it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ND46Ci64DC3tzBy9aG81Nc
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-07 22:47:32 -04:00
cliffhall
01a8f14c24 fix: address Copilot review round 14 on #2248
**The TUI ignored `incomplete`.** Round 12 added that field precisely so a
consumer could tell "not fully checked" from a real failure, and then the one
client that reads the report did not consume it — which made the field
decorative. The pane shows an Incomplete: block with the report's own reason,
and the status line reads INCOMPLETE rather than FAILED.

It sits ABOVE the manifest, not beside the status line: it explains the list
that follows — only the first N rows were fetched, the rest stay marked `·`
because nobody looked at them — and below a 512-row manifest it would be
off-screen, which is the same as absent. Found by writing the test, whose
first version asserted against a 600-entry fixture and could see neither
string. The test triggers truncation through the BYTE budget instead, so the
manifest stays three rows and the assertions measure the pane rather than the
test's viewport.

**The capped self-entry was reported under the wrong URI.** A manifest may
write its self-entry in a normalized-equivalent form; the fallback recorded
`entry.uri`, so manifest rows keyed on the declared spelling matched nothing
while the normalized extra-files filter suppressed it as already covered. The
verdict existed in the report and appeared nowhere on screen. Recorded under
`declaredSelf.uri` now.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ND46Ci64DC3tzBy9aG81Nc
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-07 22:20:20 -04:00
cliffhall
27f1b2f1bd fix: address Copilot review round 12 on #2248
**The read bounds could produce a false `ok: true`.** Entries past the cap are
never fetched, `fileFailed` only examines fetched rows, and
`resource-limit-exceeded` is a WARNING — so a manifest whose 513th file was
tampered with reported the skill verified. That trades a denial of service
for a wrong answer, which is the failure this whole PR argues against. A
truncated read is now recorded as `incomplete` and forces `ok: false`,
reported separately so a consumer can tell "this skill is wrong" from "this
skill was not fully checked". And a self entry excluded by the cap is now
verified against its declared digest, not merely read for frontmatter —
otherwise the skill's own SKILL.md was the one file nobody checked.

**`entryKey` could crash the TUI.** It called `JSON.stringify` on the whole
server-controlled entry, during render. `skillEntryKey` is decided by the
same `jsonGraphError` guard that bounds the frontmatter comparison, with a
coarse fallback that still separates two unrepresentable entries by URI —
collapsing them would show one skill's verdict under another's name.

**The tab bar wraps and `tabsHeight` was hard-coded to 1.** An OAuth-capable
stdio server serving Skills needs ~107 columns, so it wraps at 132 as well as
at 80, and every pane below was sized a row too tall. `tabBarRows` derives it
from the same list `Tabs` renders, via a shared `visibleTabs(flags)` — the
duplicated filter being how the two would drift apart again.

Nine tests in a new `tabsConfig.test.ts`, including the 80-column regression.
Two assert properties rather than instances: rows never decrease as the
terminal narrows, and a tab wider than the row gets its own rather than
looping.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ND46Ci64DC3tzBy9aG81Nc
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-07 21:57:48 -04:00
cliffhall
d6b1e36e7e fix: address Copilot review round 7 on #2248
Four findings.

**The CLI dropped what it promised to print.** `getSkill` transforms the
`skills/get` envelope to a `SkillEntry`, so every other member the loose
schema accepted was gone before the CLI saw it — including the `ttlMs` /
`cacheScope` SEP-2640 explicitly leaves open. The code contradicted a comment
two lines above it saying a CLI whose contract is "print the result" must not
reshape one. `getSkillResult` returns the envelope whole; `getSkill` is a
one-line unwrap over it, which matches the callers: the UIs want the entry,
the CLI wants the result.

**The frontmatter verdict and the digest came from different reads.** The
preview fetch and the Verify fetch are separate `resources/read` calls, so a
resource changing between them could pair a verified digest with a
frontmatter verdict for other bytes. `VerificationState.entryText` now holds
the SKILL.md as the verification read it, written in the SAME state update as
the verdict — a separate write was clobbered, because `write` returns a fresh
object and drops anything not named in it. The preview stays the fallback so
a reader who has not clicked Verify still gets the check.

**The Conformance badge excluded the frontmatter findings** it renders, so it
said `0 error(s)` above a red mismatch. Digest and size mismatches stay in
their own badge: "the listing is wrong" and "the bytes are wrong" are
different answers.

**A repeated skill URI collided two React keys** in the TUI list, in a pane
whose job is to show both entries. Index-keyed like the manifest rows.

The web fixture also gains its collision pair in the served-file lookup —
without it they were handed another skill's SKILL.md, which the badge fix
correctly began reporting as a frontmatter error.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ND46Ci64DC3tzBy9aG81Nc
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-07 20:44:51 -04:00
cliffhall
799763543f fix: address Copilot review round 4 on #2248
Eight findings. Two were visible in a terminal capture I had already taken
and read past.

**A digest mismatch rendered with no digests.** `verifySkillResource` sets
`reason` for a SIZE mismatch — which short-circuits before hashing — while a
digest mismatch carries `expectedDigest` / `actualDigest` and no `reason`, so
the TUI printed a bare `✗ notes.md` with nothing to act on. `failureDetail`
now falls back to the expected/actual pair, truncated to fit the pane.

**A dynamic skill's read failure rendered nowhere.** Its synthetic
`read-error` row lives in the report, not the manifest, and the manifest is
empty for such a skill by definition — so the pane said only "Verification
FAILED". There is a Read failures block for any report file the manifest does
not cover, matched on normalized identity.

**The non-finite sentinel could be aliased.** A listing whose value genuinely
was `{"#non-finite":"NaN"}` canonicalized identically to a served `.nan`, so
the round-3 fix moved the bug rather than closing it. Any encoding into the
value space can be aliased by a document containing the encoding, so the
comparison is structural now (`jsonLikeEqual`) and there is no sentinel at
all; `Object.is` gives NaN === NaN while keeping ±Infinity distinct.
Serialization is used only for the message.

**`parseSkillFrontmatter("null")` returned `{ fields: {} }`,** contradicting
its own non-mapping contract: an explicit null scalar parses to exactly what
an empty block does. They are told apart by the source, since the parsed
value cannot.

Also: the `files` doc comment still claimed it is empty for a dynamic skill,
which the round-2 fix made untrue; and three inline Mantine elements with two
static styling props each are extracted to `.withProps()` constants, per the
convention the rest of the file follows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ND46Ci64DC3tzBy9aG81Nc
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-07 19:55:17 -04:00
cliffhall
6b83727332 fix: address Copilot review round 3 on #2248
Two live findings. The review ran against 4fa00d1c — the commit before the
round-2 fixes — so its other three were re-reports of already-fixed issues,
verified present at HEAD rather than re-fixed.

