- Assert headersToServerSettings carries DEFAULT_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_MS.
- Type the fake transports in inspectorClient.test.ts as the SDK's
Transport via two helpers instead of an as-unknown-as double cast; the
two pre-existing copies of the same fakes in that describe block use the
helpers too.
- Bring serverList.ts's converter comments and specification/v2_servers_file.md
in line with the new contract: 30 s default, explicit 0 persisted, and
requestTimeout's 0 unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M4h8Xa6Ed9zwtv5ojX35MT
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 2. The First-run behavior section said the backend
writes the seed file "when the backend boots". It does not: the write lives
in the `GET /api/servers` handler
(`core/mcp/remote/node/server.ts`), so a backend that boots and never
serves the list leaves the path untouched.
Verified against a prod build with an isolated `MCP_CATALOG_PATH`:
after boot + GET / : catalog ABSENT
GET /api/servers : 200
after GET /api/servers : catalog EXISTS
The section now says so, and picks up two adjacent facts the old wording
also left out: the write happens inside the write lock (so a concurrent
POST/PUT/DELETE cannot be clobbered), and a read-only `--config` source is
never seeded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012x3rC3JXU17aW3uSwjPoi5
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 1. `specification/` is a maintained design record, not a
historical one, so a shipped change to the seed set belongs in it.
Two statements were stale and are now accurate:
- **First-run behavior** said the backend writes "the two current
`SEED_SERVERS`" — a reference to the `App.tsx` constant this design
replaced. It now names `DEFAULT_SEED_CONFIG`, records that the set is three
as of #2201, and points at `core/mcp/serverList.ts` as the source of truth
for the contents rather than restating them; a second copy of a list is what
goes stale.
- The API sketch's `// the two existing seeds` comment is likewise corrected.
Its `export function DEFAULT_SEED_CONFIG` is fixed to `export const` on the
same line — it is a `const`, and leaving a known-wrong signature on a line
being edited for accuracy is worse than the one-word fix.
The On-disk format block is deliberately unchanged: it illustrates the file
*shape*, not the seed set, and already carries a `streamable-http` entry
(`acme-api`) alongside the two stdio ones.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012x3rC3JXU17aW3uSwjPoi5
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Prettier prefers `_x_` over `*x*`; two spots in the Concurrency paragraph this
PR rewrote were left in the other style. `specification/` is not covered by
any `format:check` glob, so nothing flagged it — found by running prettier
against the file by hand while editing it.
Cosmetic only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTHVxSu8AUgHRLvo1ntZ8H
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
It has shipped. `core/mcp/import/strategies.ts` carries a `claudeDesktop`
strategy that reads `claude_desktop_config.json` from the documented
well-known paths and merges it in, alongside Cursor, Cline and VS Code — so
listing it as a follow-up describes the spec's original scope rather than the
code, and reads as a gap to anyone checking what is missing.
Text only; no code path touched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTHVxSu8AUgHRLvo1ntZ8H
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 5. Both comments upheld; the first is a real hole in
round 4's own fix.
**The ownership guard was in the wrong place, and overclaimed.**
Round 4 checked ownership and then called `release()`. Two problems:
- Check-then-act. The `stat` and the `rmdir` were separate async steps, so a
waiter could replace the directory in between and we deleted the winner's
fresh lock anyway — the very thing the check was added to prevent.
- Skipping `release()` on a mismatch left proper-lockfile's record registered
in its `locks` map, and its `signal-exit` handler `rmdirSync`s every
registered lock with **no ownership check of its own**. An exit during that
window deleted the winner too.
The guard now lives in `options.fs`, which is the single seam *both* removal
paths route through — `removeLock` on release, and the exit handler. It
refuses to remove a directory whose inode and birth time are not the ones
recorded at acquire, and reports the refusal as success so the library's
bookkeeping forgets the lock either way (leaving it registered is what hands
the exit handler a record pointing at the winner's directory).
The check is a `statSync` immediately followed by an `rmdirSync`, with no
`await` between them, so nothing in this process can interleave. **It still
does not close the race** — it is check-then-act across processes, which needs
the compare-and-swap Node does not expose — and saying it "closes the
destructive half outright" was wrong. file-lock.ts, README.md,
specification/v2_servers_file.md and AGENTS.md now all say it narrows the
window rather than closing it. AGENTS.md carries the negative instruction
alongside round 4's, since this is the third round spent on an overclaim.
**"It expires on its own after 10s" is false for the ENOTEMPTY case** the new
test exercises. Stale takeover reclaims through the same `rmdir`, which also
cannot remove a non-empty directory — so nothing clears it, and every later
save fails ELOCKED against it. `releaseAdvice` now branches: by-hand removal
for ENOTEMPTY, expiry for everything else.
Tests: a real child process demonstrates the exit handler removing a
replacement lock (with an **empty** directory — a non-empty one makes
`rmdirSync` fail ENOTEMPTY, which is how the first draft of this test passed
for the wrong reason). The release-failure test now asserts the message says
"by hand" and does not promise expiry. The shim's `rmdirSync` arm carries a
justified `v8 ignore`: it is reachable only from a real process exit, and its
logic is `removeIfMine`, covered through the async arm.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTHVxSu8AUgHRLvo1ntZ8H
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 4 — four comments, all the same finding against the four
files carrying the claim, and it was more than a wording problem.
The comment said a holder whose lock was replaced is told. Checked against
proper-lockfile@4.1.2, that is false in the case that actually happens:
- `updateLock` compares mtime only on its refresh tick — `stale / 2`, so 5s
here — while an ordinary mutation is a read, an scrypt derivation and an
atomic write, comfortably under a second. The tick never runs, so nothing
fires.
- `release` → `unlock` → `removeLock` is an unconditional `rmdir` with **no
ownership check**. So the compromised holder goes on to delete the
*winner's* lock on the way out, ending the winner's exclusion too: one
compromised writer silently becomes two unprotected ones.
The second half is a correctness bug, not a documentation defect, and it is
fixable here even though the takeover race itself is not.
`withSecretFileLock` now records the lock directory's inode and birth time at
acquire and re-checks them before releasing. On a mismatch it **declines to
release** — leaving the new holder's lock alone costs nothing, ours is
already gone — and warns.