**The TUI printed "Conformance: conforms" directly above "Verification
FAILED".** Self-contradictory in the one place a reader looks for a verdict:
the static checks pass on a skill whose advertised digest is well-formed,
while its bytes do not hash to it. The heading is now "Listing checks", which
names what the section covers — the checks against the entry the listing
returned, which say nothing about the bytes served. Same problem, and the
same resolution, as the web screen's "No structural issues".

**The test-server guide claimed every result carries the full modern
envelope**, which the new directory handler made untrue: `readDirectoryPage`
deliberately emits `resultType` alone, because SEP-2640 states the caching
attributes for a modern `skills/list` and says nothing of the kind here, and
its one worked example carries `resultType` only. The claim is narrowed to
the two `skills/*` results and the exception is documented as the deliberate
choice it is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ND46Ci64DC3tzBy9aG81Nc
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-07 19:34:52 -04:00
cliffhall
033600e4ca fix: address Copilot review round 2 on #2248
Four findings, two of them silent holes in the verification itself.

**A blob-served SKILL.md skipped the frontmatter check entirely.** The entry's
own file was captured as `contents.text`, so a server returning the markdown
as a base64 `blob` — a legal `resources/read` shape this module already
decodes for the digest — never reached the comparison, and the report still
said `ok`. A MUST that quietly did not run. The file is now held as bytes and
the text derived from them, which also guarantees the digest and the
frontmatter describe one snapshot.

**A dynamic skill whose SKILL.md could not be read reported `ok: true`.** It
has no manifest rows, so `files` stayed empty, and its only static finding is
a warning — a verification that could not be performed was reported as one
that passed. The fallback read now records a `read-error` for all three ways
it can fail. It is gated on `manifestListsSelf` (by normalized identity) so a
self-entry the manifest listed and failed to read is not read, or reported,
twice.

**A served `.nan` compared equal to a listed `null`.** YAML expresses
non-finite numbers, JSON does not, and `JSON.stringify` turns all of them
into `null` — so the canonical comparison reported a real mismatch as
agreement. Verified against the parser before fixing. They now canonicalize
to a form no JSON scalar can equal, and the value is named in the finding.

Also: the self-entry match is by normalized identity rather than raw string,
which stops a second read and stops this function disagreeing with
`checkSkillConformance`; and `SkillsTab.tsx` gains the file header AGENTS.md
requires.

The four `err instanceof Error` ternaries are one `reasonOf` helper now —
extracted because the coverage gate found every one of their non-Error arms
uncovered, and one honestly-tested branch beats four ignores.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ND46Ci64DC3tzBy9aG81Nc
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-07 19:24:30 -04:00
cliffhall
4fa00d1cfd feat: report a skill-name collision across the listing (#2248)
SEP-2640: hosts MUST NOT assume name uniqueness, and when two entries in one
listing collide on `name` a host MUST disambiguate them rather than silently
discarding or preferring one.

`checkSkillConformance` structurally cannot see this — it takes one entry and
a collision is a property of the pair — so `checkSkillNameCollisions` walks
the listing and returns a finding per colliding entry, each naming the
others. All three clients merge it into the entry's own findings, so it
carries through the header badge, the CLI report and the TUI row marks with
no new surface.

**It is a `warning`, not an `error`,** and that is the severity split doing
its job. The obligation is on the *consumer*: a server may legitimately
publish two skills with the same name under different paths, and the SEP's
own `acme/billing/refunds` example is exactly that shape. Calling it an error
would tell a conforming author their catalog is invalid. `--verify` therefore
still exits 0 for a collision.

In the web screen it renders as a banner directly under the Conformance
header and is filtered out of the findings list, the same treatment
`dynamic-resources` gets: it changes how everything below it should be read,
and stating one fact twice reads as two findings.

Fixed while adding it: an entry whose only finding was a banner one rendered
an EMPTY findings container instead of "no structural issues", because the
list's presence was decided on the unfiltered set while its contents were
filtered. `listedIssues` is now derived once and used for both.

The fixture gains `acme/reports` + `globex/reports`, both fully conforming
and sharing the name `reports` — also the only fixture with a multi-segment
skill path, which nothing else exercised. Eight skills over four pages now,
and the integration test walks the cursor to exhaustion rather than asserting
a fixed page count, so a future fixture does not require editing it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ND46Ci64DC3tzBy9aG81Nc
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-07 19:02:18 -04:00
cliffhall
775107776d fix: address Copilot review round 1 on #2248
Five findings, all real.

**Critical — `verifySkills` selected `contents[0]`.** These bytes are hashed
against the file's advertised digest, so accepting a block the server
labelled something else verifies one file's content against another file's
digest, and can report that as `verified`. A false pass is worse than a
missing check. `contentsFor(result, uri)` now selects by NORMALIZED identity,
which keeps the canonicalized-echo case that motivated the original code
while rejecting an unrelated block, and reports a read error when nothing
answers for the URI. This is what `onReadSkillFile` already did; the two
paths hash bytes against digests and must not disagree about which bytes.

**`skills/get` was dispatched without the extension gate** that `skills/list`
had. Hoisted into `assertSkillsSupported` so the two cannot drift — declaring
the extension commits a server to both. Without it, an undeclared server's
-32601 is indistinguishable to a script from the -32602 a declared server
returns for a URI it does not serve.

**The TUI could strand a user on a hidden Skills tab.** The tab left the bar
when the gate went false but `activeTab` did not, so the pane kept rendering
for a server that never declared the extension. Reset to `info`, following
the Auth precedent — additionally gated on `connected`, because this gate
reads a server declaration and would otherwise fire during a reconnect.

**The TUI keyed a verdict by URI**, so a refresh replacing the manifest under
the same URI left hashes computed for the previous snapshot describing the
new one. Keyed on the entry now, as the web screen already was.

**A failed "Load more" discarded the pages on screen and the retry cursor.**
Both are preserved now, and the success and failure paths share one
staleness-guarded `commit` helper so they cannot drift on which results they
may write — which is how they came to disagree.

Two nits: the six-skill counts. The docs sentence was more wrong than
reported (five awkward skills of six, three outright violations) and is
rewritten rather than renumbered.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ND46Ci64DC3tzBy9aG81Nc
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-07 18:43:58 -04:00
cliffhall
9a8488681e feat: Skills extension phase 3 — CLI, TUI, directory reads, frontmatter check
Closes #2248.

Completes SEP-2640 support across all three clients, and closes the one
obligation #2234 deliberately left open.

- `checkSkillFrontmatterMatch` compares a served SKILL.md's own YAML
  frontmatter against the entry the listing advertised, field by field. No
  digest can cover this: a digest is taken over the bytes the server served,
  so it proves the file was not altered in transit and says nothing about
  whether the listing described it honestly. Needs a real YAML parser; `yaml`
  was already a root dependency, so this adds no package — but it does newly
  put it on core/'s import graph, hence the three bundler `external` lists.

- `resources/directory/read`: result schemas defined against the normative
  text, `InspectorClient.readResourceDirectory`, a Directory section on the
  Skills screen, and `--method resources/directory/read` in the CLI. The
  client refuses the call locally when the server did not declare
  `directoryRead`, which is the SEP's MUST NOT. A child the directory lists
  but the entry does not is marked `not listed` rather than merged into the
  manifest — the SEP calls a directory result a live observation and forbids
  treating it as extending the manifest.

- CLI: `skills/list`, `skills/get` and `resources/directory/read`, plus
  `--verify` — one NDJSON report per skill, a summary on stderr, exit 7 on a
  violation. Reads are sequential; a conforming manifest may declare 512
  entries.

- TUI: a Skills pane, shown only when the server declares the extension. Each
  row carries its conformance verdict as a glyph as well as a colour, since
  the pane is read over ssh and through script(1). Enter verifies.

- `verifySkills` re-throws `AuthRecoveryRequiredError` rather than recording
  it per file: it says the session's authorization expired, so absorbing it
  would report N identical read failures and swallow the error the TUI and
  the web commands key off to reauthorize.

Two open questions settled, both in code comments where they will be found:
`skills/get` carries no caching attributes because SEP-2640 leaves the
question open in as many words, so requiring them would fail a conforming
server; and there is no `PagedSkillsState` because every consumer of this
list is a whole-catalog verdict — computed over page one of three, "this
server's skills conform" is not merely partial but wrong.

The fixture grows two skills, both for checks that were otherwise
undemonstrable: `lying-listing` (listing and file disagree, digest still
verifies) and `stale-manifest` (serves a file its manifest does not declare).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ND46Ci64DC3tzBy9aG81Nc
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-07 18:10:37 -04:00
Cliff Hall
1b5a0b5b3c
Merge branch 'v2/main' into v2/fix/2207-tui-force-color-ansi 2026-09-06 20:04:33 -04:00
cliffhall
a3bb679f1e fix: strip ANSI from TUI test frames so FORCE_COLOR cannot break assertions (#2207)
Ink writes styling as escape sequences inside the styled run, so an
accelerator underline splits the word it decorates: `<Text underline>I</Text>nfo`
reaches the frame buffer with escapes between `I` and `nfo`, and a plain
`toContain("Info")` fails against a component that is rendering correctly.
Chalk only emits color when it detects a TTY, so CI stays green and the six
failures land only on a developer whose shell exports FORCE_COLOR.

Add `__tests__/helpers/renderTui.tsx` — ink-testing-library's `render` with
`lastFrame()` and `frames` ANSI-stripped — and point all 16 renderer test
files at it. `frames` is a getter reading through to the live array, since
Ink appends to it as the component re-renders; the raw bytes stay reachable
as `stdout.lastFrame()`.

Pinning FORCE_COLOR=0 would turn the six green while hiding the class: any
future assertion on styled text has the same problem, and the suite would
stop covering the styled path at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MFp2LVH7UJST5i8bDBJghw
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-06 20:00:15 -04:00
cliffhall
81f2115e8b fix: decline a union branch requiring a name it never declares (#2224)
`isOfferable` in `core/json/rootUnion.ts` checked that a merged branch carries
at least one property and that every property value is readable, but never that
each name in `required` resolves to a property a form can render. A branch like
`{ properties: { kind }, required: ["kind", "payload"] }` was therefore offered
in the picker, rendered no control for `payload`, and had the submit-time check
report it missing permanently — the exact dead end the function's own comment
already reasons through for a `false`-schema required field, one case short.

Judge the merge, so a branch requiring only names the ROOT declares —
`anyOf: [{ required: ["email"] }, …]` — stays offerable as before. `hasOwn`
rather than `in`, since an argument legally named `constructor` would otherwise
resolve through the prototype and read as declared.

Declining every branch of a union leaves the web form with neither a picker nor
a field, which is a different dead end. `SchemaForm` now seeds the raw-JSON
editor (#2151) in that one case — a root union that resolved to no branches and
no properties — so the arguments stay expressible. Seeded rather than forced, so
the switch still works, and re-seeded during render (never in an effect) because
the form is reused across tools rather than remounted. A tool that genuinely
takes no arguments is untouched. The TUI has no such editor; there the union is
simply not offered, which is already better than a section that can never be
submitted.

Adds a `record_shipment_by` preset and wires it into the
`root-union-schemas-http.json` showcase so the shape is reproducible by hand,
with docs/test-servers.md covering it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PxYT4eKdnx1yRw7x4bW7Ts
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-06 12:59:52 -04:00
cliffhall
1e6bf6425a chore: widen verify:dep-lockstep to declared cross-install copies (#2226)
`clients/cli` resolved `@types/node` 24.13.1 against the root's 24.13.3.
Neither client declares it — #2196 consolidated it to the root — so the cli
copy arrived transitively via `@types/express` and was constrained by no
range of ours. `verify:dep-lockstep` reported OK and was right to: it
compares only packages that reach one `tsc` **program** from two installs,
and no one program sees both copies.

Fixes the instance and the class, which the issue notes are not exclusive.

**The class.** The guard grows a second tier alongside the program-derived
one, asking the weaker but broader question `AGENTS.md`'s "one version per
install-crossing dependency" rule actually states: does a package this repo
declares anywhere resolve to two versions across our installs at all? The
candidate set is every name in any install's `dependencies`/`devDependencies`
that more than one install holds a **top-level** copy of — 17 packages today.
Nested copies are excluded: one exists because some dependency asked for a
different version, so it is that dependency's range, not ours.

Neither tier subsumes the other. The program tier sees a copy no manifest
names (the `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` case, arriving through another
package's `.d.ts`). The declared tier sees a transitive copy no program
loads (this issue), two *clients* disagreeing with no root copy involved
(`@types/react`, web against tui), and the peer shadows `AGENTS.md` calls out
as ungated — `eslint`, `typescript`, `vitest`.

Deny-by-default, with its own empty `TOLERATED_DECLARED_SKEW` and the same
within-a-major rule, now stated once in a shared `toleratesSkew` so the two
tiers cannot drift.

**The instance, and three others the new tier surfaced.** All four were
patch-level:

- `@types/node` — cli 24.13.1 vs root 24.13.3. Transitive, so it takes an
  `overrides` entry in `clients/cli` (the repo's sanctioned lever for a
  transitive pin), at the root's own `^24.12.4` rather than a frozen number.
- `@types/react` — web 19.2.18 vs tui 19.2.17.
- `react` — web 19.2.8 vs root/tui 19.2.7.
- `@vitejs/plugin-react` — web 6.0.5 vs root 6.0.2.

The last three are `npm update` in the stale install: it moves the lockfile
within the declared range without widening a range, which matters for the
root `react ^19.0.0` that `ink`'s externalized-bundle exemption depends on.
No declaration or range changed.

Tests: 4 end-to-end cases (the fixture gains manifest deps and a client-side
`solo` install, so the skew is real and no program holds both copies) and 13
helper cases.