Inode and birth time rather than mtime, deliberately: both survive the
library's own `utimes` refresh, so a lock held past one tick is not accused of
being compromised, and both change on a delete-and-recreate, which is exactly
the event to detect. Where a filesystem reports neither, the two reads agree
and the check concludes "ours", degrading to the library's unaided behaviour
rather than to a false alarm. An unreadable baseline at acquire likewise
answers "ours" — with nothing to compare against, accusing a healthy lock
would be worse than releasing it.
Detection is therefore **best-effort**, and file-lock.ts, README.md,
specification/v2_servers_file.md and AGENTS.md now all say so rather than
promising the loser is told. AGENTS.md carries the negative instruction too,
since this is the second round spent on the same overclaim.
Tests: "does not delete the winner's lock after being taken over" replaces the
lock inside the body and asserts the replacement survives with the *same*
inode and birth time — it was left alone, not deleted and recreated. It waits
for nothing, being the fast case the library's tick misses. Verified by
mutation: forcing `stillOurs` to always answer true fails it. A second test
covers a release that fails while the lock genuinely *is* ours (a stray file
makes `rmdir` fail ENOTEMPTY), so the ownership check cannot swallow a real
release failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTHVxSu8AUgHRLvo1ntZ8H
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 2, both comments upheld.
**ELOCKED must not degrade.** Exhausting the retries on a held lock means the
lock is *working* and something else demonstrably holds it — so running the
mutation anyway entered the exact interleaving the lock exists to prevent,
and entered it knowing a concurrent writer was there. `set` now fails
instead. Two supporting changes:
- The retry budget went from ~3.3s to ~15s so it outlasts the 10s stale
window. Refusing is only defensible because a *crashed* holder resolves by
takeover first; with the shorter budget, one Inspector killed mid-save
would have failed every later save on the box until someone deleted the
lock by hand. Pinned by a new test that stages a dead holder's lock
directly (mkdir + backdated mtime) and asserts the save succeeds.
- Acquire is now probe-then-wait. `proper-lockfile` drives its whole acquire
through `retry`, which re-attempts on *any* error — so with a 20-retry
budget a read-only `$HOME` would have spent the full 15s re-issuing an
identical failing `mkdir` on every save before degrading. One retry-less
probe separates "held" (worth waiting out) from "unavailable" (not).
**The comment overclaimed what proper-lockfile provides, and the reviewer was
right about the mechanism.** Verified against lib/lockfile.js@4.1.2: on
EEXIST it stats, and if stale it rmdirs and re-mkdirs *without* checking the
directory it removed is the one it found stale — so a slow waiter can still
delete a fast waiter's fresh lock and both proceed. That is the same race the
hand-rolled version could not close, and it is not closable without
renameat2(RENAME_EXCHANGE).
What the library actually adds is that the loser is *detected*: its refresh
tick compares the lock's mtime against the value recorded at acquire, so a
compromised holder is told rather than proceeding silently. And what is
genuinely exclusive is the case that matters — mkdir is atomic and a live
holder refreshes its mtime, so its lock never goes stale and two running
Inspectors are serialized. The residual window opens only after a holder dies
without releasing, and the optimistic verify still covers it.
file-lock.ts, README.md, specification/v2_servers_file.md and AGENTS.md all
carried the overclaim; all four now state the narrower, true version.
Also fixes a test that was quietly asserting the opposite of its name: its
holder used stale: 60_000 while the waiter used 10_000, and staleness is
judged by the *waiter's* threshold — so the holder was declared stale after
10s and the save succeeded by takeover.
Not done: a two-process stale-takeover race test. It would be testing the
library rather than this code, and is inherently nondeterministic; the honest
response to that finding was to stop claiming the race is closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTHVxSu8AUgHRLvo1ntZ8H
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
#1950 shipped FileSecretStore without cross-process mutual exclusion, by
decision: an earlier revision hand-rolled a `mkdir` election with an owner
stamp, a heartbeat and a stale-takeover, and three consecutive review rounds
found a real race in it. The last one is not closable with what Node exposes
— claiming a stale lock atomically needs compare-and-swap on a directory
entry (`renameat2(RENAME_EXCHANGE)`) — so it was replaced with optimistic
verify-and-retry and the residual documented.
#2082 settles that as "borrow, don't hand-roll". `proper-lockfile` is what
npm itself locks with, and stale-takeover is precisely the problem it has
already solved: it re-stats the lock directory after claiming it and gives
the lock up when the mtime is not the one it wrote, so the loser of a
takeover race releases instead of proceeding.
- core/auth/node/file-lock.ts: `withSecretFileLock`. `realpath: false` so a
file can be locked into existence (the very first `set` has no
`secrets.json`, and the library's default resolves through `fs.realpath`);
a warning in place of the library's `onCompromised`, which throws from a
timer and would take the session down; and a degrade-with-one-warning path
rather than a throw when no lock can be taken — this store exists for boxes
missing the usual mechanism (#1848, #1905) and must not gain a new way to
be unavailable.
- FileSecretStore.mutate holds it across the whole read-modify-write. The
optimistic verify stays underneath and is not redundant: a lock is advisory
between the processes that take it, so the verify covers a writer outside
this codebase and covers the degrade path. The in-process queue stays too,
and gains a second job — proper-lockfile is not reentrant, so serializing
per path keeps ELOCKED meaning "another process".
- absorbFileSecretsIntoKeyring takes the same lock around orphan adoption and
the atomic claim, behind a lock-free `readdir` fast path so the common
startup (keychain available, no file ever written) neither creates a lock
directory nor warns about one it could not create.
proper-lockfile is a root `dependency` per the placement rule, and is named
in all three bundler `external` lists: tsup externalizes what the *client's*
manifest declares, so a root-only CJS package was being inlined into the ESM
bundles, leaving esbuild's `Dynamic require of "path" is not supported` shim
that killed `--cli` at import time. That rule was undocumented; it is now in
AGENTS.md beside the placement rule that creates it, and mirrored into
.github/copilot-instructions.md.