Closes #2226

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01J86a6vMcA9csPtdsg7ZcCZ
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-05 14:10:36 -04:00
cliffhall
1018d818ba chore(deps): refresh fast-uri, qs and browserslist to clear npm audit
Closes #2244
Closes #2225

All three outstanding advisories were stale lockfile resolutions, not
upward-blocked pins: every fixed version already sits inside the range its
declaring parent asks for, so refreshing the lock entry is the whole fix.

  fast-uri  3.1.5 -> 3.1.7   ajv@8.18.0 asks for ^3.0.1   (root)
  qs        6.15.3 -> 6.16.0 express@5.2.1 asks for ^6.14.0 (root)
  browserslist 4.28.2 -> 4.28.9  via @babel/core           (clients/tui)

No `overrides` entry is added, and no manifest changes. AGENTS.md's rule is
that a transitive is pinned with `overrides` rather than with `npm audit fix`
-- it does not call for a pin where none is needed. A permanent pin here would
buy nothing and would later hold a package back: `fast-uri: ^3.1.6` forbids
fast-uri 4.x for as long as it stands, including after ajv moves to it. The
monthly refresh sweep and the daily alert sweep are what catch a regression.

`npm audit` is clean in all five installs (root, web, cli, tui, launcher).

Reachability, assessed rather than assumed:

- fast-uri is the one that ships. ajv is a root runtime dependency, and Vite
  pre-bundles it into the published `clients/web/dist`, so the vulnerable code
  was inlined into the SPA rather than merely resolved at install time. Its
  input is attacker-influenced: `schemaUtils.ts` compiles the `outputSchema`
  a server under test supplies, and ajv resolves that schema's `$id`/`$ref`
  through fast-uri (`ajv/dist/runtime/uri.js`). Impact is bounded well below
  the advisory headlines, though: both SSRF advisories need a consumer that
  fetches the parsed URI, and ajv never performs a network request. The
  realistic worst case is the host-confusion pair mis-normalizing a crafted
  `$id`, giving a wrong or failed validation of one tool's output.
- qs is installed in production, but nothing shipped runs it. express is a root
  devDependency, but that is not its only path: `npm ls express --omit=dev`
  shows it reaching a production install through
  @modelcontextprotocol/server-legacy@2.0.0 (a root runtime dependency, also
  via express-rate-limit) and through @modelcontextprotocol/ext-apps ->
  @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.30.0. So qs is present in every user install.
  What holds is that no shipped module ever instantiates it: nothing in
  `core/`, `clients/*/src` or `clients/web/server` calls `express()`, the web
  backend is Hono, and server-legacy is imported only from `test-servers/src`,
  which the root `files` list does not publish. Both advisories need express to
  parse an attacker-supplied query string, which requires a live express app.
- browserslist is dev tooling. It arrives in the clients/tui install through
  eslint-plugin-react-hooks -> @babel/core, is reached only by lint, and is in
  no published bundle. The root install already resolved a patched 4.28.8 from
  the same plugin at the same version, which is what identified tui's copy as a
  stale lock rather than a constrained one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YahVxMTGpigLbZBh1JGPDr
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-04 20:19:14 -04:00
cliffhall
440d1aa5c1 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/v2/main' into v2/chore/2196-consolidate-toolchain-devdeps
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>

# Conflicts:
#	clients/cli/package-lock.json
#	clients/launcher/package-lock.json
#	clients/launcher/package.json
#	clients/tui/package-lock.json
#	clients/web/package-lock.json
2026-08-31 23:17:20 -04:00
cliffhall
f62cfbaeeb chore: address Copilot review on #2200
- Complete the bundler external lists against the AGENTS.md invariant rather
  than against today's reachability: chokidar, hono and react to clients/cli,
  chokidar and hono to clients/tui, react to the web runner. Every root-declared
  package core/ imports at runtime is now named in all three, so a new import in
  core/ cannot silently inline one.
- AGENTS.md: split the single over-broad bullet in two. commander, open,
  @hono/node-server, vite and @vitejs/plugin-react are root dependencies reached
  only from client code, so they are not part of the core/ set and need naming
  only in the external list of the client that imports them. Give the
  vitest.shared.mts pins their own rule, stating the react/react-dom exception
  instead of implying every root-owned package is aliased to the root.
- vitest.shared.mts: the umbrella comment now says root-OWNED rather than root
  runtime dependency — express is test-only and lives in the root
  devDependencies — and notes that the list is deliberately not the complete
  root set, since a package that resolves unambiguously needs no pin.
- local-dev skill: document why react/react-dom stay client-pinned, which the
  previous text contradicted.

npm run local:gate and npm run verify:bundle-externals pass.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-31 19:58:22 -04:00
cliffhall
1f5c32940d chore: consolidate duplicated runtime dependencies into the root package.json
Every runtime dependency core/ imports is now declared once, in the repo-root
package.json, and nowhere else. Deleting the client-side copies does not merely
align them: a package installs only into an install root that declares it, so
with no second declaration a second copy cannot be created at all — the failure
class #1896 was opened for and #1965/#2029 built verify:dep-lockstep to detect.

- clients/{web,cli,tui,launcher}: dropped ajv, atomically, chokidar, commander,
  open, pino, zod, @napi-rs/keyring, hono, @hono/node-server and react, as each
  applied. clients/cli and clients/launcher now declare no runtime dependencies.
- Root hono floor raised ^4.12.18 -> ^4.13.1, keeping the higher of the two
  ranges that were in the tree rather than silently lowering web's.
- tsup external lists: added ajv and zod to all three bundles, plus atomically
  and open (cli) and atomically (tui). tsup externalizes only what the nearest
  manifest declares, so a package that moves to the root is inlined unless it is
  named explicitly.
- vitest.shared.mts: repointed the pino, hono, @hono/node-server, atomically,
  chokidar and @napi-rs/keyring pins from <client>/node_modules to the repo
  root, joining express, yaml and proper-lockfile. Left behind they would
  resolve to a directory that no longer exists, or to a transitive copy an
  unrelated dependency dragged in. react and react-dom stay client-pinned so
  the pair stays version-matched within an install.
- Docs: AGENTS.md dependency placement, the root README and the local-dev skill
  describe the consolidated layout.

verify:dep-lockstep candidate set: 4 -> 2 (hono and pino fell out; only
@standard-schema/spec and zod still reach one tsc program from two installs).
npm run local:gate and npm run pack:verify both pass.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-31 19:08:24 -04:00
cliffhall
327c8d67fa chore: consolidate shared toolchain devDependencies into the root package.json
Declare the toolchain every client uses once, at the repo root, and delete the
per-client copies: eslint, @eslint/js, typescript-eslint, globals, prettier and
typescript (all five manifests), plus vitest, @vitest/coverage-v8 and
@types/node (four). Adds the latter three to the root manifest; the first six
were already there.

Every client reaches the root copy by walk-up — npm run puts each ancestor
node_modules/.bin on PATH, and Node and TypeScript resolve modules and @types
the same way — so nothing about the client scripts changes. clients/launcher now
declares no devDependencies at all and its validate is unchanged.

The copies had already drifted: globals sat at ^17.7.0 at the root against
^17.4.0 in all four clients, and typescript-eslint at ^8.65.0 against ^8.56.1.
Consolidating takes the root's version in both cases, and makes the exact
prettier pin (#1790) a single pin rather than five that can diverge.

Tools only one client runs stay where they are — tsup, tsx, vite, vite-node,
playwright, storybook, happy-dom, ink-testing-library, and each client's own
@types/*.

Documents the rule in AGENTS.md's Dependency placement section and the reasoning
in the local-dev skill.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-31 18:57:40 -04:00
cliffhall
463227c947 fix(auth): make snapshot-and-clear one atomic storage step (#2144)
Copilot review round 18. Three of its findings were the same check-then-act:
`planOAuthRevocation` is asynchronous, so the gap between its reads and the
following `storage.clear()` is still a window — shorter than the network one
closed in round 13, but the same shape. An OAuth completion landing at any of
those awaits saved a grant the clear then destroyed.

`OAuthStorage.takeRevocationSnapshot(serverUrl)` reads what revocation needs
and clears the server in ONE synchronous pass over the in-memory state, with
the persist after the mutation. `clearAndPlanRevocation` replaces
`planOAuthRevocation`, and there is no separate `clear` call left in any
caller — the clear cannot be forgotten or reordered.

The snapshot returns values unparsed, deliberately: schema validation is pure
and belongs after the mutation, since running it inside would reintroduce the
`await` this exists to remove.

Two consequences worth naming. A failure of the take-and-clear now REJECTS
rather than returning an outcome, because the state was not cleared and the
caller's contract is that it was; both clients already have a rejection path.
And cross-process atomicity is explicitly not claimed — nothing in this store
takes a lock, every mutation is a read-modify-write over a loaded snapshot, and
`clear` alone always had that property.

Also from round 18:

- The CLI's budget check ran before considering `plan.outcome`, so a key that
  needed no network was reported as budget-exhausted — warning that a grant may
  be live when that key held none.
- A disconnect failure after a successful clear was reported as "could not
  clear OAuth state" in both clients. It now goes to the disconnect channel,
  and the success is still reported.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 07:40:52 -04:00
cliffhall
b9012da988 fix: close three stale-completion holes from the round-16 suppressed block (#2144)
Copilot's round 16 reported "no new comments", but its suppressed block carried
three real findings.

- `AuthTab` released `clearInFlightRef` before checking whether the completion
  was still current, so server A settling after the user moved to B and started
  a clear there dropped B's lock and let a second B clear run concurrently
  against the same store entry. `current()` is now checked before either shared
  ref is touched: a stale clear owns nothing.
- Switching servers retired the clear but left `ownClearRef` set. The retired
  clear returns before its `oauthRevision` bump, so the marker had no bump to
  skip and would swallow the first unrelated revision on the newly selected
  server, stranding that server's banner.
- The web session check compared only the server id, which a
  disconnect/reconnect to the SAME server passes — that flow builds a
  replacement `InspectorClient`, so the old clear would have run its
  session-wide cleanup against the new session. The client identity is part of
  the check now.

Both new tests were verified to fail with their fix reverted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 06:47:31 -04:00
cliffhall
69fcdd364c fix(auth): clear before waiting on the network, not after (#2144)
Copilot review round 13. Three of its four findings were one root cause, and
it is a design flaw in the premise this PR started from.

Revoking *before* the clear meant the clear waited up to five seconds on the
network — and anything that wrote OAuth state in that window was then deleted
by a clear reasoning about the grant it replaced. A same-server reauthorization
in the TUI (whose Disconnect/Connect accelerators stay live), a stored-only web
clear for a server that becomes active mid-flight, and another CLI/TUI process
writing to the shared file-backed store all hit it.

`revokeStoredOAuthTokens` is therefore split into `planOAuthRevocation` and
`executeOAuthRevocation`, and every caller runs plan → `storage.clear()` →
execute. The snapshot still precedes the clear, because the store is where the
token, the credentials and the endpoint live; but the clear no longer waits on
anything. There is deliberately no single-call wrapper left, so no caller can
reintroduce the racy order by accident.

Fourth finding, same file: `handleConnect` now retires `clearOAuthAttemptRef`
alongside `disconnectAttemptRef`. The server-name check does not cover
disconnect/reconnect to the SAME server — the name still matches on the other
side of it — so a clear still in flight could tear down the session the connect
had just established.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 05:38:30 -04:00
cliffhall
c0bcdc7e4a fix(tui): forward the clear promise from App, so AuthTab can actually await it (#2144)
Copilot review round 12, and the best catch of the review.

`onClearOAuth` was wired as `() => { void handleClearOAuth(); }`, so the
promise `AuthTab` awaits resolved instantly. Everything round 6 through 9 built
on that await was therefore inert in production while still passing its own
tests: the pending line never showed, the repeat lock released immediately, and
a rejection went unhandled instead of reaching the failure line.

Passed directly now. The regression test drives the real App rather than
`AuthTab` in isolation — the wiring is the contract, and only an App-level test
can see it. Verified it fails when the void-ing arrow is put back.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 05:20:35 -04:00
cliffhall
5170cc484b fix(auth): close the fail-open issuer check and the remaining clear races (#2144)
Copilot review rounds 8 and 9.

- A cached metadata document with no `issuer` was letting every issuer-bound
  token go to its single revocation endpoint. Absence establishes nothing, so
  that is now a mismatch: an issuer-bound grant must match, and only a legacy
  unkeyed grant — which nothing binds to a different authorization server —
  proceeds without the comparison. This was a credential-disclosure risk, not
  just a correctness one.
- The ctx-less grant read was skipped whenever it carried an issuer stamp, on
  the assumption that slot had already been enumerated. If `listIssuers` fails
  there is no enumerated slot behind the stamp, so the one readable grant went
  unrevoked while `clear` deleted it. Both reads now share one issuer+token
  key, and the stamped issuer is retained rather than discarded.
- `AuthTab`'s repeat guard read `clearState`, which is not updated until React
  re-renders, so two `s` events in one input turn both started a clear against
  the same store entry. It is a ref now, set before the call.
- A rejected clear left `ownClearRef` set — `handleClearOAuth` never reached
  its `oauthRevision` bump — so the next unrelated revision was swallowed and
  the failure banner stranded. Cleared on that path.
- The web `clearServerOAuthAndDisconnect` had the staleness the TUI path was
  already fixed for: `isActive`/`inspectorClient` are captured before a
  five-second await, so a switch during it disconnected the session the user
  had just moved to and ran the session-wide cleanup against it. Revalidated
  against `sessionRef` after each await.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 04:38:38 -04:00
cliffhall
43c817c8e9 fix(auth): bound the whole teardown, and scope the TUI clear to its server (#2144)
Copilot review round 7.