Tests: 7 new in file-lock.test.ts driving a real second process (the existing
suite structurally cannot — `serialize` orders in-process callers before the
lock sees them), plus two for the migration fast path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTHVxSu8AUgHRLvo1ntZ8H
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Round 23 produced **no inline comments** — nothing wrong in the code it had
not already seen. The five suppressed ones are all in unchanged code: one real
misdiagnosis and four pieces of drift.
**A decrypted-but-corrupt payload was reported as a wrong passphrase.** By the
time `JSON.parse` runs, GCM has verified the tag — so the passphrase is
*proven correct*, and a `SecretFileKeyMismatchError` there tells the user to
restore a secret they never lost. `asSecretMap` was already outside that catch
for exactly this reason; `JSON.parse` was not, so the same class of mistake
survived one line above the fix for it. The decrypt now has its own narrow
catch and everything after it reports a corrupt file.
The test fixture could not express this case — it `JSON.stringify`s its
payload, so it can only produce valid JSON. Split into a raw-plaintext variant
so a fixture can carry bytes that are authentic under the passphrase and still
unparseable, which is the only shape that reaches the branch.
The rest is documentation that had drifted from the code it describes:
- `handOff`'s doc still described the re-read-and-compare protocol that the
atomic claim replaced two rounds ago — an obsolete concurrency invariant is
worse than none, because the next reader takes it as the contract.
- The spec still described that same hand-off, and still called Client and
Server Settings "the only two dialogs that accept a secret". Both now match
the code, and the dialog count is called out as load-bearing: the one that
was missing from it was the one taking secrets with no disclosure at all.
- The `void load()` in `refresh` carries the justification the repo's
no-floating-promises rule requires — `load` owns its failures, and `refresh`
is deliberately synchronous because `refreshingPersist` calls it from a
`finally`.
Full `npm run ci` green, staged tree verified first.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
One inline and three of the four suppressed. Two of the four are cases where
an earlier fix of mine was applied to one branch and not its twin.
**The footer went stale after the write that changed it.** `useInitialConfig`
fetched once, and `secretStorage` is the one field it carries that describes
state *this app mutates*: the first save under a newly-set passphrase
re-encrypts a pre-existing plaintext file. The backend re-derives the
descriptor per request — deliberately, and there is a test for that — but the
client had no way to ask again, so the footer said "Plaintext file" for the
rest of the session about a file that no longer was. Exactly the misreport
this band exists to prevent, arrived at from the client side.
The hook now exposes `refresh()`, and both persist paths that can carry a
secret call it: server settings (OAuth client secret, stdio `env:` values)
and client settings (the enterprise IdP client secret). The refresh tracks
its own liveness through a ref, since unlike the mount fetch it has no effect
teardown to cancel against.
**The plaintext branch skipped the payload validation the encrypted branch
does.** Round 12 tightened the encrypted envelope check and left this one
behind, so `{ "encryption": "none", "secrets": [] }` — trivial to hand-write —
described a healthy plaintext store whose next save `readMap` refuses. Both
branches validate now.
**`secretStoreGetStrict`'s doc contradicted the code it was written for.** It
said falling back to `get` is right "for the in-memory and file stores —
neither can fail in a way that masquerades as absence". `FileSecretStore.get`
does exactly that masquerade, which is why round 9 gave that store its own
`getStrict`. The fallback stays (the seam is optional and doubles must
compile) but the comment no longer claims it is equivalent for a store that
can fail.
**The spec documented the performance bug rather than the fix.** It still said
`getMany` decrypts once per server, which was the shape round 13 replaced —
and describing the earlier bug as the design is worse than saying nothing.
The remaining suppressed comment is the hand-off's TOCTOU delete: the
cross-process guarantee, decided against for this PR and tracked in #2082.
Full `npm run ci` green.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Three inline findings and one of the two suppressed. The other suppressed
one — that the hand-off's delete is still a TOCTOU — is the cross-process
guarantee, decided against for this PR and tracked as #2082.
**My convergence tests did not converge anything.** The reviewer caught that
the "two stores racing" tests cannot race: `serialize` keys its queue on the
resolved path *process-wide*, which I made it do in the previous commit
precisely so two instances would take turns. So the tests passed by
serialization while their names and comments claimed they were exercising
the optimistic retry, and the retry's successful path had no coverage at all.
A fix I was pleased with silently disabled the tests written to prove it
worked.
Split in two now, both honest about what they drive:
- `in-process mutations are serialized per path` keeps the multi-instance
cases, which pin a real property — it is what makes the in-process case
correct *without* relying on the retry.
- `cross-process convergence` injects one external write between the store's
write and its verifying read, via raw `fs` so it bypasses the queue the way
another process would. The surviving entry can only be explained by the
re-apply, so these pin the mechanism rather than the outcome. Covers a
set, a delete, and the encrypted path where every attempt re-derives.
**A well-formed envelope is not an openable one.** `readOnDiskEncryption`
classified by structure alone, so a wrong or unset `MCP_INSPECTOR_SECRET_KEY`
produced the quiet, healthy "Encrypted file" footer for a file whose every
`get` returns `null` and every `set` is refused — the exact state the
unreadable footer promises to warn about. It now authenticates: decrypt and
discard, costing one scrypt derivation (~23ms) per descriptor build, once per
`/api/config`. A test asserted the old behavior and has been rewritten; the
comment on it explains why "describable" has to mean *accurately* describable.
**The copy button's `aria-label` was eating the warning.** `aria-label`
replaces descendant text, so a screen-reader user heard "Copy secrets file
path …" and never heard "Plaintext file" — the one sentence that should
change their mind about typing a secret. The status now leads the accessible
name and the path follows, which also keeps the name a superset of the
visible text (WCAG 2.5.3).
**The spec still described the pre-#1950 invariant** in its migration
bullets: every plaintext secret lifted into the keychain and removed from
`mcp.json`, with only `KeychainUnavailableError` named. Both bullets now
describe the selected store, the durability gate that withholds the disk
delete for a session-scoped store, the strict read behind the store-wins
lookup, and `SecretStoreUnavailableError` as the family the handler catches.
Full `npm run ci` green, including the per-file ≥90 gate — the new validator
and retry branches needed six more cases to clear it.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
The headline is a correction to my own claim rather than a new defect.
**The optimistic verify is weaker than the comment said it was.** It
described the residual as a crash between the write and the verifying read.
The reviewer pointed out that no crash is needed: order two writers as
write-A, verify-A, write-B, verify-B and both report success while A's entry
is gone — A's verify simply ran before there was anything to see, and B did
nothing wrong. A crash is one instance of that shape, not the whole of it.
The trace in the old comment quietly assumed A verifies *after* B writes,
which nothing guarantees.
Corrected in the doc comment, the README and the spec, and the honest
summary is now stated rather than implied: this converges in every
interleaving where the clobber lands before the verify, it is not mutual
exclusion, and a deployment that needs the guarantee wants an OS-backed lock
from a dedicated library — not another hand-rolled election. It remains
better than what it replaced, which lost updates across a wider set of
interleavings and could not be closed at all with what Node exposes.
The other findings:
- **An envelope naming the cipher still is not an openable one.** Round 9
added a `kdf`/`data` presence check; three dot-separated strings satisfied
it while an empty tag, a 4-byte IV or `N: 3` still made every decrypt
throw — so the quiet "Encrypted file" footer went to a file whose next
save was guaranteed to fail. Now validates part sizes, a non-empty
ciphertext, and the scrypt cost parameters (node rejects a non-power-of-two
`N` synchronously, out of the derivation rather than the decrypt). A
positive control asserts a file we actually wrote still reads as encrypted.
- **`encryptionUnknown` + `looseMode` claimed an exposure it had not
established.** With both set, `plaintext` is absent, so a `!== false` test
landed on "anyone who can read it can read the secrets in it" — about a
file that may well hold ciphertext we simply could not classify. Three-way
now, in `secretStorageCaveat` and mirrored in the footer's tooltip, with a
test on each.
- **The README described a lock that no longer exists**, which is the worst
kind of stale doc: it stated a durability guarantee the code had stopped
providing. Rewritten to describe the actual design, including the residual.
- **The private-method access in the concurrency test** now carries the
justification the repo's TypeScript rules require: the asserted shape is
`writeMap`'s real signature, so a rename breaks the line instead of
silently detaching the stub, and a production injection seam would let the
real write path drift from the tested one.
Also updates `specification/v2_servers_file.md`, which still described #1356's
world: one keychain-only store, and unavailability as a hard error. It now
covers store selection and the probe, the file format and lazy encryption
upgrade, the concurrency design and its residual, the `getStrict`/`getMany`
seams and the two traps `getStrict` hit, the durability gate on migration,
the keychain hand-off and its conditional delete, and how the active store is
surfaced.
Full `npm run ci` green. (One unrelated `AppRenderer` theme-flip test failed
once under full-suite parallelism and passes in isolation with and without
these changes — a flake, not a regression.)
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Add a specification/v2_auth.md landing page summarizing the four auth specs
(EMA / XAA, Hardening, Mid-session, Smoke testing) with a section submenu,
mirroring the V2 UX index pattern.
Add a V2 Auth link (after V2 UX) and a V2 New Spec Impact link to every spec
page's top menu so the top-level nav is uniform, and restructure the four
v2_auth_*.md pages onto the shared two-tier menu (top menu + auth submenu).
Docs only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S3fTN8H3R8YV4yUGvZjYnX
* refactor(web): update OAuth E2E tests to use new authentication method
- Replaced `runGuidedAuth` with `authenticate` in the InspectorClient OAuth end-to-end tests to support quick authentication with CIMD pre-registration.
- Updated comments to reflect the change in authentication method and its support for HTTP test metadata URLs.
- Ensured that the tests continue to validate the expected authorization URL after the change.
Additionally, imported `ensureCimdClientRegistration` in the OAuthManager to streamline client registration during the authentication process.
* Guided-auth removal, OAuth smoke testing, and TUI/CLI support
* Added CLI OAuth runner flags tests
* Added clarifying comment on port 0 binding
* README notes on TUI oauth callback port, prettier fixes for CLI tests
* CIMD validation uses inline like EMA IdP
* Fixed TUI test failures from merge
* test: bring 5 OAuth files over the 90 per-file coverage gate
The guided-auth-removal work added/touched several files that fell below
the repo's >=90 per-file coverage gate (npm run coverage). CI doesn't run
the gate (it's local-only), so validate + test:integration passed while
these gaps slipped through. Bring them all back over the line:
- core/auth/node/runner-oauth-callback.ts: test bad-URL/non-http-scheme
throws, no-port->80 default, and IPv6 hostname bracketing. Annotate the
provably-dead guards (empty host, out-of-range port, String(err)
fallback, pathname "/" fallback) -- all rejected by new URL() upstream --
with justified v8 ignore comments instead of lowering the gate.
- core/auth/cimd.ts: test the AS-doesn't-support-CIMD early return.
- core/react/useClientSettingsDraft.ts: test the functional-updater path,
the stale-onChange-after-close prev===null guard, and the
timer-fires-after-close value===null guard.
- ClientSettingsForm.tsx: test the CIMD checkbox toggle and CIMD URL clear.
- clients/tui/src/utils/oauthDisplay.ts: test static/dcr registration
kinds, the expired IdP session, and the configured-scope/empty-scope
branches of formatScopes.
npm run coverage now passes (exit 0) across web, cli, tui, launcher.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds enterprise-managed authorization (EMA): browser-side IdP login + RFC 8693 token-exchange and JWT-bearer resource-token mint, per-server EMA opt-in in Server Settings, IdP config in Client Settings, and IdP clientSecret keychain storage. Includes the v2/main merge and review follow-ups (400 on malformed client config; normalizeIdpIssuer import consolidation).
Ports the CLI, TUI, and launcher from v1.5 into v2 behind a single
`mcp-inspector` entrypoint (launcher → web/cli/tui). Includes the
`mcp-inspector --web --dev` launcher fix (Vite alias resolution + prod-server
double-start), the root `postinstall` install cascade with simplified CI, and
spec/AGENTS docs (no-workspaces rationale, Development setup).