- The five-second timeout was per request while grants are revoked
  sequentially, so a server with N issuer slots could block the disconnect for
  N x 5s — the "short timeout" bounded a request rather than anything the user
  feels. It is now one budget for the whole call: each grant gets the remaining
  time, and a grant reached after it is exhausted is reported as never
  attempted rather than starting a fresh five seconds. `--relogin` shares one
  budget across its two key spellings for the same reason.
- `AuthTab` called the same settle handler on rejection, so a failed local
  clear or disconnect announced "OAuth state cleared". A rejection is not a
  revocation failure — those come back as outcomes — so it now has its own
  path and reports the real error. The completion is also scoped: a clear
  carries the server it started on and an attempt number, and a switch retires
  it, so server A's confirmation cannot appear under B.
- `clearOAuthAttemptRef` is now retired by the server-switch effect alongside
  `disconnectAttemptRef`; without that an A -> B -> A round trip left both the
  token and the captured name matching again. `handleClearOAuth` also
  revalidates after `await disconnectInspector()`, since a switch during that
  second await would have put the revision bump on the new selection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 03:55:37 -04:00
cliffhall
56ac83051b fix(auth): RFC-encode the Basic credential; make the TUI clear await its work (#2144)
Copilot review round 6.

- The Basic credential is now form-urlencoded per RFC 6749 §2.3.1. Round 1
  matched the SDK's raw `id:secret` on the theory that a credential should be
  presented the same way here as at the token endpoint; that does not hold — a
  client authenticated with `client_secret_post` never exercised the SDK's
  Basic path, so there is no precedent to match, and the raw form is ambiguous
  for an id containing `:` and makes `btoa` throw on a non-Latin-1 secret. The
  fixture decodes each half.
- The ctx-less grant read is suppressed on the store's issuer *stamp* rather
  than on the token's value. The active slot can hold client information
  without a token, in which case the read falls back to the legacy grant — and
  a value collision with any other issuer would have dropped that grant
  unrevoked and unreported.
- The TUI announced "OAuth state cleared" on the keypress, so with a bounded
  revocation request it said so while the work was still in flight and then
  removed it when the work finished. `onClearOAuth` returns a promise;
  `AuthTab` shows "Clearing OAuth state…" until it settles, ignores repeats
  while one is in flight, and skips exactly the revision bump its own clear
  caused so the confirmation is not immediately reset by it.
- `handleClearOAuth` now claims an attempt and retires a superseded one, the
  way `handleDisconnect` does: the await can keep it suspended for seconds,
  long enough for the user to switch servers and have server A's outcome —
  including its disconnect — land on server B.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 03:40:40 -04:00
cliffhall
6c499f3ea1 fix(auth): read enumerated issuers exactly, and stop the TUI tone going stale (#2144)
Copilot review round 4.

- `getTokens(url, issuer)` falls back to the legacy unkeyed slot when that
  issuer holds none — right for a connect, wrong for `collectGrants`, which
  labelled the fallback with the issuer it happened to be iterating and paired
  it with that issuer's credentials. During a partially migrated flow the clear
  could have sent an old, unbound token to a newly discovered authorization
  server. `OAuthStorage.getIssuerTokens` is the exact, no-fallback read; only
  the ctx-less read still falls back, which is the one place it belongs.
- The TUI's warning tone was sticky. It lived in its own state while ~30 call
  sites set ordinary OAuth notes without resetting it, so one revocation
  failure left every later "Authorization updated" yellow, across server
  switches. It is now DERIVED — `oauthMessageToneFor(message, warningText)` —
  so it cannot outlive the message that earned it, with nothing to remember to
  clear. Both setters stay plain `useState` setters: a `useCallback` wrapper
  would be a value `react-hooks/exhaustive-deps` demands in seven dependency
  arrays for an identity that never changes.
- Hook-level tests for the web wiring (previously missed): the per-server
  opt-out and the backend-proxied fetch are now asserted to reach
  `clearServerOAuthState`, so handing it the page-origin fetch — which a real
  authorization server's missing CORS headers would reject — fails a test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 02:58:04 -04:00
cliffhall
781aa69d19 fix(auth): revoke every issuer-bound grant, not just the active one (#2144)
Copilot review round 3.

`clear(serverUrl)` deletes EVERY `byIssuer` slot, but revocation read only the
context-free (active-issuer) token. A server that had authorized against
issuers A and B therefore revoked B, then destroyed the local record of A while
A's grant stayed live at its authorization server — the same leak this feature
exists to close, one level down.

- `OAuthStorage.listIssuers(serverUrl)` is the new seam (one implementation:
  every backend extends `OAuthStorageBase`). `collectGrants` walks it plus the
  ctx-less read, deduping by token, so every grant the clear will delete is
  covered.
- Metadata is cached once per server, not per issuer, so a grant bound to an
  issuer the cached document does not describe cannot be revoked: sending its
  token to that endpoint would hand a credential to a server that never minted
  it. That grant is reported as failed — dropped unrevoked — rather than
  silently discarded or misdirected.
- `aggregateOutcomes` gives a failure precedence over another grant's success,
  so one live grant cannot hide behind another's 200. Exported for its own
  test, since `computeOutcome` returns early on the empty case.

Also from that round:

- The fixture's /oauth/revoke now verifies token ownership (RFC 7009 §2.1).
  Access tokens record their owning `client_id`; a token belonging to another
  client is left alone and still answered 200 (§2.2 — the response must not
  tell one client whether another's token exists). New e2e case proves a
  second registered client cannot revoke the first's grant.
- The TUI rendered the revocation-failure note in cyan, the informational
  tone. It is a partial success — the local clear really happened — so it is
  not an `error` status, but the grant may still be live and cyan understated
  that. `AuthTab` takes an `oauthMessageTone`; the message says so explicitly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 02:40:28 -04:00
cliffhall
7f27d7e9c7 fix(auth): address Copilot review round 1 on the RFC 7009 revocation (#2144)
- RFC 8414 §2 defaults an omitted `revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported`
  to `client_secret_basic`; it does not inherit the token endpoint's list.
  Inheriting made metadata advertising only `client_secret_post` there send
  POST credentials to an endpoint that never advertised the method.
- The 5s timeout was inert on the web paths: `createRemoteFetch` re-issues the
  call as a POST to `/api/fetch` and drops `init.signal`, and the backend's
  outbound fetch gets none either, so a wedged AS could hold the teardown open
  indefinitely. A wall-clock race now enforces the deadline; the signal is kept
  because it genuinely cancels the direct-fetch paths.
- The settings-modal Clear read `settingsModalTarget`, which comes from the
  persisted `servers` list, while edits live in `settingsDraft` until the save
  debounce. Toggling the checkbox and clearing immediately used the previous
  value. It now merges the draft.
- `--relogin` clears both key spellings, so it now revokes from both rather
  than stopping at the first populated one — a stale entry under the other
  spelling is a live grant. The normalised key goes first, matching
  `findStoredServerState`, and a second key holding the same token is skipped.
- The fixture's /oauth/revoke now ENFORCES RFC 7009 §2.1 client
  authentication (both RFC 6749 §2.3.1 forms), so the e2e's claim that the
  Inspector authenticates correctly is actually tested; two negative cases
  assert a wrong secret and an unidentified client are refused.
- Dropped the `as unknown as` casts from the tests: a typed `InspectorLogger`
  double, and a spy on the real storage instead of a spread-and-cast.
- Added CLI-level tests through `runCli` for `--no-revoke`, the per-server
  `oauth.revokeOnClear`, and the stderr warning, and TUI tests for the
  forwarded opt-out and the rendered failure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 01:30:09 -04:00
cliffhall
65fd2b9e35 feat(auth): revoke OAuth tokens at the authorization server on clear (#2144)
Clearing the Inspector's OAuth state deleted the local copy of the tokens
and stopped there. The access token — and the refresh token, which is
long-lived by design — stayed valid at the authorization server until they
expired on their own, so a day of connect/disconnect iteration left it
holding grants for sessions that ended hours ago. RFC 7009 §1 describes
exactly that case, and nothing in the repo constructed a revocation
request, so a server author implementing `revocation_endpoint` had no way
to exercise it with the tool that exists to exercise this.