Closes#1246.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(servers): move oauthClientSecret and stdio env values to OS keychain (#1356)
mcp.json is designed to be tool-shareable (symlinked from Claude Desktop's
config, pasted into bug reports, synced via dotfiles), so storing OAuth
client secrets and stdio env values in plaintext there meant any of those
flows could leak them. Lift both into the OS keychain via @napi-rs/keyring
(active replacement for the archived keytar). The wire shape is unchanged:
the GET /api/servers handler rehydrates from the keychain so browser code
sees the same JSON; the on-disk file no longer contains the secret
material. Includes an idempotent migration that lifts plaintext from older
mcp.json files (or hand-edited ones) into the keychain on first read.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(servers): tolerate keychain unavailability on non-set ops (#1356)
CI on Linux failed because `@napi-rs/keyring` hard-errors without
libsecret, and the route handlers were touching the keychain even for
no-secret flows (defensive `deleteAllForServer` on POST/DELETE, sweep
on PUT). The user's intent for the Linux fallback was "hard fail when a
secret is actually involved" — not on every keychain touch.
Make `KeyringSecretStore.get / delete / deleteAllForServer` silently
degrade when the keychain is unavailable (return null / no-op); `set`
remains the one operation that hard-fails with
`KeychainUnavailableError`. The migration path catches the error and
preserves the disk plaintext rather than losing the secret.
Also inject `InMemorySecretStore` in `useServers.test.tsx` and
`servers-events.test.ts` so tests never touch a developer's real
keychain even when libsecret is present.
Adds `KeyringSecretStore` tests (vi.mock'd native bindings) and an
integration suite that simulates Linux-without-libsecret to verify the
tolerance contract end-to-end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(servers): close GET migration race; reverse keychain/disk order (#1356)
Addresses code review:
1. **Concurrency**: GET /api/servers was reading + migrating outside the
write lock, then writing inside it — a concurrent POST/PUT/DELETE
between the read and the lock acquisition could be clobbered by the
migration write. Also affected the first-launch seed write. Fix:
take a fast unlocked peek; if the file is absent (seed branch) or
carries plaintext to migrate (migration branch), re-read inside the
write lock and decide there. Added `hasPlaintextSecrets()` as a
pure predicate so the common no-migration path stays lock-free.
2. **Write ordering**: POST and PUT wrote disk first, then keychain.
A keychain `set` failure mid-write left a half-configured entry on
disk and trapped retries at 409. Reversed to keychain-first so a
503 leaves both stores in their pre-write state. PUT in-place now
sets new fields, writes disk, then deletes obsolete fields (a
failed disk write leaves orphan keychain entries — recoverable —
rather than premature deletions of fields the user still expects
to see).
3. **Tolerance simplification**: dropped the no-entry regex in
`KeyringSecretStore.delete` — both "no entry" and "keychain
unavailable" collapse to the same desired outcome (the entry isn't
there anymore), so a uniform swallow is clearer.
4. **Parallelism**: `readKeychainEntriesFor` now `Promise.all`s the
per-field `get` calls. macOS Keychain round-trips are 10-50ms;
serializing 5+ env vars per server × N servers is a meaningful
wall-clock cost on GET.
5. **Spec doc**: reflects the tolerance contract (only `set`
hard-fails) and the keychain-before-disk write ordering rationale.
New regression test in servers-route.test.ts covers the retry-after-503
contract directly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(servers): parallel keychain writes + migration partial-state comment (#1356)
Two nice-to-have observations from the re-review:
- `writeKeychainEntriesFor` now `Promise.all`s its per-field sets,
matching the read side. No ordering requirement among distinct
(id, field) keys; on unavailability every set rejects and Promise.all
surfaces the first rejection (still 503 from the route handler).
- `migratePlaintextSecrets` catch block now spells out the
partial-migration semantics: we return the original config so the
disk plaintext stays intact, and the next successful GET retries
with the keychain-wins branch absorbing already-set entries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(servers): parallel keychain deletes for symmetry (#1356)
Picks up the symmetry observation from the third review: `deleteKeychainFields`
now uses `Promise.all` like its read and write siblings. Distinct (id, field)
deletes have no ordering requirement, and `secretStore.delete` is already a
silent no-op on unavailability so Promise.all has no failure-mode surprise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(servers): flatten mcp.json settings to top-level fields (#1358)
Eliminate the nested `settings` block introduced in #1352 so each
server entry's Inspector-extension fields live as direct keys alongside
`type` / `url`, matching the `.mcp.json` shape Claude Code / Cursor /
Cline write:
- `headers` becomes a `Record<string, string>` on disk (was nested
`settings.headers` as a pair-array)
- `oauth` becomes a nested `{ clientId?, clientSecret?, scopes? }`
object (was flat `settings.oauthClientId` / `oauthClientSecret` /
`oauthScopes`)
- `metadata`, `connectionTimeout`, `requestTimeout` move to the
entry's top level as-is (Inspector-only fields)
The in-memory + wire shape is unchanged from #1352: `InspectorServerSettings`
keeps pair-array `headers` and flat `oauth*` fields because the form
needs them in that shape to drive controlled-component editing. The
bidirectional conversion lives in `serverList.ts`
(`storedFieldsToInspectorSettings` / `inspectorSettingsToStoredFields`)
and is invoked by `mcpConfigToServerEntries` / `serverEntriesToMcpConfig`
and by the server route's `buildStoredEntry`. The `PUT /api/servers/:id`
wire envelope keeps the preserve/clear/apply semantics from #1353 — the
backend splats validated `settings.*` onto top-level disk keys when
assembling the next on-disk shape.
Hard-cutover migration per the issue's decision 4: files written by the
one pre-#1358 v2/main build have a nested `settings` block; we drop the
node on read with a one-line warn including the server id. The persisted
headers / metadata / timeouts / OAuth credentials are intentionally lost
on first read — users re-enter them via the form (or hand-edit the file
into the flat shape). v2 has not shipped a stable release with the
nested shape, so the blast radius is dogfooders only.
The smuggle-guard in `buildStoredEntry` widens from just `settings` to
all six Inspector-extension keys (`settings`, `headers`, `metadata`,
`connectionTimeout`, `requestTimeout`, `oauth`), so a caller can't
bypass `validateSettings` by nesting any of them inside `config`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(servers): address PR review on flatten (#1359)
- Single-source the Inspector-extension key list with `satisfies`
(finding 1). `INSPECTOR_FIELD_KEY_MAP satisfies Record<keyof
StoredInspectorFields, true>` in serverList.ts means a new field on
the type forces a compile error here. The set is exported and
re-used by the server route's smuggle guard, so adding `proxy` or
similar in the future updates all three sites in lockstep. The PUT
preserve path now uses a new `stripInspectorFields` helper that
derives from the same source instead of hand-destructuring.
- Add read-path shape validation in `normalizeMcpServers` (finding 2):
`headers: "oops"` / `metadata: 42` / `oauth: []` / non-numeric
timeouts are dropped individually with a warn, so a hand-edited
malformed file can't put garbage rows into the form. Mirrors the
write-side `validateSettings` symmetry. New integration test covers
each malformed shape with a partial fixture so a single bad key
doesn't take out the whole entry.
- Align new warns to the `fileLogger || console.warn` fallback pattern
(finding 3) via a small `logWarn` helper, so the legacy-drop and
smuggle warns are visible in `npm run dev` where the logger is
often unconfigured.
- Spec doc tweak: the CLI/TUI out-of-scope note's "writes to
`settings.headers`" reference now reads "writes to the entry's
top-level `headers` field on disk (post-#1358 flat shape)" (finding
4). Avoids confusion for future readers.
- Nits: replace `current.mcpServers[originalId]!` with explicit
narrowing; add a comment on the OAuth truthiness drop in
`storedFieldsToInspectorSettings` mirroring the write-side comment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(servers): address pass-2 review on flatten (#1359)
- Tighten `isNonNegNumber` with `Number.isFinite` so `Infinity` and
`NaN` are rejected at the read boundary, matching the write-side
intent (finding D). Hand-edited `connectionTimeout: Infinity` would
have passed the prior check and propagated to the form.
- Add a one-line comment in `normalizeMcpServers` noting that the
per-entry object is mutated in place via the `delete` calls — safe
for today's callers (freshly parsed JSON, no other reference held)
but worth flagging for the next reader (finding A).
Skipping findings B (move type guards to module scope — single call
site) and C (`isOauthObject` lenient on extra keys — reviewer
confirmed this is the intended forward-compat behavior, matching
`normalizeServerType`'s unknown-key passthrough).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(servers): fix mutation-comment caller branch label (#1359)
The previous comment named the GET handler's "seed branch" as a caller
of normalizeMcpServers, but that branch returns DEFAULT_SEED_CONFIG
directly without normalizing. The actual second caller is the
file-present branch (after parseStore). Correcting the label so a
future reader looking for the seed branch caller doesn't waste time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(servers): persist per-server settings to mcp.json (#1352)
- Add optional `settings` node alongside the transport config in each
`~/.mcp-inspector/mcp.json` entry. Round-trips through
`mcpConfigToServerEntries` / `serverEntriesToMcpConfig` and the
`/api/servers` POST/PUT routes.
- Drop `MCPServerConfig.headers` from `SseServerConfig` /
`StreamableHttpServerConfig` and remove the headers textarea from
`ServerConfigModal`. Custom headers are now entered only in
`ServerSettingsForm` and reach the wire via `settings.headers`.
- Wire `ServerSettingsModal` into `App.tsx`; saves dispatch through a new
`useServers.updateServerSettings` mutator. `updateServer` carries the
existing settings across config-only saves so they aren't dropped.
- Apply settings on the *first* outbound request after a server loads —
no need to open the settings form first:
- `settings.headers` → SSE / streamable-http wire headers.
- `settings.metadata` → `InspectorClientOptions.defaultMetadata`,
merged into every outgoing `_meta` (call-time keys win).
- `settings.requestTimeout` → `InspectorClientOptions.timeout`.
- `settings.connectionTimeout` → Promise.race wrapper around connect().
- `settings.oauth*` → pre-seeded OAuth client credentials.
- `RemoteConnectRequest` carries `settings` so the remote backend can
source transport headers from the same source as the local path.
- `oauthClientSecret` is persisted in `mcp.json` alongside stdio `env`
values, both protected by the file's `0o600` permission.
- Update `specification/v2_servers_file.md` with the new shape and the
removal of the legacy headers field.
Tests: round-trip in `serverList.test.ts`; persistence on POST/PUT in
`servers-route.test.ts`; first-connect header injection in
`transport.test.ts`; `defaultMetadata` merging in
`inspectorClient.test.ts`; `useServers.updateServerSettings` +
`updateServer` settings-preservation in `useServers.test.tsx`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(servers): rebuild InspectorClient on every connect so settings refresh
The previous onToggleConnection branch reused the existing InspectorClient
on a same-server reconnect, which froze settings at the moment the client
was first constructed. Editing headers, metadata, timeouts, or OAuth
credentials in the settings form was therefore invisible until the user
either switched servers or reloaded the page — surprising right after a
visible save.
Always call setupClientForServer on (re)connect so the latest
target.settings flow through to the transport's headers / requestInit, to
defaultMetadata, and to the OAuth manager.
Also adds remoteClientTransport tests that pin the wire-level contract:
settings round-trip through the /api/mcp/connect body when supplied, and
the field is omitted when no settings are configured.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(history): stop wiping pendingRequestEntries inside the connect event
State managers (ManagedToolsState, ManagedPromptsState, ManagedResourcesState,
ManagedResourceTemplatesState, ManagedRequestorTasksState) handle the
client's "connect" event by calling `void this.refresh()`. The synchronous
portion of refresh runs through SDK Protocol.request → transport.send →
MessageTrackingTransport.send → trackRequest, all before yielding to the
network — so each list request gets tracked into MessageLogState's
pendingRequestEntries inside the same connect event dispatch.
MessageLogState's own "connect" listener was registered after those state
managers (it's the last one constructed in App.tsx) and cleared
pendingRequestEntries on every connect. Listener order meant the clear ran
*after* the requests were tracked but before their responses arrived,
leaving the history with unmatched "response" entries marked PENDING.
The clear-on-disconnect (via statusChange → disconnected) already handles
session-boundary cleanup, so clear-on-connect was purely defensive and now
actively harmful. Drop the connect listener; keep the disconnect path.