core/auth/revocation.ts builds and sends the request; the three clear paths
call it, so the behavior is written once — web's "Clear OAuth state and
disconnect" (both the active and stored-only paths), the TUI's Auth tab,
and the CLI's --relogin. It runs BEFORE the local clear, because the token,
the client credentials and the discovered `revocation_endpoint` all live in
the store the clear is about to empty. The request names the refresh token
when there is one: §2.1 asks the AS to also invalidate the access tokens
issued under the same grant, so one request covers both halves.

Best-effort by construction. Every path returns a TokenRevocationOutcome
rather than throwing: no advertised endpoint means nothing is sent and that
authorization server behaves exactly as before, and a network error, a
non-2xx, a 5s timeout or an unreadable store is reported and nothing more.
Forgetting the tokens is what the user asked for. `lost_authorization_state`
recovery deliberately skips it — it clears a half-finished flow to retry it,
and an authorization that never completed has no grant to revoke.

Client authentication resolves the preregistered slot first, mirroring
BaseOAuthClientProvider.clientInformation; reading only the dynamic slot
would send no authentication for a server configured with `oauth.clientId`.
The Basic credential is byte-identical to the SDK's applyBasicAuth so this
request and the token request cannot present the same secret differently.

Opt out per server with `oauth.revokeOnClear` (default on, only `false`
written to disk) or per CLI run with --no-revoke. Read at clear time rather
than connect time, so toggling needs no reconnect. Turning it off is a
testing affordance: a client that walks away still holding live tokens is a
case a server author may want to reproduce.