Tests: updated the unit test to assert the new behavior (connect does not
clear); added an integration regression that wires a sibling connect
listener firing listTools and asserts the response folds into the request
entry instead of appearing as an orphan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: drop accidentally tracked debugging screenshot
pending-requests.png was a local debugging artifact attached to a
conversation, not source. Remove it from the tree (the working copy is
kept so the user still has it locally) and rely on the existing untracked
behavior going forward.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(servers): add e2e check that settings.headers reach upstream MCP
Stitches the full v2 pipeline together in one assertion:
browser-style RemoteClientTransport
→ POST /api/mcp/connect (settings in body)
→ backend createTransportNode applies settings.headers to requestInit
→ SDK StreamableHTTPClientTransport
→ upstream MCP test server
Captures the upstream HTTP request via FetchRequestLogState and asserts
both `X-Tenant` and `X-Trace` are present on the outbound POST. Catches
any regression that breaks the wire between the form and the upstream
server in a single integration test, instead of the previous coverage
which exercised each hop in isolation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ServerSettingsModal): invert ListToggle compact prop so icon matches state
ListToggle's `compact` prop represents the list's *current* compact state:
true means "currently compact" and renders the expand icon to advertise
the action (open up). The settings modal was passing
`compact={allExpanded}` — exactly inverted. When all sections were open
it showed the expand icon (suggesting "open more") and when collapsed it
showed the collapse icon, opposite of every other ListToggle caller in
the app.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style(HistoryListPanel): match ServerListScreen Export button — rename + default variant
Renames "Export JSON" to "Export" and switches from the subtle ToolbarButton
to the same `Button variant="default"` used by ServerListControls so the
two Export affordances look identical across screens. Also moves the
button to the right of the ListToggle (mirroring the order on the server
list screen) and disables it when there are no entries to export.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style(HistoryListPanel): move Clear button to top toolbar, match Export style
Moves the Clear affordance out of the "History (N)" section header and
up to the panel toolbar alongside Export, where it now uses the same
`Button variant="default"` styling. Order in the toolbar is now:
ListToggle · Clear · Export. Clear is disabled when there are no
unpinned entries to remove (pinned entries are intentionally preserved).
ToolbarButton helper is unused after this change and dropped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: ignore local debugging screenshots at repo root
Stops `git add -A` from re-staging the `*.png` files Claude Code drops
at the repo root from attached conversation screenshots. The pattern
only matches the top-level (`/*.png`) so legitimate image assets in
subdirectories (e.g. `clients/web/public/`) still get tracked when
explicitly added.
Also untracks the two screenshots that slipped through previously
(initialize-request.png, pending-requests.png).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style(LogStreamPanel): match HistoryListPanel button styling
Clear / Export / Copy All on the Logging screen were rendered with the
subtle ToolbarButton helper while History's equivalents use
`Button variant="default"`. Switch all three to the default variant so
the toolbars look identical across screens and mirror the disabling
behavior — each button is now disabled when `entries.length === 0`.
ToolbarButton helper is unused after this change and dropped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(servers): address PR review — debounce save, preserve-on-omit PUT, validate shape, lift connect timeout
Round-up of fixes from https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector/pull/1353#issuecomment-4526861959:
1. ServerSettingsModal saves were firing on every keystroke (one PUT +
full mcp.json refresh per character). App.tsx now debounces by 300ms
and flushes on modal close so a burst of edits coalesces into one PUT
and the form value can't flicker back mid-typing.
2. `PUT /api/servers/:id` with an omitted `settings` field used to
silently wipe the persisted settings node. The route now treats the
three intents distinctly:
- field omitted → preserve existing on-disk settings
- explicit null → clear the settings node
- settings object → validate + apply
`useServers.updateServer` is simplified to drop the client-side
carry-through hack, and the test that documented the broken behavior
is flipped + augmented with explicit-clear and bad-shape cases.
3. `connectionTimeout` Promise.race is moved from App.tsx into
`InspectorClient.connect()`, reading `this.serverSettings?.connectionTimeout`.
TUI/CLI consumers now get the same behavior; on timeout the client
internally disconnects so the next connect starts clean.
4. Custom Headers hint in `ServerSettingsForm` notes that `Authorization`
is owned by the OAuth flow when OAuth is configured — avoids the
sharp edge where the SDK's authProvider silently overwrites a
user-set Authorization header.
5. New `validateSettings` on the server route rejects malformed shapes
(`settings: []`, `settings.headers: "oops"`, non-numeric timeouts,
etc.) with 400 instead of letting them persist and crash the UI.
7 (nit). Renamed `settings` → `savedSettings` inside `setupClientForServer`
so the variable holding the persisted settings doesn't shadow the
later locally-derived values.
Follow-ups opened separately:
#1356 — Move oauthClientSecret out of mcp.json into the OS keychain (review #6).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(servers): address PR review pass 2 — connect-timeout test, unmount cleanup, tagged intent, lenient settings read
Pass-2 review at https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector/pull/1353#issuecomment-4527089705:
(a) New integration test pins the new client-layer connect-timeout
contract: a hanging stub transport with `connectionTimeout: 50`
rejects with the descriptive error and lands the client in "error"
status. Documents what TUI/CLI consumers should expect from the
lifted Promise.race in InspectorClient.connect().
(b) useEffect cleanup clears `pendingSettingsTimerRef` on unmount so a
route change or HMR mid-debounce can't fire one stale PUT against
an unmounted component.
(c) Refactor the PUT-route `settingsIntent` discriminator from
`"preserve" | "clear" | { value }` to a tagged union with `kind`,
and consume it with a `switch` for exhaustiveness — reads cleaner
and makes adding a fourth intent painless.
(d) `normalizeMcpServers` now runs `validateSettings` on the on-disk
settings node and silently strips it if invalid, mirroring the
existing lenient-on-read pattern from `normalizeServerType`. Closes
the read/write asymmetry where a hand-edited malformed `settings`
could survive on disk and get carried through preserve-on-PUT.
New route test pins the strip-on-GET + no-propagate-on-preserve-PUT
behavior.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(servers): pass-3 review — patch-style PUT, toast on close-flush fail
Pass-3 review at https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector/pull/1353#issuecomment-4529276897.