test-servers now advertises `revocation_endpoint` and serves POST
/oauth/revoke, faithful on §2.2 (an unknown token is a success) and §2.1
(revoking a refresh token invalidates the access tokens under the same
grant), with oauth-revocation-http.json / oauth-no-revocation-http.json as
showcase configs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177mPHAdECD18nLLCTwR5rh
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-28 00:48:57 -04:00
cliffhall
b0b252a5c0 fix: address Copilot review round 41 — const does not demand a property, required-only branches
- `const` constrains a property that is PRESENT; it neither requires the
  property nor acts as a default. It is now supplied automatically only where
  the schema also requires the field — in `collectSchemaDefaults`,
  `applySchemaConstants` and the TUI's initial values alike — so an optional
  `dryRun: { const: true }` no longer turns a valid `{}` call into one that
  asks the server to do something. A value that IS present is still corrected
  to the constant, whatever supplied it, and the field stays read-only.
- Offerability is judged on the base+member merge rather than the raw member,
  so `anyOf: [{ required: ["email"] }, { required: ["phone"] }]` over
  root-declared properties is offered. It was declined, which left the gate
  checking the base alone and accepting `{}` — which that schema rejects.
- The TUI's branch sections keep the schema's own `required` for the seeding
  decision while still rendering every branch field non-required, which is what
  keeps a static form submittable.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-26 16:08:24 -04:00
cliffhall
85b030cbde fix: address Copilot review round 37 — stale constants, inherited answers, prefixed labels
- The seeding effect re-applies constants as well as filling absences: an
  in-place schema change can move a `const` the user cannot edit, and the
  read-only field then displayed the new value while `values` still held the
  old one — which is what would be submitted. Ordinary defaults are still only
  ever added, so an edited field keeps what the user put there.
- hasMissingIn checks own-property presence: a required argument legally named
  `constructor` resolved to the inherited one and read as supplied, enabling
  a submit the schema rejects.
- The TUI keeps the declared name as a branch field's fallback title. The
  prefix is an internal field NAME, and buildFields labels from its map key —
  so the showcase displayed `__b0__address` where the schema says
  `address`.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-26 14:50:52 -04:00
cliffhall
ba91db97e2 fix: address Copilot review round 34 — structured constants, non-required const controls
- A `const` may be an object or an array, with or without a `type`, and
  `String({...})` is "[object Object]" — which no CLI argument can equal, so
  the only value such a schema accepts never matched. Supplied text is parsed
  and compared structurally through the resolver's own comparison (exported as
  `sameJsonValue` so the two cannot disagree), for both branch selection and
  the substitution.
- The TUI's one-option const control is never marked required: its option may
  legitimately be the empty string, which ink-form's required gate can never
  accept, so submission would not even reach `decodeFormValues`. The value is
  fixed by the schema, and `missingRequiredFields` still validates the call.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-26 13:39:16 -04:00
cliffhall
ab3f8c779a fix: address Copilot review round 25 — names before constants, unrenderable properties
- selectBranchIndex asks the supplied NAMES first and falls back to a lone
  agreeing constant only when they settle nothing. A matching `const` does
  not identify a branch while another candidate leaves that property unpinned:
  `{ kind: "email", phone: "555" }` agrees with an email branch whose
  `address` is missing while satisfying a phone branch outright.
- isOfferable requires every property VALUE to be readable — JSON Schema's
  boolean form is fine, a `null` or an array is not a schema at all and the
  web form dereferences one on the way to choosing a widget. Such a branch is
  declined rather than handed on to crash a tool panel that would otherwise
  have rendered.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-26 09:30:36 -04:00
cliffhall
d334710d6f fix: address Copilot review round 20 — malformed applicators, const-null under anyOf
- rootUnion reads every composition keyword through `membersOf` and every
  `required` through `requiredOf`. These schemas describe the wire and each
  member arrives as `unknown`, so `anyOf: {}` or `required: "x"` really
  can arrive — and reading them as lists threw, taking all three clients down
  rather than declining one malformed tool. Both web and TUI required-field
  checks are guarded the same way.
- admitsNull evaluates a sibling `anyOf` beside a `const: null` instead of
  refusing outright: the union decides in both directions, and
  `{ const: null, anyOf: [{ type: "null" }] }` admits null as plainly as an
  all-string union rejects it. Refusing it left a read-only required field
  seeded with the only value it accepts and submit permanently disabled.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-26 07:26:49 -04:00
cliffhall
36cf58fe6c fix: address Copilot review round 18 — empty-string constants, nested branch reset
- TUI missingRequiredFields treats an empty string as supplied when the
  property's own `const` pins it there. The one-option control cannot produce
  anything else, so reporting the seeded value as missing made such a branch
  permanently uncallable.
- A nested SchemaForm is reset by the branch-aware key too. Two outer
  alternatives can both carry the same nested object field, and a nested form
  left mounted across an outer switch kept displaying the inner branch chosen
  for the other one while the newly seeded values described another shape.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-26 06:55:20 -04:00
cliffhall
95030cfdb6 fix: address Copilot review round 17 — shared branch narrowing, null admissibility
- The name-based narrowing is extracted as `narrowBySuppliedNames` and used
  by the CLI coercion as well as the form: an undiscriminated union whose
  branches type a shared name differently was losing the coercion for every
  argument, including the ones that identify the branch unambiguously. The
  type-agreement fallback now also polls only the const-compatible branches.
- TUI missingRequiredFields accepts `null` only where the property admits it,
  matching the web gate: branch fields are rendered optional, so a
  `default: null` on a non-nullable required field reached the check and the
  call went out with a value the schema rejects.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-26 06:38:46 -04:00
cliffhall
df1e39e623 fix: address Copilot review round 13 — cross-keyword contradictions, own-property required check
- rootUnion: keywords the two declarations state SEPARATELY can contradict too.
  A merged `const` is now checked against its own `type` and `enum`, so
  root `x: { type: "string" }` under branch `x: { const: 1 }` declines
  instead of seeding an immutable 1 into a string field. An integer const still
  satisfies a `number` type — the one direction JSON Schema widens.
- TUI missingRequiredFields tests `Object.hasOwn` first: an argument legally
  named `constructor` resolved to the inherited one and read as supplied, and
  the call went out without it.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-26 05:21:21 -04:00
cliffhall
246ee1c262 fix: address Copilot review round 9 — canonical constant comparison, name-based inference, permissive schemas
- rootUnion: schema values are compared through a key-sorted rendering, so two
  discriminator constants written as {a,b} and {b,a} are recognized as the same
  value rather than as mutually exclusive alternatives.
- selectBranchIndex: after the const and required passes, a name only ONE
  alternative declares identifies that alternative; a name several declare is
  ambiguous and says nothing.
- additionalProperties counts as restrictive only when its schema states an
  assertion — an annotation-only `{ title: ... }` is the equivalent of
  `true`, like `{}`.
- Drop the unjustified double casts from the ToolTestModal fixtures; the
  schemas are assignable to Partial<Tool> as written.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-26 04:07:50 -04:00
cliffhall
85b8e4601c fix: address Copilot review rounds 7 and 8
- rootUnion: a `oneOf` demands that EXACTLY one alternative match, which
  flattening cannot preserve, so it is offered only when a discriminator makes
  the alternatives mutually exclusive; `anyOf` makes no such claim and is
  unaffected. An empty `additionalProperties` schema is the equivalent of
  `true` and no longer declines a union.
- selectBranchIndex: falls back to the branch whose own required fields the
  values supply, so an undiscriminated union's values open the picker on the
  shape they describe rather than on the first branch.
- admitsNull: honors a sibling `nullable: true` beside `const: null`.
- SchemaForm: a value is carried only where the incoming branch leaves the
  root's declaration as it found it; anything it declares itself is reset,
  since it may type the name differently from where the value was typed.
  `hasOwn`/`fromEntries` throughout, so `constructor` is not read as a
  supplied value and `__proto__` is not dropped into the prototype setter.
- TUI: the same prototype-safe construction on the way out of the form, and
  the chosen branch's `required` list is checked at submit — rendering a
  branch's fields optional makes the FORM satisfiable, not the call, so the
  missing names are reported rather than a known-invalid call being sent.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-26 03:54:24 -04:00
cliffhall
1a271e4931 fix: address Copilot review round 3 — conjunctive keywords, unflattenable allOf, branch inference
- rootUnion: a branch restating a constraint the root states differently is
  declined (keywords at one level are conjunctive and no intersection is
  computed here), while annotations may disagree freely. An `allOf` with a
  member it cannot fold in — JSON Schema's boolean form, or a $ref whose
  constraints are unknown rather than absent — is left intact instead of
  merged-and-stripped, which would turn an unsatisfiable schema into a
  fillable form.
- rootUnion: `declaresAnyFields` counts the raw composition members, so
  `hasInputFields` reports fields for a union the resolver declines and an
  App tool is never auto-invoked with empty arguments.
- SchemaForm: the picker opens on the branch the supplied values identify
  (an App deep link overlays its args, so they can name another branch), and
  a branch switch no longer carries a value the outgoing branch declared —
  the branches may type the same name differently.
- TUI: a base property some branch redeclares is offered in EVERY branch's
  section under that branch's inherited or specialized declaration, so a
  branch that does not redeclare it can still supply a required root
  argument.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-26 02:01:44 -04:00
cliffhall
84cd0c10f0 fix: address Copilot review round 2 — conjunctive merges, generated-name collisions, CLI branch selection
- rootUnion: a name both the root and a branch declare is now MERGED rather
  than replaced, so a root `minimum` survives a branch `maximum`; a branch
  that contradicts the root on a property's `type` describes an unsatisfiable
  value and is declined outright. Branch offerability also requires that
  `properties` really is an object (a malformed `properties: null` threw)
  and that the member's own `type` admits objects.
- rootUnion: `ownFields` becomes `declaredFields` — a branch commonly
  specializes a root property, and consumers must render the specialization.
- TUI: the generated select and branch prefixes step aside from any name the
  schema itself declares (JSON has no reserved namespace), decode filters them
  by exact name, a branch's specialization renders in its own section, and a
  `const` is rendered as a one-option select whose typed value is restored
  from the schema on submit.
- convertToolParameters: identify the branch from the discriminator constants
  the call supplies; when none identifies one, coerce only names every
  declaring branch types the same way rather than picking an arbitrary branch.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-26 01:41:17 -04:00
cliffhall
2782ed75d1 fix: address Copilot review — const precedence, TUI variant model, decline both-keyword unions
- rootUnion: decline a schema carrying BOTH oneOf and anyOf rather than
  reading one and silently dropping the other's constraints.
- SchemaForm: handle `const` before every type dispatch and for every
  constant type, so a numeric/boolean constant, or a schema carrying both
  `const` and `enum`, can no longer offer a forbidden value.
- collectSchemaDefaults / TUI initialValue: `const` outranks `default`,
  which is an annotation a schema may set to something its const rejects.
- convertToolParameters: resolve from the first branch's merged schema, so a
  branch's specialization of a root-declared property is what types the arg.
- TUI: ink-form keys values by field name across the whole form, so two
  branches' `kind` were one field and the later section's initial value
  decided what the earlier submitted. Branch fields now render under prefixed
  names behind a Variant select, and decodeFormValues translates back on
  submit, dropping every branch but the chosen one.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-26 01:01:54 -04:00