(b) `PUT /api/servers/:id` now treats both `config` and `settings` as
optional patches:
- field omitted → preserve the on-disk value
- explicit body value → apply
- settings: null → clear
`updateServerSettings` stops reading `existing.config` from the
in-memory `servers` snapshot, which closes the closure-capture
hazard where a refresh between debounce-schedule and flush could
silently revert a separate edit. The route is the single source of
truth for transport config now. New tests cover settings-only PUT,
rejected non-object config, and the empty-body no-op patch case.
The previous "rejects a missing config" test is rewritten to
document the new no-op-preserve semantics.
(c) Inline comment near the PUT rebuild loop documents that writing
the full mcpServers map back is what gives the route its desirable
self-healing property for malformed settings on *other* entries —
deliberate side-effect, not an accident of normalization.
(d) `flushPendingSettings` surfaces failures via @mantine/notifications
instead of swallowing them. The modal already closed by the time
the flush PUT resolves, so a silent fail would leave the user
thinking their last edits saved (especially painful for the OAuth
client secret). The notifications wiring was already mounted in
main.tsx.
Pass-3 (a) — settings form being effectively uncontrolled mid-edit — is
acknowledged in the reply: working as intended today; the proper fix is
internal modal state when file-watching (#1345) forces the issue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(servers): pass-4 review — strip smuggled settings out of config
Pass-4 review at https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector/pull/1353#issuecomment-4529861349.
Main finding: `normalizeServerType` spreads unknown keys, so a body
that nested `settings` inside `config` would smuggle a settings field
onto the stored entry without ever passing through `validateSettings`.
Strip the settings key off the incoming config in `buildStoredEntry`
so `validateSettings` remains the single write path for the settings
node — the "one source of truth" invariant pass 2 set up holds again.
Two new tests pin the strip on both routes:
- POST with `config.settings = { bogus }` lands an entry with no
settings node on disk.
- PUT with `config.settings = { bogus }` + `settings: null` clears
the real settings *and* doesn't re-attach the bogus payload via
the spread.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(servers): pass-5 review — absorb late connect rejection, tighten validateSettings, log smuggle warning
Pass-5 review at https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector/pull/1353#issuecomment-4529954490.
Main finding: when the connect-time `Promise.race` lost to the timeout,
the original `this.client.connect(this.transport)` promise was left
pending. After `disconnect()` tore the transport down, real transports
(SSE / streamable-http) would reject that promise later — with no
handler attached, producing a Node `unhandledRejection` (and a vitest
suite warning). Attach a no-op `.catch` right after creating the
connect promise so Node sees the late rejection as handled.
Nit (a): `validateSettings` was casting the raw object through to
`InspectorServerSettings`, which let unknown keys ride along onto disk.
Replaced the cast with an explicit pick-and-build over the known
fields. Unknown stowaways now silently drop on the way through. New
route test pins the behavior.
Nit (b): `buildStoredEntry` now logs a `warn` via the route's pino
logger when an incoming `config` carries a `settings` key. The strip
is still defensive (it isn't a documented contract) but the warning
lets a misconfigured client find out about the wasted field instead
of debugging a silent drop.
Nit (c) — the defensive `?? {}` fallback in `buildStoredEntry` —
acknowledged in the review reply; left in place as belt-and-braces.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(servers): pass-6 polish — scope absorber, thread id, drop empty OAuth, guard `in`
Pass-6 review at https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector/pull/1353#issuecomment-4529979135. Reviewer signed off as ready; landing the four marginal cleanups since they're all small.
(a) `connectPromise.catch(() => {})` moves inside the
`if (connectTimeoutMs > 0)` branch. The await-only path propagates
rejection cleanly through the outer try/catch — the absorber is
only needed when the race leaves the original promise unattended.
Code now reads as "absorber is tied to the race," which is the
real invariant.
(b) Thread `id` (POST id, PUT newId) through `buildStoredEntry` and
include it in the smuggle warning's pino bindings. Two clients
smuggling simultaneously are distinguishable in the log instead
of indistinguishable.
(c) `validateSettings` coerces empty-string OAuth fields to absent.
The form emits `""` when the user clears an input, and an empty
`oauthClientId` on disk would later be misread as "OAuth configured."
New route test pins it.
(d) `buildStoredEntry` adds a null/object guard before `"settings" in
configObj`. The route layer pre-checks this on POST and PUT, but
the helper's `unknown` parameter is a weak contract; the guard
makes it safe to call from anywhere.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(spec): reflect settings persistence + patch-PUT contract in v2_servers_file
The doc was authored when `mcp.json` only stored the server list. Bring it
forward to match what shipped in #1352 / PR #1353:
- Summary calls out that the file also stores per-server settings and
links into the Per-server settings section.
- On-disk format note explains that `settings` is an optional Inspector-
specific extension that other MCP tools ignore.
- New top paragraph on the Per-server settings section explains the
basic-config / settings UI split rationale (simpler form for the
common case, advanced settings tucked behind a second dialog).
- UI bullet is rewritten to match the patch-style PUT semantics that
emerged across the review cycle: settings-only and config-only
PUTs preserve their counterpart inside the write lock, so neither
modal can silently clobber the other half. The earlier "must
re-send settings on PUT" hack is gone.
- New bullets capture the save cadence (300ms debounce + flush-on-close
+ failure toast), the patch-PUT contract (omit-preserve / null-clear /
rename), and the write-path / read-path validator gates.
- Secret storage bullet links to #1356 (OS-keychain follow-up).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(spec): show a third entry with the optional settings node
The On-disk format example demonstrated only basic stdio entries. Add a
streamable-http entry with a populated `settings` node so readers can
see the shape inline rather than having to scroll to the Per-server
settings section. Inline comment in the block cross-links there for the
full contract and notes that other MCP tools ignore the extension key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Design for replacing the hardcoded SEED_SERVERS in App.tsx with a
file-backed list at ~/.mcp-inspector/mcp.json, reusing the v1.5-ported
storage primitives and the canonical mcp.json parser. Ties the new doc
into the Storage section nav as the first sub-menu item.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
cliffhall
Bob Dickinson